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ABSTRACT
Much attention has been paid in recent years to issues associated with 
corporate governance and there have been significant changes and 
developments in the governance arrangements in the UK higher education 
sector. In this context, the research reported here explores the perceptions 
held by governing body members in English higher education institutions of 
the roles of their governing bodies. Governing body members’ perceptions of 
the effectiveness of their governing bodies are also considered.
The research uses a series of case studies, involving the collection and 
analysis of data gathered in interviews with governing body members and 
senior staff in seven English higher education institutions. These data are 
used to explore the views of governing body members with regard to the roles 
and effectiveness of their governing bodies, and to compare their perceptions 
with external expectations. The predictions of governance theory with regard 
to the roles of boards and board members are also considered and compared 
to the lived experience of those roles as perceived by governing body 
members.
The study reveals some degree of variability in the approaches to 
governance at different types of institution, but also many common features. 
The latter include marked differences between the roles undertaken by 
governing body members and the roles envisaged for them in formal 
guidance. Governing body members are shown to be content to delegate 
their responsibilities for educational character to academics. Effectiveness in
higher education governance is revealed to be complex and multi-faceted. 
The particular importance to effectiveness of board processes and interaction 
between governing body members is demonstrated. It is shown that no single 
governance theory offers a full explanation for the described behaviour and 
approaches of governing body members, but that aspects of different 
theoretical positions offer useful explanatory insights when taken together.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the study
1.1 Context
1.1.1 The development of interest in higher education governance
Much attention has been paid in recent years to the governance of 
higher education institutions in the United Kingdom. This attention has partly 
been associated with a growing practical concern about the effectiveness of 
the governing bodies of those institutions, expressed by the national higher 
education funding bodies - the funding councils for England, Scotland and 
Wales, and the Department for Education in Northern Ireland - and by sector- 
based bodies, particularly that which brings together the chairs of universities, 
the Committee of University Chairs (CUC). This concern has also been 
reflected since 2004 in the activities of the Leadership Foundation for Higher 
Education (LFHE), which has played a significant role in professionalising 
higher education governance, through its training programmes and research 
into topics such as effectiveness in governance (Schofield, 2009).
Increasing interest in governance has also been prompted by 
developments in the private sector, following the publication of the Cadbury 
Report on corporate governance (Cadbury, 1992), which ‘led to a worldwide 
movement for the reform of corporate governance’ (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, 
v). After the Cadbury Report there came in due course the Greenbury (1995), 
Hampel (1998), Turnbull (1999) and Higgs (2003) reports, all of which
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updated the overall requirements for corporate governance in the private 
sector in the UK and contributed to the serial development of the Combined 
Code for Corporate Governance (FRC, 2010, in its latest iteration). These 
private sector developments provided strong exemplars for the higher 
education sector. The CUC published its first governance guide in 1994, 
which by now has developed to the point that it incorporates a formal 
‘Governance Code of Practice’ (CUC, 2009) with which institutions are 
expected by the funding councils to comply, or to explain why they do not.
Although a range of issues associated with power, authority and 
decision-making in higher education institutions have been the subject of 
previous study, relatively little research has been undertaken specifically on 
higher education governance in the UK, notwithstanding the considerable 
practical attention paid to the subject in the past two decades. Moreover, 
some of that research has been concerned with system level governance as 
opposed to institutional governance. In addition, as I shall demonstrate, 
particularly in chapter 3, even where research into higher education 
governance has been carried out, that research has taken only limited 
account of corporate governance theories, and little attention has been paid to 
the perceptions of the people most closely concerned with governance -  i.e. 
the members of the governing bodies of higher education institutions. There 
has also been only limited study of perceptions of the overall effectiveness of 
the governance arrangements of higher education institutions in the United 
Kingdom. These areas will therefore be the focus of the work described in 
this thesis.
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1.1.2 The researcher’s background
Although the most significant aspects of the context for this research 
are those touched on above, which will be explored much more fully in 
chapters 2 and 3, a further contextual aspect to the study lies in my own 
background. While I believe that the ways in which organisations are 
governed is a topic of considerable intrinsic interest, my personal interest in 
higher education governance stems in large part from having been involved in 
the practice of university governance as secretary to the governing body at 
Cranfield University from 1999 to 2007. My work in that capacity led me to 
become increasingly interested in the ways in which governance 
arrangements in the higher education sector had developed, and were 
continuing to develop. This was associated with a growing curiosity as to the 
views on governance of those most involved in that process -  i.e. the external 
and internal members of governing bodies, and those members of senior 
university staff routinely in attendance at governing body meetings.
My background will have affected aspects of the ways in which I have 
conducted this study. For instance, at a practical level, it undoubtedly had a 
positive effect on my capacity to gain access to some institutions. My prior 
knowledge of the sector, and of higher education governance in both theory 
and practice, could in principle also have had less positive effects, for 
example through influencing my interpretation of the views expressed to me 
by interviewees. To address this, I have operated on the basis of setting 
aside my presuppositions, or bracketing (see sub-section 4.3.1). As a final 
point, I should add that neither Cranfield University, where I was last
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employed in higher education, nor the Open University, where I was 
registered while undertaking this research, are amongst the case study 
institutions reported on in this thesis.
1.1.3 Timing of the research
The research was undertaken during the period 2008-2012. A scoping 
exercise was undertaken between May and September 2009 (see section 
4.4), with the primary data collection being carried out between November 
2009 and December 2010. Data analysis began in the summer of 2010, but 
mainly took place from spring 2011 through to the end of that year.
1.2 Research aims and questions
1.2.1 Overall aims of the research
The overall aims of the research reported in this thesis were:
(a) to explore how members and other attendees of the governing 
bodies of English higher education institutions perceive the roles 
of their governing bodies, and their own roles as individuals 
involved with those governing bodies; and
(b) to explore how members and other attendees of the governing 
bodies of English higher education institutions perceive the 
concept of effectiveness in relation to higher education 
governance, and the ways in which they contribute to enabling 
their governing bodies to be effective.
These overall aims will be considered in the light of the range of 
literature concerning governance theory and practice discussed in chapter 3.
4
They will also be explored in the context of the expectations as to the roles of 
governing bodies and their members promulgated by bodies such as the 
higher education funding councils, the CUC and the LFHE, while bearing in 
mind, and considering the explanatory value, if any, of predictions as to the 
nature of governance roles derived from governance theory. Similarly, 
perceptions as to what constitutes effectiveness will be considered in the light 
of expectations derived, again, from both formal guidance as to supposed 
best practice, and from previous studies of effectiveness in governance.
1.2.2 Specific research questions
Given the overall research aims, the specific research questions 
chosen were:
• What are the main roles of higher education governing bodies, as 
perceived by governing body members and attendees?
• How do the members and attendees of higher education governing 
bodies perceive their individual roles, and the ways in which they 
contribute, or not, to the overall roles of the governing body as a 
whole?
• What do governing body members and attendees regard as 
effectiveness in the context of the work of the governing body of a 
higher education institution?
• What factors do governing body members and attendees regard as 
the most important contributors to governing body effectiveness?
In addition to the primary research questions, a number of subsidiary topics 
were also specified, concerning the relevance of governance theory, issues 
associated with governance failures and the question of institutional autonomy 
(see chapter 4, sub-section 4.1.2).
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1.3 Research methodology, design and methods
1.3.1 Research methodology and research design
Given the research aims and the specific research questions set out 
above, it was felt appropriate to approach this study from a standpoint 
recognising aspects of the tenets of both critical realism and interpretivism 
and constructionism (see, for example, Bryman and Bell. 2007, 17-25). This 
approach is discussed further in chapter 4. I have also approached the 
research on the basis that the research process needs to be treated, at least 
in part, as a craft, as proposed by Daft (1983).
As the focus of the study involved an in-depth consideration of 
governing body members’ perceptions of their roles, and of issues around the 
effectiveness of their governing bodies, I concluded that the research should 
be undertaken on a qualitative basis, using semi-structured interviews as the 
primary method of data collection. Initially I concluded that a case study 
research design would be appropriate, as case studies involve ‘an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its 
real-life context’ (Yin, 2009, 19). I therefore approached the collection of my 
data on this basis, identifying a number of case study institutions, chosen to 
reflect aspects of the diversity of the UK higher education sector, with a focus 
on English universities and university colleges; I adopted a purposive 
approach to the selection of the individual institutions.
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Potential case study institutions were approached via their university 
secretaries (or equivalent) with the assistance of the Association of Heads of 
University Administration, of which I was formerly a member. This generic 
approach brought expressions of interest, and of willingness to participate in 
the research in principle, from a number of institutions. It was supplemented 
by specific approaches to selected individuals already known to me. (See 
chapter 4 for further details of the case study institutions.)
Subsequently, in analysing my data, I found that analysis on a case by 
case basis -  i.e. an institution by institution basis -  provided less overall 
insight than consideration of the data relating to the cases as a whole. Stake 
(2006) refers to a group of cases studied in this way as a quintain, where the 
‘quintain ... is an object or phenomenon or condition to be studied’ (Stake, 
2006, 6; this approach is discussed further in chapter 4). I therefore modified 
my research design to accommodate a thematic content analysis of the data 
gathered across all the case study institutions, whilst still noting differences 
between the institutions where appropriate.
1.3.2 Research methods
The principal research method chosen involved gathering primary data 
through semi-structured interviews with governing body members and 
attendees. Taking a semi-structured approach ensures that a consistent 
range of topics can be raised with all interviewees, whilst allowing for 
variability from interview to interview. Given the arguably elite nature of the 
interviewees, an additional consideration was that it seemed probable that
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such interviewees would be more likely to agree to take part in one-to-one 
interviews, than other types of discussion, such as focus groups.
Consideration was given to using other data collection methods, 
including a questionnaire survey, the review of documentation such as 
agendas and minutes, and the observation of board meetings. It was decided 
not to attempt to carry out a questionnaire survey, but use was made of 
meeting-related documentation, and observation of meetings was carried out 
at one institution. In addition, a matrix providing summary information about 
selected theoretical perspectives on governance was discussed with most 
interviewees at the end of their interviews. However, these methods were 
supplementary to the primary collection of data through semi-structured 
interviews. The rationale for the decisions made is set out in chapter 4, where 
further information about the interview process is also provided.
1.4 Outline of the approach taken in the thesis
1.4.1 Contextual material, literature review and methodology
In chapter 2 relevant features of the historical development of the 
British and, where appropriate specifically English, higher education system 
will be discussed, together with details of how the current governance 
arrangements of British higher education institutions have developed. The 
place of the study in governance in higher education in the context of broader
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aspects of the study of power, authority and decision-making in universities 
will also be briefly considered.
Pertinent aspects of the existing literature concerned with governance 
will be reviewed in chapter 3. This will encompass brief consideration of 
definitions of governance, and the development of governance as a concept 
in the commercial and business sector, before turning to an exploration of the 
range of theoretical approaches to governance developed through the course 
of the twentieth century. Chapter 3 also addresses recent research on 
governance in the private sector, before turning to governance in the public 
and voluntary sectors, ultimately concentrating on previous research into 
higher education governance.
The aims of the research presented in this thesis, summarised in 
section 1.2 above, will be addressed more fully in chapter 4, as will the 
ontological and epistemological issues, research methodology, research 
design and research methods touched on in section 1.3 above. Ethical 
considerations will also be addressed, and it will be shown that established 
ethical principles have been followed, with approval to undertake the work 
being obtained from the Open University’s ethics committee, and that ethical 
issues that arose during the research were dealt with appropriately. Finally, 
questions of validity and reliability, and credibility and plausibility, will also be 
considered.
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1.4.2 Data analysis, discussion and conclusions
As already noted, data were principally collected through semi­
structured interviews with members and attendees of the governing bodies of 
the case study institutions. These data are presented and analysed in 
chapters 5 to 8, where subsidiary data sources are also referred to as 
appropriate. Chapter 5 provides a summary of the principal findings of the 
research drawn from the interview data. The nature of the documentary and 
observational data is also summarised, and an overview of interviewees’ 
responses to the governance theory matrix is presented. The data are 
analysed and discussed in more detail in chapters 6 to 8.
The overall conclusions drawn from the study are set out in chapter 9. 
These conclusions provide new empirically-based insights into the 
perceptions of governing bodies roles held by their members, the apparent 
contradictions inherent in some of those roles, and the capacity of governing 
body members and attendees to accept and successfully negotiate the 
complexity involved. In addition, the relationship between governing body 
members’ perceptions of governing bodies’ roles and the normative roles 
prescribed by the higher education sector’s governance code of practice 
(CUC, 2009) are explored. The wide variety of views held about governing 
bodies’ effectiveness will also be demonstrated, as will the importance 
attached to issues around governance processes and interpersonal 
interactions. The extent to which governance theory is relevant to the 
understanding of higher education governance will be illustrated. Finally, the 
significance of the research will be critically evaluated.
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Chapter 2: The context for the study
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 A period of change
The study reported in this thesis was undertaken during a period -  
2008-2012 - that most people concerned with higher education in the United 
Kingdom would regard as one of significant change, associated with the 
planned introduction in England from 2012 of markedly higher levels of fees 
for undergraduate students. However, a case can be made that for many 
years a series of changes has placed continually increasing pressure on all 
British higher education institutions and, therefore, inevitably, on their 
governance and management arrangements. These changes, together with 
aspects of the historical development of UK higher education, established 
contextual features of the higher education system that still influence it today. 
In this chapter, I shall therefore briefly review aspects of the development of 
higher education in the United Kingdom, before considering the ways in which 
the governance arrangements in the sector have developed. In doing so, I 
shall demonstrate that certain features of institutions, and the specific nature 
of their governance arrangements, have their roots in much earlier times, and 
that these long-standing features continue to have a significant impact. I shall 
also consider the relationship of governing bodies to other foci for power and 
authority in universities.
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2.2 Higher education in England to the mid twentieth century
2.2.1 From medieval origins to a national system
The first universities were established in the medieval period as 
teaching institutions and rapidly developed a number of features still seen in 
higher education institutions today. These included some form of over­
arching governing body, and the grouping together of scholars teaching 
cognate subjects into faculties. Also established was the idea of universities 
as autonomous institutions, subject in principle to limited outside influence and 
direction, with their senior scholars free to follow their own intellectual pursuits 
(see Barnett, 1990, Rothblatt, 1997). However, autonomy was never in 
practice unchallenged or untrammelled, and the struggle in higher education 
apparent today between institutional autonomy and external influence has 
been a feature of universities since their creation (Perkins, 1973).
Given the essential limiting of generic higher education in England for 
over six hundred years to Cambridge and Oxford, their collegiate structure 
and arrangements for self-government established distinctive ideas about the 
nature of higher education that still influence many higher education 
institutions today. However, when the first additional universities were finally 
founded in England in the nineteenth century, new approaches to higher 
education began to develop that provided access for new kinds of students, 
drawn from a broader spectrum of society. Subsequent new foundations in 
the major English provincial cities were marked by their strong focus on 
serving local needs, as perceived by the prominent local citizens, primarily
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industrialists and other businessmen, who were instrumental in their creation, 
and they concentrated on practical subjects -  technical, professional and 
vocational. These differences were the basis of a tension between liberal and 
vocational visions of higher education which is still a prominent issue today 
(Tight, 2009, 11).
Another issue in British higher education today whose roots can also 
be traced to the later nineteenth century is that of the relationship between 
teaching and research. The medieval concept of the university as a teaching 
institution continued into the nineteenth century, as exemplified by the work of 
Newman (1852/1976), whose views on the primacy of teaching ‘dominated 
thinking in England up until the 1970s’ and continue to exert significant 
influence (Tight, 2009, 302). Despite this, the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries saw a significant development of research activity. This 
sowed the seeds for a debate about the proper relationship between teaching 
and research that, like the liberal versus vocational education debate, has 
continued to the present day.
Facilitating the growth of research activity in the early twentieth century 
was the start of regular government funding (Tight, 2009, 26), and general 
government funding for universities also increased markedly during the first 
half of the twentieth century, so that ‘by the Second World War, the state 
would become the dominant funder of universities and colleges’ (Tight, 2009, 
24). Other developments during this period included the creation of the 
University Grants Committee (UGC) and the establishment of the Committee
13
of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), the forerunner of the present 
Universities UK (UUK) (Berdahl, 1959; Salter and Tapper, 1994; Shattock, 
1994). These two bodies became progressively more important as, 
respectively, an intermediary body between government and the higher 
education sector, and the locus for a collective voice for universities, until the 
1990s.
2.3 Higher education after the Second World War
2.3.1 Increasing government direction
The idea of government intervention in higher education, as in other 
areas of public life, was firmly established by the end of the Second World 
War. After the war there was an increase in demand for higher education, 
and a new government focus on scientific and technical higher education. 
More university colleges became universities and distinctive colleges of 
advanced technology, with a strong vocational and technological focus, were 
created. From this time there was ‘a new style of relationship’ between the 
state and the higher education sector, ‘with government’ supplying ‘a large 
share of the money for a huge expansion in higher education’ (Stewart, 1989, 
46-48). The post-war period also saw significant increases in research activity 
and in the provision of postgraduate teaching in universities, again largely 
government funded.
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2.3.2 The Robbins Committee -  higher education for all
By the start of the 1960s there had been some growth in the numbers 
of students in higher education (see Tight, 2009, 54-56, particularly Table 
3.4a) and further growth was already in the pipeline. Accepting this growth, 
the Anderson Committee of 1960 recommended that all full-time UK 
undergraduates should receive public funding to support their studies. This 
proposal led to the establishment of the means-tested maintenance grants 
that became regarded as the norm, and that set the context in which the 
eventual introduction of student loans (from 1990) and the requirement to pay 
tuition fees (from 1999) caused such controversy.
The Anderson report was followed by the better known Robbins Report
(more formally the Report of the Committee on Higher Education), issued by
the committee under the chairmanship of Lord Robbins, appointed in 1961:
To review the pattern of full-time higher education in Great Britain and 
in the light of national needs and resources to advise Her Majesty’s 
Government on what principles its long-term development should be 
based. (Committee on Higher Education, 1963, 1)
The Robbins Report ‘wholeheartedly accepted the need for the new
universities’ that had already been approved, but also ‘argued for the need to
create many more if the expected future demand for university places was to
be met’ (Walford, 1987, 5). The report forecast a significant increase in
demand for higher education, without ‘allowance for any relaxation in the
standards required’ and on the assumption of the
basic principle that all who are qualified to pursue higher education 
should have the opportunity of doing so. (Committee on Higher 
Education, 1963, 65, 70)
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Together, the Anderson and Robbins reports set the seal on an approach to 
higher education which provided a model of notionally free access to an 
undergraduate university education for all people qualified to receive it. This 
became deeply embedded in the national consciousness, and created the 
standard against which all later changes to the arrangements for student 
support have been judged.
Despite its primary focus being on the education of undergraduate 
students, the Robbins report also acknowledged the established place of 
research in universities, and dismissed the idea that ‘teaching and research’ 
were ‘antithetical’ and in ‘opposition’ to one another (Committee on Higher 
Education, 1963, 88). Subsequently, research has come to appear to be the 
primary concern of many universities, and the debate about the relationship 
between teaching and research, and the primary roles of academic staff in this 
regard continues to the present day.
2.3.3 The Polytechnics
Although the Robbins report was intended to settle the nature of the 
higher education sector for the foreseeable future, within only a couple years 
the decision was taken to create the polytechnics (DES, 1966). These in most 
cases were created from existing colleges, controlled and funded by local 
government, and these arrangements continued. The polytechnics did not 
award their own degrees, but had their programmes accredited by the CNAA 
(the Council for National Academic Awards). It was expected that ‘the two 
halves of the binary system’, as it became known, would be ‘different, but of
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equal status’, but that the polytechnics would be cheaper, more easily 
controlled and ‘more responsive to the needs of industry and commerce’ 
(Walford, 1987, 15). Despite tensions around the idea that polytechnics and 
universities were different but equal, which was probably never truly accepted 
(Regan, 1979, 182-185), the establishment of the polytechnics also helped 
address, at least for a time, some of the tensions between the liberal and 
vocational conceptions of higher education that had first become apparent a 
century earlier.
2.3.4 The high-water mark?
In the 1960s and 1970s the number of students in UK universities 
continued to increase (see, for example, Tight, 2009, 55, Table 3.4a). 
Shattock and Rigby, discussing resource allocation in universities, labelled the 
years 1967-72 as ‘the high-water mark of university funding’ and suggested 
that ‘by 1972 the scaling down exercise had begun’ (Shattock and Rigby, 
1983, 10). Subsequently, although the Robbins principle was reaffirmed 
(Wagner, 1982, 8-9), demographic changes, growing economic difficulties and 
changing political attitudes towards higher education all combined to alter the 
funding and attitudinal situation, particularly for universities.
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2.4 The shock of the 1980s
2.4.1 The end of an era
Change came rapidly in 1979 with the election of a new Conservative 
government which promptly ‘announced a policy of level funding’ (Pratt and 
Lockwood, 1985, 7). This was accompanied by the raising of overseas 
students’ fees and a matching withdrawal of UGC funding (Shattock and 
Rigby, 1983). Very quickly, the financial position for higher education 
worsened even further, with cuts of around 15% from 1979-80 to 1983-84 
according to Shattock (1994, 20). The approach of the UGC to managing the 
policy changes and reduced funding of the early 1980s has been much 
debated (see, for example, Kogan and Kogan, 1983; Shattock, 1994; Tight, 
2009), but it clearly became more proactive in its oversight of the university 
system, as illustrated from the mid 1980s by the move towards increasing 
selectivity in the allocation of research funding via new research assessment 
exercises (RAEs) in 1985 and 1989.
For the polytechnics, the picture was mixed, and arguably less difficult 
than for the universities, but there were nonetheless significant challenges for 
some institutions (see Pratt, 1997, 243-249).
A further strand of outside pressure related to new government concern 
with efficiency, effectiveness and economy in the public sector generally. In 
higher education, the UGC was asked to consider ‘radical changes to 
maintain quality and efficiency’ (Stewart, 1989, 231). However, in their
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subsequent report, the UGC had little to say about individual universities and
their responses in relation to more general issues of governance and
management were also brief. They nonetheless provide an interesting insight
into the assumptions about the role of university governing bodies (councils)
then obtaining, as it was noted that:
When universities were expanding, the major decisions were where 
growth should take place: that was clearly a matter for the Senate 
within the financial guidelines laid down by the Council. ... For the rest 
of this century at least, financial limitations will be a severe constraint 
on universities and they will have to make hard choices. ... It Is not 
usually for the Council to make the choices, but part of its responsibility 
is to ensure that hard decisions are faced and choices are made. 
(UGC, 1984, 40; my emphases)
At the time the report was written, most decision-making was therefore seen
as broadly the preserve of the universities’ senior academic committees (the
senates), and not their governing bodies (the councils). As will be discussed
below (section 2.10.1), this attitude, and the norms with which it was
associated, had in reality only developed in the 1960s. The idea of there
being limits to what are regarded as appropriate subjects for direct
intervention and decision-making by governing bodies can still be seen
reflected in the attitudes towards educational character and academic
activities displayed by governing body members interviewed in this study, as
will be seen below, particularly in chapter 6.
2.4.2 The Jarratt report
The CVCP established its own review process through a committee 
chaired by Sir Alex Jarratt (Chancellor of the University of Birmingham). The 
Jarratt committee’s remit was to ‘promote and co-ordinate ... a series of 
efficiency studies of the management of the universities’ (CVCP, 1985, 6). In
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its report the Jarratt Committee recommended, inter alia, that councils should 
assert their responsibilities, and that Vice-Chancellors should be recognised 
as chief executives, and not just academic leaders. The report has been 
characterised both as endorsing a ‘line management’ model and as asserting 
that ‘universities ... should conduct their affairs without a centralised 
organisation’ (Stewart, 1989, 234-235). It also stressed the ‘need for change 
throughout the university system’, and ‘the search for value for money’, whilst 
arguing that ‘improved management ... must be the servant, not the master’ 
(CVCP, 1985, 34). At the same time, it continued to endorse the Robbins’ 
principle that higher education should be available to all who were able to 
benefit from it. Overall, the report was perhaps trying to promote a range of 
outcomes that were to some extent mutually contradictory, in recognising a 
need for change, but assuming that existing attitudes towards the nature of 
higher education and access to it would remain largely unaltered.
2.5 New public management
2.5.1 The development of new public management
Many of the concerns about efficiency, effectiveness and relevance to 
national needs that were raised about the higher education sector were also 
raised in relation to other parts of the public sector in the UK. This led to the 
development of what became known as ‘new public management’ as a 
reaction to the widely held perception in the 1970s and 1980s that the public 
sector was inefficient and ineffective. It was part of the distinctive policy
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portfolio of the Conservative government that came to power in 1979 and was 
intended across the public sector as a whole to ‘promote the efficient and 
effective provision of public services’. Associated with these moves was an 
assumption of ‘the superiority of the private sector and private sector 
management techniques’ (Osborne and McLoughlin, 2002, 9).
2.5.2 New public management and higher education
The growth and development of new public management has been 
discussed by a wide range of authors such as Barzelay (2001), Clarke and 
Newman (1994, 1997) and Ferlie et al (1996). In relation to the higher 
education sector in the UK, in a previous study I identified a significant 
increase in what I called ‘managerialism’ (Buck, 1991), associated with 
changes in university management practices in the 1980s. A more wide 
ranging, and more recent, study by Deem et al (2007) also demonstrated 
considerable evidence of the effects of new public management on the sector. 
Deem and her colleagues found that the tenets of new public management 
were widely adopted by senior managers in higher education and, therefore, 
approved by governing bodies (if often implicitly rather than explicitly). 
However, they reported in addition that many academics found the resulting 
changes of approach unwelcome, and no longer ‘consistent with a notion of 
higher education as a public service or public good’ (Deem et al, 2007, 182). 
Emphasising just as strongly the existence of negative attitudes towards new 
public management, McNay (2007) found that a wide range of academics 
believed that one effect of the adoption of new public management was that
[academic] provision [has become] less innovative and creative, and
possibly of lower quality ... [and] the creative contribution of individuals
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... has been suppressed in the interests of administrative efficiency. 
(McNay, 2007, 53)
Given these findings, it is not perhaps surprising that there has also 
been a polemical strand of research into the subject. This uses rhetoric 
around terms such as commodification, industrialisation and ‘McDonaldization’ 
(see, for example, Hayes and Wynyard, 2002; Parker and Jary, 1995; 
Prichard and Willmott, 1997; Willmott, 1995; and Winter, 1995). A theme 
common to these studies was the growth in power of senior managers, and 
the organs of central management, particularly in the older, chartered 
universities, associated with a weakening of the roles of senates, and the 
undermining of traditional concepts such as collegiality.
2.5.3 New public management and governance
The specific impact of new public management on governance has 
often been associated straightforwardly with the adoption of approaches to 
governance drawn from the private sector. Ferlie et al (1996, 117-164) 
provide an overview, addressing topics such as board composition, and 
changes in board roles. They note that in the case of NHS boards, for 
example, one of the most significant changes in the early 1990s was the 
inclusion on boards for the first time of senior managers; this was coupled with 
an increase in the ‘homogeneity of non-executives’ and a consequent ‘loss of 
a broader base of experience’. Nonetheless, they concluded that boards 
‘were progressing towards being more strategically oriented’, with ‘non­
executives ... successfully negotiating a more active role in the strategy 
process’ (Ferlie etal, 1996,128,137).
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Deem et al (1995) studied the influence of new public management on 
school governance. They suggested that by the mid-1990s school governing 
bodies had become ‘a hybrid of notions of political participation and the new 
managerialism’, and were ‘powerful sites for the monitoring and regulation of 
professional educators’. This had, they felt, changed the culture in schools 
and led to a move from a public sector ethos to an atmosphere more akin to 
private business (Deem et al, 1995, 33).
Turning to the higher education sector, Bennett (2001) highlighted the 
fact that institutions were increasingly expected or obliged (in the case of the 
post-1992 universities) to adopt governance structures and processes drawn 
from exemplars in the private sector, on the grounds that doing so would 
necessarily improve their performance. This last point, and the extent of the 
influence of new public management on higher education, is reinforced by 
Shattock (2008). He argues, inter alia, that ‘although the structures of a 
former self-governed, self-managed, sector remain largely in place ... they no 
longer have substance but rather serve to conceal the state’s control of policy’ 
(Shattock, 2008, 182). Shattock also illustrates ways in which the 
specification by government of policy parameters to the intermediary funding 
bodies (the funding councils) has become increasingly detailed and directive 
(Shattock, 2008, 196-197). Shattock’s work therefore highlights how the 
adoption by successive governments of new public management approaches 
to UK higher education institutions has had implications for the power and 
authority of governing bodies, both directly and indirectly.
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2.6 The late 1980s and 1990s
2.6.1 The purpose of higher education revisited
The government focus on the funding of higher education shifted in the 
later 1980s to renewed concern about the purpose of the higher education 
sector and its failure to produce enough science, technology and engineering 
graduates and ‘to develop closer links with industry, commerce and their local 
communities’ (Tight, 2009, 78). From this time it became, as it still is, a given 
of government higher education policy that institutions must strive to serve 
national needs more directly and more effectively, and that they can best do 
so by concentrating on teaching and research in science, technology and 
engineering, and in vocational and professional education.
During the same period, a policy of encouraging a higher proportion of 
the population to enter higher education was adopted. This saw the first steps 
of the widening participation agenda. Expansion was predicated on further 
reductions in unit costs and was associated with the introduction of ‘top-up’ 
loans (DES, 1988b), to replace part of the existing means-tested student 
grant. This provoked much controversy -  see, for example, Barr (1989), 
Christie et al (2001) and Pilkington (1994) -  but the reliance of students on 
loans to cover both their living costs and subsequently from 1998 their tuition 
fees has, of course, now become an established feature of British, and 
particularly English, higher education.
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2.6.2 From polytechnics to universities, and the Dearing review
The late 1980s and early 1990s also saw polytechnics and many large 
colleges taken out of the control of local authorities and converted into 
independent higher education corporations. This process placed them in a 
position where they could be more directly subject to government policy, 
implemented through the new Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council 
(PCFC). However, almost as soon as these changes had been implemented, 
the polytechnics and a number of colleges of higher education were accorded 
in 1992 the university status many of them had long sought (Pratt, 1997, 300- 
302; DES, 1992).
These changes came at a point when the proportion of young people 
entering higher education was close to having doubled in a period of just over 
five years, to almost 30% from around 15% in the second half of the 1980s 
(Tight, 2009, 81). At the same time, the resources made available to 
universities per student continued to decline, and the PCFC and the 
Universities Funding Council (which briefly replaced the UGC), were 
superseded by nationally-based funding councils for England, Scotland and 
Wales (the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the 
Scottish Higher Education Funding Council and the Higher Education Funding 
Council for Wales).
The latter part of the period culminated in a new review of the higher 
education sector in the form of the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher 
Education (NCIHE; NCIHE, 1997), chaired by the then Sir Ron Dearing. The
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Dearing committee’s remit concerned ‘the purposes, shape, structure, size 
and funding of higher education ... over the next 20 years’ (NCIHE, 1997, 3) 
and the recommendations in its report were wide-ranging (see NCIHE, 1997, 
370-382). They included a number of proposals relating specifically to 
governance which will be returned to below (see sub-section 2.9.7). In the 
case of student funding, the committee endorsed the principle that tuition fees 
should be introduced.
Finally, the 1990s saw an even stronger emphasis on research, and its 
funding. The financial and reputational rewards from achieving a good 
performance in successive RAEs ensured that all universities devoted 
significant amounts of time to preparing for each exercise. For the so-called 
research intensive universities, success in the RAE meant getting a bigger 
share of the total HEFCE funding available for research; for former 
polytechnics, despite undertaking very little research by comparison to the 
pre-1992 universities, the RAE provided an opportunity to gain small, but 
potentially significant amounts of new funding with which to support and 
develop activities seen as appropriate to their new university status.
2.7 The new millennium
2.7.1 Further growth, but more government direction and regulation
In the years after the Dearing committee reported, there was further 
significant growth in student numbers, accompanied, for the first time in
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almost two decades, by some growth in real terms in the income received by 
higher education institutions (HEPI, 2006, Annex A). Nonetheless, how to 
fund higher education was a continuing issue. With another round of 
controversy, variable tuition fees (albeit capped initially at £3000) were 
introduced (DfES, 2004). At the same time, the Office for Fair Access and the 
Office of the Independent Adjudicator were both created, each in effect 
decreasing institutional autonomy.
Research funding was further concentrated and, because of the 
perception that universities were still doing too little to support business and 
industry, yet another review was established. The resulting Lambert report 
failed to demonstrate that universities were ignoring business needs (Lambert, 
2003, 3), but amongst its outcomes was the creation of a new funding stream 
to support research with business and industry in a limited number of 
institutions. The review also led to number of recommendations directly 
concerned with the ‘management, governance and leadership’ of higher 
education institutions (Lambert, 2003, 6).
2.7.2 The Browne review and beyond
The government had stated in 2004 that there would be a review of the 
variable fee arrangements, and it took place under the chairmanship of Lord 
Browne in 2009. The Browne report’s main recommendation on funding was 
that the cap on tuition fees should be lifted (Browne, 2010, 25). Although the 
idea of uncapped fees was not adopted, the government subsequently agreed 
a new maximum tuition fee of £9000, albeit apparently hoping that relatively
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few institutions would set their fees at that level, although this has not 
happened in practice (for thoughts as to the reasons see Brink, 2012). A 
corollary of the introduction of higher tuition fees was a marked reduction in 
direct funding from HEFCE for teaching.
Subsequently, and by then of course in the context of a serious 
economic downturn, the government published in June 2011 a White Paper, 
Students at the Heart of the System (BIS, 2011). At the time of writing it is not 
clear how much of the White Paper will be implemented, but yet another 
review ‘to look again’ at how universities ‘work with business’ is promised, and 
the HEFCE is to take ‘on a new role as consumer champion for students’ so 
the state of flux in the higher education sector continues.
2.7.3 New challenges but deeply-rooted norms
As of 2012, therefore, English higher education institutions are facing a 
future with major changes to the basis for their funding, with much HEFCE 
funding for undergraduate teaching due to cease. In relation to research, 
there is no sign that the policy of concentrating funding in a small number of 
institutions is likely to change, and there is uncertainty about the potential 
impact of changes to the process for assessing research excellence and 
allocating funding (under the new research excellence framework). At the 
same time, funding from the research councils is decreasing. Although less 
regulation is promised, new requirements to provide information (notionally to 
assist students) are due to be imposed on institutions, and another review of 
the perennial issue of university-business interaction is proposed.
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This is the current challenging scenario for institutional governing 
bodies. They face it in a context in which they and their institutions have 
inherited and continue to wrestle with a series of long-standing issues and 
cultural assumptions. These include:
• conceptions of the university as a teaching institution based 
ultimately on the very particular ideas enshrined in Oxford and 
Cambridge, two atypical and privileged universities;
• a continuing tension between liberal and utilitarian views of the 
curriculum, notwithstanding the moves in many universities in 
recent times to give increased emphasis to vocational and 
professional higher education, and to extend their provision in 
these areas;
• the rise to prominence of research, as opposed to teaching, and 
its consequent prestige within the higher education profession;
• the constant government refrain, echoed in every decade since 
the 1950s, to the effect that universities are insufficiently 
connected to, or aligned with, business and industry, and thereby 
contribute too little to the national economy.
It is in this wider, external higher education landscape that the views
expressed by those involved in the governance of higher education in
England, that are explored in the latter parts of this study, need to be
considered. Those views also need to be set in the context of the current
governance arrangements in English (and British) higher education
institutions, and it is therefore both appropriate and necessary to turn next to a
discussion of those arrangements and how they have come about.
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2.8 The development of the governance arrangements of UK higher
education institutions
2.8.1 The three main models
A helpful starting point to a review of higher education governance is 
provided by Shattock (2006, 5-16). He identifies three primary models of 
higher education governance in England, which he calls the Oxbridge model, 
the civic university model and the post-1992 Higher Education Corporation 
model (Shattock, 2006, 5). Shattock’s three models are helpful and 
appropriate. However, since his civic universities are governed by charters 
and statutes, and the fact of being chartered is their main distinguishing 
feature vis-a-vis the higher education corporations, which can alternatively be 
referred to as incorporated institutions, I shall henceforth use the terms 
chartered and incorporated institutions.
2.8.2 The Oxbridge model
Oxford and Cambridge were founded in the European tradition as self- 
governing communities of scholars, and by the sixteenth century had become 
corporations with legal powers analogous to those of individuals. They could 
transact business, hold property, employ staff and sue and be sued. These 
powers, and the fact that they were held by the institution itself, have been 
carried forward to the present day (Shattock, 2006, 6), and remain central to 
the governance of both Oxford and Cambridge, notwithstanding the relatively 
recent introduction at each institution of a small number of external, lay
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members onto their governing bodies (four out of 25 at Oxford, and two out of 
23 at Cambridge).
2.8.3 The chartered model
The Oxbridge governance model formed the basis for the chartered
model of university governance, and therefore for the current governance
arrangements of most pre-1992 universities. Describing the arrangements set
out when Owens College was created in Manchester in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, Shattock notes that there was:
A court as the overall governing body, a council as the executive 
governing body ... and an academic senate ... with lay majorities on 
the court and council but a senate made up solely of academic 
members. (Shattock, 2006, 8-9)
A similar court, council and senate model was adopted for the University of
Birmingham when it was awarded its charter in 1900. Amongst the
parameters established at Birmingham was the inclusion on the council of a
significant proportion of academics (around a quarter). Arrangements similar
to those at Birmingham became the norm as further universities received their
charters through the twentieth century, down to the 1960s.
In the nineteenth century chartered governance model, ‘the powers of 
court and council were virtually unqualified’ (Moodie and Eustace, 1974, 34). 
Bargh et al (1996, 4-5) suggest this was due largely to the role played by 
‘local political, professional, commercial and industrial elites’ in the 
establishment of the first civic universities, and that consequently ‘lay councils 
were the dominant organizations in the early universities’. However, during 
the first half of the twentieth century ‘the academic profession’ began to
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‘assert its claim to co-rule with lay-led councils’ (Bargh et al, 1996, 5). This 
led to a gradual reduction of councils’ powers in relation to the academic 
aspects of universities, and the development of a narrower focus on issues 
associated with finance and administration (Archer, 1979, 520). The 
culmination of this lengthy process came in the 1960s, when a ‘Model Charter’ 
was produced by the Privy Council in the context of the creation of what were 
then known as the new universities (including, for example, Essex, Warwick 
and York). This maintained the standard powers of the governing body, but 
gave senates ‘extensive rights’ to initiate action and to be consulted (Moodie 
and Eustace, 1974, 35). The typical bicameral arrangements of most English 
chartered universities had therefore developed by the 1970s, with power and 
influence effectively shared between councils and senates, with the former 
having very little role to play in relation to academic issues, even at a strategic 
level.
2.8.4 The incorporated model
The incorporated governance model was created when the 
polytechnics and some large colleges were removed from local education 
authority control in the late 1980s and converted into free-standing higher 
education corporations. The origins of the predecessors of most polytechnics 
and colleges, like those of the chartered universities, lay in local activism, 
albeit this time with a local government emphasis. This meant that their 
governing bodies tended to include a large number of local councillors (Bargh 
et al, 1996, 4-5), and this was still broadly the situation when the polytechnics 
were first established in the late 1960s. New ‘instruments and articles of
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government’, which ‘determined the composition of the governing body’, were 
drawn up at that time (Pratt, 1997, 277). The detailed arrangements for each 
polytechnic varied (Locke, 1974), but their governing body membership 
included local councillors (about one-third of the total), people with business 
or industrial and commercial backgrounds, and staff and students (Pratt, 
1997, 279).
When in due course the new higher education corporations were 
created, their governance arrangements were not, in their fundamentals, 
markedly different from those of their predecessors. Those arrangements 
were, however, more uniform and included parameters specifying the 
permitted size of the governing body (12-24), and details of powers that had to 
be exercised by the governing body and could not be delegated. Amongst 
those powers, the governors had an explicit responsibility ‘to determine the 
educational character of the institution’ (Pratt, 1997, 292), which was not 
matched in the chartered institutions. As the newly incorporated polytechnics 
and colleges rapidly became universities, their governance arrangements 
remained essentially the same. The marked contrast between the 
governance arrangements of the chartered and the incorporated institutions 
extended to the fact that in the latter:
the corporate body was no longer co-terminus with the institution itself
but was vested in the governing body alone. (Shattock, 2006, 15)
Alongside the governing bodies of the new higher education 
corporations, there were bodies analogous to the senates of chartered 
universities. However, the powers of these bodies were limited (Shattock, 
2006, 15). There were also very few members of staff on incorporated
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institutions’ governing bodies in comparison to the number on the governing 
bodies of chartered institutions (Pratt, 1997, 94). Overall, the governance and 
management structures of the higher education corporations, both as 
polytechnics, and then as universities from 1992, were perceived as 
promoting and serving a new, more managerialist, culture (see, for example, 
Deem, 1998; Deem and Brehony, 2005; Deem eta l, 2007; Kogan, 1989).
2.9 Current governance arrangements in practice
2.9.1 Councils and boards of governors
The governance arrangements at Oxford and Cambridge are so 
distinctive as to not provide a model for the rest of the sector and I will 
therefore focus here on those institutions conforming to the chartered or 
incorporated models of governance. In each case, their current governance 
arrangements still conform in their essentials to those described above in 
section 2.8. They are all therefore still ultimately governed by an over-arching 
board, still known as a council in the chartered universities, or most often just 
as the board of governors in of the incorporated institutions. In both cases 
these boards (generically from now onwards the governing bodies) continue 
to comprise both internal and external members, with the external, or lay, 
members forming the majority. By the 1970s, governing bodies in chartered 
universities tended to be relatively large, having between 30 and 50 members 
(Halsey and Trow, 1971, 107). Recent changes mean that most chartered 
universities’ governing bodies now have between 20 and 30 members, with
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fewer internal members than used to be the case. In the incorporated 
governance model, governing bodies are usually smaller than in their 
chartered university counterparts, not least because of the upper bound of 24 
members set by the 1988 Education Reform Act (DES, 1988a), with fewer 
internal members.
2.9.2 Senates and academic boards
Alongside their governing bodies, separate committees with 
responsibility for academic affairs continue to exist, in the form of senates and 
academic boards, albeit with diminished power and influence than in the past, 
particularly in the case of the senates of chartered universities. Such 
committees are chaired by the Vice-Chancellor and are comprised largely of 
academics, together with a number of student representatives and sometimes 
a small number of non-academic staff. Senates and academic boards almost 
always have more members than councils, and although the number of 
members has tended to decrease over time, there are still some senates in 
chartered universities that have over a hundred members. In the incorporated 
institutions their senates or academic boards tend to have 30 to 40 members, 
with there usually being a requirement that at least 50% hold senior 
management positions (CUC, 2009, 46).
2.9.3 Courts
In addition to the council and the senate, the chartered university 
governance model also still features a court. These have large memberships, 
with well over a hundred members being common. Usually, the majority of
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court members are external to the institution. Members were, historically, and 
in many cases still are, selected by a wide variety of methods (see, for 
example, Halsey and Trow, 1971, 106). Although courts were originally in 
theory the supreme constitutional bodies in chartered universities, so that a 
council could be seen as ‘the executive committee of the court’ (Moodie and 
Eustace, 1974, 97), courts’ powers were rarely if ever exercised even in the 
early to mid twentieth century. By the 1960s and 1970s, it was possible to 
write that courts were ‘far too unwieldy to transact any detailed business’, but 
that they helped inform ‘public opinion to which the university is in the long run 
accountable’ (Mountford, 1966, 130). Shattock highlighted the role of the 
model charter issued by the Privy Council in 1963 in removing from courts 
their ‘overall governing powers’ (Shattock, 2006, 10). In the 1990s and 2000s, 
many chartered universities made changes to their charters and statutes to 
remove from their courts any remaining vestiges of the ‘supreme’ authority 
they once notionally held.
Although they are not required to have them, a small number of 
incorporated institutions have chosen to establish courts, albeit without any of 
the formal powers of their antecedents in charted institutions.
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2.10 The locus of power and authority in universities
2.10.1 The changing relationship between councils and senates in chartered 
institutions
In considering the development of the UK higher education sector and 
its governance (see sub-sections 2.4.1, 2.8.3), it has been noted that by the 
1960s and 1970s the primacy of governing bodies in the direction and control 
of universities had ended, and that it was widely accepted that power and 
authority properly resided with academics, and primarily therefore, in terms of 
governance arrangements, with senates. This was notwithstanding the fact 
that in chartered universities, there remained, as there always had been, ‘in 
legal terms, an element of subordination in senate’s relations to council’ 
(Moodie and Eustace, 1974, 97). Indeed, a number of authors writing about 
the relationship between councils and senates in the post-Robbins period, 
such as Aitken (1966), Mountford (1966) and Halsey and Trow (1971), all for 
example stressed that with regard to the notional overall authority of councils, 
their powers over the senate were rarely exercised, and their rights in 
academic matters were limited. Halsey and Trow were able to go so far as to 
suggest that the
Senate is the chief academic body and in practice the centre of 
university power. (Halsey and Trow, 1971, 107; my emphasis)
In the 1960s and 1970s, therefore, the senate was seen as the ‘supreme
governing and executive body of the University in all academic affairs’
(description of the senate at the University of Newcastle, cited by Moodie and
Eustace, 1974, 75; used here to show their emphasis on the word ‘supreme’),
and it was ‘indisputable’ that there had been ‘a substantial move towards
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internal academic self-government in all major areas of decision-making’ 
(Moodie and Eustace, 1974, 36-37). There were clear perceptions that the 
power of university governing bodies was limited and hardly ever exercised in 
relation to matters deemed to fall within the purview of the senate.
Given the recognised power and authority of governing bodies in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries already noted (see sub-section
2.8.3), this raises the question as to how this change in the balance of power
in universities came about. Bargh et al (1996) suggest that:
Not until after the First World War did the academic profession in the 
‘old’ university sector, through senates, assert its claim to co-rule with 
lay led councils.
and that:
Only gradually did councils cede their powers over ... academic staff 
and ... academic matters, and concentrate instead on financial and 
other administrative questions. (Bargh et al, 1996, 5)
Bargh et al saw this as of a piece with the overall development of the ‘process
of government and the nature of governance’ in Britain as a whole, which was
such that during the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth century certain
assumptions were so widely held as to be generally accepted and
unchallenged. In this context, while governance was a matter of significant
interest in newly-established institutions in the nineteenth century, the make
up of their governing bodies (drawn from local elites), and their power and
authority, were not challenged, or regarded as anything other than appropriate
(Bargh et al, 1996, 2). Later, in the first part of the twentieth century, ‘issues
of governance subsided’ and ‘the legal, and conventional, framework within
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which universities operated appeared to have been settled’ (Bargh et al, 1996, 
2).
Subsequently, in association with the professionalisation of academic
staff, and their assertion of their own authority, ‘the management initiative’
redounded to the senior staff within universities, while the ‘policy initiative’
increasingly became the responsibility of the state, so that there developed a
‘new university order, in which councils and governing bodies played a
subordinate role’ (Bargh et al, 1996, 2-3). By the 1960s, therefore, as noted
above (sub-section 2.8.3), the idea that the leading role in universities was
appropriately played by academics was firmly established. Indeed, it was so
prominent that representations were even made to the Robbins Committee
that external members of council were
not only unnecessary but ... an imposition on the teaching body, 
indeed, that nothing but complete autonomy for the teachers is 
appropriate to an academic corporation. (Committee on Higher 
Education, 1963, 217)
While the committee’s report accepted that councils should not ‘interfere’
internally in their universities, particularly in academic matters, it ruled out the
possibility that new arrangements might be adopted that radically reduced the
external membership of governing bodies.
The emphasis on the leading role of academics in governance began 
to change in response to the external pressures in the 1980s referred to 
above (section 2.4), following recommendations from the UGC and the 
CVCP’s Jarratt committee. The proposals made by both the UGC and Jarratt 
about governance were, however, in practice limited. In the latter case they
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included a proposal that all universities should establish joint council and
senate planning and resources committees, demonstrating a continuing
concern with the importance of maintaining harmony between councils and
senates. Shattock (2006, 13) suggests that this proposal ‘to some extent
ameliorated’ the ‘practical force, and the sentiments, lying behind’ the
suggestion that councils needed to assert themselves. He felt that more
important was a statement of principle in the Jarratt report that
senates’ essential role should be to coordinate and endorse detailed 
academic work ... and be merely ‘the main forum for generating an 
academic view and giving advice on broad issues to council’. 
(Shattock, 2006, 13, quoting CVCP, 1985, 24)
It can be argued that this description of the role of senates is essentially that
which applies in many universities today.
Nonetheless, the concern in the 1980s about the purpose and utility of 
higher education and about efficiency, economy and effectiveness, and the 
changes to university administration and management that resulted, meant 
that the trend which had led power and authority to migrate over time from 
councils to senates in chartered institutions was reversed. This applied even 
to a certain extent in polytechnics, where there had been some growth in the 
influence of academic boards during the 1960s and 1970s. Overall, therefore, 
as Lockwood put it, by the 1980s the ‘internal characteristics of universities’ 
had led to a situation in which the relationship between councils and senates 
was ambiguous and effective power was divided (Lockwood, 1987, 93).
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2.10.2 Overviews of power, authority and decision-making in universities
In addition to the discussion by some authors, partly illustrated above, 
of detailed aspects of the nature of, and the basis for, power and authority in 
universities, the issue has also been considered in broader terms. Moodie 
and Eustace, for example, saw strands of what they called democratic, 
oligarchic and republican government in British universities, while expressing 
a firm preference (in line with the spirit of their times) for the republican model, 
which privileged the authority of academics (Moodie and Eustace, 1974, 232- 
233). For Baldridge (1975), albeit writing about a US university, the basis for 
understanding academic governance, and the sources of power and authority 
in higher education, was the recognition of the appropriateness of a political 
model of governance, as opposed to more traditional bureaucratic and 
collegial models. This approach led to what he called ‘cabinet administration’, 
where ‘the hero is replaced by the prime minister; the giant is replaced by the 
manager of an expert staff (Baldridge, 1975, 205). Not featuring prominently 
as a source of power and authority in either Moodie and Eustace’s or 
Baldridge’s accounts are, however, institutional governing bodies.
Clark (1983) offers another discussion of the bases for authority in 
academic institutions, and for ‘legitimate rule’ at differing levels. These 
included ‘discipline-rooted authority’ (such as personal and collegial rulership, 
and guild and professional authority), ‘enterprise-based authority’ at 
institutional level (including trustee authority and bureaucratic authority) and 
‘system-based’ authority (involving governmental bureaucratic authority, 
political authority and ‘systemwide academic oligarchy’); to these he added
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what he referred to as the ‘wild card of authority: charisma’ (Clark, 1983, 10S- 
125). Clark also identified different national modes of authority (e.g. 
American, British, Japanese) and the ways in which different sources or types 
of authority help determine ‘who can act’ and how decision making takes 
place. Ultimately, Clark saw ‘the value of perceiving higher education as a 
power struggle’, with ‘undivided power ... the greatest single danger in the 
operation of a system of higher education’ (Clark, 1983, 264-265). He was 
thus a firm proponent of the merits of the (primarily US concept) of shared 
governance and antagonistic towards what he saw as the inappropriate trend 
towards evaluating universities like businesses. In later research Clark 
retained his commitment to shared governance as likely to promote 
sustainable success in higher education institutions, in association with the 
idea of a strengthened steering core (Clark, 2004).
Another model for higher education of interest for its over-arching 
approach was that put forward by Becher and Kogan (1980; 1992). Their 
model was based on normative and operational modes, on the one hand, and 
levels of organisation, from the individual unit to overarching central authority 
(such as government), on the other hand. They noted that other authors, 
including Moodie and Eustace (1974) and Clark (1983), had traditionally seen 
the norms associated with authority in universities as being determined by 
academics, either individually, or collectively within their institutional units, or 
by central authorities, rather than at institutional level. However, following the 
changes in the UK in the 1980s, which involved increased
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demands for academic accountability from a growingly powerful 
national system, and the need for decisions to be made about the 
implementation of cuts and reorientations of effort,
they noted that
for the most part, ... institutions with strong leadership seemed best 
able to survive. (Becher and Kogan, 1992, 67)
For Becher and Kogan, leadership resided primarily with Vice-Chancellors.
However, despite the post-Jarratt emphasis on executive authority, Becher
and Kogan still saw the Vice-Chancellor as having a ‘Janus-like role’, involving
both managerial and mediating aspects, so that they needed to be both a
leader and ‘first among equals’ (Becher and Kogan, 1992, 69); although
considerable, Vice-Chancellors’ powers were therefore qualified and rarely
unlimited.
With regard to institutional governing bodies, Becher and Kogan felt 
that their powers remained limited in practice, and ‘over academic substance 
... minimal’, with ‘little evidence that the lay members have been able, or have 
wished to exercise any such power’. In addition, while Becher and Kogan 
recognised governing bodies’ authority in relation to the use of resources, they 
saw them acting ‘normally ... on the advice of the head of the institution’ 
(Becher and Kogan, 1992, 73).
Further comment on the role of the Vice-Chancellor, and his or her 
power and authority, is offered by Lockwood. He noted that senior officers in 
universities operated generally in a context of ‘diffusion and ambiguity’, where 
there was ‘fragmentation of authority and ... reliance upon consensus’ 
(Lockwood, 1987, 94). However, while he forecast that the role of ‘lay
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leaders’, particularly the chairs of governing bodies, was likely to become 
more prominent, the ‘dominant leadership role’ should be ‘that of the Vice- 
Chancellor’. Indeed, for Lockwood a Vice-Chancellor’s leadership ideally 
required ‘a deep, and manipulative, involvement in the internal politics of the 
institution’, ‘a clear belief in a strategy for the future’, and a capacity for 
‘consensus-building’ (as distinct from ‘consensus-seeking’) (Lockwood, 1987, 
103-104). The importance of the Vice-Chancellor, as chief executive, and of 
senior management teams, and their relationship to the chair and a small 
number of members of the governing body, was also stressed by Bargh et al 
(1996). They noted the ‘complementary nature’ of the relationships between 
governing body chairs and Vice-Chancellors, and the challenges this can 
pose (Bargh et al, 2000, 98). In another variation on the theme, work by 
Kogan and Hannay supported the contention that ‘the balance of power’ had 
‘shifted at the top level of institutions’, with ‘the executive working with the 
governing body, as a collective’ (Kogan and Hannay, 2000, 190).
A helpful summary of the nature of the power and influence of 
university governing bodies is provided by Shattock (2003). He notes that 
‘governing bodies have become more important as a control mechanism’ but 
also identifies a number of ways in which, if their strengths are properly used 
by universities, they can continue to be ‘an extremely important component in 
the management of the university’ (Shattock, 2003, 103). In this regard he 
lists a variety of areas where he thinks governing bodies can make particularly 
important contributions, such as ‘providing technical and professional advice’, 
‘taking the long view’ and ‘acting as a referee for internal arguments’
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(Shattock, 2003,103-106). Shattock accepts that there has been a
‘downgrading of the respect for the academic contribution to effective
governance’, but points out that this is
in spite of the evidence provided by institutional performance which 
strongly suggests that those universities that encourage a considerable 
academic participation in governance are the most successful in the 
league tables, and that those that discourage it are amongst the least 
successful. (Shattock, 2003, 107)
Shattock may be overestimating the link between the role of academics in
governance and institutional success, given that it could be argued that the
greater overall success of chartered institutions, when compared to
incorporated institutions, probably relates more to differences in funding and
historic missions, and that the greater role of academics in governance in the
former than the latter has been an incidental feature of their structures and
histories, rather than a major causal factor in their greater success.
Nonetheless, Shattock is able to point to other evidence of the potential
importance of a continuing role for academics in governance, on the grounds
that
in all the major incidents of misgovernance in the UK since the 1980s 
... it has been the academic community which has blown the whistle. 
(Shattock, 2003, 107)
Ultimately, Shattock takes the view that, on the whole, university 
governing bodies have not become the sole focus of power and authority in 
universities, although their role in this regard has increased markedly in recent 
years. Instead, the roles of Vice-Chancellors and executives remain the most 
prominent, to the extent that where good governance has been threatened, 
this has been due to
45
over dominant or occasionally ineffective executive teams, rather than 
from over ambitious governing bodies themselves or from dissident 
academics. (Shattock, 2003, 107-108)
Shattock concludes that the ‘powers of governance’ should be kept ‘in
balance’ and that ‘successful universities’ will
appoint able and forthright laymen, because they value the contribution 
they can bring, ... develop strong corporate leadership ... with an 
effective central steering core which is accountable to but retains a 
close dialogue with a senate or academic board which reflects the 
views of a vibrant academic community’. (Shattock, 2003, 108)
As will be noted below (sub-sections 2.11.2 and 2.11.3), these views need to
be considered alongside increasing specification of formal governing body
roles by the higher education funding councils and the CUC, which imply that
more power should reside with governing bodies in practice than Shattock
suggests is, or should be, the case.
2.11 More recent pressure for changes in governance arrangements
2.11.1 External pressures and the influence of governance failures
In line with the recommendations of the Jarratt report, many institutions 
did indeed establish joint council and senate committees, and some 
universities made arrangements to adjust the size of their governing bodies. 
However, most chartered universities’ governing bodies continued to include 
amongst their members a significant number of academic staff who were not 
members of the institution’s senior management, and the parameters under 
which universities’ governing bodies continued to operate were simply those 
set out in their existing charters and statutes.
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A separate governance-related development in the second half of the 
1980s was the establishment in 1986, initially on a somewhat informal basis, 
of what became in 1996 the Committee of University Chairmen, and more 
recently the Committee of University Chairs (CUC). Although the CUC did not 
in its early years adopt a very public posture, it gradually became more 
prominent in relation to governance issues. In 1995 it published its first guide 
on governance (CUC, 1995), prompted, Shattock suggests, by governance 
problems at Huddersfield and Portsmouth universities (Shattock, 2006, 51 and 
99-105). Revised editions of the guide have been issued every few years 
since then (CUC, 1998, 2000a, 2004b, 2009). The widespread acceptance of 
the CUC guide was demonstrated from the start by its endorsement by the 
CVCP (now UUK) and the Association of Heads of University Administration 
(the representative group for university secretaries, registrars and equivalent 
post-holders); latterly its status has been made official by its approval and use 
as a template against which to judge institutions’ governance arrangements 
by all the UK funding councils.
Before the problems in the early 1990s at Huddersfield and Portsmouth 
just referred to, there had also been a prominent governance failure at what 
was then University College, Cardiff. It related to failure to control institutional 
spending in the context of the funding cuts of the early 1980s. Eventually, the 
principal was removed from office and a rescue plan which led to the 
University College merging with the University of Wales Institute of Science 
and Technology (also located in Cardiff) was implemented (see Shattock, 
1988). The governance failures at University College, Cardiff fed directly into
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a review of the UGC chaired by Lord Croham, which highlighted concerns
about the accountability of the UGC and universities for the expenditure of
their government grants. Changes to institutions’ formal financial
responsibilities followed, set out in a new ‘financial memorandum’
a contract between a Funding Council and an [institution] for the 
education of set numbers of students against a financial allocation, 
[which] made the governing body, not the institution, accountable for 
delivery. (Shattock, 2006, 14)
Later changes arising in similar vein further emphasised the responsibilities of
the governing body, and of the Vice-Chancellor, and saw the eventual
introduction of audit committees in all institutions.
2.11.2 The Dearing review and its aftermath
The problems that had arisen at Huddersfield and Portsmouth, and, 
also at the Southampton Institute, led to further scrutiny of university 
governance by the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life (Nolan, 
1995). Around the same time, developments in the private sector led to the 
publication of the Cadbury Report and its code of best practice (Cadbury, 
1992). When, therefore, the Dearing Committee was set up in 1996, in 
addition to addressing the problematic issue of student funding (see sub­
section 2.6.2 above), it was also tasked with considering ‘value for money and 
cost-effectiveness’ (NCIHE, 1997, 3). The committee chose to interpret this 
statement rather broadly and devoted a chapter in its final report to issues 
associated with management and governance (NCIHE, 1997, 228-247).
Amongst the committee’s subsequent recommendations was the 
suggestion that a more formal ‘code of practice’ should be drawn up and that
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institutions should be required to report annually ‘on their compliance with the
code’ (NCIHE, 1997, 237; also 377, recommendation 59). There were also
proposals, inter alia, about ensuring that governing bodies had primacy (there
was concern about the remaining powers of some chartered universities’
courts), aspects of governing body membership, and the undertaking by
governing bodies of periodic effectiveness reviews. These recommendations
were endorsed by the government in a general sense (DfEE, 1998a, 61), but it
was left to the higher education sector to take a number of issues forward,
including a specific proposal that the governing bodies of chartered
universities should be reduced in size to no more than 25 members (NCIHE,
1997, 240-241). Shattock has plausibly argued that this was meant
to set up processes which would over time force the pre-1992 
universities to adopt a post-1992 size of governing body and implicitly 
endow those governing bodies with the same kind of unicameral 
powers of direction that obtained in the post-1992 universities. 
(Shattock, 2006, 52)
Although a CUC-led review of the size of governing bodies in chartered
universities took place, and there were reductions in the size of many of them,
the average size remained around 33 (CUC, 2000, 5). The CUC’s resistance
to the Dearing committee’s recommendations also extended to not wishing to
see their governance guidance transformed into a formal code of practice.
Nonetheless, in the audit processes of the funding councils, particularly
HEFCE, the CUC’s guide came to be used more and more explicitly as
though it were a code. Taken as a whole, the recommendations of the
Dearing committee have played a central role in the approach to governance
since the late 1990s by the higher education funding councils.
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2.11.3 Developments after Dearing
Following the publication of the Cadbury Report and consequent 
developments in the private sector, increased attention began to be paid also 
to the effectiveness of higher education governing bodies. Work was 
undertaken by the CUC on effectiveness (CUC, 1999), and in relation to 
reviewing institutional performance (CUC, 2002, 2006a) and to reviewing 
governance arrangements more generally (CUC, 2000a, 2004a, 2006b). The 
CUC also undertook related work on the development of ‘key performance 
indicators’ with the aim of enabling governing bodies to better monitor 
institutional performance (CUC, 2006a, 2008).
As noted above (sub-section 2.7.1), external interest in university 
governance and management continued in the Lambert review (Lambert, 
2003, Chapter 7, 93-106). Its recommendations finally led to the CUC 
governance guide being accepted as the basis for a more formal code of 
practice.
Apart from supporting the work of the CUC, the HEFCE and the other 
funding councils also took a direct role in promoting changes to governance 
arrangements. Some of these changes were prompted by further 
developments in the private sector, including guidance issued in relation to 
audit committees and aspects of risk management and internal control (FRC, 
2003, 2005). This led to the imposition on higher education institutions of new 
requirements in relation to corporate/financial reporting and in their 
approaches to risk management (HEFCE, 2004, 2005).
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Another relevant development was the creation of the Leadership 
Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE) early in 2004 (LFHE, 2011a). A 
significant strand in the LFHE’s activities relates to governance, including the 
commissioning of research, and the running of a Governor Development 
Programme (LFHE, 2011b), in association with the CUC, from whose earlier 
work it developed. Recently, the LFHE has taken the lead in collaboration 
with the CUC on research projects to explore what constitutes an ‘effective 
and high-performing governing body’ (Schofield, 2009) and to develop a 
‘framework for identifying governing body effectiveness in higher education’ 
(LFHE, 2011c).
2.11.4 Further crises and more reviews
Notwithstanding all the changes to governance arrangements just 
discussed, the sector has not proved immune from further governance crises. 
The most prominent of these was at London Metropolitan University in 2008- 
2009. It was associated with the university’s failure over several years to use 
the correct definition for determining when students had completed their 
courses. This affected the amount of HEFCE funding the university was 
entitled to receive. Eventually the university faced ‘clawback’ of some ‘£36.5 
million ... in respect of over-claimed funding for 2005/6-2007/8’ and ‘a 
reduction in funding for 2008/09 capped at £15 million’ (Melville, 2009, 2). 
Much of the blame attached to the then Vice-Chancellor - ‘he must take the 
major responsibility and culpability for the outcome’ (Melville, 2009, 10) -  but 
the ultimate responsibility, and failure, of the governing body was recognised, 
so that they were invited ‘in due course ... to consider the benefits of new
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leadership and refreshed membership of the board and its committees’ 
(Melville, 2009, 11).
The problems at London Metropolitan University were associated by 
some commentators with HEFCE’s subsequent inclusion in proposed 
changes to its financial memorandum of the power to ‘require the governing 
body to take steps to rectify the position’ if HEFCE were to decide that ‘the 
accountable officer cannot be relied upon’ (HEFCE, 2009, 9, para 21; my 
emphasis). In the event, following opposition from the sector (as illustrated by 
some respondents in this study -  see chapter 6), the initial proposals were 
amended, although HEFCE retains the right, ‘in extremis’, to ‘ask the 
governing body to appoint someone else to report to HEFCE’ (HEFCE, 2010, 
8, para 26).
In addition to the difficulties at London Metropolitan University, a 
number of alleged problems involving governance issues were reported to 
have occurred elsewhere. An article in The Independent suggested, for 
example, that the ‘sudden “resignation”’ of the Vice-Chancellor at City 
University was related to ‘a long-standing disagreement with the governing 
body’ (Hodges, 2009). The same article also indicated that problems between 
Vice-Chancellors and their governing bodies might be at the root of the 
departures of the Vice-Chancellors of the University of East London, the 
University of East Anglia and Leeds Metropolitan University, and the Principal 
of Royal Holloway. The THE highlighted further issues, such as allegations by 
a council member at Brunei University that the Vice-Chancellor ‘holds council
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and its membership in contempt’ and that the council is ‘about as effective as 
a bunch of stuffed donkeys’ (Newman, 2009). In the cases referred to just 
above (i.e. not including the London Metropolitan case), governing bodies 
may well have been behaving entirely appropriately, and simply exercising 
their ultimate responsibility for the oversight of their institutions. However, the 
undoubted governance and management failures at London Metropolitan and 
the level of concern about the governance implications of changes elsewhere, 
illustrate the continuing interest in, and importance of, higher education 
governance.
In a further sign of that interest, albeit relating to other parts of the UK, 
two recent studies of governance in higher education have been undertaken 
in 2010-2011 in Wales (McCormick, 2011) and Scotland (von Prondzynski, 
2012). The reports in question are relevant partly because they demonstrate 
the continuing scrutiny of higher education governance on a UK-wide basis, 
but also because of the detailed and particular nature of some of their 
recommendations, and the differences between them. In the case of the 
Welsh report, for instance, it recommends, inter alia, that:
• R7 ... the national funding and regulatory agency ... should
evaluate the engagement of governing bodies in the strategic 
planning process and the rigour of governor scrutiny of 
institutional performance.
• R8 ... a common set of KPIs ... at national, UK and
international level should be applied in the evaluation of 
institutional performance by all governing bodies.
• R10 Governing bodies should consist of between 12 and 18
members as the norm, inclusive of staff and student members. 
(McCormick, 2011, 34)
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The Scottish report recommends, inter alia, that:
• Remuneration committees should include staff and student 
members.
• Meetings of governing bodies should normally be held in public.
• Each governing body should be required to ensure ... that at 
least 40 per cent of the membership is female.
• Senior managers other than the Principal should not be 
governing body members and should not be in attendance at 
governing body meetings, except for specific agenda items, 
(von Prondzynski, 2012)
Each of the two reports includes significantly more recommendations than
those highlighted above, but it is striking that in both cases very specific detail
is gone into. In addition, the reports suggest that there are likely to be
growing differences in the approach to higher education governance in each
country, with both also moving away from the model applicable in England. It
remains to be seen how far such recommendations will be implemented, and
what influence, if any, they may subsequently have on governance in
England.
2.12 Conclusions
2.12.1 Governance as both constant and changing
There has been considerable change over time in the external policy 
environment of the higher education sector. This has significantly affected 
institutional approaches to research, teaching and other activities, and the 
funding streams available to support them. At the same time, a number of 
deeply-rooted traits of the higher education system as a whole, derived from 
shared cultural and organisational values, continue to influence the ways in
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which institutions respond to the changing higher education landscape. Some 
features of higher education governance are related just as strongly to long­
standing norms. This is particularly so in the case of the chartered 
universities, where the underlying arrangements continue to be recognisably 
related to those derived in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from 
medieval origins. Despite the notional de novo creation of the incorporated 
institutions’ governance arrangement in the 1990s, they have their own links 
to previous approaches to governance running back to the nineteenth century. 
These involve in many instances a particularly strong commitment to 
vocational education, and a practice of engagement with their localities, that 
continue to inform the attitudes of their governing bodies.
The relative power and authority of governing bodies, and their role in 
the decision-making processes of higher education institutions has also varied 
over time. Initially, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, governing 
bodies were recognised as having the ultimate authority over all aspects of 
universities. However, once the initial parameters for the governance of 
institutions appeared to have been settled, academics gradually but 
increasingly asserted their role in the management and control of universities. 
This trend was coupled with increased government influence and direction of 
the higher education sector as a whole, so that by the 1960s the authority of 
governing bodies generally, particularly in the university as opposed to what 
was then about to become the polytechnic part of the sector, had diminished 
to the extent that it was widely accepted that primacy in university governance 
lay, appropriately, with academics. Subsequently, external pressures
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associated with funding cuts and increasing prescription in higher education 
policy, together with expectations derived from new public management and 
the development of governance arrangements in the private sector, led to the 
migration of some power and authority back to governing bodies, alongside a 
marked increase in the executive and managerial power of Vice-Chancellors 
and other senior managers in higher education institutions.
At the same time governing bodies were also encouraged, and in due 
course became expected, to adopt new, and more uniform, governance 
practices, whether directly decreed by government, or developed more 
organically as a sector response to indirect pressures, such as those 
associated with governance developments in the private sector. The 
approach required of governing bodies has become steadily more 
prescriptive, with an increasing burden of regulation and the development of 
something very close to a mandatory code of practice. Governing bodies 
have also arguably become more professionalised, adopting common 
practices specified in the governance code, and under the influence of the 
training programmes of the LFHE. Despite this, problems in governance 
involving disputes between governing bodies and their Vice-Chancellors or 
Principals have been reported more frequently. Certain features of both the 
higher education landscape generally, and higher education governance, can 
therefore be seen as constant and deep-rooted, but many details of the 
general and governance landscapes have changed, and are continuing to 
change. This is the context in which the perceptions of higher education 
governing body members and attendees are explored in this study.
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Chapter 3: The study of governance
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The scope of the chapter
The previous chapter reviewed the development of the higher 
education sector in the United Kingdom, and England in particular, and of the 
nature of the governance arrangements in the sector. It is now appropriate to 
set the governance arrangements within British and specifically English higher 
education in the context of a broader discussion of governance. In doing so, I 
shall start by briefly considering definitions of governance, before turning to 
some of the literature setting out theoretical approaches to governance. I 
shall then discuss the potential relevance of institutional theory and role 
theory, before reviewing aspects of literature concerning effectiveness in 
governance. Finally, there is a variety of literature directly related to how the 
members of both private sector boards and public sector governing bodies 
have previously been found or perceived to perform their roles, and 
appropriate parts of this literature will be discussed.
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3.2 Definitions of governance and the specification of board roles
3.2.1 The variety of definitions
An extended general discussion of the term governance, as used 
across the social sciences, is offered by Kooiman (1999). In introducing the 
subject he notes that ‘governance as a concept has been a catchword in 
many corners of social science disciplines’ and that different definitions and 
approaches to governance tend to be applied in differing circumstances and 
to different levels of society. Given the focus of this study, the definition of 
governance which is most pertinent concerns corporate governance, which 
Kooiman defines as ‘the ways big organizations are directed and controlled’. 
Kooiman notes that a number of ‘central concepts ... quite often surface’ in 
discussions of governance, such as concern with the ‘rules and qualities of 
systems’, ‘co-operation to enhance legitimacy and effectiveness’ and 
‘processes, arrangements and methods’ (Kooiman, 1999, 68-70). Aspects of 
these concepts will be seen to recur throughout this study.
3.2.2 Definitions of corporate governance in the private sector 
Kooiman’s definition of corporate governance aligns with that set out in
the report of the Cadbury review of corporate governance in the UK in the
early 1990s, the nub of which states that
corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled. (Cadbury, 1992,15)
Charkham (1994, 2005), saw the ‘appointment of the Cadbury committee’ as
the start of ‘the modern governance movement’ (Charkham, 2005, 5) and the
Cadbury definition has been widely adopted; Clarke (2007, 2), for instance,
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suggests that it is ‘the most direct and useful’ definition. The Cadbury report 
was the first of a series of reports on different aspects of corporate 
governance, such as the Turnbull Report on managing risk, the Smith Report 
on audit and the Higgs Report on non-executive directors (see, for example, 
Keasey et al, 2005a, 23-40). The definition of corporate governance devised 
by Cabdury is still that used in the current version of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code promulgated by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC; 
FRC, 2010, 1).
It is, however, possible to define corporate governance in the private 
sector in a variety of ways, each with a different focus. This is illustrated by 
Huse (2007, 18-24), who recognises
• a ‘managerial definition’, where ‘board members ... are seen 
simply as instruments for management’;
• a ‘shareholder supremacy definition’, in which ‘board members 
are ... instruments for the shareholders’;
• a ‘stakeholder definition’, which involves ‘the outcome of 
interactions between multiple stakeholders’; and,
• a ‘firm definition’, which focuses on ‘what is best for the firm’ and 
where governance facilitates cooperation. (Huse, 2007, 18-23)
Definitions of corporate governance can also be broader. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests for example 
that:
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. [It] ... provides the structure through which objectives ... 
are set, and the means of obtaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. (OECD, 2004, 11)
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3.2 .3  Specification of board roles in the private sector
Implicit in definitions of corporate governance are ideas about the roles 
board need to undertake to meet the requirements of the definition. Cadbury 
suggested that ‘the responsibilities of the board’ included:
• setting the company’s strategic aims;
• providing leadership to put those aims into effect;
• supervising the management of the business; and’
• reporting on their stewardship (Cadbury, 1992, 15).
In addition, non-executive directors needed to:
• review the performance of the board and of the executive; and,
• take the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise (Cadbury 
1992, 21-22).
Subsequent developments to the UK’s corporate governance code added the 
ideas that boards are responsible for:
• ensuring the existence of a framework of controls which enables 
risk management;
• setting the company’s values and standards; and,
• ensuring that obligations to shareholders and others are 
understood and met (Higgs, 2003, 21).
In the UK’s business and commercial sector, then, the primary roles of 
the board are seen to relate to:
• providing leadership and ensuring the long-term success of the 
company;
• scrutinising the performance of the management and monitoring 
the reporting of performance;
• setting the strategic direction and constructively challenging and 
helping develop proposals on strategy;
• having the right balance of skills, experience, independence and 
knowledge to operate effectively;
• ensuring appropriate controls exist to assess and manage risk;
• setting values and standards; and,
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• ensuring accountability to shareholders. (FRC, 2010).
3.2.4 Definitions of corporate governance in the public sector
Definitions of corporate governance in the UK public sector are similar
to those used in the private sector. For the Independent Commission on
Good Governance in Public Services, governance is simply ‘the leadership,
direction and control o f ... organisations’ (Independent Commission, 2004, v).
In the National Health Service (NHS), governance was defined in 2003 as:
The systems and processes by which health bodies lead, direct and 
control their functions in order to achieve organisational objectives and 
by which they relate to their partners and the wider community. (NHS, 
2003, 7)
The latest official NHS publication on governance (NLC, 2010) refrains from
offering a definition as such, but notes that:
The purpose of NHS boards is to govern effectively and in doing so to 
build public confidence that their health and healthcare is in safe 
hands. (NLC, 2010, 8)
In government, the Treasury defines corporate governance as ‘the way in 
which organisations are directed, controlled and led’ (HM Treasury, 2011, 9). 
All these definitions amount to variations on Cadbury according to context.
In studies of governance in the public sector, as opposed to official 
guidance and codes of practice, simple definitions are also widely used. 
Cornforth, for example, defines governance as ‘the systems by which 
organisations are directed, controlled and accountable’ (Cornforth, 2003a, 17). 
In higher education, Shattock uses an equally pragmatic and descriptive 
definition of governance as, ‘the constitutional forms and processes through 
which universities govern their affairs’ (Shattock, 2006, 1). As a final example,
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Fielden regards governance as ‘all those structures, processes and activities 
that are involved in the planning and direction of the institutions and people 
working in tertiary education’ (Fielden, 2008, 2).
3.2.5 Specification of governing body roles in the public sector
As in the private sector, a variety of expected and accepted governing 
body roles have been developed in association with definitions of governance 
in the public sector. In the NHS, for example, three over-arching roles for 
boards are recognised:
• formulating strategy;
• ensuring accountability for the delivery of strategy, and for the 
existence of robust and reliable systems of control; and
• shaping a positive culture for the board and the organisation, 
which involves promoting values and standards of conduct. (NLC, 
2010, 8-15)
In the case of the higher education sector, some roles of governing
bodies are specified directly by the funding councils. The Higher Education
Funding Council for England (HEFCE), for example, through its financial
memorandum, requires that higher education institutions’ governing bodies
‘ensure that the mandatory requirements of the financial memorandum are
complied with’, and that ‘institutions ... meet the legislative requirements
imposed upon them as corporate bodies’ (HEFCE, 2010a, 43). More
generally, HEFCE’s financial memorandum specifies that
the governing body of an institution is collectively responsible and has 
ultimate non-delegable responsibility for overseeing the institution’s 
activities, determining its future direction and fostering an environment 
in which its mission is achieved’ (HEFCE, 2010a, 7).
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In addition, HEFCE ‘expects’ governing bodies to act in accordance with the
guidance issued by the Committee of University Chairs (CUC) and to adopt
its Code of Practice (CUC, 2009).
The expectations placed on governing bodies in the CUC code start
from the premise that:
Every higher education institution shall be headed by an effective 
governing body, which is unambiguously and collectively responsible 
for overseeing the institution’s activities, determining its future direction 
and fostering an environment in which the institutional mission is 
achieved and the potential of learners maximised. The governing body 
shall ensure compliance with statutes, ordinances and provisions 
regulating the institution and its framework of governance and, subject 
to these, shall take all final decisions on matters of fundamental 
concern to the institution (CUC, 2010,13).
The CUC code also specifies, inter alia, that the primary responsibilities of the
governing body shall include:
• approving the mission and strategic vision of the institution, long­
term business plans, key performance indicators (KPIs) and 
annual budgets, and ensuring that these meet the interests of 
stakeholders;
• appointing the head of the institution ... [and] monitoring his/her 
performance;
• ensuring the establishment and monitoring of systems of control 
and accountability, including financial and operational controls and 
risk assessment; and,
• monitoring institutional performance against plans and approved 
KPIs (CUC, 2009, 13-14).
The CUC code also makes reference to meeting legal requirements, and
compliance with the Nolan principles of good conduct in public life (Nolan,
1995), and states that independent, external governors should
question intelligently, debate constructively, challenge rigorously and 
decide dispassionately, and ... should listen sensitively to the views of 
others, inside and outside meetings of the governing body (CUC, 2009, 
17).
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Taken as a whole, a list of governing body roles with similarities to that 
for the private sector can be set out for the higher education sector:
• meeting legal and regulatory requirements;
• overseeing the activities of the institution and monitoring 
institutional performance;
• determining the future direction, and approving the mission and 
strategic vision and long-term plans;
• ensuring appropriate controls exist to assess and manage risk; 
and,
• ensuring accountability to stakeholders.
Missing from this list when it is compared to that for the private sector is any 
explicit mention of a leadership role, and reference to the skills and 
experience of governing body members. The idea of a leadership role for 
governing bodies (rather than for chairs or Vice-Chancellors) appears only 
recently to be emerging explicitly in thinking about higher education 
governance (Schofield, 2009; see also sub-sections 3.5.3, 3.8.5)
3.2.6 The overall position
With regard to defining corporate governance, there is a consensus 
around variants of the definition used in the Cadbury Report. It is this 
definition, in a generic form, and with the addition of references to leadership 
and accountability, which I shall adopt for this study, so that:
corporate governance is the system by which organisations are
directed and controlled, and through which they are led and enabled to
be accountable.
In relation to board and governing body responsibilities, the attributes 
set out in sub-sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.5 are representative both of expectations 
in general, and in the higher education sector. They provide normative
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benchmarks against which the perceptions of the people interviewed in this 
study will in due course be set. It is now appropriate to turn to the question of 
governance theory, and its relevance to this research.
3.3 The development of corporate governance theory
3.3.1 The origins of corporate governance theory
Although some authors have suggested that corporate governance is ‘a 
term that scarcely existed before the 1990s’ (Keasey et al, 2005a, 1), for 
which the ‘touchpaper was lit in the 1980s’ takeover boom’ (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001, 3), there is an extensive body of previous work, going back to the first 
half of the twentieth century. At that time, economists began to take an 
interest in the governance of corporations because of the problem of ‘the 
divorce of ownership from control’ due to changes in the ownership pattern of 
companies ‘from individual ownership, to ownership by large, publicly financed 
corporations’ (Berle and Means, 1933, vii-viii). This led to the view that 
managers would become ‘a self-perpetuating oligarchy, unaccountable to the 
owners whom they were expected to represent’ (Mizruchi, 2004, 581). These 
perceived problems had, however, little immediate impact on future studies of 
governance and it was arguably not until the 1970s, when a number of 
factors, including the collapse of the US railway company Penn Central, 
together with changes in share ownership patterns (Cadbury, 2002, 10), finally 
provided a catalyst to further academic interest and led to the exposition of 
agency theory.
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3.3.2 Agency theory
The seminal paper in the initial development of agency theory is
generally accepted as being that published by economists Jensen and
Meckling in 1976. They suggested, inter alia, that
managers, as the ‘agents’ engaged by shareholders and other 
owners (the ‘principals’), tended to behave in ways that maximised 
their personal benefits, rather than acting in the best interests of the 
principal. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 59)
Since first coming to prominence, agency theory has established itself as the
predominant theoretical approach to commercial corporate governance -  ‘the
overwhelming dominant theoretical perspective applied in corporate
governance is agency theory’ (Daily et al, 2003, 371); ‘agency theory is, in
practice, regarded as the Bible of corporate governance’ (Huse, 2007, 45).
Agency theory assumes that people are ‘self-interested and generally 
unwilling to sacrifice personal interests for the interests of others’ (Daily et al, 
2003, 372), and that managers will therefore pursue their own self-interest 
and take decisions accordingly, rather than doing things that are in the 
interests of the shareholders. The implication in terms of corporate 
governance practice is that the role of the board must be to oversee the 
activities of management and to curtail managers’ tendency to act only in their 
own interests, thereby reducing agency costs and protecting shareholders’ 
interests.
3.3.3 Is agency theory relevant to the public sector?
Although agency theory has been extremely prominent since the 
1970s, it is clear that it will not always be relevant to governance in the public
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sector. In some cases this will be because public sector organisations do not 
often have a single readily identifiable principal or group of principals, 
analogous to the shareholders of a commercial company. In the UK higher 
education sector, for instance, there is a variety of groups, internal and 
external to institutions, who can be seen to have legitimate interests in their 
running, including, for example, students (and in some cases their parents), 
staff, the wider community and government. In addition, although the power 
of Vice-Chancellors has grown in the last two decades, it is still rarely 
untrammelled, and their capacity to serve their own ends is therefore likely to 
be more limited than that of their private sector counterparts.
Another significant factor is that higher education institutions, like many 
other public sector bodies, are subject to strong influence by the government, 
which is also their major funder. An alternative view could therefore see 
government as the sole ultimate principal. In this scenario, the power of the 
agents and, indeed, the governing body as the protector of the principal’s 
interests, may be moot. However, almost all higher education institutions in 
the UK are legally independent and autonomous entities, so that the 
governing body might legitimately see its role in some circumstances as 
defending that autonomy against the government, which reinforces the idea 
that the precepts of agency theory are not straightforwardly applicable in the 
higher education context.
Some of these potential difficulties were illustrated in an article by 
Buckland (2004). Buckland saw some advantage in using agency theory,
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because it enabled ‘the fitness of the form of governance to the issues of 
organisational control ... [to] ... be directly addressed’ (Buckland, 2004, 245). 
However, he accepted that there were problems in identifying the principals in 
universities, and that in consequence it was not clear who had the right to 
control universities. Nevertheless, even if agency theory cannot reasonably 
be seen as offering by itself a complete approach to governance in the public 
sector, there will undoubtedly still be occasions when individual senior 
managers seek to do things that benefit them, but not necessarily their 
institution and its principals (however defined), and to that extent any public 
sector boards, including university governing bodies, will need to guard 
against the problems predicted by agency theory.
3.3.4 Transaction cost economics
Given the problems of relating agency theory to a public sector context, 
and criticisms that have been levelled at its applicability even in the private 
sector, it is appropriate to consider whether any of the other governance 
theories that have developed since agency theory came to prominence seem 
more likely to be applicable to the public sector and to higher education in 
particular. Related to agency theory, but usually seen as distinct from it, is 
transaction cost economics. Like agency theory, its origins lie in the 1930s, 
with the work of Coase (1937), although significant developments again did 
not occur until the 1970s and later (Williamson, 1979, 1996). Like agency 
theory, transaction cost economics assumes that individual managers will 
seek to serve their own interests, but where in the former the ‘individual is the 
basic unit’, in the latter ‘the transaction is the unit of analysis’ (Huse, 2007,
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52). It is then argued that rather than expending effort to reduce costs for the 
organisation as whole, thereby ensuring that benefit accrues to the 
shareholders, managers will again pursue arrangements that benefit them 
individually.
As with agency theory, board activity is seen once more as needing to 
guard against irrational or self-serving behaviour by managers. Board 
members therefore need to undertake a monitoring and, if necessary, 
controlling role, in relation to the behaviour and actions of senior managers. 
They may also, through their knowledge and expertise, and/or their network of 
contacts, be able to facilitate opportunities for transaction costs to be reduced. 
As was the case for agency theory, it is unlikely that an approach to 
governance based solely on transaction cost economics will be appropriate in 
most public sector contexts. It is, however, possible to conceive of 
circumstances in which board members’ expertise or their network of 
professional contacts might bring benefit to public sector institutions through 
reduced transaction costs, so that aspects of this approach to governance, 
like agency theory, cannot wholly be disregarded.
3.3.5 Stakeholder theory
The two economic approaches to governance just discussed can be 
contrasted with a number of alternatives, which Learmount (2002) calls 
organisational approaches. These include stakeholder theory, stewardship 
theory and trusteeship. The importance of stakeholder theory and 
stewardship theory are also stressed by Clarke (2004) and Huse (2007) and
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both have been widely regarded as potentially applicable to public sector 
organisations.
Stakeholder theory stresses the need to take account in governance of 
multiple stakeholders. Stakeholders can be ‘any individual or group who can 
affect or is affected by the organisation’s objectives’ (Freeman, 1984, 46). 
This clearly has an immediate resonance in a public sector context. A further 
potential aspect of stakeholder theory that may have relevance in the public 
sector is its common association with a moral perspective. Phillips, for 
example, argues that ‘stakeholder theory is distinct because it addresses 
morals and values explicitly as a central feature of managing organisations’ 
(Phillips, 2003, 16).
In any given organisational context, multiple stakeholders can usually 
be identified and they can be classified in various ways (Clarke, 1998). In 
private organisations, for example, in addition to shareholders, stakeholders 
might include groups such as staff, customers and suppliers, or even groups 
representative of wider social, political or environmental interests. In a public 
sector context, although there will usually be no direct analogue of 
shareholders, there will often be external agencies to whom institutions have 
some accountability (most commonly government agencies), in addition to 
stakeholder groups such as staff, customers or clients, and representative or 
political groups in the wider community. Public sector institutions may well 
also be more constrained by regulation, or social or political expectation, as to 
what constitutes appropriate organisational behaviour, than private sector
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organisations. This in turn may make them subject to influence by a wider 
range of internal and external stakeholders, and more likely to recognise the 
existence of legitimate public interest in, and moral dimensions to, their 
activities.
A recognised difficulty in the application of stakeholder theory relates to 
the complexity of the inter-relationships that are presumed to exist. 
Learmount (2002, 9-11) highlights a number of issues that he suggests have 
inhibited the development of stakeholder theory, such as a tendency to focus 
on the justification of the use of the stakeholder approach. Nonetheless, 
stakeholder theory has clear relevance in the context of governance in public 
sector organisations, where there is normally an explicit recognition of the 
requirement to serve the needs of many different external and internal groups. 
This is undoubtedly the case for higher education institutions.
3.3.6 Stewardship theory and trusteeship
Turning to stewardship theory, this assumes, like stakeholder theory, 
that people are not solely motivated by self interest, and therefore rejects the 
premise of agency theory that managers will always act only in their own 
interest. Indeed, stewardship theory was developed in a deliberate challenge 
to agency theory by Donaldson and Davis (1991). They argue, inter alia, that 
‘role-holders’ can be ‘motivated by a need to achieve’, and can ‘gain intrinsic 
satisfaction through’, activities such as performing inherently challenging 
work, and exercising responsibility and authority. Managers can also develop 
a sense of identification with their organisation, and choose to serve its needs
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out of a sense of loyalty and/or duty, even where ‘a course of action may be 
unrewarding personally’ (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 51).
In the private sector, stewardship theory assumes that returns to 
shareholders will be safeguarded if managers are granted autonomy, and if 
attention is paid to issues such as managerial motivation and managers’ 
identification with their organisations (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al, 
1997). With regard to the relationship between stewardship theory and 
stakeholder theory, Karns (2011, 341) suggests that they ‘share many core 
values’, but that while stakeholder theory is concerned primarily with ‘the 
larger purpose of business and its role in society’, stewardship theory focuses 
‘on management practices’.
Associated with stewardship theory is the concept of trusteeship. The 
‘duty of the trustee’ can be seen as being ‘to preserve and enhance the value 
of the assets under his control, and to balance fairly the various claims to the 
returns which these assets generate’ (Kay and Silberston, 1995, 92). The 
concept of trusteeship features strongly in higher education governance in the 
United States (see, for example, Chait et al, 1991; Kezar and Eckel, 2004), 
but it is potentially relevant also in the UK higher education sector, given that 
most UK higher education institutions are independent, self-governing entities 
with assets that are owned by the institutions themselves. On the whole, 
however, the idea of stewardship in governance provides a broader approach 
than that of pure trusteeship, and on those grounds it is arguably of greater 
importance as an explanatory model.
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The ideas of both stewardship theory and stakeholder theory appear 
relevant to many public sector contexts, including the UK higher education 
sector. Conceptions of the role and purpose of higher education institutions 
can empower a variety of groups to regard themselves as legitimate 
stakeholders. Such groups may be variously specified, but their legitimacy 
will often be widely recognised and will need to be addressed through 
institutions’ governance mechanisms. The idea of stewardship is also clearly 
valid in higher education, with institutions pursuing aims and outcomes that 
are not ultimately financial, and which relate to conceptions of public good.
3.3.7 Other theoretical models
A variety of other theoretical approaches to corporate governance have 
been developed. Summary accounts of some of these are offered by Clarke 
(2004, 4-26; 2007, 23-30), while Hung (1998) offers a helpful typology. 
Clarke’s accounts add resource dependency, managerial hegemony and 
class hegemony to the range of theories discussed above.
Resource dependency theory presumes that boards and their members 
promote the development and success of organisations through the access 
they provide to external resources (see, for example, Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al, 2000, 2009). Hillman et al
(2000), for instance, highlight a variety of ways in which board members act 
as ‘environmental links’. These include ‘business experts’, ‘support 
specialists’ and ‘community influentials’ who provide, respectively, general 
high level expertise and links with other organisations, specialised expertise
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plus links to ‘suppliers or government agencies’ and ‘non-business 
perspectives’ and links with ‘powerful groups in the community’ (Hillman et al, 
2000, 239-242).
Managerial hegemony theory, in contrast to the other theories referred 
to so far, is predicated on the idea that board power is in practice very limited, 
and that chief executives have far more power and influence than boards, 
through their ability to influence the selection of board members, set board 
agendas and control information flows. These issues are discussed at more 
length by Mace (1971) and Lorsch and Maclver (1989) (see sub-section 
3.6.2).
Finally, class hegemony theory sees ‘corporations as exploitative 
vehicles for [the] accumulation of wealth and power (Clarke, 2007, 27) and 
board members as being drawn from self-perpetuating elites (see also, for 
example, Mills, 1971; Useem, 1984).
Hung’s work divides theoretical approaches into those based on 
extrinsic and intrinsic influence factors, which are in turn shaped by external 
contingencies or internal institutional expectations. From these derive six 
roles -  linking, coordinating, control, strategic, maintenance and support -  
each associated with a governance theory -  respectively, resource 
dependency, stakeholder, agency, stewardship, institutional and managerial 
hegemony (Hung, 1998, 105). Hung therefore suggests that no single theory 
illuminates the whole picture of corporate governance. Instead, different
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theories can help explain or predict different aspects of board roles. This 
supports a broader application of the points noted above about, for example, 
the fact that agency theory or transaction cost economics may not by 
themselves provide useful ways of modelling the behaviour of governing 
bodies in higher education.
3.3.8 Implications of governance theory
The governance theories considered above offer a wide variety of ways 
of suggesting or predicting how boards ought to behave to fulfil their corporate 
governance functions. These roles can be seen to include:
• controlling and monitoring (agency perspective);
• co-ordinating and reflecting diverse interests, and linking to 
resources (stakeholder and resource dependency perspectives);
• preserving and maintaining resources and overseeing strategy 
(stewardship and institutional perspectives); and,
• supporting management (managerial hegemony perspective)
However, no single theory by itself can be shown to provide a reliable model 
for board behaviour, even in the private sector. Nonetheless, there appears to 
be a way forward through the recognition that different theoretical positions 
may well be applicable, or may carry more or less explanatory weight, in 
different circumstances. It is with this approach in mind that the merits of 
governance theory in relation to higher education governance will be 
discussed in analysing the data collected in this study. I shall now consider 
another theoretical approach which may be of use in considering the findings 
of this study, institutional theory.
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3.4 Institutional theory
3.4.1 The relevance of institutional theory
It was suggested in chapter 2 that there are features of the present 
cultural and institutional context in which higher education institutions operate 
that have their origins at different points in the past. These include the 
tensions between liberal and utilitarian views of education, the competing 
conceptions of universities as teaching or research institutions, and the idea 
that universities are communities of scholars operating in egalitarian and 
collegial settings. The development and persistence of these facets of higher 
education systems can potentially be viewed through a lens based on the 
tenets of institutional theory.
3.4.2 The development and nature of institutional theory
Institutional theory can be seen as a successor to traditional 
approaches to explaining organisational structures, such as those embodied 
in the works of Taylor (1911), Weber (1948) or Simon (1956), with their 
concern about issues such as the size and complexity of institutions. 
However, institutional theory focuses, instead, on the external environments of 
institutions and the ways in which those environments influence the structures 
and behaviour of organisations (see, for example, Freeman, 1973; Meyer and 
Brown, 1977).
Two main strands of institutional theory are usually identified, 
sometimes known as ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutional theory. However, despite
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their differences, both forms of institutional theory identify constraints on 
organisations. So-called old institutionalism highlights how informal structures 
exist and work alongside, or against, formal structures, while new 
institutionalism sees irrationality in the formal structures themselves, with 
tendencies to conformity and the effects of shared culture influencing 
organisational behaviour. This in turn implies that ‘the bases of 
institutionalized behavior ... for ... old institutionalists ... were values, norms 
and attitudes’, that were absorbed and adhered to by the members of 
organisations, while for new institutionalists, ‘taken-for-granted scripts, rules 
and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991, 14-15). Examples of work in the realm of the so-called ‘old 
institutional theory’ includes that by authors such as Selznick (1949, 1957) 
and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978); work in relation to ‘new institutional theory’ 
includes, for example, that by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983).
New institutional theory suggests that organisations, and their 
behaviour, will be influenced by the ‘myths of their institutional environments’, 
which lead to the creation of formal organisational structures which express 
‘social purposes as technical ones and specify in a rulelike way the 
appropriate means to pursue’ them. The nature of appropriate functions 
within different types of organisations can then become pre-determined, with 
‘classifications of organizational functions, and the specifications for 
conducting each function’ available as ‘prefabricated formulas for use by any 
given organization’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 344).
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3.4.3 Isomorphism
Given the idea that similar types or category of organisation tend to 
become more similar to one another over time, for reasons other than 
rationality or the pursuit of efficiency, DiMaggio and Powell refer to the 
concept of isomorphism, defined as ‘a constraining process that forces one 
unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 147-150). DiMaggio 
and Powell propose three ‘mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change’, by 
means of coercive, mimetic or normative isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism 
involves adopting structures and practices in response to pressures from 
other organisations or because of cultural expectations. In the case of 
mimetic isomorphism, structures and practices are adopted from other 
organisations that are perceived as successful and are taken as a model to 
follow. Finally, normative isomorphism arises out of concepts such as 
professionalisation, whereby the members of an occupation define the 
conditions and methods of their work and thereby establish a cognitive base 
and legitimation for their occupational autonomy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
150-152).
Examples of each of these types of isomorphism can be conceived as 
occurring within the UK higher education sector. For instance, the imposition 
by HEFCE of certain types of reporting requirement on institutions, leading to 
the creation of similar structures and common approaches across the sector 
(for example, to risk assessment or audit activities), can be seen as an 
example of coercive isomorphism. Similarly, the long-standing tendency of
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academic staff to see their identify as relating to their discipline, rather than to 
their association with a particular higher education institution (Becher and 
Trowler, 2001; Halsey, 1992; Halsey and Trow, 1971), can be conceived as 
an example of normative isomorphism.
3.4.4 Institutional theory and research into higher education
Despite its potential explanatory value, formal studies of aspects of 
higher education that have drawn on institutional theory seem to be relatively 
infrequent and somewhat eclectic. Examples include studies of community 
colleges (Brint and Kabarel, 1991), tenure systems and the employment of 
academic staff in colleges and universities (Sine and Tolbert, 2008), and 
sources of administrative structure in higher education institutions (Tolbert, 
1985). These studies all relate, however, entirely or primarily to US contexts.
In the UK context, institutional theory was used by Edwards and 
Cornforth (2003) in their study of the factors influencing the contributions of 
governing boards to strategy. They considered the boards of four public 
sector organisations, a school, a further education college, and two voluntary 
organisations (one local, one national) and concluded, inter alia, that 
‘institutional pressures’ help determine ‘current thinking and norms about 
boards’, which board members then draw on in understanding their role and 
that of their board (Edwards and Cornforth, 2003, 81).
Despite the fact that there have been relatively few instances in which 
institutional theory has featured in studies of governance, its central concept -
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that organisations are influenced and shaped by their national, sectoral and 
cultural environments -  clearly has value as an explanatory mechanism in the 
case of the governance of UK higher education institutions, bearing in mind 
both the persistence of structural and cultural features of the higher education 
system in the UK over many years and, as illustrated in the previous chapter, 
what can be recognised as isomorphic pressures leading to changes over 
time to higher education institutions.
3.5 Role theory
3.5.1 The nature of role theory
Another theoretical perspective of possible relevance to the study of
higher education governing bodies, in the context of a focus on governing
body members’ perceptions of their roles, is role theory. According to Biddle,
role theory, in the form of ‘the role perspective’, developed initially in the
1920s and 1930s in a number of disciplinary contexts. It focuses on ‘patterns
of human conduct’, that is, roles, in association with
expectations, identities and social positions; and with context and 
social structure as well as with individual response (Biddle, 1979, ix).
Banton (1965) noted that role theory was primarily seen as being a facet of
social psychology, although he suggested that a broader approach was called
for, involving both a comparative and anthropological perspective. Biddle
(1979, 1986) felt that role theory offered a perspective that bridged social
psychology, sociology and anthropology.
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Biddle defined role theory as
a science concerned with the study of behaviors that are characteristic 
of persons within contexts and with various processes that presumably 
produce, explain, or are affected by those behaviors. (Biddle, 1979, 4)
He also noted that a number of propositions were associated with role theory,
albeit they were not all regarded as valid by ‘the larger community of social
scientists’. These included the identification of roles associated with shared
identities (determined by social positions), or with expectations (awareness of
roles leads to the adoption of behaviours then deemed appropriate), and the
idea that roles are often learned (and are therefore socialised) (Biddle, 1979,
8). Biddle also discussed what he regarded as five important perspectives on
role theory:
functional role theory -  this focuses on the characteristic behaviour of 
people holding social positions within stable social systems. Roles 
here involve ‘shared, normative expectations that prescribe and explain 
these behaviors’;
symbolic interactionist role theory -  an approach which ‘stresses the 
roles of individual actors, the evolution of roles through social 
interaction, and ... cognitive concepts through which’ peoples’ conduct 
is understood and interpreted;
structural role theory -  which concentrates on social structures, which 
consist of stable groups of people ‘who share the same, patterned 
behaviors’;
organizational role theory -  which concentrates ‘on social systems that 
are preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical’. Roles ‘are assumed 
to be associated with identified social positions and to be generated by 
normative expectations’; and,
cognitive role theory -  focussing on ‘relationships between role 
expectations and behavior’, and therefore on ‘social conditions that 
give rise to expectations ... and to the impact of expectations on social 
conduct’. (Biddle, 1986, 70-76)
81
3.5.2 The potential relevance of role theory
Given the widespread association of governing bodies with the 
performance of particular roles, as illustrated in sub-sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.5, 
the idea that roles in a wide variety of settings may be associated with 
characteristic behaviours determined by social or organisational positions, and 
that they may also be influenced by formal and informal norms and 
expectations as to what behaviour is appropriate, role theory is clearly of 
potential relevance to the study of governing bodies and members’ 
perceptions of their roles. An extensive range of potential uses of role theory 
is illustrated in Biddle and Thomas (1966), although only one of the studies 
they present -  by Wahlke et a/, concerning the roles of legislators in US state 
governments -  has a governance context (and that somewhat tenuously). A 
recent general study of approaches to social psychology (DeLamater and 
Myers, 2011), presents a number of examples of the use of role theory, and of 
related concepts such as role identities and roles in groups, but again without 
any reference specifically to a governance context.
In literature concerned specifically with corporate and institutional 
governance, which will be discussed at some length below (see sections 3.7 
to 3.9), there is essentially no discussion of role theory per se, despite 
considerable consideration of the roles of governing bodies and their 
members. Role theory may therefore have the potential in the future to 
provide a detailed framework for the exploration of governing body members’ 
roles and behaviour from the perspective of social psychology and, to some 
extent, anthropology. However, given the focus in this study on governance
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theory, as well as governing body members’ perceptions of their roles in the 
context of the formal role expectations embodied in codes of practice, as 
discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3, role theory is perhaps best regarded in the 
context of this study as a potential explanatory mechanism at an over-arching 
level, rather than as a specific analytical tool.
3.6 Effectiveness in governance
3.6.1 The effectiveness of private sector boards
Judging the effectiveness of boards and governing bodies has been a 
focus of a variety of research into private sector governance. In studying US 
private sector boards, Mace (1971), for example, found them to be primarily 
passive entities, subject to managerial hegemony, and therefore prima facie 
ineffective. Although Lorsch and Maclver (1989) saw more scope for board 
members to fulfil the roles usually assigned to them, they nonetheless 
concluded that there was still a need for ‘further innovations ... if directors are 
to be effective governors’ (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989, 6). Amongst the issues 
cited by Mace and Lorsch and Maclver as affecting the capacity of board 
members to be effective, were lack of knowledge about the organisations they 
were governing, control of information by management, and lack of time (see 
also sub-section 3.7.2).
An explicit concern with judging effectiveness is apparent in work by 
Forbes and Milliken, who developed a model that linked board effectiveness
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to ‘board task performance’, and its ‘cohesiveness’ (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999, 492-493). McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) studied board members’ roles 
in strategy development (in their case in a UK context), but in doing so they 
highlighted various features of board process which enabled board members 
to be more involved in strategy development and thereby more effective. 
These features included the ways in which agendas were structured, allowing 
sufficient time for discussion of strategic issues, and the presentation of 
information to boards so that it can be debated and influence future decisions. 
The focus of these studies is therefore on board members carrying out their 
roles, and on processes that are seen as important in facilitating this.
Significant work on board effectiveness was undertaken in the UK in
association with the Higgs Review of board effectiveness (Higgs, 2003;
McNulty et a/, 2003; Roberts et al, 2005; see also sub-section 3.7.4). McNulty
et a/’s/Roberts et a/’s research involved gathering data through ‘40 interviews
with chief executives, chairmen, executive and non-executive directors’ of
FTSE 350 companies. Their research led them to suggest that it is
the actual conduct of the non-executives vis-a-vis the executive that 
determines board effectiveness. Non-executives can both support the 
executives in their leadership of the business and monitor and control 
executive conduct ... [and] the key to board effectiveness lies in the 
degree to which non-executives ... are able to create accountability 
within the board in relation to both strategy and performance. (Roberts 
et al, 2005, S6; their emphasis).
Roberts et al also pointed to ‘the pivotal role of the chairman in creating the
conditions for non-executive effectiveness’, and stressed, inter alia, the central
role of non-executive board members in ‘questioning and challenging the
executive’ and the importance of openness, trust and mutual respect (Roberts
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et al, 2005, S21). They concluded that effective non-executive board 
members were characterised by ‘three linked sets of behaviours’, such that 
they were ‘engaged but non-executive’, ‘challenging but supportive’ and 
‘independent but involved’. Roberts et a/’s finding provide an interesting 
conception of board roles that will be seen in due course to find echoes in the 
perceptions of their roles held by the members of higher education governing 
bodies whose views are reported in this study (see chapters 5 and 6).
Further work concerned with board effectiveness includes, for example, 
that by Leblanc (2004), who noted the importance to board effectiveness of 
the ‘very specific competencies and behaviours of individual directors, the 
effectiveness of the cha ir... and the ability of the board to work together as a 
group’ (Leblanc, 2004, 440). Nicholson and Kiel (2004) devised ‘a framework 
for diagnosing board effectiveness’ in which they saw board effectiveness as 
deriving from board members’ knowledge and experience, their networks and 
inter-relationships, explicit and implicit board policies, procedures and cultural 
traits, and board members’ own cultural values, norms and motivations 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2004, 444-452). Finally, an overview of board 
effectiveness is offered by Petrovic (2008) in a review article. She concluded 
that ‘both board dynamics and structural/contextual elements’ are important 
‘for board effectiveness’ (Petrovic, 2008, 1387).
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3.6.2 The effectiveness of public sector boards
Studies on board or governing body effectiveness in the UK public 
sector include work by Ashburner on the NHS, where she suggested that ‘how 
boards interpret their roles and how they operate are key to their 
effectiveness’ (Ashburner, 1997, 285). Ashburner concluded that most board 
members saw personal qualities as being more important attributes than 
specific skills. In addition, important features in promoting board effectiveness 
were the selection of appropriate items for board agendas, the provision of 
good quality information to non-executives and the extent to which non­
executives were involved in strategy formulation (Ashburner, 1997, 289-293).
Other relevant work on the NHS includes that by Peck (1995), Harrison 
(1998) and Storey et al (2010). Peck highlighted problems with the 
effectiveness of an NHS board, concluding that the board had had a ‘minimal 
impact... on the governance of the organisation’ (Peck, 1995, 154). Harrison 
noted, inter alia, concern that non-executive board members’ roles were 
unclear, and the importance to the effective functioning of the board of the 
relationship between the chair and the chief executive. Finally, Storey et al 
(2010, 13-14) questioned boards’ overall effectiveness (in relation to the 
ultimate extent of their influence), and noted issues around the information 
available to boards, and the negative impact on board effectiveness of over- 
assertive chief executives.
In work on other parts of the UK public and voluntary sector, a direct 
focus on board effectiveness is offered by Cornforth (2001). His study
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associated board effectiveness with ‘board inputs’ (board members’ skill and 
experience and the time they had available to act as board members), the 
specification of ‘clear board roles and responsibilities’, a shared ‘vision of how 
to achieve their goals’, and periodic reviews of how ‘board and management 
... work together’ (Cornforth, 2001, 217). In another study, Cornforth and 
Edwards (1999) considered the factors influencing the effectiveness of 
boards’ strategic contributions. Good meeting practice, the quality and 
quantity of information available to the board, and board members’ lack of 
skills in governance processes were all identified as being important in 
determining whether board’s were effective or not (Cornforth and Edwards, 
1999, 361). The overall picture is one in which board practices and personal 
interactions are frequently identified as important contributors to effectiveness.
3.6.3 Governance effectiveness in the higher education sector
In relation to the higher education sector, considerable attention has 
been paid to performance measurement more generally (Broadbent, 2007), 
but there has been less direct consideration of effectiveness in governance. 
Bargh et al (1996) touched on a number of topics that can be related to 
effectiveness, although they paid little attention to it as a subject in its own 
right. They noted, for example, that there were ‘limitations to governor 
influence over decision-making’, and that this was partly associated with 
governing body members’ dependence on the executive for information, and 
their perceptions that they lacked sufficient detailed knowledge of higher 
education and were therefore not always well placed to challenge the 
executive (Bargh et al, 1996, 135-136). Bargh et al also concluded that ‘it is
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inevitable that interpersonal processes will have a powerful influence on 
governance’. They found this to be associated with the creation of ‘an 
informal core of governors, led by the chair, who could exert considerable 
influence over the remaining independent governors’. They commented 
further that ‘the dependency of “effective” governance on interpersonal and 
informal arrangements ... contains the best and worst of the governance 
process’ (Bargh etal, 1996, 151).
Effectiveness was a more explicit concern for Bennett (2001). He 
identified a set of ‘effective governance factors’. These factors were derived 
from a variety of sources, and included having clear constitutional processes, 
clarity of purpose, capacity to think strategically, quality and timeliness of 
information received, and board members’ skills (Bennett, 2001, 62-63; see 
also Bennett, 2002, 295-296). Using questionnaire data, Bennett highlighted 
issues such as the lack of time governing body members had to devote to 
their roles, and the importance to effectiveness of good personal relationships 
between board members.
Recent studies by Bott (2007), Llewellyn (2007) and Berezi (2008) 
have also touched on effectiveness to varying degrees (see also sub-section 
3.9.5). In the case of Bott and Llewellyn, the focus of their studies was on the 
roles, respectively, of the chairs and secretaries of governing bodies. Their 
consideration of effectiveness therefore related primarily to what made those 
role-holders effective, and to their contribution to effectiveness more 
generally. In relation to the role of the chair, for example, Bott suggested that 
the chair’s personal effectiveness was associated with their ability to ensure
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effectiveness in relation to their major responsibilities. Thus, a chair would be 
ineffective if he or she was ‘unable to secure effective financial accountability’ 
(Bott, 2007, 113). Another factor highlighted by Bott was the chair’s ability to 
work well with, and provide guidance to a core group of ‘lay leadership 
figures’, thereby ensuring ‘that on all critical issues, they maintain the support 
of a majority on the governing body’ (Bott, 2007, 209). Llewellyn found, inter 
alia, that the secretary had an important role in contributing to overall 
effectiveness, working in tandem with the chair and Vice-Chancellor, ‘outside 
the formal setting of the governing body meeting’, through ‘relationship 
building, the exercise of power and influence, agenda setting and decision- 
making’ (Llewellyn, 2007, 53).
Turning to Berezi (2008), his research concerned higher education 
governance more broadly, and he addressed effectiveness more generally. 
He identified a number o f ‘determinants of effectiveness’, including:
• knowledge, skills and expertise;
• induction and development;
• compliance with governance codes and legal frameworks; and,
• achievement of the strategic objectives of the university. (Berezi, 
2008, 252-261)
He also noted that of the elements identified as demonstrating effectiveness
achievement of [the] strategic objectives of the institution appears to be
the only outcome issue ... that can be described as a measure of
effectiveness. (Berezi, 2008, 287)
In addition, Berezi explored the reviews of their own effectiveness undertaken 
by governing bodies. He found them to be regarded positively, and 
suggested that the undertaking of such reviews showed that governing bodies
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took ‘performance issues ... seriously’. However, he also had reservations 
about the reviews, as he suggested that they could be improved by the use of 
‘independent external assessors’, since this would both make them ‘free from 
bias’ and increase their rigour (Berezi, 2008, 267-268).
Finally, in this consideration of approaches to the effectiveness of 
governing bodies in higher education, one needs to turn to Schofield (2009), 
and his report for the CUC and LFHE on effectiveness in higher education 
governance. The primary outcome of his work was the development of sets of 
enablers and outcomes of effective governance. These covered a wide 
variety of factors, as illustrated by his six primary enablers, which were:
1. Effective leadership and governing body dynamics
2. Effective governance structures and processes
3. Effective governing body membership
4. Commitment to vision, organisational culture and values
5. Effective performance monitoring and measurement
6. Effective information and communication (Schofield, 2009, 28)
Given that each of these six enablers has five subsidiary elements, and that 
he specifies in addition nine potential outcomes of effective governance, 
Schofield’s approach to judging the effectiveness of governance 
arrangements is complex. However, he provides a clear illustration of the fact 
that determining what constitutes effectiveness in governance is difficult and 
not easily susceptible to distillation. Schofield’s approach, taken together with 
the data about other aspects of determining the effectiveness of boards and 
governing bodies explored in this section, provides an interesting context in 
which to consider the perceptions of governing body members in this study. It 
is now appropriate to turn to other strands of governance research.
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3.7 Governance research in relation to the private sector
3.7.1 The scope of governance research
As illustrated above (section 3.3), a significant strand in corporate 
governance research in the past few decades has concerned corporate 
governance theory per se. The variety of other foci for research into corporate 
governance in the private sector can be illustrated by surveys such as those 
brought together by Keasey et al (2005b). This edited volume includes 
contributions relating to the study of topics such as ‘governance codes, the 
role of ownership, institutional shareholders, boards of directors and executive 
remuneration’, and ‘alternative arrangements ...notably the role of the market’ 
and ‘the role of (entrepreneurial) leadership’ (Keasey et al, 2005a, 8-9). 
Another line of research has considered corporate governance in different 
international contexts from a comparative perspective -  for an overview see, 
for example, Charkham (2005). However, in the context of this thesis, the 
studies most likely to be germane are those relating to board roles and board 
effectiveness. The latter have already been considered above (see section 
3.6), so I shall concentrate here on the question of board roles.
3.7.2 The reality of board roles -  classic studies in the USA
Amongst important studies of board roles that endeavour to focus 
directly on what boards and board members do, two wide-ranging pieces of 
research from the business sector in the United States provide a good starting 
point, despite having already been touched on briefly above (see sub-section 
3.6.1), those by Mace (1971) and Lorsch and Maclver (1989). In each case 
these studies explored the perceptions held by board members of their roles,
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with Mace ‘interviewing literally hundreds of businessmen’, while Lorsch and 
Maclver ‘interviewed nearly 100 outside directors of corporation and received 
questionnaires from over 2,000’.
Mace concluded, inter alia, that most board members saw their role as 
largely being advice-giving, rather than decision-making. However, this 
advice could not be ‘of the sort which requires lengthy and penetrating 
analysis’ (Mace, 1971, 179), since most directors spent little time on their 
roles as board members. Amongst his other findings, Mace suggested that:
• most boards did not ‘establish objectives, strategies, and 
policies’, but that ‘these roles are performed by company 
managements’ and that ‘Presidents and outside directors 
generally agreed that only management can and should have 
these responsibilities’;
• in respect of ‘asking discerning questions’ board members did 
not, by and large, feel able to do this, due to ‘their lack of 
understanding ... and [wanting] to avoid looking like idiots’; and,
• although boards were usually deemed responsible for selecting 
the company president, this process was controlled in practice 
by the out-going president (Mace, 1971,185-196).
The overall flavour of Mace’s findings can be illustrated by one of the quotes
he includes in his book, to the effect that ‘outside directors ... are, after all,
nothing more or less than ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree’ (Mace,
1971,90).
In the case of Lorsch and Maclver’s work, one of their premises was 
that there had been significant change in the landscape of corporate 
governance in US business in the two decades preceding their study (i.e. the
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1970s and 1980s). Whereas boards had been ‘elitist corps of overseers with 
limited responsibility’ (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989, 4), by the time of the study, 
directors no longer saw ‘themselves as pawns of management’. Nonetheless 
most directors still acknowledged ‘a number of constraints on their ability to 
govern in a timely and effective manner’, including
their own available time, a lack of consensus about their goals, and the
superior power of management, particularly the CEO-chairman.
(Lorsch and Maclver, 1989, 1-2)
Lorsch and Maclver identified a variety of ‘impediments to directors’ capacity 
to govern effectively’ and a number of ‘factors that enhance or constrain their 
real power’, with the former including the board’s legal authority and group 
solidarity, and the latter things such as limited time, knowledge and expertise, 
group norms about acceptable behaviour and the power of the chief executive 
officer (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989, 170, Table 8-1).
Lorsch and Maclver did not, though, suggest that boards could not 
influence or withstand their CEOs. Indeed, like Mace, they saw the provision 
of advice and guidance by the board as a routine part of the ‘service’ role of 
directors (see also Johnson et al, 1996), going so far as to say that directors 
felt this was ‘their key normal duty’ (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989, 64-65). 
However, their research suggested that boards, and particularly the external 
members, were not often united enough, or sufficiently cohesive, to deploy 
fully their potential to influence or capacity for restraint This was due to the 
fact that they met ‘infrequently and relatively briefly at tightly structured 
meetings with a full agenda’, had little opportunity to communicate with one 
another outwith board meetings, and operated in the context of norms ‘that
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discourage open criticism’ and the discussion ‘of fundamental premises and 
purposes’ Lorsch and Maclver, 1989, 170).
From the perspective of governance theory, Mace’s study provided 
strong support for managerial hegemony theory. Although Lorsch and 
Maclver were, on the whole, rather more positive about the capacity of boards 
to carry out their intended roles, their work is also usually regarded as 
confirming the tendency of boards to operate in accordance with the premises 
of managerial hegemony.
Of course, Lorsch and Maclver, and Mace before them, were 
concerned with the corporate governance of commercial entities in the United 
States, where different legal and regulatory regimes obtain than in the United 
Kingdom. In addition, some critical details of boards’ structural arrangements 
differ from those of the UK, most notably the fact that in the United States it 
was, and still is, the norm for the posts of board chair and chief executive to 
be combined, whereas this is uncommon in the UK (and does not occur at all 
in the UK higher education sector). It also needs to be borne in mind that both 
studies were conducted prior to the increase in regulatory activity in the 1990s 
and 2000s, which led to developments in the US such as the 2003 Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act. The board roles discussed by both Mace and Lorsch and Maclver 
are, nonetheless, similar in many respects to the roles expected today of the 
governing bodies of UK higher education institutions, and their findings are 
therefore still of relevance, despite the very different context in which they 
were developed.
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3.7.3 Board roles in the UK
An example of a study somewhat similar to those of Mace and Lorsch 
and Maclver, but UK-based and rather more recent is that of Stiles and Taylor
(2001). They interviewed 51 directors from a wide range of public companies 
in the UK drawn from the list of the 1,000 largest companies produced by the 
Times. They also undertook case studies of four major companies, where 
they considered a variety of written data sources, as well as interviewing at 
least five directors.
In introducing their study, Stiles and Taylor noted that both ‘the media 
and corporate governance experts’ had traditionally ‘characterized boards 
largely as rubber stamps for management’. They also pointed out that there 
had been significant recent changes in corporate governance, and that these 
had ‘increased the potential influence of the board’, but had failed ‘to allay the 
popular perception of boards as ineffectual’, with non-executive directors 
labelled ‘variously as poodles, pet rocks, or parsley on the fish’ (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001, 1). They set out to consider, inter alia, whether these 
perceptions were justified.
In relation to some of the commonly accepted, and by now familiar, 
specific roles of boards, they concluded that:
• board members did not see their role as devising strategy, but as 
setting its context and acting as ‘gatekeepers’ in relation to strategic 
proposals (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, 51);
• in relation to control, directors did not see their role as one of 
policing, but rather as using the firm’s control systems to enable 
them ‘to set new strategic directions’ and to focus ‘organizational 
attention by setting new strategic targets and performance goals’ 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001, 61);
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• promoting and sustaining links with shareholders was of primary 
importance, although taking account of the interests of other 
stakeholders was recognised as usually being in companies’ 
interests (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, 101); and,
• inter-relationships between board members were very important. 
The role of chair was key to building trust and good relationships, 
but issues such as the credibility and assertiveness of non­
executives and board norms about subjects such as the 
acceptability of boardroom debate, were also significant factors 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001, 116).
Stiles and Taylor characterised their work as reaching conclusions 
contrary to, and more positive than, research by authors such as Mace and 
Lorsch and Maclver. However, they also suggested that the strong thrust in 
the 1990s to increase boards’ capacities to control companies was, in the light 
of their findings, ‘warranted only in extreme conditions’, because it was mainly 
‘the building of relationships within and around the board’ that enhanced 
board effectiveness. Stiles and Taylor therefore went on to promote the idea 
that while boards should establish a ‘threshold level of monitoring’, once they 
had done so they could move on to enjoy ‘a cooperative relational process 
enhanced by the development of trust-based relationships between board 
members’. In addition, boards did not need to be seen overturning 
management proposals, because they could ‘set standards for the quality and 
nature of proposals ... [and] the boundaries of what is acceptable in a 
proposal and what is not’, relying on the fact that the simple existence of the 
board and the requirement from time to time to present to it, ‘acts as a strong 
incentive for managers to perform as well as they can ... and acts as a driver 
to efficiency’ (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, 117-122).
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So in the work of Stiles and Taylor one has board members presenting 
a more positive view of their world than their American counterparts in the 
work of Mace and Lorsch and Maclver. But if the views expressed by the 
respondents in the earlier studies seem to Stiles and Taylor unduly cynical, 
and the managerialist perception of boards, in association with the tenets of 
agency theory, as unnecessarily negative, perhaps the respondents in their 
own study were too complacent and their prescription for future success in 
corporate governance not as secure as Stiles and Taylor’s results implied, 
given the dramatic failure of corporate governance in the financial crash of 
2008-2009. Nonetheless, they raise a number of interesting possibilities to 
bear in mind when considering the perceptions of governing body members in 
the UK higher education sector.
3.7.4 The study of board processes
In relation to board processes, Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) 
suggested, inter alia, in a wide-ranging survey, that they have been under­
researched. A similar view was expressed by Forbes and Milliken (1999, 
502), who concluded that ‘understanding the nature of effective board 
functioning is among the most important areas of management research’. 
This view was echoed by a number of contributors to a special issue of the 
British Journal of Management published in 2005, highlighting research by 
Roberts et al (2005) and responses to that research. As already noted above 
(sub-section, 3.6.1), the work presented by Roberts et al arose from their 
contributions to the Higgs Report. In their 2005 paper they suggested
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that despite considerable empirical work there remains very limited 
understanding of the working processes and effects of boards of 
directors. (Roberts et al, 2005, S5)
Several of the other papers in the volume prompted by Roberts et a/'s work
are also of interest. Pye and Pettigrew (2005), for instance, accepted that
much scope remained for further work on board processes and related issues.
They recommended pursuing studies that ‘seek to relate process and practice
to performance over time’, and pay ‘attention to micro-processes’ in board
interactions such as ‘trusting, influencing’ and ‘risking ... which would shed
light on the (shifting) power to define meaning and adjudge effectiveness of
behaviour’ (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005, S36). These recommendations are
apposite not only in the context of private sector governance, but also in
relation to public sector governance, including higher education governance.
3.7.5 Board frameworks
In another response to Roberts et a/’s 2005 paper, Huse (2005) 
considered different ways in which board accountability has been defined in 
the business world -  noting the long-standing primacy of agency concepts, 
but also the growth of alternative perspectives. Huse diagnosed a gap 
between the roles boards are expected, or predicted, to play, and the ways in 
which boards and their members actually undertake those roles. He also 
highlighted the importance of ‘formal and informal board structures and norms’ 
and the tendency for boards to rely on ‘formal and informal rules’, particularly 
the latter (Huse, 2005, S74). In drawing up ‘a framework’ of ‘concepts relating 
to actual board behaviour’ (Huse, 2005, S66-74), Huse made a strong case 
for viewing board roles and board member behaviour from multiple
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perspectives, and in doing so highlighted the potential importance of 
qualitative studies that draw directly on the accounts of board members.
Another attempt to provide a framework for the study of boards was 
that of Nicholson and Kiel (2004). They took a systems view, where the board 
is regarded as a social phenomenon and has a number of components (for 
example, policies, procedures, personal relationships and individuals’ 
knowledge, skills and abilities), that receive a variety of inputs and transform 
them into outputs including board and corporate performance. They went on 
to suggest that successful boards have a number of common characteristics, 
such as internal interdependence, a capacity for feedback, the potential to 
pursue and achieve outcomes in a variety of ways, and the capacity to adapt 
to changing environmental conditions. Given these characteristics, boards 
work as transformation processes, relying on members’ intellectual capital - 
human, social, structural and cultural - to achieve effective governance. The 
contributions of board members are therefore made possible because of their 
general and specific knowledge and experience, their internal and external 
networks and inter-relationships, the board’s framework of explicit and implicit 
policies, procedures and cultural traits, and the cultural values, norms and 
motivations of the individuals making up the board (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004, 
444-452). Like Huse, Nicholson and Kiel provide an interesting and useful 
way of combining a range of approaches to studying and evaluating ‘the 
complexities of boardroom life’.
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3.7.6 Other studies of corporate governance in the private sector
There have been many studies of more specific aspects of corporate 
governance in the commercial world, including further work that may be of use 
in a comparative context. For example, Pettigrew and McNulty considered 
‘power in the boardroom’ and ‘the contribution to strategy by chairmen and 
non-executive directors’ (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999). In their 1999 paper, they studied just over one hundred 
non-executive company directors in the UK and concluded that while their 
influence on corporate strategy did not often extend to initiating ‘strategic 
plans and ideas’ they had an ‘active involvement... in processes of strategic 
choice, change and control’ (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999, 70). This, they 
noted, was in contradiction to the findings of authors such as Mace (1971; see 
sub-section 3.7.2).
The idea of a ‘legalistic perspective’ on boards, associated with paying 
close attention to the fulfilment of boards’ legal requirements, is discussed by 
authors such as Zahra and Pearce (1989, 292-297) and Huse (2007, 43-44). 
As Zahra and Pearce put it, this approach ‘posits that board attributes -  
composition, characteristics, structure, and process -  determine a board’s 
performance of its two primary roles: service and control’ (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989, 292). A range of potential drawbacks to the legalistic perspective have 
been identified, with Huse, for example, noting that ‘from a legal perspective 
the main board task ... will be that of acting in a crisis’ and that boards often 
do not even do ‘what they are supposed to do according to the law’ (Huse, 
2007, 44). Considerations of this kind, and the strong focus in the literature
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on other theoretical perspectives, may help explain why there is little explicit 
attention given to ways in which private sector boards carry out their legal and 
regulatory responsibilities. A variety of other studies could also be cited, but it 
now seems more appropriate to consider studies of governance in the public 
sector.
3.8 Governance research in relation to the public sector
3.8.1 The public sector generally
Governance in the public sector has a very wide scope as to the types 
of organisations involved and the range of activities they undertake, both in 
the UK and elsewhere. For the UK, Cornforth offered an interesting 
discussion of the context for public sector governance, and of aspects of 
governance theory that he feels are relevant to the study of public sector 
boards (Cornforth, 2003a, 1-14). He noted that there has been a particular 
focus on ‘the stewardship role of boards’, and on ‘the ability to hold 
management to account and to see that resources ... are used properly’ 
(Cornforth, 2003a, 6). He went on to discuss the relevance of a number of the 
governance theories highlighted above (Cornforth, 2003a, 6-11, and Table 
0.1; see section 3.3), and pointed to their ‘one-dimensional’ nature, 
suggesting instead ‘a multiple paradigm perspective, which focuses on the 
paradoxes of governance’ and considers some of the ‘main tensions facing 
boards’. For example, should boards be representative or professional, 
elected or appointed, and should the focus be on democracy or expertise? To
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what extent should boards be risk averse, and concerned with conformance, 
and the ‘careful monitoring and scrutiny o f ... past performance’, or focussed 
on performance, which ‘demands forward vision, an understanding of the 
organisation and its environment, and perhaps a greater willingness to take 
risks’? And to what extent should boards control managers or partner with 
them? (Cornforth, 2003a, 13-14; see also Cornforth, 2003b.)
Cornforth, alone or with various collaborators, has made a number of 
other contributions to the literature on governance in the UK public sector. 
For example, Cornforth and Edwards studied boards’ contributions to strategy 
in a variety of organisations (Cornforth and Edwards, 1998, 1999; see also 
sub-section 3.6.2). They found that overall the input of boards to 
organisational strategy was limited. It was most significant, and increasing, in 
the case of a further education college, where ‘strategy-making’ was seen as 
a clear board role, although the regulatory and compliance burden imposed 
on the institution was such that the board had less time to address strategy 
than they desired. The extent of boards’ involvement in strategy was 
influenced by factors such as regulatory frameworks, traditions and norms, 
and various aspects of more detailed governance arrangements. There were 
also issues with regard to the practical matters such as the provision of 
information, with there being ‘sometimes too little, sometimes too much’, so 
that in the former case it was difficult to make any strategic contribution, while 
in the latter case the amount of attention that could be paid to strategy was 
limited (Cornforth and Edwards, 1999, 360-361).
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Other interesting studies in the education sector include that by Deem 
et al (1995) (see also sub-section 2.5.3). This involved, inter alia, the direct 
exploration of school governors’ views of their roles, and the roles of their 
governing bodies. Amongst the conclusions reached was that, while lay 
governors brought a great deal of useful knowledge to their schools, from their 
previous experience or current occupations, their ‘knowledge about 
educational institutions and processes ... sometimes appeared incomplete, 
fragmented and, on occasion, inaccurate’ (Deem et al, 1995, 85, their 
emphasis). In addition, ‘lay governors frequently have views about education 
... at odds with the values and educational philosophies of the schools they 
govern’ (Deem et al, 1995, 85-86). While this could lead to positive 
interactions, it could also lead to conflict, and to professional staff trying to 
limit lay governors’ involvement, or to confine it to areas other than learning 
and teaching. Notwithstanding the differences between school governance -  
with its explicitly participatory and notionally democratic aspects -  and higher 
education governance, there is potential for comparing Deem et a/’s findings 
with the findings of this study, particularly with regard to external governors’ 
knowledge of higher education.
More recently, Farrell (2005) studied the extent to which school 
governors were involved in strategy. The context of her work was the 
increasing use of private sector boards as models for boards in the public 
sector. She noted, inter alia, that ‘legislative reform [had] placed significant 
responsibilities for school leadership and strategic development with school 
governing bodies’, but found that governing bodies were ‘not significantly
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involved in strategic activity’ (Farrell, 2005, 107). Farrell follows a model 
proposed by McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) in their paper (referred to in sub­
section 3.7.6 above) on the role of board members as strategists in large UK 
companies. Farrell’s work is therefore both of interest in its own right, and as 
an example of using ideas developed in relation to governance in the private 
sector in a public sector context.
3.8.2 The National Health Service
Another substantial strand in the literature on UK public sector 
governance is that concerned specifically with the NHS. For instance, two 
overviews of corporate governance in the NHS are provided by Ashburner 
(1997, 2003). In the first of these studies, Ashburner questioned the 
appropriateness of adopting private sector board models in the NHS. This 
was in the context of the creation of NHS trusts, and the consequent adoption 
of new organisational and governance structures. She also considered 
boards’ roles in relation to strategy development, concluding that it was 
‘problematic to assess the role and influence of the non-executives ... since 
this is often an implicit rather than an explicit process’ and that boards’ 
effectiveness depended ‘upon the willingness of the executives to open up the 
strategy formulation process to the board’ (Ashburner, 1997, 292-293).
In the second of Ashburner’s studies, she suggested there had been a 
transition in NHS governance from ‘conformance’, through ‘performance’ to ‘a 
small move back towards recognising the importance of accountability’. In 
these changes, Ahsburner saw a tension between the role of boards in
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promoting performance, through their involvement in strategic decision­
making, and the need for them to ensure accountability. She also noted that 
in some cases this tension was associated with a perception that boards’ 
effectiveness was reduced if they paid too much attention to accountability, 
and that it was more relevant to consider the need for boards to balance their 
responsibilities ‘in relation to accountability, probity and effectiveness’ 
(Ashburner, 2003, 213-18).
Following the move to allow for the creation of new ‘foundation trusts’ 
from 2003, further work on NHS governance has been carried out by Storey 
with two different but over-lapping groups of colleagues (Storey et al (2010 
and 2011). Part of their research concerned perceptions of ‘good governance’ 
in the NHS and how senior managers and others were interpreting and 
developing institutional governance arrangements. They noted that some of 
their informants, ‘especially chief executives’ were sceptical about the value of 
governance, although the ‘chairs of boards and non-executive directors were 
champions of the idea’ (Storey et al, 2010, 8). Good governance was 
understood by board members to be about achieving ‘a balance of forces 
which enabled various role-holders to make appropriate inputs’, and they 
‘found statistically significant evidence to show trust board governance did 
make a difference’. They also noted, with regard to the specific role of chief 
executives, that too much assertiveness was a bad thing, and when chief 
executives were seen as being too assertive, ‘[NHS] trust performance 
measures on a whole range of variables tended to be low’ (Storey et al, 2010, 
8).
105
Taken together empirical studies of governance in the NHS provide a 
further useful source of comparative material to inform the study of higher 
education governance. However, in relation to studies of governance in both 
the NHS and other parts of the public sector, it is important to bear in mind 
differences of context, and detail, when making comparisons with the higher 
education sector. School governing bodies, for example, are required to 
include parent governors, for which there is no direct analogy in the higher 
education sector. NHS boards, on the other hand, are very clearly executive 
boards. They are quite small, usually with eleven members, consisting of a 
non-executive chair, plus equal numbers of non-executives and executives. 
These arrangements are, again, very different from those that obtain in the 
higher education sector. In addition, while there have been many changes to 
the context within which higher education governing bodies operate (as shown 
in chapter 2), there have been at least as many, and arguably more, changes 
to the contexts of other parts of the UK public sector, particularly the NHS. 
Nonetheless, while details of governance structures and the contexts in which 
they operate vary, there are at the same time strong commonalities in terms of 
formally defined purposes and goals that make comparisons still of significant 
interest and use. With this in mind, I shall turn to previous studies of higher 
education governance.
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3.9 Previous studies of higher education governance
3.9.1 Starting points
A small number of studies of the governance of higher education in the 
UK have already been referred to above, either in chapter 2, or above (see 
sub-section 3.6.3). These will be touched on again here, together with other 
research on UK higher education governance. Some reference will also be 
made to studies of higher education governance outwith the UK that are of 
potential comparative relevance. In considering this material, it should be 
borne in mind that despite the amount of attention paid to governance in UK 
higher education institutions in recent years, the amount of research directly 
concerned with governance has until recently been rather limited. This is 
illustrated, for the period up to 2003, by Tight’s overview of research into 
higher education. He shows, inter alia, that only a minority of the research 
into higher education being undertaken at the turn of the last century was 
concerned with institutional management and governance (Tight, 2003, 22 
and 45). Nonetheless, although the overall volume of relevant work is limited, 
there have been a number of useful studies.
3.9.2 Overviews of higher education governance
As noted in chapter 2 (sub-section 2.8.1 et seq), Shattock (2006) 
provides a good overview of governance in the UK higher education sector, 
describing the main features of higher education governance, and offering, 
inter alia, interesting and helpful summaries of some of the crises in higher 
education governance during the 1980s and 1990s (see sub-section 2.11.1).
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Other overviews of higher education governance can also be cited. Tapper 
(2007), for example, focused on the system level and offered a cogent 
account of the development of higher education policy in the UK, particularly 
from the 1980s onwards. He was, however, concerned largely with political 
governance, and not with institutional governance. Braun and Merrien (1999) 
also principally addressed system level governance, but offered a 
comparative perspective, with contributions relating to several other European 
countries, and the United States, as well as the UK (McNay, 1999), as did 
Kogan et al (2006) and their contributors (although Askling and Henkel (2006) 
had something to say about institution level governance). These studies, like 
that of Deem et al (2007), help set more focussed institution level studies in a 
wider context. They demonstrate that higher education institutions’ freedom 
of action, and the practical extent of the autonomy that can be exercised by 
their governing bodies, have become increasingly circumscribed over at least 
the past twenty to thirty years.
3.9.3 More specific research into higher education governance in the UK
v
Notwithstanding the fact that the overall volume of research on higher 
education governance has been relatively limited, it has been the focus of two 
special issues of Higher Education Quarterly in 2002 and 2004 (volumes 56 
(3) and 58 (4)). Articles in the first of these volumes addressed subjects such 
as the external pressures on universities (Salter and Tapper, 2002), the case 
for a continuing role for academics in university governance (Dearlove, 2002), 
and governance in the new universities created from the former polytechnics
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(Bennett, 2002; Knight, 2002). In addition, Shattock argued the merits of a 
‘move back to the concept of “shared governance’” (Shattock, 2002, 235).
Shattock is a particular proponent of the concept of shared governance 
(see also Shattock, 2005), arguing that institutional governance in higher 
education needs to be ‘rebalanced’ so that neither the ‘corporate-dominated’, 
nor the ‘academic-dominated’ forms have primacy (Shattock, 2002, 235). He 
also notes that the UK’s two most successful institutions ‘by far’ (i.e. 
Cambridge and Oxford) are those with only ‘minimal lay involvement’ in their 
governance (Shattock, 2005, 214-215).
The second special issue of Higher Education Quarterly focussed 
specifically on the governance recommendations arising from the Lambert 
Report (see also sub-sections 2.7.1 and 2.11.3). Two contributors - Shattock 
(2004a and 2004b) and Buckland (2004; see also sub-section 3.3.3) - were 
particularly critical of the Lambert recommendations, with Shattock, for 
example, seeing them as ‘a distraction from a proper consideration of the 
factors that encourage improved performance’ (Shattock, 2004a, 227). 
Middlehurst (2004), in contrast, took the Lambert Report as a starting point for 
a discussion of leadership roles and management structures, with a focus on 
internal governance arrangements. Her call for ‘a shift in focus from 
structures and roles to people and processes’ (Middlehurst, 2004, 259), in 
relation to future internal management and governance arrangements, chimed 
with Bennett’s recommendation that more research into governance
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processes was needed, as the boards of the post-1992 universities were ‘very 
efficient but not necessarily very effective’ (Bennett, 2002, 287).
In addition to the calls from Bennett and Middlehurst for more study of 
governance processes, two common, and related, threads are discernible in 
the articles just cited. These are a concern about the validity or usefulness of 
applying governance models drawn from the private sector to higher 
education, and a view that there remains merit in the involvement of academic 
staff in the governance of their institutions.
Middlehurst has made other contributions in relation to higher 
education leadership and governance (for example, Middlehurst, 1993; 2008). 
In her earlier study, she saw the external members of governing bodies as a 
‘group who contribute symbolically and actively to the success of institutional 
leadership’, although she also suggested that they were ‘not directly 
concerned with ... those aspects of leadership which involve articulating 
values and developing commitment and cohesion within the institution’ 
(Middlehurst, 1993, 114-115). In her later work, Middlehurst again focused 
principally on the leadership roles of universities’ senior executives, but she 
also recognised the potential for governing bodies to make important 
contributions.
Other relatively recent studies of aspects of the governance of UK 
higher education institutions include Elton (2008) on the relevance of 
Humboldt’s ideas with regard to academic freedom and their implications for
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governance arrangements; Salter and Tapper (2000) on the ‘politics of 
governance’ with particular reference to quality assurance; and Taylor (2006) 
on the implications for institutional governance of the introduction of new 
internal management and organisational structures in four pre-1992 
universities. However, little of the material cited so far in this sub-section goes 
very far in relation to consideration of the roles of governing bodies and their 
members, or the issue of governing body effectiveness, other than Bennett’s 
paper in regard to the latter. There is also hardly any consideration of the 
potential relevance of governance theory, apart from by Buckland, and I shall 
turn to this issue next.
3.9.4 Engagement with governance theory
A recent discussion of university governance from a theoretical 
perspective, drawing on data from the UK, the ‘British Commonwealth’ (as the 
Australian author puts it) and the United States, is offered by Trakman (2008). 
He identified ‘five primary models of board level governance ... (1) faculty; (2) 
corporate; (3) trustee governance; (4) stakeholder; and (5) amalgam models’ 
(2008, 63). Although using similar terminology, he does not, however, engage 
fully with governance theory, using the term ‘corporate governance’ to 
encompass a very general idea of governance that focuses on ‘fiscal and 
managerial responsibility’. Nonetheless, Trakman questions the ‘captivating 
rationale of corporate efficiency’ and the fact that this is often contrasted with 
a perception of universities as being ‘poorly managed or fiscally inefficient’ 
(Trakman, 2008, 69). Ultimately, although Trakman offers some interesting
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thoughts about different aspects of university governance, he does not draw 
any very clear conclusions about his models and their applicability.
In their wide-ranging empirical study that has already been cited
several times (see, for example, sub-sections 2.8.3, 2.10.1 and 3.6.3), Bargh
et al (1996) have something to say about ‘comparative perspectives on
corporate governance’, under which heading they refer to developments in the
private sector, changes elsewhere in the public sector in the UK, particularly in
the NHS, and developments in other parts of Europe and in the United States
(Bargh et al, 1996, 152-168). However, they make no explicit reference to
governance theory, focussing instead on the growth of managerialism and the
government’s encouragement
of the belief that the corporate sector provides the most appropriate 
model of governance for higher education in the age of massification 
and marketization. (Bargh etal, 1996, 167)
A number of other empirical studies do, however, make explicit mention 
of governance theory. For example, Bennett (see again sub-section 3.6.3) 
discussed the ‘stewardship’, ‘agency’ and ‘representation’ models of 
governance (Bennett, 2001, 12-13). He did not, though, develop or discuss 
these concepts to any extent. Llewellyn (2007), in his study of the role of 
governing body secretaries, had somewhat more to say, highlighting various 
facets of the agency, stewardship, stakeholder and managerial hegemony 
theories, and concluding that there was merit in combining theoretical 
perspectives (Llewellyn, 2007, 34-39). He also saw particular benefit in the 
concept of ‘the paradoxes of governance’, following Cornforth (2003b) (see 
sub-section 3.8.1). Finally, Berezi (see again sub-section 3.6.3) discussed
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agency, stewardship, stakeholder, managerial hegemony and class 
hegemony theories, and suggested a number of ways in which these theories 
could be related to the roles of university governing bodies. For example, in 
relation to class hegemony theory, Berezi noted that the external members of 
university governing bodies tend to be recruited ‘from among corporate elites 
in business, industry and the professions’ and that the theory suggests that 
such elites will be self-perpetuating, and will promote particular approaches to 
governance (Berezi, 2008, 58-59). Berezi’s brief discussions of the
implications of other governance theories for university governance are not 
dissimilar to the comments I have offered above (see section 3.3).
Berezi also discussed the applicability of various facets of governance 
theory in relation to his findings. He suggested, for example, that one could 
perhaps see the funding councils as principals operating on an agency theory 
basis vis a vis individual universities. In relation to stewardship theory, Berezi 
saw a number of the governing bodies that he studied operating in accord with 
its tenets; he identified these institutions as forming a ‘proactive-active’ group 
(see next sub-section). In the case of stakeholder theory, Berezi identified 
what he called an ‘accountability deficit’, due to the ‘limited representation of 
stakeholder groups’ (Berezi, 2008, 296). This led him to recommend that 
there should more academic representation on governing bodies (Berezi, 
2008, 301). This was an interesting position for Berezi to adopt, given that it 
runs counter to the trend towards less academic influence on governance of 
the last twenty years. However, Berezi’s finding of an accountability deficit in
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relation to stakeholders was not one for which evidence was found in my own 
study (see sub-sections 7.5.3 and 8.2.3 below).
Rather more extended reference to governance theory was a feature of 
Schofield’s recent study of governing body effectiveness (Schofield, 2009; see 
also sub-section 3.6.3). In addition to considering agency and stewardship 
theory, Schofield discussed what he called management, political and 
partnership perspectives (Schofield, 2009, 18-26). He related his 
management perspective to the ‘inevitably ... managerial view’ resulting from 
the development of the combined code of governance in the UK private sector 
(FRC, 2010). In the case of political approaches to governance, Schofield 
suggested that these would not generally be applicable in the UK, other than 
perhaps in the context of large federal institutions. Finally, with regard to 
partnership governance, Schofield cited the John Lewis Partnership as a 
strong exemplar, and suggested that it ‘provides a good example of the 
correlation between a hugely successful business and explicitly collegial 
governance’ (Schofield, 2009, 25).
In relation to the overall utility or validity of governance theory, 
Schofield concluded that it ‘probably depends upon the nature of the 
organisation and board’ in question in any particular set of circumstances. He 
suggested that a hybrid approach to governance theory is likely to be of most 
relevance and adopted such an approach in drawing his conclusions, and 
making recommendations, about governing body effectiveness (Schofield, 
2009, 25-26).
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3.9.5 Findings from empirical studies
Having touched on the extent to which they engaged with governance 
theory, I shall now turn to the principal findings of the empirical studies 
considered above, adding to those studies that of governing body chairs by 
Bott (2007), who did not discuss governance theory per se in his work. 
Starting again first with Bargh et al (1996; also sub-sections 2.8.3, 2.10.1 and 
3.6.3) their research involved a questionnaire survey of nearly 750 governing 
body members from 28 higher education institutions, and four case studies, in 
which governing body members and senior staff were interviewed (Bargh et 
al, 1996, Appendix 1). This led them to posit eight possible roles for 
governing body members. These were:
• five internal roles in relation to
- strategy (determining strategic mission);
- audit (guaranteeing financial and organisational integrity);
- supervision (overseeing the chief executive, etc);
- managerial issues (appointing staff and setting 
performance-related remuneration); and,
- participation in formal appeals mechanisms.
• two external roles
- representing the institution; and,
- negotiating on behalf of the institution.
• one combined internal/external role
- providing support for the institution
(Bargh et al, 1996,89).
The more broad-ranging of the roles included in Bargh et a/’s list bear a 
reasonably close relationship to those subsequently set out in the code of 
practice produced by the CUC (CUC, 2009), and to the roles identified by 
governing body members in this study (see, in particular, chapters 5 and 6). 
From their questionnaire, they deduced that governing body members
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regarded their strategy, audit and supervision roles, in that order, as the most 
important.
In the case of Bennett (2001), he combined analysis of the minutes of 
board meetings from three higher education corporations with a questionnaire 
survey of board members in one of those institutions and four others. From 
the former, Bennett concluded, inter alia, that the response of most governors 
to most items was passive. He also found that ‘very few items’ addressed 
‘issues concerning boards’ purpose, effectiveness or accountability’ or 
‘appeared to be designed to assist the board to monitor the executive’ 
(Bennett, 2001, 98). In the case of his questionnaire data, Bennett’s findings, 
which focussed primarily on issues of effectiveness, have been discussed 
above (sub-section 3.6.3).
Bennett’s principal conclusions were about the passivity of boards, the 
high level of support for his ‘effective governance factors’, the differences in 
some areas between the views of external governors and staff or student 
governors, and issues relating to the training provided for governors. 
Bennett’s conclusions were based on the assumption ‘that Boards of 
Governors are the focus of power within institutions’. However, given the 
‘apparent lack of debate, or discussion, on major strategic and governance 
issues’, he wondered whether this meant that real power lay elsewhere, and 
therefore whether, in consequence, the responsibilities of boards should be 
changed, given that they appeared to be failing to be effective in relation to 
their existing responsibilities (Bennett, 2001, 137). These aspects of
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Bennett’s discussion suggest the boards he studied were operating in 
accordance with the tenets of managerial hegemony theory, although this was 
not one of the theoretical positions on governance that he himself discussed.
Bott (2007) undertook a study of the role of the chairs of university 
governing bodies. This involved him interviewing chairs, other members of 
governing bodies and senior managers in four universities (two pre-1992 and 
two post-1992 institutions). His range of respondents and types of institution 
were therefore similar to those in this study, as was his overall research 
methodology. Bott characterised the results of his research as providing ‘a 
detailed “insider’s” picture of the chair’s job’ (Bott, 2007, 202). He used the 
concept of the ‘chair’s domain’ to refer to the ‘territory of the university ... over 
which the chair exercises authority and power’, as distinct from ‘the domains 
of other bodies and officeholders’. This domain included ‘rules and
regulations’, but also ‘formal and informal understandings’ about the chair’s 
role ‘amongst key players’ (Bott, 2007, 204).
Bott identified a range of influences on chairs and their domains. The 
external members of a governing body, as a group, were one such influence. 
He reported the existence of a marked level of incomprehension (and some 
exasperation) between external members of governing bodies and internals, 
which was sometimes mutual. This, he suggested, was ‘the obverse of [the] 
generally-expressed “complementary skills and talents” argument for non­
expert majorities on governing bodies’ (Bott, 2007, 205). Interestingly, as will 
be seen below in due course, there was relatively little sign of
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incomprehension or exasperation with their counterparts in the views 
expressed either by external or internal respondents in this study.
Other features of Bott’s work highlighted:
• the tendency of chairs to adopt approaches to governance 
drawn from their experience in commercial and business 
environments;
• chairs’ role as leaders on their governing bodies of a small 
group of senior lay governors (with such ‘inner circles’ existing 
in all four institutions studied);
• chairs’ significant role in strategy development; and,
• evidence that the boundary between governance and 
management was ‘so mutable as to have become almost a 
fiction’. (Bott, 2007, 208-216)
Overall, Bott suggests that the role of chairs, which has always been
significant, is becoming even more so, with the chair’s domain extending into
new areas both within and outwith the university.
As noted in sub-sections 3.6.3 and 3.9.4, Llewellyn (2007) was 
concerned with the role of governing body secretaries. In his study he used a 
web-based questionnaire, and a programme of semi-structured interviews 
with secretaries, chairs and Vice-Chancellors from nine institutions. In 
framing his research, Llewellyn developed a proposal that there were three 
‘cross-cutting themes’ related to the role of governing body secretaries, these 
being ‘role context, relationships and influence’ (Llewellyn, 2007, 159), all 
three of which he found evidence for. Through the use of cluster analysis on 
data from his web-based survey, Llewellyn identified three ‘practice-based’ 
institutional groupings (Llewellyn, 2007, 167), and concluded that ‘institution 
type’ was not ‘a key determinant in the practice of governance’ and that ‘the
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approach taken by institutions’ could be better characterised via the practices 
they used.
In the case of the research undertaken by Berezi (2008) (see also sub­
sections 3.6.3 and 3.9.4 above), he set out to explore the ‘perceptions of lay 
university governors and their accounts of governance practices’ in seven 
universities in England and Scotland. Given this, it is perhaps not surprising 
that two of Berezi’s four principal research questions were very similar to the 
questions posed in this study, as they related to the ways in which governing 
body members’ ‘perceive and understand their governance roles and 
practices’, and the ways in which they ‘claim to assert the effectiveness of 
their governance practices and performance’ (Berezi, 2008, 269-270). His 
results are therefore clearly very pertinent here1.
In his main study Berezi interviewed 27 people associated with 
governing bodies - 15 from four English universities, and 12 from three 
Scottish institutions. Berezi also observed governing body meetings at five 
institutions, and a committee meeting at one other university, as well as 
collecting documentary material. The majority of his conclusions arose, 
however, from his analysis of interview data. Those conclusions concerned:
• governing body members’ backgrounds and motivations;
• the principal roles of governing bodies, which he identified as 
being concerned with accountability, strategy, monitoring,
11 did not become aware of Berezi’s work until the middle of 2011. Berezi’s approach to his 
research therefore had no influence on my own research questions and methodology, nor on 
my data collection. Having become aware of his thesis while I was undertaking my data 
analysis, I took the decision not to read his work until after I had completed that data analysis, 
when I came to revise and update my literature review.
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compliance and assessment (of the performance of the 
governing body);
• approaches to strategy which were either ‘reactive-passive’ and 
largely ‘executive-driven’, or ‘proactive-active’ and more 
collaborative, with greater lay contribution (the first of these two 
approaches Berezi associates with the managerial hegemony 
strand of governance theory, the latter with stewardship);
• risk assessment and control, where he found the focus to be on 
management risk, rather than governance risk;
• the accountability of governing bodies; and,
• issues around performance reviews and the effectiveness of 
governing bodies and individual governors. (Berezi, 2008, 270- 
289)
As will be seen in due course, there are some areas where the data analysed 
in this study support Berezi’s conclusions, but other areas where they do not. 
Berezi suggested that ‘the cultural emphasis of the institutions [studied] has 
massively shifted from the collegial to [a] corporate culture of governance and 
management’ (Berezi, 2008, 293). This is a view which I think can be 
regarded as sustained in part by the findings from this study, but which the 
evidence I shall present suggests is not as clear cut as Berezi’s ‘massively’ 
implies, being instead in my view rather a question of combining a more 
corporate approach with a significant degree of continuing regard for 
collegiality.
In this review of recent detailed studies of higher education governance 
in the UK, the final example I shall refer to once again is the report by 
Schofield (2009), which has also already been considered above (see sub­
sections 3.6.3 and 3.9.4). Schofield’s work made use of a questionnaire 
survey, carried out on behalf of the LFHE and CUC by the Office of Public 
Management (OPM), and interview-based case studies. The OPM’s
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questionnaire was addressed to governing body members and executives in 
27 higher education institutions. Six main topics were covered, relating to:
• institutional purpose and mission;
• effective performance;
• the promotion of institutional values and good governance;
• taking transparent decisions and managing risk;
• developing the governing body; and,
• engaging stakeholders, partnership working, and accountability. 
(Schofield, 2009, 49)
The results showed, inter alia, that there were ‘high levels of satisfaction’ in
relation to:
• the understanding of governing bodies’ responsibilities;
• governing bodies role in relation to strategy; and,
• the working relationships between governing body members 
and institutions’ senior managers.
They also suggested that there were ‘areas of challenge’ with regard to:
• communication and relationships, both internally and externally, 
particularly ‘in many cases with the senate or academic board’;
• the need for better performance monitoring of governing bodies 
and individual governing body members; and,
• benchmarking performance. (Schofield, 2009, 49)
The survey’s results therefore offer some potentially interesting insights to 
consider alongside the results arising from this study.
Taken as a whole, the work discussed above by authors such as Bargh 
et al, Bennett, Berezi, Bott, Llewellyn and Schofield covers a wide range of 
topics that are pertinent to the research reported here. Unlike much of the 
other literature discussed above, their findings are directly concerned with 
higher education governance. Provided, of course, that those findings are 
used carefully and with discrimination, they are potentially of significant
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relevance for comparative purposes when considering the conclusions 
reached in this thesis.
3.9.6 Research outwith the UK
Another area of work of potential relevance to this study is that 
concerned with higher education governance outwith the UK. However, 
bearing in mind the different contexts in which such research has taken place, 
and its extensive nature, particularly in relation to the USA, I shall touch here 
only on a small number of studies of particular relevance, starting with a study 
by Baird (2004) on higher education governance in Australia. Despite the 
Australian context, the subject of Baird’s research -  which is concerned with 
how governing body members perceive and carry out their roles - and the way 
it was carried out, places it firmly in the same general category of research as 
this study, and several of those cited above by, for example, Berezi (2008), 
Bott (2007) or Llewellyn (2007).
Unlike the other studies just cited, or this research, Baird’s work was 
explicitly associated with a particular theoretical framework, in that she made 
significant use of Bourdieu’s sociological theories and of critical discourse 
analysis (Baird, 2004, 68-97, particularly 69-73). In doing so, she developed 
an approach involving the identification of ‘repertoires of value’ to which she 
related the ways in which governing body members discussed the governance 
of their institutions. She also linked three of these repertoires to the 
governance models set out by Hung (1998; see sub-section 3.3.7 above). 
Baird’s ‘repertoires’ were:
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• the business repertoire, associated with agency and stewardship 
theories;
• the community stakeholder repertoire, with an emphasis on public 
legitimation and civic engagement, associated with stakeholder 
and resource dependency governance models;
• the university community repertoire, which stresses traditional 
university values and participation by academics, associated with 
managerial hegemony, but also with institutional and stakeholder 
governance models; and
• the repertoire of professionalism, which focuses on governing 
body effectiveness and ideas linked to supposed best practice in 
governance. (Baird, 2004, 145-149)
In her overall conclusions, Baird suggested, inter alia, that governing body 
members used multiple concepts in discussing governance, that the business 
repertoire was not dominant although it was used ‘to marginalise other 
discourses’ and that governance ‘is being shaped by an emerging 
professionalised discourse ... that is not specific to universities’ (Baird, 2004, 
255).
Turning to the United States, there has been extensive study of higher 
education governance. Examples of recent overviews include those by Gayle 
et al (2003), Kezar and Eckel (2004), and Mortimer and O’Brien Sathre 
(2007). There is, however, no scope for any extended discussion of such 
work here, nor -  given the distinctive and different US higher education 
context -  would such discussion arguably do other than provide further 
generic examples of governance roles and how they are perceived. 
Nonetheless, I believe that it is relevant to make reference to work by Chait et 
al (2005), and a recent study by Kezar (2006), because of their influence on 
the recent work by Schofield (2009) on UK governance that has been cited 
several times above.
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Building on earlier work (Chait etal, 1991; 1996), Chait (with one of the 
same colleagues and one new colleague) has recently undertaken research 
on ‘governance as leadership’ (Chait et al, 2005). In this study, Chait et al 
developed the idea that there are different ‘modes of governance’ -  fiduciary 
(‘concerned ... with the stewardship of tangible assets’), strategic (involving 
the creation of ‘a strategic partnership with management’) and generative (‘a 
critical source of leadership’) (Chait et al, 2005, 6-7). The latter is seen as 
involving ultimately a new approach to governance, and as contributing 
strongly to the capacity of governing bodies to be effective. The ideas in this 
study are important in the UK context because of their influence on the work 
of Schofield (2009). That influence should not be over-stated, but Schofield 
refers to Chait et a/’s work in the section of his report which identifies ‘effective 
leadership and governing body dynamics’ as the first of his ‘enablers of 
effective governance’ (see sub-section 3.6.3 above). This is in a context 
where leadership has not previously featured to any great extent (i.e. prior to 
Schofield’s report) as a potential role for the governing bodies of UK higher 
education institutions.
Also influencing Schofield is recent work by Kezar (2006). Schofield 
noted explicitly that the six factors he identified as enablers of effective 
governance build on Kezar’s work (Schofield, 2009, 27). That work reported 
the results of a wide-ranging empirical study of governing board performance, 
focussing on public higher education boards in the US. Kezar stressed both 
the need for higher education institutions to have ‘high-performing boards’,
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because of the ‘complex issues’ they face, and the lack of a clear definition of 
what constitutes or contributes to high performance/effectiveness (Kezar, 
2006, 969-970). She went on to identify six ‘elements of high-performing 
boards’ associated with board leadership and culture, the provision of 
appropriate support for the board, maintaining effective external relations, 
good relationships amongst board members, and having the right governance 
structures (Kezar, 2006, 984-997, and Table 1). Factors similar to at least 
some of these will in due course be seen to be perceived as important by 
governing body members in this study.
3.10 Summary and conclusions
3.10.1 The limits of previous studies
The discussion of the literature set out above illustrates the relative 
paucity until recently of studies into higher education governance in the UK, 
despite the rise to prominence of the issue at the behest of government and 
intermediary agencies such as the funding councils. It also demonstrates that 
although a number of studies of university governance have been undertaken 
in recent years, those studies have only considered to a limited extent the 
potential explanatory value of governance theory. In addition, it remains the 
case that few studies have thrown light on the questions of how governing 
body members in general perceive their roles, and the effectiveness of their 
governing bodies.
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Both in relation to the explanatory value of governance theory, and in 
the case of research into the roles of board members, board processes and 
what may constitute or promote effectiveness in governance, studies 
undertaken in the private sector and in other parts of the public sector can 
make up to some extent for the relative paucity of work directly concerned 
with higher education governance. For example, research such as that of 
Mace (1971), Lorsch and Mclver (1989), Stiles and Taylor (2001), McNulty et 
al (2003), Pettigrew and McNulty (1998) or Roberts et al (2005), addresses 
how board members perceive their roles, and how they view their capacity to 
contribute to boardroom effectiveness. Similarly, the discussions of public 
sector governance by authors such as Ashburner (1997, 2003), Cornforth 
(2003a, 2003b, 2003c) or Deem (1995) provide further comparative material 
against which to consider the results of this study. Together with those 
studies of higher education governance that have been cited above, material 
of this kind provides a good basis against which to consider the findings of the 
empirical study reported in this thesis. With this in mind, I shall turn in the 
next section to a review of my research aims and question and a discussion of 
methodological issues and research methods.
126
Chapter 4: Research methodology, design and methods
4.1 Research aims and questions revisited
4.1.1 Overall research aims
In chapters 2 and 3 various aspects of the context for this study were 
explored. It was shown that many factors have influenced the development of 
the current governance arrangements in the higher education sector in 
England, and that relatively little empirical research has been undertaken into 
the perceptions of higher education governing body members of the roles and 
effectiveness of their governing bodies. There is, therefore, a good prima 
facie case for undertaking further empirical research into the governance of 
English higher education institutions, and that it is both pertinent and timely to 
do so. It is in this context that the principal overall aims of the research 
pursued in this study, as set out in chapter 1, were:
(a) to explore how members and other attendees of the governing 
bodies of English higher education institutions perceive the roles 
of their governing bodies, and their own roles as individuals 
involved with those governing bodies; and
(b) to explore how members and other attendees of the governing 
bodies of English higher education institutions perceive the 
concept of effectiveness in relation to higher education 
governance, and the ways in which they contribute to enabling 
their governing bodies to be effective.
These overall aims remain valid in the light of the material reviewed and
discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and it has also been shown that governing
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body members’ role perceptions need to be considered in the light of a 
number of other factors. Firstly, the explicitly stated expectations of governing 
body roles as promulgated by the Committee of University Chairs (CUC), and 
endorsed by bodies such as the higher education funding councils and the 
Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE) (see sub-section 3.2.5); 
secondly, the predictions as to the nature of governance roles derived from 
governance theory and institutional theory (see sections 3.3 and 3.4); and, 
thirdly, information obtained from previous studies of governance with a focus 
on the roles of board and governing body members, and in relation to 
effectiveness (see sections 3.6 et seq).
4.1.2 Specific research questions
Given the overall research aims, the specific research questions it was 
decided to address were as follows:
• What are the main roles of higher education governing bodies, as 
perceived by governing body members and other attendees?
• How do the members and attendees of higher education governing 
bodies perceive their individual roles, and the ways in which they 
contribute, or not, to the overall roles of the governing body as a 
whole?
• What do governing body members and attendees regard as 
effectiveness in the context of the work of the governing body of a 
higher education institution?
• What factors do governing body members and attendees regard as 
the most important contributors to governing body effectiveness?
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As well as these primary research questions, a number of subsidiary topics 
were also specified, including:
• To what extent do models derived from governance theory appear 
to be relevant or helpful in explaining or characterising the roles of 
higher education institutions’ governing bodies?
• Bearing in mind recent instances of governance failure, how 
confident are governing body members and attendees of their 
collective capacity to identify potentially critical issues across the full 
range of their institutions’ activities?
• Given the formal autonomy of higher education institutions, do 
governing body members and attendees regard their governing 
bodies as accountable to any external body or bodies, and if so in 
what ways?
• How do governing body members and attendees feel that the 
nature of governance practices and of the interactions between 
those attending governing bodies contribute to effectiveness?
In the terms used by Maxwell (2005, 72-73), the questions and sub­
questions set out above should not be viewed from too instrumentalist a 
perspective. Instead they should be seen as providing a route towards the 
development of an understanding of the beliefs and perceptions governing 
body members have about their roles, rather than as ways of eliciting 
necessarily observable or measurable data. It is therefore not the intention 
that answers to these questions will be obtained that represent ‘the truth’ in 
some absolute sense, as it is clear that ‘truth can vary from place to place and 
time to time’ (Collins, 1983, 88). At the same time, where much of the data is 
derived directly from individual governing body members through interviews
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(see sub-section 4.3.1), as is the case in this study, it is, however, also 
important that respondents do not supply information they know to be false or 
misleading (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002, 89-90). Bearing these points in mind, 
it is now possible to consider the research methodology and research design 
for this study.
4.2 Research methodology and research design
4.2.1 Underlying assumptions
Explicit references to underlying epistemological and ontological 
assumptions do not often appear in the literature discussed in the preceding 
two chapters. Nonetheless, while it is clear that a variety of approaches have 
been adopted in previous studies of governance, it is also apparent that the 
commonest approach has been positivist and realist. However, given that the 
principal aims of this research, and the nature of the research questions, 
involve considering individuals’ perceptions of the situations they find 
themselves in, I believe that it is most appropriate in this study to take an 
approach that recognises aspects of critical realism, interpretivism and 
constructionism. My stance is therefore relativist, in the terms used by 
Easterby-Smith et al (2002, 32-33), and assumes that different people can -  
and often will - have differing perceptions of the same events. Overall, I 
propose adopting a pragmatic perspective, without taking an extreme stance 
in regard to the extent of the subjective nature of institutions (see, for 
instance, Burrell and Morgan’s seminal work (1979) on paradigms, and
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subsequent discussions by authors such as Hassard (1991) or Willmott 
(1993); for a summary see Bryman and Bell, 2007, 25-27).
An additional aspect to the assumptions underlying my approach to this 
research is the proposition that the research process needs to be treated, at 
least in part, as a craft, as proposed by Daft (1983). Daft’s position was 
developed in the context of a more general debate about the merits of so- 
called ‘scientific conceptions of social research, and quantitative method’ 
versus an increasing variety, and frequency of use, of qualitative research 
methods (see, for example, Seale, 2004, 99-113). For Daft, adopting, and 
relying solely on, formal research techniques was insufficient, and attention 
needed to be paid to ‘research c ra ft... [whose] elements ... are neither fixed 
nor complete’ and which rely on the deployment by researchers of their craft 
skills (Daft, 1983, 544). Daft therefore promotes the idea that the research 
process must, at least in part, be instinctive and intuitive. Explicit references 
to the idea of craft in research in other discussions of research methodology 
are relatively rare (although see, for example, Watson, 1994). However, I 
suggest that the concept of craftsmanship in research is important, and that 
the research process needs to involve not only the deployment of appropriate 
formal techniques and methods, but also conscious recognition of the role of 
the researcher’s craft ability.
4.2.2 Research design
Given the focus of this study it was apparent that it would be important 
to obtain data directly from individual members of governing bodies. A
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research design employing qualitative methods was therefore felt to be 
appropriate, involving direct interaction between the researcher and the 
research subjects. This contention is supported by Maxwell (2005), who 
highlights what he calls the intellectual and practical goals for which qualitative 
studies are suited. Maxwell’s intellectual goals include, inter alia, 
‘understanding the meaning, for participants in the study, of the events, 
situations, experiences and actions they are involved with or engage in’, 
‘understanding the particular context within which the participants act, and the 
influence that this context has on their actions’, and ‘identifying unanticipated 
phenomena and influences’; his practical goals for qualitative research include 
‘generating results and theories that are understandable and experientially 
credible’ (Maxwell, 2005, 22-24, his emphases).
The presumptive use of qualitative methods, and the gathering of data 
directly from governing body members, perhaps through interviews or focus 
groups, was not, though, seen as precluding the use of additional methods as 
part of the overall research design, with a view to eliciting additional or 
supplementary data. A mixed methods approach, possibly involving in 
addition the use of a questionnaire survey, the analysis of secondary 
documentary evidence, and/or the observation of governing body meetings 
was therefore also considered.
Examples of all these research methods, used singly, or in 
combination, can be found in the literature discussed in the previous chapter. 
Bargh et al (1996), for instance (see sub-section 3.9.5), used a questionnaire
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survey, combined with case studies in which governing body members were 
interviewed and one governing body meeting observed. In the case of more 
recent empirical research of higher education governance in the UK (see 
again sub-section 3.9.5), case study-based approaches were widely used, in 
combination with a variety of other methods, including questionnaire surveys 
(Bennett, 2001; Llewellyn, 2007), interviews with governing body members 
(Berezi, 2008; Bott, 2007; Llewellyn, 2006), observation of governing body 
meetings (Berezi, 2008) and documentary analysis (Bennett, 2001; Berezi, 
2008).
A variety of methods has also been used in studies of governance in 
other sectors. The study of public and voluntary sector governance by 
Cornforth and Edwards (1998, 1999), for example, was based on four case 
studies and involved observation of meetings, semi-structured interviews and 
analysis of relevant documentation and systems. In relation to the NHS, Peck 
(1995) used a questionnaire survey, observation of meetings and analysis of 
board documents. In the private sector, the basis for the studies in the US by 
Mace (1971) and Lorsch and Maclver (1989) was semi-structured interviews. 
This was also the method used by Stiles and Taylor (2001) and McNulty et al 
(2003). (For all references in this paragraph see sections 3.7 to 3.9.)
In my view, the richest and most persuasive accounts amongst those 
touched on here, and others discussed in chapter 3, are those that used a 
case study design, and involved data collection via interviews with governing 
body or board members, or multiple methods, one of which was interviews.
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With this in mind, and given the aims of my research and my proposed overall 
methodological stance, I concluded that a case-study design was appropriate, 
particularly in regard to the collection and initial analysis of my data. As will 
be seen below, however, I concluded in due course that detailed analysis of 
my data was best approached through considering the totality of the individual 
cases taken together -  that is, at the level of the quintain, as defined by Stake 
(2006, 4-8; see sub-sections 4.2.3 and 4.5.4 below). I was also initially 
minded to use multiple methods, albeit with interviews of governing body 
members featuring prominently. However, as will again be seen below, my 
intentions in this regard changed also.
4.2.3 Case studies
‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2009, 19). Case 
studies relate to things ‘such as a workplace or organization’ with an 
‘emphasis ... upon an intensive examination of the setting’ (Bryman and Bell, 
2007, 62), and ‘may be especially suitable for learning more about a little 
known or poorly understood situation’ (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005, 135). The 
last point is particularly pertinent with regard to existing knowledge of the 
perceptions of governing body members about governing body roles.
One suggested limitation of case studies is the extent to which the 
findings from such research can be generalised. This point is made, for 
example, by Bryman and Bell (2007, 63) and by Gillham (2000, 6). However, 
Yin argues that ‘case studies ... are generalizable to theoretical propositions’
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if ‘not to populations or universes’ (Yin, 2009, 15), while Stake points to the 
feasibility of ‘refining understanding’ through what he calls ‘petite 
generalizations’, as well as the potential for case study research to modify 
‘grand generalizations’ (Stake, 1995, 7; his emphases). Another positive 
discussion of the possibility of generalising, in certain ways and in certain 
circumstances, is offered by Flyvbjerg (2004, 423-425). Ultimately, these 
views all illustrate the need to ensure that the conclusions eventually drawn 
from any piece of case study research must be appropriate to the context in 
which the research was undertaken, the research questions posed, and the 
nature of the analysis undertaken.
Another consideration in case study research is whether the focus is on 
a single case, or on several cases (Gerring, 2007, 20). Yin suggests that the 
evidence from ‘multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the 
overall study ... [then] more robust’. On the other hand, he adds that there 
may be disadvantages from using multiple cases, because ‘by definition, the 
unusual or rare case, the critical case, and the revelatory case all are likely 
only to involve single cases’ (Yin, 2009, 53). This is a contention that I think 
Yin overstates, as it does not seem unreasonable to imagine that the unusual 
or revelatory features of a particular case might sometimes become even 
more striking in the context of a study of multiple cases.
If multiple cases are studied, Gerring suggests that as the number of 
cases increases, the intensity of the study of each separate case will 
eventually decrease to the extent that it will no longer be valid to regard the
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approach as being case study research (Gerring, 2007, 20). The question to 
consider is then the balance between breadth and depth in a study, and the 
extent to which additional cases provide opportunities to explore more facets 
of the subject under investigation, and add to the richness of the data 
obtained. Issues of this kind are also discussed by Stake (1995, 2006). He 
notes that sometimes it may be appropriate to study single cases, but that 
often a collective case study (1995, 4-5), or multicase study (2006, 17-32), 
may be more appropriate. In the latter regard, Stake argues that ‘the benefits 
of multicase study will be limited if fewer than, say, 4 cases are chosen, or 
more than 10’ (Stake, 2006, 22). Stake discusses at some length how 
multiple cases might be chosen, and the varied approaches that this might 
involve. It is clear that there is often merit in undertaking case study research 
with multiple cases, and given the emphasis in the primary research aims and 
questions for this study on governing body members’ overall perceptions of 
their governing bodies’ roles and effectiveness that is the approach that is 
adopted in this study.
Where multiple cases are explored, as in this study, a further 
consideration that arises is how those cases are analysed. They can be 
analysed primarily on a stand alone basis, and the results for each case 
compared and contrasted with one another, or the analysis can consider the 
totality of the cases taken as a whole. In the latter case, Stake suggests that 
‘the single case is of interest because it belongs to a particular collection of 
cases’ Stake (2006, 4) that have shared features. Together Stake defines the 
set of cases taken together as the ‘quintain’, or ‘the object or phenomenon or
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condition to be studied’ (Stake, 2006, 6) -  in this case the perceptions of 
governing body members. However, even where the principle object of study 
is the quintain, issues remain about the degree to which attention is focussed 
at the level of the quintain, or at the level of the individual cases. As Stake 
puts it:
Both the collective and the specific are worth knowing, but what is 
worth knowing next? ... The multi case study is about the quintain, but 
is it the quintain with loose ties to the cases or the quintain with vital 
ties to the cases? (Stake, 2006, 7)
This issue will be returned to below (sub-section 4.5.4).
4.2.4 Parameters for selecting the case study institutions
A number of ways of choosing the case study institutions could have 
been used, but in this study a purposive approach was adopted. However, 
even with the adoption of a purposive approach, the choice of case study 
institutions remained challenging, because of the variety of ways in which UK 
higher education institutions can be differentiated. Institutions can, for 
instance, be categorised by:
• the nature of their governance arrangements (for example, 
chartered vs incorporated institutions);
• institution size (measured in different ways -  for example, income, 
number of students, number of staff);
• institution type (using a pre-existing typology - for example, Tight, 
2007 - or one drawn up specifically for the study); or,
• institutional performance (whether in terms of financial outcomes, 
research assessment exercise (RAE) results, or National Student 
Survey rankings).
One could also consider other approaches, such as whether there might be 
particular value in studying institutions undergoing significant change, if such
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could be identified, or institutions that appear to be operating broadly in a 
steady state.
An additional consideration was whether the institutions in the study 
should be drawn from across the UK as a whole, or just from within one of the 
UK’s constituent parts -  i.e. England, Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales. 
Although many features of higher education are common across the UK, there 
are also differences, for historical and political reasons. To reduce this aspect 
of variability in the external environment, I decided that the case study 
institutions should be chosen only from amongst universities and other higher 
education institutions in England. However, having narrowed the parameters 
for selection in one regard, I then took the view that there was such a wide 
variation in the nature of English higher education institutions, judged by 
parameters of the kinds set out above, that at the institutional level it was 
more appropriate to allow for this variety than to attempt to minimise it. The 
range of institutions selected for the study therefore included:
(a) both chartered and incorporated universities;
(b) research-intensive and teaching-focussed institutions;
(c) institutions with varied histories, ranging from a large civic 
university with nineteenth century origins, to an institution which 
became a university after 2000;
(d) institutions ranging in size, as measured by student numbers, from 
under 5000 to over 30000, and in terms of total income from well 
under £25M to over £300M;
(e) institutions varying in their degree of specialist focus from those 
entering staff to fewer than 10 units of assessment in the last RAE, 
to those entering staff to around 40 units of assessment.
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Consideration was given to seeking to include either Cambridge or Oxford 
amongst the case study institutions. However, it was decided that their 
position vis-a-vis the rest of the higher education sector was too distinctive 
and too privileged.
4.2.5 The process of identifying individual institutions
The process for identifying individual institutions combined a general 
approach to university secretaries and registrars with approaches to selected 
individuals already known to me. The general approach was by means of an 
e-mail message about my research kindly sent out by the Association of 
Heads of University Administration (AHUA). Almost all members of AHUA are 
secretaries to their institutions’ governing bodies, and even where they are not 
they tend to work closely with the governing body secretary. The AHUA e- 
mail therefore drew my research to the attention of relevant institutional 
contacts. As I had been a member of AHUA myself, many of the recipients of 
the AHUA e-mail either knew me, or knew of me, and a number of people 
subsequently contacted me to indicate their willingness to assist with my 
research. I also followed up the AHUA e-mail by making direct approaches to 
a number of other people. In making contact, I briefly set out something about 
my background, the nature of my research, and what it involved in practice. 
Although dealing with university secretaries or similar post-holders, I 
recognised that they would need the agreement of the chairs of their 
governing bodies and their Vice-Chancellors (the final say might lie with the 
chair, but it was unlikely that a chair would agree unless the Vice-Chancellor 
was positive).
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Through the AHUA e-mail, and my own direct approaches, I was able 
to identify five case study institutions. I had it in mind initially that a total of six 
institutions might be approached. This number was selected on the grounds 
that it was sufficient to ensure a reasonable reflection of the variety of the 
types of institution in the English higher education sector. In addition, by 
involving this number of institutions, the demands placed on each of them 
would be reduced. Seeking to involve more than about six institutions 
seemed likely to be impractical, given the overall time frame for the research. 
Once the first five institutions had agreed to participate, I delayed identifying a 
potential sixth institution in case any issues arose in the first five institutions 
that might influence my choice of additional institution. No such issues arose 
and I therefore eventually endeavoured to identify a further institution that 
differed from those already involved. Time constraints meant that several 
institutions were then approached at once, and when two of them, each 
differing in a number of ways from the institutions already included in the 
study, proved willing to take part, I took up both offers. In the end, therefore, 
there were seven case study institutions in all.
4.2.6 Summary details of the case study institutions
In terms of their governance arrangements, three of the seven 
institutions selected were chartered universities (pre-1992 universities), three 
were incorporated universities (two being post-1992 universities and one a 
post-2000 university), and one was a university college, with governance 
arrangements very similar to those of the incorporated universities. The 
institutions fell into a number of the categories in the typologies proposed by
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authors such as Scott (1995, 43-53) and Tight (2007, 2009). It was also 
possible to differentiate some of the institutions by the self-selecting groups to 
which they belonged. The case study institutions therefore included members 
of the Russell Group (large, research-intensive institutions), the 1994 Group 
(small to medium-sized research intensive institutions), Million+ (primarily 
teaching-focussed institutions), and GuildHE (smaller institutions, mainly 
university colleges and teacher training or other specialist colleges).
The principal features of the case-study institutions in relation to a 
range of parameters are set out in Table 4.1 below. The numbers and types 
of governing body member at each institution are given in Table 4.2 overleaf.
Table 4.1: Case study institution parameters
Institutional parameters
Income HEFCE Rsch Staff (fte) Students NSS RAE UoAs
Institution (£M) %age income (Acad/rsch (Head rank rank entered
(£M) vs total) count)
CityMod 150 40% <10 500-750 vs 20000+ 2nd 3rd <10
1500-2000 q’tile q’tile
Civic 300+ 30% 75-100 2000+ vs 20000+ 2nd 1st 40
5000+ q’tile q’tile
ExCAT 100 35% 10-25 <500 vs 7500+ 1st 2nd <10
1000-1500 q’tile q’tile
Greenfield 125 30% 10-25 500-750 vs 10000+ 2nd 1st 10-20
1500-2000 q’tile q’tile
NewMill <100 40% <10 <500 vs 10000+ 3rd 4th 10-20
1000-1500 q’tile q’tile
TownMod 150 35% <10 500-750 vs 30000+ 3rd 3rd 10-20
1500-2000 q’tile q’tile
Unicollege <50 50%+ <10 <250 vs <5000 2nd 4th <10
<500 q’tile q’tile
Notes: HEFCE = Higher Education Funding Council for England; Rsch = research; 
Acad = academic; NSS = National student survey; RAE = Research 
Assessment exercise; UoA = Unit of assessment (in RAE); q’tile = quartile.
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Table 4.2: Numbers and types of governing body member
Institution
Total
members
Proportions of governing body members by type
External Exec staff Non- Students 
members members exec
staff
Attendees
CityMod 16-20 75% 5% 15% 5% 6-10
Civic 21-25 67% 5% 20% 10% 6-10
ExCAT 26-30 50% 33% 10% 10% 1-5
Greenfield 21-25 50% 10% 33% 5% 6-10
NewMill 21-25 80% 5% 10% 5% 1-5
TownMod 16-20 75% 5% 15% 5% 1-5
Unicollege 16-20 80% 5% 10% 5% 1-5
Notes: Exec = executive, Non-exec = non-executive; percentages may not 
add to 100% due to rounding
I believe that the data set out above demonstrate that the case study 
institutions reflect aspects of the diversity of the English higher education 
sector. Further summary details of each institution, including an indication of 
the reasons for the names allocated to each of them (CityMod, Civic, etc), are 
given in Appendix 1.
4.3 Research methods
4.3.1 Collection of data from interviews
It was intended that a significant amount of data would be gathered by 
means of direct interaction with governing body members. It also seemed 
appropriate, and indeed was arguably necessary, to collect data not just from 
governing body members but also from members of university staff that 
engage regularly with governing bodies. This category includes university
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secretaries and other members of institutions’ senior management teams, 
many of whom are regular or routine attendees at governing body meetings, 
but are not members. I concluded that the most effective way of obtaining 
data was to conduct individual semi-structured interviews. Individual 
interviews have the potential advantage, over, say, group discussions or focus 
groups, of eliciting an individual’s views in a context where they cannot be 
directly influenced by the views of other people. This is not to say that even in 
a one to one interview people might not sometimes be influenced by a sense 
of the views of their colleagues, or that there may not be value in the insights 
that could arise in group discussions. Nonetheless, on balance I decided it 
was preferable to use interviews.
The decision to take a semi-structured approach to the interview 
process was based on the premise that such an approach allows for ‘flexibility 
balanced by structure’ (Gillham, 2005, 70), whereby a range of questions, or 
specific topics of enquiry, can be addressed with all interviewees. At the 
same time, there is flexibility, in that there is no requirement or expectation 
that all interviewees need to be asked the same questions, in the same order. 
Instead, by allowing interviews to develop more organically, interviewees are 
able to present their observations and opinions in a manner and sequence 
that is to a degree of their own choosing. Often this leads in practice to 
interviewees addressing topics without the interviewer having to ask specific 
questions.
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In undertaking semi-structured or open-ended interviews, it is usually 
accepted that, as Gillham puts its, ‘a subjective construction is being made’ 
(Gillham, 2005, 6, his emphasis). Gillham also writes about the importance of 
detachment on the part of the interviewer, and the need to be aware of any 
preconceptions that the researcher may hold about their research. A focus on 
the idea of detachment means for some researchers primarily operating using 
a realist approach to interview data (Silverman, 2005, 154-157). However, the 
idea of setting aside one’s preconceptions as a researcher also arises widely 
in social research in the form of ‘bracketing’. Bracketing involves suspending 
cultural values and expectations (Berger and Keller, 1981, 52), so that the 
researcher does not frame research results in terms of his or her own 
conceptions but judges research participants’ responses on their own terms. 
In addition to bracketing, the importance of empathising with research 
participants, and being understanding of their views even when not 
intrinsically minded to be in agreement with them, is also often seen as 
essential (Ashworth and Lucas, 2000, 299).
Rapley (2001) discusses what he sees as the lack of sufficient 
recognition of the co-construction of interview accounts and stresses, inter 
alia, the importance of ‘an awareness and sensitivity to how interviewees and 
interviewers collaboratively produce the talk’ (Rapley, 2001, 317, his 
emphasis). Alvesson (2003) offers a further route to approaching interview 
data, involving metaphor and reflexivity. He suggests that interviews should 
be seen as more than either ‘a researcher-controlled tool or as a human 
encounter for coproduction of knowledge’, and that instead one should be
144
‘critically interpreting specific interview situations and accounts’ (Alvesson, 
2003, 31).
Notwithstanding Rapley’s or Alvesson’s criticisms, my own approach to 
interviews and interview data remains broadly that they should be seen 
primarily in terms of Gillham’s subjective constructions, or, despite Alvesson’s 
dislike of the idea, as encounters for the coproduction of knowledge, at the 
same time recognising the criticisms that can be levelled at this approach, and 
the need to be aware of, and to reflect upon, the complexities of interview 
situations. In relation to the latter point, for example, the issue of 
interviewees’ truthfulness, or otherwise, needs to be considered, and the 
extent to which, even if people are not being deliberately deceitful, the 
account they provide will inevitably be subjective and may be subject to 
shared norms and expectations, such as those predicted by role theory (see 
section 3.5).
4.3.2 Elite interviewing
A further reason for adopting individual semi-structured interviews as a 
data collection method was the fact that most of those interviewed were likely 
to fall into the category of elite interviewees (Gillham, 2005, 54-59)). Elite 
interviewees are generally people in positions of power, either within a specific 
organisational context, or in a more general sense. The external members of 
university governing bodies can reasonably be regarded as having elite status 
simply by virtue of their governing body membership, but they will also often 
hold, or have held, senior positions in other organisations, and some aspect of
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their elite status often flows from that background. The elite status of an 
interviewee can also be associated with their expertise, and external 
governing body members often have specific expertise or experience (for 
example, in finance and accounting) that has been at least part of the basis 
for their being asked to join the governing body.
Given their status, elite interviewees have the potential to be difficult to 
deal with. They may know more about the topic under discussion than the 
researcher (Gillham, 2005, 54), cannot usually be required to participate in 
interviews (not that unwilling interviewees are desirable in any scenario), and 
will need to be convinced of the potential value of the research. At a 
pragmatic, operational level, it may be easier to arrange to interview such 
people individually, rather than as part of a group. In addition, for some such 
people it might also be desirable for the interviewer to be seen to be focussing 
specifically on their individual views, as this may help stress the specialness 
of those views and increase the likelihood that they will participate fully in the 
interview process.
Finally, elite interviewees are more likely to engage with the research if 
they recognise and can relate to the knowledge and expertise of the 
researcher. It is therefore important for the researcher, as interviewer, to 
appear credible. In the context of this study, my former role as a university 
secretary meant that most of the interviewees readily accepted that I was 
likely to be knowledgeable about the issues under discussion, and able to 
engage with those issues in serious and meaningful ways, thereby not
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wasting their time. In some cases interviewees asked me to expand on my 
background and, in particular, on my reasons for undertaking this research. 
Where such discussions occurred, they appeared to provide reassurance to 
the interviewees about my knowledge of higher education and its governance, 
and the seriousness of my intent.
4.3.3 Other data collection methods
As touched on above (sub-section 4.2.2), I considered using other data 
collection methods in addition to conducting semi-structured interviews, such 
as the use of a questionnaire, study of documentation, and the observation of 
board meetings. I was deterred from undertaking a questionnaire survey 
partly because many higher education governing body members had recently 
participated in a survey on governance conducted by the Office of Public 
Management on behalf of the LFHE and CUC (see sub-section 3.9.5). I felt 
that another questionnaire was unlikely to be welcomed. In addition, the time 
inevitably needed to gain ethical approval for this study meant that any 
questionnaire would have had to be issued in parallel with the undertaking of 
interviews, whereas I would have preferred the interviews to be informed at 
least in part by preliminary consideration of any questionnaire data. Bearing 
in mind these points, and recognising that data gathered through a 
questionnaire would not address my research aims as directly as interview 
data, I decided not to use one.
I did, however, use the other methods referred to above, albeit primarily 
as supplementary methods. In the case of documentary evidence, agendas
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and minutes of governing body meetings, as well as some additional material, 
were available for most institutions. These documents provided information 
about, for example, the topics addressed at governing body meetings, the 
length and complexity of agendas, and the apparent extent of routine 
business. This kind of data cannot throw direct light on governing body 
members’ perceptions, but there is nonetheless the possibility of using it to 
help set some of the comments made by governing body members in context.
Turning to the observation of governing body meetings, I initially hoped 
to arrange to observe meetings of several governing bodies. However, 
although all the case study institutions were very supportive of the study, at 
only one institution did the chair and Vice-Chancellor feel able to agree to 
observation being undertaken. I had a closer and more long-standing 
personal relationship with the university secretary at that institution than with 
some of the equivalent post-holders in the other case study institutions, and 
this probably facilitated the agreement to my observing meetings. Given, 
however, that in the end only two governing body meetings were observed, I 
felt that the data thus gathered were, like the data from reviewing 
documentation, best used principally to supplement the much larger body of 
data obtained from interviews.
Finally, I decided also to seek information about governing body 
members and attendees’ views of selected corporate governance theories. I 
did not, however, wish to ask specific questions about governance theory 
during the interviews. This was because I felt that raising the subject directly
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was likely to detract from the pursuit of my primary research aims, concerning 
peoples’ perceptions of their roles, and issues around effectiveness. Instead,
I chose to present interviewees, at the end of each interview, with brief 
summaries of characteristics associated with four theoretical perspectives on 
governance -  the agency, stewardship, stakeholder and managerial 
hegemony positions (see chapter 3). These four perspectives were chosen 
as being amongst the most prominent theoretical positions discussed in the 
governance literature. They were presented in the form of a two by two matrix 
on a single sheet of A4 paper (see figure 4.1, below). I had found that a 
similar approach provided interesting data in a previous study about the 
organisational culture of academic departments (Buck, 2008).
The summary descriptions of each perspective on governance were 
collated and distilled from material in a number of standard introductory 
surveys of corporate governance, particularly those of Clarke (2004, 2007). 
The matrix was not presented to interviewees until the end of the interview, 
and then only after they had confirmed there were no further remarks they 
wished to make. Interviewees were invited to comment on whether they 
thought any of the theoretical positions, either alone or in combination, might 
be applicable to their own institution. It was also made clear that if they did 
not feel any of the positions described was relevant, that was an equally valid 
response.
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AGENCY
Assumes primacy of self-interest in 
behaviour of managers.
Board role to restrain/counteract 
perceived tendency of managers to 
act in their own interests, rather than 
in the wider interests of the 
organisation and its 
owners/stakeholders.
STEWARDSHIP
Assumes no inherent conflict of 
interest between managers and 
owners/stakeholders.
Board role to ensure maintenance of 
institution and its assets and to 
promote co-ordinated approach to 
operation of the enterprise.
MANAGERIAL HEGEMONY
Assumes power of board is relatively 
limited in comparison to power of 
management and that the influence of 
the board is therefore also limited, 
and is less than that of management.
Board fulfils primarily formal and 
regulatory functions. Relationship 
between owners/stakeholders and 
managers not often significantly 
mediated or influenced by board as a 
collective entity.
STAKEHOLDER
Assumes existence of multiple 
stakeholders with legitimate and inter­
linking influence on the institution, via 
multilateral agreements or 
interactions.
Role of board to recognise and 
mediate relations between 
stakeholders and the extent of the 
influence of different stakeholders on 
the overall management ands control 
of the organisation.
Figure 4.1: Matrix of theoretical perspectives on governance
4.3.4 Access to, and the selection of, interviewees
As already indicated, each case study institution was approached via 
the university secretary or equivalent post-holder. Thereafter, in most cases 
contact with potential interviewees was handled by that person’s office. This 
was understandable on privacy and data protection grounds. It also meant 
that the practical arrangements for most of the interviews were made by staff 
of the institution. A disadvantage of this arrangement was that I had less
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direct control over the selection of individual interviewees. Subsequently, 
however, I had no sense that any of the people I met had been put forward by 
their institutions because they were likely to uncritically support some kind of 
official position; they seemed, instead, to be independent-minded individuals 
who felt able to express clear and varied opinions about the issues we 
discussed. I also had no impression that any institutions had briefed their 
governing body members in advance about any of the topics I had indicated I 
wished to discuss.
Two institutions adopted a different approach, in that they chose to tell 
their governing body members about my research and to invite any who were 
interested in assisting with it to contact me directly. This worked reasonably 
well, but led to my interviewing only five people from each of these two 
institutions. There was one other case where only a small number of people 
was interviewed (four, at UniCollege), but this was because they were from 
one of the last two institutions added to the set of case studies, and they 
preferred to participate on a small scale.
Given the overall research aims, and the nature of the methodology 
chosen, there was no imperative that the number and nature of the people 
interviewed in each case study institution should be the same. However, I felt 
that it was important that examples of each of a number of standard types of 
governing body member, and attendee, should be included. I therefore 
requested that as far as possible the interviewees at each institution should 
include both external and internal governing body members, with preferably at
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least two or three in the former category, and in the latter category at least 
one executive member (preferably the Vice-Chancellor), one non-executive 
staff member and a student. In the case of the external members, I asked to 
interview the chair, if possible, and that amongst the other externals there 
should be one or more people who chaired sub-committees. With regard to 
attendees, I sought the inclusion in the sample of one member of the 
institution’s executive group (or equivalent), such as a Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
or Pro-Vice-Chancellor, and the university secretary. The intention was to 
interview a broad cross-section of types of governing body members and 
attendees. Although my preferred parameters were not met at every 
institution, overall they were achieved, as Table 4.3 below shows.
Table 4.3: Numbers and categories of interviewees
Institution Total
number
interviewed
Including:
Externals
Exec
Internals, of which:
Non- Student 
exec
Attendee
CityMod 8 2, incl 
chair
1 (VC) 1 1 3 (incl 
Sec)
Civic 10 5, incl 
chair
0 2 2 1
ExCAT 8 2, incl 
chair
2 (incl 
VC)
1 1 2 (incl 
Sec)
Greenfield 8 4, incl 
chair
2 (incl 
VC)
1 1 0
NewMill 5 5, incl 
chair
0 0 0 0
Town Mod 5 3 1 (VC) 1 0 0
UniCollege 4 2, incl 
chair
0 1 0 1 (Sec)
Overall 48 23 6 7 5 7
Notes: Exec = executive, Non-exec = non-executive; incl = including; 
VC = Vice-Chancellor; Sec = governing body secretary
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4.3.5 The interviewing process in practice
The first interviews took place in late November 2010. Thereafter they 
continued until May 2011, after which there was a hiatus while the last two 
institutions were identified. The final interviews were then completed between 
October and December 2011. A copy of the interview protocol is attached as 
Appendix 2. As predicted above, in many interviews it did not prove 
necessary to raise directly all the topics listed in the protocol, because they 
were raised by the interviewees themselves. Different supplementary 
questions therefore tended to be asked, in different ways, in each interview. It 
proved possible, in most instances, to address all the issues on the protocol 
during each interview. This was because the time allowed was normally up to 
an hour. This time allocation proved satisfactory, with most interviews lasting 
between 50 minutes and an hour. However, in the case of one institution 
(UniCollege) a series of four interviews were scheduled by the institution 
sequentially at 45 minute intervals without breaks. While the last of these 
interviews ran naturally to a by then normal time of just under an hour, the 
other three had to be curtailed.
All interviewees were assured of confidentiality, and of anonymity both 
for them and their institution. They were given a note providing information 
about the research, and were asked to sign consent forms, one copy of which 
they retained (see Appendix 3; for ethical issues see section 4.6).
Having accepted (see sub-section 4.3.1) that the interviews were 
subjective constructions, and encounters for the coproduction of knowledge, I
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was aware of the importance of establishing a rapport with the interviewees, 
and of creating a climate in which they would feel able to express their views 
frankly. Most of the interviews could subsequently be fairly characterised as 
friendly discussions under confidential conditions between professionals with 
a shared interest in governance. The primary expressions of opinion about 
the subjects under discussion were in all cases those of the interviewees, but 
from time to time interviewees would seek my comments on their views. 
Bearing in mind the need to bracket my own pre-conceptions, whilst at the 
same time being careful not to be discourteous by failing to respond to 
interviewees’ queries, as far as possible I restricted myself to short responses; 
at times it was sufficient to acknowledge the humour or irony inherent in the 
views expressed by an interviewee. That each interview was in practice a 
conversation between two participants is illustrated by the fact that on average 
around 15% of each recording involved me talking (in a very few instances 
this figure fell below 10% or rose above 20%).
In practice, almost all the interviewees appeared able relatively easily 
to relax. They also gave the impression of expressing their views freely and 
fluently, but with consideration. As the interviewer, I found all the interviews 
interesting and enjoyable. The interviewees gave every indication that they 
also found the process interesting and enjoyable, and a number of people 
explicitly said that this had been the case; some people also commented that 
they had found it useful to have an opportunity explicitly to reflect on their 
experience of governance. In no case did I form the impression that any 
interviewee was distorting their account, or deliberately presenting their
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perceptions in such a way as to promote a particular agenda about higher 
education governance. Having said this, it was occasionally possible to detect 
differences of approach to the manner in which different types of interviewee 
chose to present their views. This was most noticeable in the case of the 
Vice-Chancellors and governing body chairs, with some examples of each of 
these types of interviewee being prone to use more rhetorical flourishes than 
other interviewees to demonstrate the vigour of the roles they played.
One interviewee was known to me as a former colleague (albeit from 
over a decade before the research was undertaken). The only difference that 
I was aware of this introducing into the interview process was that he 
accepted my general understanding of the circumstances in which he was 
operating even more quickly than did most of the other interviewees (that is, 
the difference was a matter of degree, and not fundamental to the nature of 
the interaction).
Interviewees were given a choice as to where they wanted to be 
interviewed. Most interviews were then conducted at the relevant institution, 
although meetings with six external members were held at their workplaces, 
two further externals preferred to meet at the Open University’s London 
offices, and one external chose to see me at his home. All the interviews 
were recorded using a digital recorder. Happily all the recordings proved to 
be of good quality with very few inaudible words (under 1% of the total). 
Where something was inaudible, it was usually due to me speaking too 
quietly. In only one instance did outside noise interfere, when an interview
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was conducted close to a room where tables were being laid, but even this 
only led to very occasional inaudibility over a relatively short time period.
Transcripts were produced from the recordings. Around half of these 
were prepared entirely by me. First drafts of the remainder were made by an 
external transcription agency, but I then checked all of these in detail against 
the original recordings, and corrected any errors or omissions. A copy of each 
transcript was sent to the relevant interviewee, to give them an opportunity to 
correct anything they saw as factual errors and to provide an opportunity for 
them to comment or raise any concerns. The interviewees were told that if 
they did not respond they would be regarded as being content with the 
transcript as an accurate record of the interview.
Only a small number of interviewees chose to respond. Two internal 
governing body members (one executive and one non-executive) did so by e- 
mail. Both confirmed that they were happy with the transcripts, and then 
kindly drew attention to a small number of typographical errors. There were 
three further respondents, all external members. Two of them (a chair and a 
deputy chair) were content that the transcripts accurately reflected their 
interviews, but asked for some references to their current or former roles 
outwith their institutions to be made less explicit. Assurances had already 
been given that details of this kind would not be quoted in the thesis, to avoid 
increasing the chance that individuals might be identified (see sub-section
4.6.2 below). However, in response to these specific concerns, changes of 
the kind each person sought were made to the transcripts -  for example, in
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one case reference to the interviewee’s role with another specific type of 
public sector governing body was amended to refer simply to their 
involvement with another public sector body, the type not being specified.
The third external to respond fell into a different category, as he got in 
touch by telephone to express his concern, in very strong terms, that the 
transcript had not been sent to him confidentially. He thought therefore that 
its contents would have been seen by university staff and was angry, both 
because he felt his confidence had been betrayed and that the frank nature of 
some of his comments meant that since they ‘had been seen’ by his university 
his reputation would have been compromised.
This external’s transcript had, in fact, as in all cases, been sent to him 
on a private and confidential basis, but this had not at first been apparent to 
him. The problem arose because, where interviewees had been approached 
on my behalf by staff of the institution, I had sent copies of the transcripts to 
them via the institution (through the office of the university secretary). Indeed, 
had I not proceeded in this way, institutions would have had to provide direct 
contact details for their external governing body members, when their 
reluctance to release such information had been the reason for institutional 
staff having organised the interviews in the first place. On the basis of my 
own experience as a former university secretary, and my judgement as to the 
professionalism of the offices I was dealing with, I felt sure that transcripts 
sent under separate cover in sealed envelopes would be passed on to the 
interviewees unopened. In sending out the transcripts, though, I made two
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errors, at least as viewed by the external member who complained. The first 
was that I used ordinary white or brown envelopes, and not envelopes that 
gave any outward indication that they had originated in the Open University. 
The second error was that I did not take steps to help demonstrate that an 
envelope had been forwarded unopened, by, for example, signing across the 
flap of the envelope and sealing the signature under clear sticky tape. In the 
case of the interviewee who complained, he received what I am confident was 
my original sealed envelope. However, because it did not look intrinsically 
official, he assumed that the transcript and explanatory letter from me that it 
contained had been put in it by staff at his university, and that they had 
therefore seen and read the transcript.
After a lengthy conversation, and having described the nature of the 
envelope he should have received, and its contents, I was able to persuade 
the external in question that the envelope he had received was the one I had 
personally sealed, and that his institution had therefore not opened it. In a 
subsequent e-mail, where he offered some minor comments and made one 
request for some wording to be amended, he also apologised for the strength 
of his initial reaction. However, he clearly still had some sensitivity about the 
matter, and I decided that it would be best only to use his interview as 
background material. I have therefore not quoted directly from it in this thesis.
I also decided that in the light of this incident I should adopt the practice of 
signing across the flaps of the envelopes used when sending transcripts and 
sealing the signature under sticky tape. I applied this procedure to the
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remaining twenty per cent or so of the transcripts that had not yet been sent 
out when this incident occurred.
4.4 The scoping exercise
4.4.1 Consideration of a pilot study
At the start of my research, I considered the possibility of interviewing a 
small number of governing body members as part of an explicit pilot study. I 
concluded, however, that this would be difficult due to time constraints, and 
that it was probably not necessary because the main data collection process 
would inevitably be iterative. In addition, although I expected that my capacity 
to undertake interviews effectively would improve over time, I did not believe 
that it was necessary for me to undertake a pilot study to test my basic ability 
to do so, as I had carried out such interviews on two previous occasions. One 
of these had been some time ago, when I researched managerialism in 
universities for my MBA (Buck, 1991), but the second occasion had been 
when I was researching organisational culture in the University of York for the 
MRes (Buck, 2008) I undertook immediately before embarking on the work for 
this thesis.
4.4.2 Exploring views as to current governance issues
Instead of a pilot study, I decided that there would be merit in 
undertaking a scoping exercise, to explore the views about current issues of a 
small number of people actively concerned with higher education governance.
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This enabled me to compare my own views with those of other university 
secretaries and provided a mechanism for seeking the perspectives on 
current governance issues of people associated with three key organisations, 
the AHUA, CUC and LFHE. I therefore arranged to meet with a small number 
of university secretaries, who amongst them had appropriate links with the 
AHUA and CUC, and with a representative of the LFHE. These meetings took 
place between May and September 2009. They were not recorded, although 
written notes were made during each interview and a more formal summary 
record drawn up shortly afterwards. Each interview explored the views of the 
individuals involved as to the issues raised by a preliminary version of my 
research questions, and also ensured that key organisations in higher 
education governance were informally made aware of my plans.
The scoping exercise helped refine the overall research aims for the 
project, and informed the more detailed research questions. The individuals 
interviewed were all supportive of the research, and felt that it was interesting 
and likely to be worthwhile. The views and opinions expressed during the 
scoping exercise reinforced some aspects of my own views as to current 
governance issues, whilst at the same time helping to broaden my 
perspective. None of the views expressed by people interviewed during the 
scoping exercise have been used as data in the research project proper, and 
none of those people was subsequently interviewed during the main part of 
the study, although two of them were from institutions that became case study 
institutions.
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4.5 Data analysis
4.5.1 Potential methods for analysing interview data
A variety of approaches can be taken to the analysis of qualitative data, 
and to interview data in particular. These range from content analysis, which 
in its classic form has its roots in quantitative methodology, through 
conversation analysis, discourse analysis and narrative analysis, to more 
inductive approaches, such as grounded theory. General discussions of 
various methods are offered by authors such as Seale (2004), Silverman 
(2005, 149-244), Bryman and Bell (2007, 579-621) or Easterby-Smith et al 
(2002, 117-129). Discussions with a focus on case studies include those by 
Gillham (2000, 71-75, 93-100), Stake (1995, 71-90) and Yin (2009, 127-16), 
or in the specific context of research interviewing that of Gillham (2005, 134- 
147).
Implicit, but only occasionally explicit (see, for example, Gillham, 2005,
130), in many methods is the identification of common themes and concepts
in the data under analysis. Perhaps the implicit nature of much of the use of
thematic analysis partly explains why it has been ‘poorly demarcated and
rarely acknowledged’, despite being widely used (Braun and Clarke, 2006,
77). Braun and Clarke suggest, however, that thematic analysis can and
should be regarded as a method in its own right that it
can be applied across a range of theoretical and epistemological 
approaches, ... which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet 
complex, account of data. (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 78, their 
emphasis)
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Braun and Clarke’s argument is, in my view, persuasive, and I 
concluded that bearing in mind the overall aims of this study (involving the 
exploration of the perceptions of governing body members about their roles 
and the effectiveness of their governing bodies) it would be appropriate to 
seek to identify themes and concepts in the transcribed interview data, and 
therefore to undertake a thematic analysis along the lines proposed by Braun 
and Clarke. This involves a multi-phase process for undertaking the analysis, 
and consideration of a ‘checklist of criteria for good thematic analysis’ (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006, 87-93, 95-96, with helpful summaries in their tables 1 and 
2). Although I have not followed their guidance rigidly, I have adopted both 
the spirit and the general nature of their approach in undertaking my own 
analysis.
4.5.2 Data transcription
Transcription of the interview data (see sub-section 4.3.5), was the first 
practical step in approaching the data analysis. In addition to being a 
necessary preliminary to the analysis proper, the transcription and review 
process, involving the reading, checking and re-reading of the transcribed 
data, served the purpose of enabling me to familiarise myself with the 
interview data, in line with the first phase of Braun and Clarke’s process for 
undertaking thematic analysis.
In transcribing interview data, there a number of approaches to the 
representation of speech. Some of these involve the use of elaborate formal 
systems to record not just the words spoken in an interview, sometimes
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represented phonetically, but the speakers’ ‘turns’, and features of speech 
such as pauses and their length, the degree of emphasis placed on words, 
and the intonation used by the speaker (see, for example, Potter, 1996, 136- 
138, or Silverman, 2005, 163-168). However, given the form of analysis 
intended here, i.e. thematic analysis, the transcripts produced for this study 
did not attempt to represent the participants’ speech phonetically, or to record 
word stress, unless it was very marked, or intonation. In a similar vein, non­
verbal noises and hesitations were noted only by the use of generic terms 
such as ‘erm’, ‘er’ or ‘mmm-hmm’. Where respondents used obviously 
abbreviated or colloquial versions of words, these were transcribed as spoken 
-  for example, many interviewees routinely used ‘cos’, for ‘because’. Pauses 
for thought, and other gaps in speech were also noted, but only categorised
into broadly shorter or longer ‘....... ’ silences. Remarks, usually sotto
voce, made by one speaker while the other was talking were noted. Most 
commonly these involved me, as interviewer, making a short remark, or noise, 
by way of an acknowledgment that I was listening to the interviewee and an 
encouragement to them to carry on, as for example in this excerpt from 
remarks by an interviewee at Civic university:
Civic 4: Erm, it seemed to me that there was a way to look at the way 
<name of university> was being operated (DB: mmm-hmm). Erm, in a 
non-executive role you can actually do things (DB: yeah) and you can 
make yourself very useful to people, if you’re prepared to put it in, put, 
I, I was happy to put some time into it.
This extract also illustrates the use of <text> for substitutions of things such as
peoples’ names or, as in this case, the name of the institution, to preserve
anonymity.
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In addition to being specifically double-checked against the digital 
recordings, the transcripts were all, as indicated above, also re-read in full or 
in part on more than one subsequent occasion both at the start of the analysis 
process, and as the analysis proceeded. Where there appeared to be a prima 
facie lack of sense in a transcript, relevant sections of the original recordings 
were reviewed again. Some of these checks led to changes to the transcripts, 
but the majority did not, which acts as a reminder that people do not always 
speak sense.
4.5.3 Identifying initial themes, coding data and defining final themes
Braun and Clarke recommend the identification of initial codes for 
‘interesting features of the data ... across the entire data set’ and then 
‘collating codes into potential themes’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 87). My own 
approach to coding and the identifications of themes was similar, although I 
chose firstly to identify broad themes, through a review of the transcripts from 
the first five case study institutions visited (in due course a similar exercise 
was undertaken for the final two case study institutions, but less formally, 
given that by then a number of themes and a basis for more detailed coding 
had largely been established). In reviewing the transcripts, those from 
interviews at Greenfield University, which was the third institution visited, were 
considered first. This was on the basis that by the time I undertook interviews 
at Greenfield I had completed over a dozen interviews elsewhere (at Civic and 
TownMod universities) and I felt that my ability to practice my craft as an 
interviewer was more secure and less variable than it had been initially. I then 
proceeded to analyse transcripts of interviews from later in the overall
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sequence (from ExCAT and CityMod universities) before turning to the 
transcripts from interviews completed earlier, with the exception of the 
transcripts of interviews at the last two institutions visited, which were 
analysed last.
In identifying initial broad themes, my decisions were informed by my 
reviews of the literature, both in relation to the normative expectations set out 
in governance codes of practice (see sub-sections 3.2.3. and 3.2.5) and with 
regard to the governing body roles predicted or privileged by different 
governance theories, or elucidated in previous studies of governance in 
practice (see sections 3.3 and 3.7 to 3.9). I did not, however, do this by 
formally comparing a list or lists of potential roles derived from the literature 
with the transcripts, preferring instead to endeavour to identify themes 
emerging from the data iteratively and without prescription. The themes thus 
identified were those aspects of the data that in my judgement as the 
researcher, and bearing in mind the research aims and questions for the 
study, captured ‘something important about the data’, as Braun and Clarke 
(2006, 82) put it. Through this process, a number of preliminary themes were 
identified against which the transcript data were then coded more rigorously 
and in greater detail. The process of coding and identifying themes in the 
transcript data as a whole was iterative.
Notwithstanding the identification of initial broad themes, such as 
‘challenging the executive’ or ‘playing a role in institutional strategy’ (see 
Chapter 5), I found it helpful to code some of the transcribed material under
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very generic headings - for example, the code ‘Role of GB’ was used for any 
reference to the overall role or purpose of the governing body. Other codes 
were, however, more specific -  for example, ‘GB size’ related to comments 
specifically about the size of the governing body in relation to its role(s) or 
effectiveness. In addition, despite having identified some potential themes on 
a preliminary basis, I was concerned to ensure that the overall approach to 
coding should be open. Most codes were therefore created and applied as 
each transcript was worked through. After each set of transcripts was 
completed (where a set came from a single institution), the coding of the 
transcripts completed earlier in each set was reviewed in the light of any new 
codes used initially for the transcripts coded later in each set. Coding was 
facilitated by the use of the NVivo9 software package (Bazeley, 2007). The 
software was not, though, used to attempt to develop or apply any formal 
structures to the codes as they were developed.
In view of the open approach to coding adopted, when the initial 
themes were re-considered, and potential additional themes identified, on the 
basis of the review and collation of individual codes, the themes as a whole 
varied greatly in their scope and breadth, and some were clearly inter-related. 
For example, some data were coded as identifying a theme around governing 
body members’ perceptions of their individual roles, as opposed to the overall 
roles of the governing body as a whole, but there was, perhaps inevitably, 
considerable overlap between the two sets of material thus coded. Once the 
data from all the case study institutions had been coded, primary over-arching 
themes relating to governing body roles and governing body effectiveness
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were reviewed and subsidiary themes identified where appropriate. These 
themes and sub-themes, and the material drawn from the transcripts 
classified in this way, form the basis for the discussion and analysis set out in 
chapters 5 to 8. Overall, the methods for identifying and defining themes was 
in accordance with the processes proposed by Braun and Clarke, albeit with a 
less linear and more iterative approach than a strict reading of their 
recommendations perhaps implies.
4.5.4 The balance between the quintain and the individual cases
Having completed the coding of the transcribed interview data, and the 
identification of themes therein, a further question to consider in the 
presenting the data and discussing and interpreting the findings was the 
balance between the quintain (as defined by Stake, 2006; see sub-section
4.2.3 above) and the individual cases. Consideration of the principal themes 
in the light of the primary and secondary research questions on a case by 
case (i.e. an institution by institution) basis showed that while there were 
some interesting differences across the institutions, there were also strong 
similarities (see chapter 5). Given that the primary aims of the study were to 
explore governing body members’ perceptions of the roles and effectiveness 
of their governing bodies at an overall level, I concluded that it was 
appropriate for the major part of the discussion and interpretation of the data 
to focus at the level of the quintain, rather than on the individual cases and the 
differences between them, albeit without ignoring any interesting findings in 
the latter regard that could be discerned.
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4.5.5 Analysis of other types of data
I noted above (sub-section 4.3.3) that I obtained documentary evidence 
in the form of agendas and minutes of meetings from some institutions, and 
was able to observe meetings of the governing body at one institution (Civic 
university). These supplementary data were analysed initially on their own 
terms. That is, the documentary evidence was reviewed and a record made 
of the subjects discussed by the governing body, the ways in which agendas 
and minutes were structured, the number of separate documents supplied to 
governing body members, and the quantity of paper this involved, and so on. 
The data were then considered in the light of themes or sub-themes arising in 
the interview data about, for example, governing body members’ perceptions 
of various practical aspects of the operation of the governing body, including 
the appropriateness or otherwise of the quantity of material to de dealt with at 
each meeting. It was also possible to use this data to show that time was 
spent engaging in some activities -  such as financial monitoring -  that 
featured little in governing body members’ discussions of their roles.
The limited observational data were analysed primarily in terms of the 
length and number of contributions made by individual governors and 
attendees. This gave, for example, an indication of the extent to which the 
chair or the Vice-Chancellor dominated proceedings orally. The degree to 
which material was reported/presented by executives was also noted, as was 
the nature and variety of interventions by governing body members, including 
external members, internal but non-executive members, and students. Other 
factors noted and considered in the light of the views expressed by
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interviewees included aspects of apparent behaviour, such as the degree to 
which people appeared to be engaged by the meeting (in terms of body 
language, occurrence of side discussions, etc).
Taken as a whole, analysis of the documentary and observational data 
allowed for a certain degree of triangulation in some areas reflected in the 
interview data, as well as in certain instances casting light on, and permitting 
explanations to be adduced, in relation to topics about which interviewees 
were relatively silent. An overview of these points will be presented in chapter 
5 and points of detail discussed where relevant in subsequent chapters.
4.6 Ethical considerations
4.6.1 Formal approval processes and potential ethical issues
The Open University has clear guidelines and requirements with regard 
to the ethical approval of all research projects. These were followed, and 
formal approval was obtained from the university’s Human Participants and 
Materials Ethics Committee (now the Human Research Ethics Committee) 
before any case study institutions were approached. A copy of the letter 
confirming the approval of the project is attached as Appendix 4. The ethical 
guidelines of the Open University, the Economic and Social Research Council 
and the British Educational Research Association were reviewed, and borne 
in mind both when formal approval to undertake the research was sought, and 
subsequently when any issues arose during the research.
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In seeking ethical approval no significant risks were seen to exist either 
for the participants in the study or the researcher. This was primarily because 
it was difficult to conceive of any physical risks that might arise, and the nature 
of the research was such that no groups of people who would ordinarily be 
classified as vulnerable were involved. It was recognised that there was a 
potential risk of adverse consequences for an individual interviewee’s 
relationships with his/her institution or his/her peers, if someone chose to 
express negative, uncomplimentary or controversial views in an interview and 
those views then became public with attribution to the individual concerned. 
However, all data were treated as confidential and were processed and 
analysed on an anonymised basis, both as to the names of individual 
participants and their institutions, so that the likelihood of anyone’s views 
becoming public and being attributable were very small.
With regard to anonymising data, as already noted above (section 
4.3.5), it was explained that the research would be conducted on this basis 
when institutions were first approached, and therefore stressed to, and 
understood by, those approving participation. Where potential interviewees 
were approached on my behalf by their own institution, a text was supplied to 
be given to governing body members and attendees, and I made clear that I 
did not wish any institution to seek people to participate on anything other 
than an entirely voluntary basis. Where potential interviewees were 
approached directly by the researcher, similar information was supplied (see 
Appendix 5).
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It was recognised that an absolute guarantee of anonymity could not be 
given with regard to the identity of the institutions involved, as it was possible 
to envisage circumstances in which an institution might be identifiable from 
some of its characteristics, despite not being named. Great care has, 
however, been exercised in presenting the background material about each 
case study institution so as to limit the likelihood that any individual institution 
might be identifiable. Care has also been taken with regard to the material 
quoted from transcripts to avoid reference to anything likely to identify an 
institution or an individual. It is hoped that in this way the effective anonymity 
of the participants in the study has been assured. Individuals were advised 
that they had the right at any time to withdraw from the study any or all of the 
data they had supplied. Consent forms were signed by all those who agreed 
to participate in the study.
As some of the recordings of interviews were transcribed by an 
external agency, it is possible that the agency, or its staff, may have identified 
some of the case study institutions, and that they then might have attempted 
to identify individual interviewees. This was because, although neither 
institutions nor interviewees were named in any written material sent to the 
transcription agency, interviewees sometimes referred to their institutions by 
name in the recordings. Interviewees did not tend to refer to themselves by 
name, but they occasionally used the names of other people. Although I 
recognise that there cannot be complete certainty that such details have not 
been misused by the transcription agency, the work was undertaken by the 
agency on the basis that it was strictly confidential. The transcription agency,
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which was recommended to me as reliable and trustworthy by another 
researcher, was clearly used to working on a confidential basis and to regard 
the preserving of confidentiality as central to its activities. I have had 
assurances from the transcription agency that they have not retained any 
data, and there is no indication that there has been any breach of 
confidentiality or anonymity by the agency.
Data protection issues have also been borne in mind, and the Open 
University’s requirements met, with all material in hard copy held securely in 
the researcher’s work area at the Open University, or at his home (where no- 
one else had access to it). Copies of electronic files, including the digital 
recordings and transcripts, and drafts of descriptive and analytical material 
prepared during the writing of this thesis, were held on a password-protected 
file server at the Open University, or on a memory stick and laptop used only 
by the researcher.
4.6.2 Ethical issues arising during the research
Two particular issues arose during the research that had ethical 
implications. The first issue, as noted in section 4.3.5, concerned the 
inclusion in a small number of transcripts of details that interviewees indicated 
they would rather had not been transcribed. The transcripts were not 
intended to be read by anyone other than me (apart from the staff of the 
transcription agency when they were creating some of them). No-one else 
was regarded as eligible to read the transcripts other than my supervisors, 
and in the event I only shared part of one transcript with them. This was in 
order to enable them to make a prima facie judgement as to whether or not I
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was gathering appropriate data, and on the basis that they would respect the 
confidentiality of the material. My supervisors were also necessarily aware, in 
confidence, of the identity of the case study institutions.
The fact that some details -  for example, of interviewees’ roles outwith 
their institutions, or in the case of university staff, for instance, information 
about their previous careers -  could lead to individuals being identified if the 
transcripts were illicitly obtained by a third party was recognised. To guard 
against this, references to other organisations were routinely anonymised. In 
a few cases, some detail was left in a transcript to enable the context of an 
interviewee’s remarks to be properly understood. In these instances, I added 
a note or comment to the transcript stating that the detail had been retained to 
enable the context of the statement to be understood, but stressing that the 
detail would not be used in any quotation from the transcript. This was meant 
both as an aide-memoire for me, and as a point of reassurance to 
interviewees when they read the transcripts. Although, as noted above, two 
interviewees were not sufficiently reassured by the annotations and asked for 
some factual details to be deleted, or amended, I believe that this approach 
probably did reassure some other interviewees.
As also discussed above (sub-section 4.3.5), one other person made 
representations about a transcript due to his initial fear that its confidentiality 
had not been maintained. His concern in this regard was eventually 
assuaged, but I nonetheless decided not to use any quotations from that
173
transcript or to otherwise refer explicitly to that interviewee’s views in this 
thesis.
In addition to the two particular issues dealt with above, there could 
potentially be ethical issues associated with the use of material from the 
transcripts and the extent to which that material appropriately represents the 
views of the interviewees. Having seen the transcripts and had an opportunity 
to comment on them, the interviewees have to some extent validated their 
content as a whole, either implicitly or explicitly, but they have not, of course, 
had any role in the selection of excerpts from transcripts for use in this thesis. 
Ultimately, it falls to the researcher to use material obtained from transcripts in 
a reasonable and consistent manner and not in ways that might give a 
misleading impression about the views of any particular interviewee. Any 
judgement of the extent to which I have been successful in this regard will 
depend upon the coherence and persuasiveness of the material presented in 
the succeeding chapters.
4.7 Issues of validity and reliability
4.7.1 Validity and reliability in qualitative research
A final consideration in this discussion of research methodology and 
related issues is the question of validity and reliability. Yin (2009, 40-45) 
considers construct, internal and external validity, and reliability, in the context 
of case study research. However, these concepts have been the subject of
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significant debate in relation to qualitative studies -  see, for example, the 
helpful summary by Bryman and Bell (2007, 162-168, 411-428). Even the use 
of the terms validity and reliability has been questioned in qualitative research, 
on the grounds that concerns with validity and reliability can only be applicable 
when dealing with quantitative research based on a positivist approach (see, 
for example, Silverman, 2005, 223-224; Smith, 1996).
In this regard, the work of Hammersley (1990, 1992) is useful. He 
discusses approaches to validity and reliability, drawn primarily from 
quantitative research, including the concepts of internal and external validity, 
and reliability and finds them unhelpful or insufficient (Hammersely, 1990, 54- 
57). He proposes instead the assessment of the value of research on the 
basis of validity and relevance. In relation to the former, he states:
By validity, I mean truth; interpreted as the extent to which an account
accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers.
(Hammersley, 1990, 57)
He then introduces the concepts of plausibility and credibility as ways of 
judging validity. While suggesting that ‘plausibility and credibility forms a 
relatively weak basis forjudging claims’, and ‘provides no guarantee that ... 
judgements will be correct’, Hammersley argues that it is nonetheless the only 
basis on which it is appropriate to make such judgements (Hammersely, 1990, 
61-62).
With regard to relevance, Hammersley is concerned with relevance ‘to 
issues of public concern’. This does not imply that all research needs to 
contribute narrowly and directly to a specific aspect of practice. It does, 
however, suggest that research should address issues that can be conceived
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in some sense as broadly relevant to practice, and of interest to ‘a wide 
variety of practitioner audiences’. As with his discussion of validity, 
Hammersely concludes the judgements of plausibility and credibility are 
critical in assessing relevance (Hammersley, 1990, 64-70).
An alternative expression of the meaning of validity and reliability from 
the ‘relativist’ viewpoint is offered by Easterby-Smith et al (2002, 53-54), who 
suggest that validity is appropriately addressed if ‘a sufficient number of 
perspectives have been included’ in a study, whilst reliability concerns 
whether ‘similar observations [will] be reached by other observers’.
Other views on validity and reliability could be cited, but I shall just add 
to the points already made the issues of ‘researcher bias’ and ‘reactivity’ 
(Maxwell, 2005, 108-109). The former involves the researcher’s subjectivity, 
while the latter concerns the influence of the researcher on the setting or 
individuals being studied. However, as Maxwell indicates, these issues 
cannot be addressed in qualitative research by attempting to eliminate them. 
Instead, the aim should be to understand ‘how a ... researcher ... might 
influence the conduct and conclusions of a study’ (Maxwell, 2005, 108-109).
4.7.2 The positions adopted in this study
As I noted above, the conclusions eventually drawn from this research 
will need to be appropriate to the context in which it has been undertaken, the 
research questions posed, and the nature of the analysis undertaken. With 
regard to the question of validity, in this study I believe I have, for example,
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addressed some of the issues involved in taking forward from the 
consideration of the literature in chapters 2 and 3 to my data analysis, a 
consistent range of concepts and widely used ways of describing and 
defining, for instance, governance roles and processes. More generally, I 
accept the tenor of the positions espoused by Hammersley and Easterby- 
Smith et al. The number of case study institutions included in this research, 
and the extent and variety of individual respondents, therefore, together 
ensure that an appropriately wide range of perspectives have been included 
in the study to enable judgements to be made about the validity and relevance 
of my research, in terms of the credibility and plausibility, and the coherence 
and consistency, of the account given.
Turning finally to reliability, I would argue that I have given sufficiently 
clear details of the methods I have used, and of the nature of the cases (and 
of individual data sources within cases -  i.e. types of governing body member, 
etc), that the research process, from data collection to analysis, could be 
repeated. I would expect the outcome of such a process to meet the criteria 
suggested by Easterby-Smith et al, or Hammersley, in terms of findings and 
conclusions similar to mine being reached.
4.8 Conclusions
4.8.1 Overall methodological position
In this chapter I have briefly explained the underlying assumptions
behind my approach to this study, and the basis for adopting qualitative
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methods and a case study research design. In the latter regard, I have also 
indicated how I have addressed the issue of the balance between the analysis 
of my data in relation to the quintain, or the totality of the case studies 
considered as a whole, versus the individual institutions taken on a case by 
case basis, and the reasons for focussing on the former. Details have been 
given of how the study was undertaken, ethical issues have been addressed 
and questions of validity and reliability discussed. Overall, I contend that my 
methodological approach is consistent with my research aims, and the more 
specific research questions that derive from those aims. I shall now, 
therefore, turn to my data, and its analysis.
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Chapter 5: The principal findings from the research
5.1 Expectations as to governing body roles
5.1.1 Parameters set in the UK private sector
It was shown above (section 3.2) that a wide variety of roles and 
responsibilities have been associated with boards and governing bodies. 
These were summarised for the UK private sector in sub-section 3.2.3 and 
included roles in relation to:
• control and oversight of the executive;
• setting the strategic direction;
• ensuring appropriate controls exist; and,
• ensuring accountability to shareholders.
Consideration of governance theory (see sub-section 3.3.8), and of studies of 
governance in a range of private sector settings, suggested that attention 
should also be paid to:
• supporting management;
• linking organisations to external resources; and,
• preserving and maintaining institutional purpose and assets.
5.1.2 Explicit expectations in the higher education sector
In the higher education sector, the equivalent set of expectations as to 
governing body roles involved:
• meeting legal and regulatory requirements;
• overseeing the activities of the institution and monitoring 
institutional performance;
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• determining the future direction, and approving the mission and 
strategic vision and long-terms plans;
• ensuring appropriate controls exist to assess and manage risk; 
and,
• ensuring accountability to stakeholders (see sub-section 3.2.5).
In the light of these parameters, and other expectations of both private and 
public sector boards and governing bodies discussed in chapter 3, and the 
approach to the analysis of the data discussed in chapter 4 (see section 4.5), 
it is now appropriate to consider in summary form the principal findings that 
emerged from that data. I shall first consider the transcribed interview data, 
before turning to the secondary documentary and observational data, and 
then the data obtained from the exposure of governing body members and 
attendees to a matrix summarising a number of prominent theoretical 
perspectives on governance.
5.2 Perceptions as to the principal roles of higher education 
governing bodies
5.2.1 The variety of roles perceived by governing body members
The first pair of the primary research questions in this study focus on 
governing body members’ and attendees’ perceptions of collective governing 
body roles, and their own roles as individuals in that wider context. In 
exploring these questions, an iterative approach was taken to the identification 
of themes in the transcript data, as noted in chapter 4 (sub-section 4.5.3). In 
this process, perceptions of a variety of governing body roles were revealed. 
In most instances these roles could be related to those summarised in sub­
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section 5.1.2 above, derived from the Committee of University Chairs’ (CUC’s) 
Governance Code of Practice (CUC, 2010), or from the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England’s (HEFCE’s) Financial Memorandum (HEFCE, 
2010b). However, other roles were perceived to exist that were not explicitly 
set out in CUC or HEFCE guidance. It also became apparent as the first half 
of the transcript data was considered that there were also governing body 
roles that form part of the standard normative repertoire of such roles that 
were mentioned by only a very small number of interviewees.
The principal themes identified in the data, and associated with the 
overall roles of governing bodies were as follows:
(a) Challenging the executive management team. The variety of 
terminology used in relation to this theme included reference to 
acting as a check and balance on the executive, or holding them 
to account; occasionally the terminology extended to ideas of 
oversight and scrutiny, or supervision, of the university, or 
specifically of the Vice-Chancellor and/or the executive. Related 
points included making the executive uncomfortable when 
necessary, and the governing body’s capacity ultimately to block 
proposals.
(b) Supporting the executive management team. Many interviewees 
gave the impression that being supportive of the executive was 
ultimately more important than being too challenging. This 
involved specifically supporting the Vice-Chancellor or Principal, 
not stifling the executive, and being supportive unless there were 
imperative reasons not to be; the idea of being a critical friend was 
mentioned by some respondents, and of being both challenging 
and supportive.
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(c) Providing advice and guidance. There was a strong theme 
associated with the governing body offering both general and 
specialised advice and guidance to the Vice-Chancellor and the 
executive. It was recognised that this could involve constructive 
criticism, and that one way of being supportive was to advise and 
guide. Nonetheless providing advice and guidance emerged as a 
clear and distinct role in its own right. Other aspects of this theme 
included a strong focus on individual governing body members’ 
expertise and specialist knowledge, and a somewhat less frequent 
stress on the benefits of team-working.
(d) Acting as a link with, and/or having an ambassadorial role to, the 
outside world. In some cases this theme was associated with the 
idea of engagement with local communities; in other instances 
there was emphasis on links between individual external 
governing body members and important external individuals or 
organisations, whose influence could be mobilised on the 
institution’s behalf.
(e) Playing a role in strategy development. Respondents reflecting 
this theme spoke of agreeing the institutional strategy, or 
contributing to it, but there was variability in views as to where the 
lead role in strategy development resided. Sometimes it was 
seen as residing with the governing body, but more often the 
governing body was regarded as ‘influencing’, or ‘contributing to’, 
or ‘agreeing the direction’ of the strategy.
(f) Overseeing educational character and academic activities. An 
additional theme emerging strongly in the data from all the 
institutions related to the extent to which the governing body was, 
or should be, involved in the oversight of the educational 
character and the academic activities of the institution. This was 
recognised as an important issue in all the institutions, but in most 
cases it was felt that the governing body’s role should be limited, 
and that responsibility in this area should be exercised primarily 
by academics.
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In addition to the themes identified above as arising in the data, and the 
governing body roles associated with those themes, there were additional 
themes that emerged much less strongly, and less frequently, but that could 
also be related directly to roles that are part of the standard package of 
governing body roles, as reiterated in section 5.1 above. These were:
(g) ensuring compliance with legal and statutory requirements; and,
(h) paying explicit attention to issues associated with risk assessment 
and management.
Finally, it is relevant to note also that there was hardly any indication 
that governing bodies might play a leadership role. As was noted in sub­
section 3.2.5, this is not currently identified as a role in the governance 
guidance for the higher education sector. It does, however, feature in the 
package of standard roles in the commercial sector, and has been recently 
highlighted in the higher education context by Schofield who suggested, inter 
alia, that ‘it is increasingly recognised that an effective board has an important 
leadership role’ (Schofield, 2009, 28). However, the evidence from this study 
is that such a role is not recognised in this way.
5.2.2 The principal governing body roles considered institution by institution
As indicated in chapter 4 (sub-section 4.5.4), the themes with regard to 
governing body roles that emerged from the interview data were considered 
initially on an institution by institution basis. In each of the seven institutions 
involved in the study, all of the first six themes, and therefore roles, identified 
above were perceived to exist. The approximate strength with which each 
theme was highlighted in the interviewees’ responses is indicated in Table 5.1
183
below, which also gives an impression of the extent to which the less 
frequently recognised themes were also identified.
Table 5.1: Governing body roles identified institution by institution
Principal
roles:
Institutions: 
CityMod Civic ExCAT Gr’nfield NewMill TownMod UniColl
Challenge vvv vv vv vv vvv VV vv
Support vv vvv vv vvv vv vv vv
Advice and 
guidance
vv vv V vv vv V vv
Link to outside 
world
vv V vv V vv vv vv
Contribute to 
strategy
vvv vvv vv V vvv V vv
Hands off re 
educ character
vv vvv vv vvv No, more 
hands on
vv No, more 
hands on
Legal & stat 
compliance
vv V V - - V V
Risk ass’mnt V V - vv - V -
Notes: V, VV, or VVV = estimates of degree of support for category indicated: 
- = no mention.
Overall, as Table 5.1 illustrates, in relation to most of the themes 
identified in the interview data there was a considerable degree of 
commonality in the views expressed across all the institutions. The clearest 
differences on an institution by institution basis lay in the attitudes displayed 
toward governing body oversight of educational character. Although it was 
widely accepted that governing bodies had an ultimate responsibility for the 
educational character and academic activities of their institutions, in five 
institutions the governing bodies’ approach to these issues in practice was to 
be very much ‘hands-off. Only in the case of NewMill university and
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UniCollege was the approach more ‘hands-on’. These differences will be 
considered further when each of the themes and roles identified above is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter (section 6.7).
The other major differences between institutions in Table 5.1 - towards 
governing bodies’ roles in relation to legal and statutory compliance and risk 
assessment and management - reflect principally a lack of reference by most 
respondents to these issues. Whilst it is reasonable to note therefore, that 
interviewees identified these roles more clearly in some institutions than 
others -  for example, CityMod with regard to compliance and Greenfield in 
relation to risk - this cannot necessarily be taken to imply in the cases where 
these issues were less frequently discussed, or not discussed at all, that no 
attention is paid to such topics, as review of documentary evidence suggests 
otherwise. These points will be considered further in section 6.8.
Finally, in relation to the more subtle indications of differences between 
institutions in respect to the other themes and roles highlighted, while I am 
confident that these differences reflect my consistent judgement of the 
perceptions expressed by interviewees in different institutions, they 
nonetheless remain subjective assessments of the weight and nature of the 
opinions expressed. So, for example, I am clear that respondents from 
Greenfield and TownMod universities had less to say about governing bodies’ 
roles in providing advice and guidance to the Vice-Chancellor and the 
executive than was the case in the other institutions in the study. However, 
although this impression was formed partly in the light of the number and
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extent of the comments made by interviewees that could be linked to this 
theme, it was not, nor should it have been, primarily a judgement based on 
something amounting to a quantitative measure. Instead, it reflects my overall 
impression of the nature of the comments made about a particular governing 
body role, the relationship of those comments to expressions of opinion about 
other governing body roles, and an ultimately holistic judgement as to the 
extent to which different themes, and therefore roles, are privileged and seen 
as important from institution to institution. This overall holistic judgement 
therefore attempts to capture partly an indication of the frequency of 
comments about a particular governing body role, based on the number of 
interviewees who discussed that role, but also something about the extent of 
the comments made. Extended remarks or multiple references to a role were 
therefore given greater weight than less extensive or singular comments. I 
have also attempted to take account of how interesting or thoughtful 
comments were, although this was certainly the most subjective aspect of a 
process that was inevitably subjective overall.
Similar points apply to each of the major themes identified above, and 
their associated governing body roles. In addition, the potential for variability 
in the overall impression formed of governing body members’ and attendees’ 
perceptions associated with the make up of each institutional group of 
interviewees must be borne in mind. For example, in some cases most of the 
interviewees from an institution were external members of the governing body 
(100% in the case of NewMill), whilst elsewhere more internal members or 
attendees than externals were interviewed (six out of eight in the case of
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CityMod; see Table 4.3, p 152). These differences militate against attaching 
too much significance to the differences in the prominence and potential 
importance of particular themes that are apparent when they are viewed on an 
institution by institution basis.
5.2.3 The principal governing body roles considered by category of
governing body member or attendee
Given that the governing body members and attendees interviewed in 
this study fall in to a number of straightforward and common categories, as set 
out in Table 4.3 (p 152), it was also possible to consider whether perceptions 
of the principal roles of governing bodies varied according the category into 
which each individual interviewee fell, both generally and in relation to specific 
individual roles such as those of chair, Vice-Chancellor and governing body 
secretary. The approximate strength with which each theme was identified in 
this context is indicated in Table 5.2 overleaf.
The table shows, as was also the case with the extent of variation in 
perceptions of governing body roles viewed institution by institution set out in 
Table 5.1 (p 184), that there was a considerable degree of commonality in the 
views expressed by different types of governing body member or attendee. 
The clearest differences perhaps lay in degree of emphasis given by external 
members to their perceptions of governing bodies’ roles in relation to 
challenge, support, the provision of advice and guidance, and linking to the 
outside world, when compared to the perceptions of other governing body
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Table 5.2: Governing body roles identified by category of governing body
member or attendee
Category of GB member or attendee:
Principal roles:
Chair VC Sec’tary External
member
Internal
non-exec
Student
Challenge VV v v V VVV VV V
Support v v v v v V v v v v v v v
Advice and 
guidance from 
externals
v v v v V v v v v v v v v
Advice and 
guidance from non- 
execs & students
v v v v v v V v v v v v
Link to outside 
world
v v v v V v v v v v V
Contribute to 
strategy
v v v v v v v v v v V
Hands off re educ 
character
v v vvv V v v v v v v v v
Legal & stat 
compliance
V V V V (V) (V)
Risk ass’mnt - V - V - -
Notes: V, VV, or VVV = estimates of degree of support for category indicated;
(V) = hint of support; - = no mention;
Internal executive members and attendees have been omitted from the 
categories listed on the grounds that only two of the former and three of the 
latter were represented amongst the interviewees, and they were not evenly 
distributed across the institutions.
members. In relation to the provision of advice and guidance by the 
governing body, it seems reasonable here to differentiate between advice and 
guidance ultimately derived from external members and that from internal 
non-executive staff members and students. Students appeared to value 
particularly strongly the fact that their views were sought and listened to, but 
while this was recognised by other categories of governing body member, the 
relative emphasis placed on students’ (and non-executive staff members’) 
contributions by external members was markedly less. The nature of these
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and other apparent differences will be considered further in more detail in the 
next chapter (section 6.4).
As with the more subtle indications of differences between institutions 
in respect to governing body roles highlighted in Table 5.1 (p 184), I believe 
that my judgement of what the transcripts reveal about the perceptions 
expressed by different categories of governing body member and attendee set 
out in Table 5.2 (p 188) are reasonable, and consistent with the data. 
However, it needs to be stressed that the results set out in the table are once 
again based ultimately on my subjective assessments of the weight and 
nature of the opinions expressed. So, for example, while I am confident that 
the institutional secretaries taken as a whole said less about, and gave less 
emphasis to, most of the governing bodies’ roles when compared to the other 
categories of respondent, only three governing body secretaries were 
interviewed and caution therefore needs to be exercised when comparing 
their views collectively to those of larger groups, such as the six chairs or the 
17 other external members. Having said which, I suspect that the governing 
body secretaries were to some extent simply being professionally cautious, 
and therefore measured, in their responses, when compared, say, to the 
sometimes more outspoken and occasionally tendentious external members. 
As with the institution by institution differences apparent in Table 5.1, the 
judgements recorded in Table 5.2 reflect my overall impression of the nature 
of the comments made, their relationship to expressions of opinion about 
other governing body roles, and an ultimately holistic judgement as to the
189
extent to which different themes, and therefore roles, are privileged and seen 
as important by different categories of governing body members or attendees.
5.3 Perceptions of effectiveness in higher education governance
5.3.1 The development of concern with effectiveness
In chapters 2 and 3 it was noted that from at least the mid 1980s 
onwards there was an increasing focus on efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy in both the public sector generally, and in the higher education 
sector. The Jarratt report (sub-section 2.4.2) was arguably the first serious 
attempt by the university sector to address these issues collectively. 
Subsequently, a range of factors combined to create the circumstances in 
which the effectiveness of governance became a major area of attention in 
higher education. The CUC led the way in promoting interest in university 
governance from the late 1990s (see sub-section 2.11.1), latterly in 
association with the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE). 
The LFHE ultimately took a leading role in the development of proposals 
intended to enable the higher education sector to improve governance 
effectiveness (Schofield, 2009; LFHE, 2011c; see sub-section 3.6.3). The 
collective efforts of the CUC, LFHE and the funding councils have led to the 
development of a number of expectations as to the nature of higher education 
governing body effectiveness and how it may be achieved. However, these 
expectations, expressed for example in Schofield’s multiple enablers and 
outcomes of effective governance (Schofield, 2009, 28-45; see again sub­
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section 3.6.3), do not yet have (and, indeed, may not come to have) the same 
weight placed on them as the widely accepted expectations with regard to 
governing body roles. Nonetheless, they provide a convenient comparator to 
bear in mind when considering the views expressed in relation to the second 
pair of primary research questions considered in this study (see sub-section 
4.1.2), concerning perceptions as to what constitutes effectiveness, and the 
factors that contribute to achieving effectiveness in governance.
5.3.2 The variety of factors perceived as contributing to, or demonstrating,
governing body effectiveness
Whereas the perceptions of governing body roles that emerged from 
the transcript data were relatively discrete and could reasonably 
straightforwardly be grouped into a set of common themes that most 
interviewees referred to, the picture in relation to perceptions of effectiveness 
in governance was more fragmented. Nonetheless, a variety of factors could 
be identified that respondents either felt demonstrated effectiveness, or 
contributed to achieving effectiveness. The most frequently discussed factors 
were as follows:
(a) Performing governing body roles well. This theme involved the 
idea that effectiveness was associated with carrying out the major 
roles of the governing body (challenge, support, contributing to 
strategy, etc) and palpably doing so well.
(b) Institutional performance. A number of interviewees related 
effectiveness straightforwardly to institutional performance in the 
sense that if an institution was successful this was seen as 
demonstrating that the governing body was being effective.
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(c) The capability and performance of the chair. A distinct strand of 
thought suggested that the chair had a crucial role to play in 
ensuring effectiveness.
(d) The capability and performance of individual governing body 
members. Alongside a focus on the chair and his/her role, a 
number of interviewees also regarded the capability and 
performance of individual governing body members as very 
important to achieving effectiveness.
(e) Behaviours and trust. As well as individuals’ capabilities, another 
critical factor was seen to involve peoples’ behaviours towards 
one another, and stressed the importance of trust and openness.
(f) Structural aspects of governance arrangements. In some cases 
respondents laid particular stress on the potential contribution to 
effectiveness of structural aspects of governance arrangements, 
such as the nature of the governing body’s sub-committees and 
how they operated.
(g) The nature of governing body processes. Here there was an 
emphasis on matters such as how agendas were structured, and 
meetings managed, and their role in ensuring effective 
governance.
(h) Provision of appropriate information. A final theme worth citing 
here concerned the need, if a governing body was to be effective, 
for it to provided with appropriate information, both with regard to 
its nature and quantity.
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A number of other factors perceived as contributing to effective were also 
mentioned, albeit less frequently. In addition, a number of governing body 
members and attendees discussed additional issues in the general context of 
effectiveness. These included:
(i) The intrinsic difficulty of effectiveness as a concept. A number of 
respondents made clear that they saw effectiveness in 
governance as a difficult issue to address.
(j) Institutional accountability and independence. For some 
interviewees, the question of effectiveness related to some degree 
to the extent to which governing bodies met perceived 
accountability requirements. However, this issue also led some 
people to discuss the importance of institutional independence 
and the governing body’s role in guarding that independence.
(k) The capacity to identify and address crises. The governing body’s 
capacity to identify and address crises was seen in some cases 
as the potential ultimate test of effectiveness.
5.3.3 Effectiveness factors and issues considered institution by institution
Although the themes associated with effectiveness in governance were 
arguably overall somewhat less cohesive than principal themes in relation to 
governing body roles discussed above (see sub-section 5.2.2), the data can 
also be reviewed on an institution by institution basis. They are set out in 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 below.
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Table 5.3: Factors perceived as demonstrating, or contributing to, 
governing body effectiveness on an institution by institution basis
Effectiveness
factors
Institutions: 
CityMod Civic ExCAT Gr’nfield NewMill TMod UniColl
Performing GB roles well V V V vv V V V
Inst performance V (V) V V vv V V
Capability of chair vv vv V vv V V V
Capability of GB members V vv vv vv V vv V
Behaviours and trust (V) vv V V vv vv vv
GB structure (V) V V vv V (V) V
Nature of GB processes vv V V V vv (V) (V)
Provision of appropriate 
info
vv vv V V V V V
Table 5.4: Other issues associated with considering 
governing body effectiveness institution by institution
Issues associated with 
effectiveness
Institutions: 
CityMod Civic ExCAT Gr’nfield NewMill TMod UniColl
Difficulty as a concept VV V vv V - - (V)
Institutional accountability vv V V V VV VV V
Institutional independence V vv V vv - V -
Confidence re crises (V) V V vv V V (V)
Notes: (V), V, or VV = rough estimates of degree of support for category indicated 
(where (V) = hint of support): - = no mention.
Although some variation on an institution by institution basis is 
detectable in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 -  for example, with regard to the importance 
to effectiveness of the capability of the chair, or the nature of governing body 
processes -  these are arguably less marked than the similarities. This 
position is broadly sustained even when institutions are considered in groups 
-  e.g. chartered versus incorporated. For instance, with regard to the 
importance of the chair, two of the three institutions where this was perceived
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as one of the more important contributors to effectiveness, Civic and 
Greenfield were chartered, but one, CityMod, was incorporated. Even where 
one factor -  the nature of governing body processes -  was seen as somewhat 
less significant in all three chartered institutions (Civic, ExCAT and 
Greenfield), it was then seen as more significant in two of the incorporated 
institutions (CityMod and TownMod), but apparently less significant in the 
other incorporated institution (NewMill) and in UniCollege (whose governance 
arrangements are equivalent to those of the incorporated institutions). In the 
case of perceptions with regard to institutional independence, possibly slightly 
more significance can be attached to the fact that this was perceived as most 
important at two of the three chartered institutions, but least important at the 
institution that had most recently become a university (NewMill) and at 
UniCollege, which was working towards university status and had only 
relatively recently achieved university college status. However, in all cases 
one needs to bear in mind again the breadth of views expressed, and the 
differences in the nature and size of the groups of individuals expressing 
these opinions, and therefore to be cautious in drawing overall conclusions.
5.3.4 Effectiveness factors and issues considered by category of governing
body member or attendee
The principal themes associated with effectiveness in governance, 
considered by category of governing member or attendee, are set out in 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 below. In these two tables, as was the case in Tables 5.3 
and 5.4 (p 194), no very strong patterns are discernible. It is, however, 
interesting to note the overall stress on the role of the chair, the importance of
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behaviours and trust, and the general consensus as to the importance of 
appropriate information provision. The absence of the mention of a number of 
factors by both governing body secretaries and student members is also 
relatively striking, with the latter being perhaps more explicable (on grounds of 
lack of experience and possibly narrower breadth of view), than the former.
Table 5.5: Factors perceived as demonstrating, or contributing to, governing 
body effectiveness by category of governing body member or attendee
Effectiveness
factors:
Category of GB member or attendee:
Chair VC Sec’tary External
member
Internal
non-exec
Student
Performing 
GB roles well
V V - vv vv -
Inst performance V vv - vv V -
Capability of chair V vv V vv (V) V
Capability of GB 
members
V V (V) V V (V)
Behaviours and 
trust
vv V V V V (V)
GB stucture V (V) V (V) vv -
Nature of GB 
processes
vv V V vv V V
Provision of 
appropriate info
vv V vv vv V vv
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Table 5.6: Other issues associated with considering governing 
body effectiveness by category of governing body member or attendee
Issues associated 
with effectiveness
Category of GB member or attendee:
Chair VC Sec’tary External
member
Internal
non-exec
Student
Difficulty as a 
concept
V V vv V V (V)
Institutional
accountability
vv vv (V) vv V VV
Institutional
independence
V V - vv V -
Confidence re 
crises
V V (V) vv V V
Notes: (V), V, or VV = rough estimates of degree of support for category indicated 
(where (V ) = hint of support): - = no mention.
It seems reasonably clear overall, however, as was the case with perceptions 
of governing body roles, that similarities of view amongst different categories 
of governing body members and attendees are more common than 
differences.
5.4 The quintain or the case studies
5.4.1 The balance between the quintain and the case studies reviewed
It was noted in Chapter 4 (sub-section 4.5.4) that consideration of the
principal themes arising from the transcribed interview data showed that some
differences could be detected on a case by case, and therefore an institution
by institution, basis, but that there were overall more similarities in
interviewees’ responses than differences. This point is clearly illustrated by
the summaries presented above in Tables 5.1, 5.3 and 5.4 (pp 184 and 194).
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Bearing in mind the nature of the data, and its reflection of the necessarily 
subjective perceptions of individual governing body members and attendees, 
it cannot as a whole be regarded in any simple sense as representing an 
objective truth, but must instead be seen as comprising a palette of subjective 
constructions. Adding to this mix my role, as the researcher, in the creation of 
these subjective constructions, it would, I believe, have been inappropriate to 
undertake a fine-grained analysis of the interview data on an institution by 
institution (and therefore case study by case study basis). Given that the 
material set out in Tables 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6 (pp 188, 196, 197) shows even 
more clearly that there are more similarities than differences in the data when 
they are considered in relation to different categories of governing body 
member or attendee, an approach focussing on a detailed analysis of 
interviewees’ responses according to the category of their governing body 
membership or attendance type, would I suggest also have been 
inappropriate. With these thoughts in mind, I shall therefore present, analyse 
and interpret the interview data in more detail in the following chapters in 
relation on the one hand to the perceived principal governing body roles and 
on the other hand to the perceived effectiveness factors and issues set out in 
sections 5.2 and 5.3 above. Before doing so I shall now turn to the findings 
from the supplementary documentary and observational data also collected 
during the study.
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5.5 The documentary data
5.5.1 The extent of the meeting documentation considered
Simply by virtue of being committees, all the governing bodies of the 
case study institutions used standard types of documentation, including 
agendas, minutes and a variety of other papers on a wide range of subjects. 
The most complete set of meeting-related paperwork was obtained from Civic 
university, with relatively complete sets of data available also for CityMod and 
Greenfield universities and UniCollege. Given the secondary nature of the 
documentary material as a data source, and constraints on the time available 
for the study as a whole, I did not attempt to obtain fuller sets of data from the 
other institutions (ExCAT, NewMill and TownMod). Where documentary 
evidence was reviewed, it covered a period of one to one and a half years 
across the academic years 2009-2010 and 2010-2011.
5.5.2 Agendas
The range of topics covered on all the agendas was broadly similar, as 
one would expect. In each case there was some preliminary business (such 
as apologies, minutes and matters arising, and declarations of interest). 
Thereafter the agenda items varied, although in most cases there were a 
number of standard items taken next at each meeting. For example, at Civic 
university these items always included a health and safety report, chairman’s 
business and Vice-Chancellor’s business. Chair’s business and Vice- 
Chancellors’ reports were common features at all institutions.
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Apart from revealing standard items addressed at every, or almost 
every, meeting, the agendas reveal the breadth of topics addressed by each 
governing body. Regular reports on institutional finances appear, as do items 
such as the approval of the annual budget and of one off items associated 
with capital projects or other medium to long term developments. Other topics 
include regular reviews of risk management, reports from a wide range of sub­
committees, reports to external bodies such as HEFCE and consideration of 
proposals made by such bodies (e.g. amendments proposed by HEFCE to the 
financial memorandum in 2009-2010).
In terms of the overall structuring of agendas, the practice appeared to 
be most developed at Civic university, where six explicit categories were used 
-  ‘preliminary business’ at the start and ‘other business’ at the end, with the 
other categories being (in sequence) strategic matters, governance and risk, 
performance monitoring and reserved matters. Although this approach 
appeared to provide clarity for governing body members, detailed scrutiny of 
the agendas suggested that some variability still existed as to what was 
deemed to fall in each category. For instance, an item relating to a series of 
changes to the institution’s statutes appeared at one meeting in the 
performance monitoring section, but came back to the following meeting in the 
strategy section of the agenda, without it being immediately apparent why this 
was the case. In addition, the performance monitoring section seemed at 
times to be used as a catch-all category, with, for example, consideration of a 
revised code of practice on freedom of speech being dealt with in this section.
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Governing body agendas therefore reflect varying degrees of apparent 
consideration as to how meetings might best be structured. There was also 
routine use of ‘starring’ to identify items not requiring discussion, and a 
mixture of types and scales of business for consideration, from policy 
documents, through regular and routine but significant topics such as annual 
budgets, to one-off items varying from large scale development projects to 
items requiring formal approval for fiduciary or regulatory reasons.
At all the institutions where agendas were studied, the number of items 
for consideration varied from about 15 to about 30 at each meeting. In all 
cases between a quarter and a third of these items were starred as not for 
discussion. Even where topics were discussed, the comments of some 
interviewees and observation of governing body meetings at Civic university 
(see section 5.6) revealed that only a small number of agenda items at each 
meeting -  around three or four - would lead to extended discussion, and that 
the time taken up by discussion of most items was in practice around five to 
ten minutes.
5.5.3 Quantity of paperwork for consideration by governing bodies
Also apparent from consideration of documentary evidence was an 
indication of the quantity of material considered at each meeting. The 
perceived importance to governing body effectiveness of the nature and 
quantity of paperwork provided to governing bodies was highlighted by a 
number of governing body members in their interviews (see Tables 5.3 and 
5.5, pp 194 and 196). The material available from Civic and Greenfield
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universities showed that the papers supplied for most governing body 
meetings ran to between 100 and 200 pages, and was occasionally as much 
as 300 pages. On balance less paperwork was provided to governing body 
members at Civic university than at Greenfield university, but at Civic 
university people had to had to contend with longer agendas and a higher 
number of distinct, separate papers then their counterparts at Greenfield 
university. Possibly related to this, when the governing body minutes were 
considered, those from Civic university tended to be the longest, running to 
well over ten pages, compared to between 5 and 10 pages at Greenfield 
university. Although somewhat less of the governing body paperwork was 
available for CityMod university and UniCollege, it appeared that on the whole 
less paperwork was presented at the meetings of these two institutions than at 
Civic and Greenfield universities. It is possible that this difference relates to 
the incorporated versus chartered nature of the two pairs of institutions, but 
given the small number of institutions involved this point is necessarily 
speculative.
From the governing body minutes it appeared clear that much time - 
indeed, the majority of the time -  in each meeting was spent by the chair, 
Vice-Chancellor or executive attendees in introducing and presenting material, 
and that the opportunities for contributions from external members were 
somewhat limited because of this. The minutes also suggested that the items 
dealt with (but not in all cases discussed) at governing body meetings at Civic 
and Greenfield universities could be categorised as follows:
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Table 5.7: Categories of item, and frequency of 
occurrence, in governing body minutes
Category of item Civic university Greenfield university
Routine preliminaries 17% 31%
Governance/membership 13% 5%
Strategy-related 11% 10%
Monitoring and approval 24% 27%
Receipt of information 37% 26%
Other activities 8% 1%
In relation to the overall perceptions of governing body roles set out in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (pp 184, 188) and the categories of items discussed and 
their frequency of occurrence in the documentary evidence there is at first 
sight something of a mismatch. However, the nature of meeting agendas and 
papers presented for discussion, most of which had been drafted by members 
of the executive or had come from subsidiary committees, meant that they 
were not often likely to identify examples of input from governing body 
members in terms of roles such as providing challenge, or support, or advice 
and guidance. The minutes of meetings were in principle more likely to 
capture direct input by governing body members in discussions, and therefore 
to demonstrate them carrying out their self-perceived roles. However, in 
practice the minutes reviewed were written in a very concise style, which did 
not often capture much detail of discussion, or indicate other than very 
occasionally which individuals had made particular points. It was therefore 
perhaps inevitably difficult to support, or rebut, most claims by governing body 
members as to the roles they carry out by reviewing documentary evidence.
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By contrast, however, it was possible to note evidence in the 
documentation that governing bodies, and therefore governing body 
members, were attending to some of the normative roles expected of them 
that they had had little to say about in their interviews. This was because 
subsumed within the categories of items discussed at each governing body 
meeting were numerous items dealing with monitoring and approval, and the 
receipt of information. These categories, and particularly the former, involved 
a range of items concerned with the governing bodies’ roles in relation to 
compliance with legal and statutory requirements, and risk management, 
which it was noted in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (pp 184 and 188) were not 
emphasised to any great extent in the data obtained from interviews with 
governing body members and attendees.
5.5.4 Limitations as to the vaiue of documentary evidence
Although useful information can be obtained from documentary 
evidence, it needs to be recognised that such material necessarily has 
limitations as a source of data. Minutes, for example, can provide details of 
topics considered by governing bodies, the extent to which different types of 
information were presented, and how they were formally recorded as being 
addressed. However, minutes will very rarely, if ever, reveal anything about 
governing body members’ perceptions of their roles. In the context of this 
study they were therefore primarily of use to supplement the data obtained 
directly from governing body members in interviews. In that regard they 
provided some confirmation for members’ expressions of concern about the 
volumes of material they received, and the time available to deal with that
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material. The documentary evidence also gave some idea of the nature and 
frequency of the topics considered in governing body meetings, and showed 
that more consideration is given to activities associated with monitoring and 
control roles than was apparent in the interview data.
5.6 Evidence from the observation of meetings
5.6.1 Parameters for the observation of meetings at Civic university
Two governing body meetings were observed at Civic university. The
meetings in question were routine meetings, being part of the regular 
schedule of meetings. One took place in the early spring of 2010 and one in 
the early summer of the same year; they will therefore be referred to as the 
spring meeting or the summer meeting as appropriate. There were just under 
30 people present at each meeting. Summary details of the number and 
nature of the people present at each meeting, of the physical and other 
practical arrangements for the meeting, and how I approached the task of 
observation, are given in Appendix 6.
5.6.2 The observations made
In making observations, my first impression was that the general 
atmosphere immediately before each of the meetings was very positive. Both 
when coffee and tea were taken before the meetings, and as people moved 
into the meeting room, there was a good-natured buzz of conversation. This 
gave the impression of a group of people who appeared to get on well
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together and who were, generally speaking, looking forward to the meeting 
they were about to attend. At the start of each meeting, albeit more strongly 
at the spring meeting than the summer meeting, the chair took the opportunity 
to attempt some pre-emptive meeting management, by stressing the 
importance of a small number of items that were likely to need extended 
discussion and encouraging those who wanted to contribute to that discussion 
to be focussed and concise. These comments prompted some humorous 
banter, but members gave clear signals of acknowledging her remarks, and 
their serious intent, either nodding or murmuring their assent.
The majority of the time in each meeting was taken up by the chair, the 
Vice-Chancellor, or by members of the executive presenting oral reports, or 
orally introducing papers for consideration. The approximate breakdown of 
how time in each meeting was used is set out in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 below.
Table 5.8: Approximate time taken up by each type of item 
on the agenda at each meeting
Type of agenda item and approx time spent (mins) plus number of separate 
items dealt with (in brackets)
Meeting
Preliminaries Strategy- Governance Monitoring 
related and risk & approval
Reserved Not for 
items discussion
Spring 25 (5) 45(2) 0 (0 ) 110(9) 0 (0) 0 (4)
Summer 65 (5) 20 (3) 60 (2) 35 (6) 5 (1 ) 0(11)
Table 5.9: Approximate breakdown of time taken up by 
members or attendees at each meeting
Speaker category and approximate time spent (mins) and proportion of total 
meeting time taken up (in brackets)
Meeting
Chair Vice- Executive External Internal members:
Chancellor attendees members Staff Student
Spring 30 (17%) 30 (17%) 60 (33%) 40 (22%) 15(8%) 5 (3%)
Summer 45 (24%) 45 (24%) 30 (16%) 50 (27%) 10(5%) 5 (3%)
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In relation to the data in Table 5.8, at the spring meeting the two items 
addressed in the strategy-related category both took similar amounts of time 
(ca 20 to 25 minutes), while in the monitoring category one multi-part item 
took 30 minutes, one other item took 20 minutes and another two items took 
10 minutes each. In the summer meeting, the chair’s and Vice-Chancellor’s 
reports both contained more separate sub-items than had been the case in 
the spring, a number of which in themselves involved lengthy reports, and the 
preliminary section of the agenda therefore took considerably longer than it 
had in the spring. Two of the three strategic items at the summer meeting 
were matters coming back to the governing body after further work had been 
done following previous consideration and this led to relatively short 
discussions of these items. At this meeting the longest item, presented and 
then discussed for a total of some 55 minutes, was the report of a governance 
review. The review had been chaired by a deputy chair, who presented the 
report (he was, of course, an external member), and prompted considerable 
discussion amongst the other external members.
Turning to Table 5.9, the two factors just mentioned above account for 
the increase from the spring to the summer meetings in the amount of time 
taken up with contributions from external members, and the change in the 
balance of the contributions of external members versus executive attendees. 
Table 5.9 also shows the considerable amount of time at each meeting taken 
up by the chair and Vice-Chancellor (over half the time at the summer 
meeting). Overall, around two-thirds of the time was taken up by contributions 
from the chair, the Vice-Chancellor or executive attendees. Most of these
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contributions involved the provision of information to other members of the 
governing body. Contributions from the other members made up around a 
third of the time taken for each meeting, with external members contributing 
most, internal, non-executives contributing about a quarter to a third of the 
time input by external members, with the students having least to say. In 
addition, the students’ comments, on the evidence of these two meetings, 
were restricted to topics of direct interest to students, such as 
accommodation, except when they were explicitly invited by the chair to 
express views on broader issues. The extent of the contributions by 
governing body members other than the chair and Vice-Chancellor are 
summarised in Table 5.10 overleaf.
The table shows 4 externals failing to contribute to the spring or 
summer meetings (out of 10 and 11 externals present respectively). 
However, although my view was inevitably subjective, in neither meeting did I 
form the impression that these externals had been deterred from speaking. 
Indeed, all the external members appeared to be attentive most of the time, 
listening to what was being said, and showing signs of interest or agreement, 
even when they did not feel moved to contribute personally. The non­
executive staff and the students also appeared, from their body language, to 
be interested in and engaged by what was going for most of the time. 
Amongst the external members making three or more contributions, the same 
people featured in each meeting. They included one of the deputy chairs and 
two sub-committee chairs. All three of them gave signs in the meetings of 
being particularly self-confident, albeit very courteously so.
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Table 5.10: Number of contributions by each
type of governing body member present
Type of member Spring meeting Summ er meeting
Number of externals present excl chair 10 11
Of whom, number making no contributions 4 4
number making one contribution 3 1
number making two contributions 1 1
number making three contributions 1 2
number making four contributions 1 0
number making five contributions 0 1
number making six contributions 0 2
Number of internal non-executives present 4 2
Of whom, number making no contributions 2 1
number making one contribution 1 0
number making two contributions 0 1
number making three contributions 1 0
Number of student members present 2 2
Of whom, number making no contributions 0 1
number making one contribution 0 1
number making two contributions 2 0
Another aspect of the number of contributions made by members was 
that female external members (excluding the female chair) seemed less prone 
to contribute than male external members. The ratio of men to women in the 
external membership was about three to one, so one would expect there to be 
fewer contributions in total from women than men. However, on the basis of 
the two meetings observed, women appeared to be less likely to contribute, 
pro rata, than men. It would have been interesting to see if this apparent 
difference was borne out over a longer period, or was simply a quirk of the two 
meetings in question.
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Although the general tenor of the meetings, and the behaviour and 
engagement of members and attendees, were broadly positive, there were 
occasional signs of disengagement, with people clearly not paying attention to 
whoever was speaking. In some instances this lack of engagement was 
illustrated by people holding side conversations, or in the case of some 
members of the executive, by the use of BlackBerrys (or similar hand-held 
devices) and in one instance the extended use of a laptop computer. Generic 
signs of lack of focus on what a speaker was saying sometimes occurred 
towards the end of relatively lengthy items. In most of these instances it 
seems likely that some members or attendees felt that enough had already 
been said on a subject, so that they did not feel it necessary (or were not 
sufficiently inspired) to keep paying attention; in other cases, people may just 
have become bored. A slight increase in signs of disengagement was 
apparent towards the end of both meetings, accompanied by an increase in 
yawning, and it seems probable that this was simply a reflection of some 
people finding it difficult to maintain their concentration towards the end of a 
fairly lengthy meeting. Other signs of disengagement included fairly clear 
instances of people looking around the room, some cases of staring at the 
ceiling and people reading their papers when oral contributions were being 
made.
5.6.3 The value of the observational data
The observation of two governing body meetings at Civic university 
confirmed the generally positive impression of their experience conveyed by 
the members and attendees of that governing body when they were
210
interviewed. Nonetheless, during the course of each meeting there were 
varying degrees of engagement with the proceedings by those present. 
Executive attendees appeared more prone to lose interest in some items than 
members, but for the great majority of the time, most people seemed to be 
paying attention and listening closely to what was being said. The impression 
conveyed by consideration of meeting documentation (see sub-section 5.5.3), 
that around half the items in meetings of Civic university’s governing body 
were items involving the receipt of information (including the standard 
preliminary items at each meeting), was shown by the observation process 
potentially to under-represent the amount of time devoted to information 
receipt.
It was also possible from the observation process to begin to identify 
individual members or attendees taking on particular personal roles, or types 
of role, within the group as a whole. For example, executive attendees with 
particular functional remits (e.g. the Directors of Human Resources and 
Finance) were reticent about speaking to items other than those in their 
professional area. Similarly, the student members clearly saw their role 
principally as commenting on subjects that were of direct relevance to the 
student body, but otherwise allowing the other people present to ‘get on with 
it’. Taken as a whole, the observation process gave strong evidence of the 
importance of personal interactions to the governance process. It also 
provided support for the contention drawn from the study of meeting 
documentation that attention was paid to compliance with legal and statutory 
and obligations, and issues associated with risk assessment and
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management, despite these roles not being highlighted in their interviews by 
governing body members.
Overall, the information obtained suggests that data from the 
observation of governing bodies may have significant potential for illustrating 
how governing bodies operate in practice. The data from Civic university also 
hints at the possibility of identifying different types of personal behaviour 
according to the backgrounds and natures of individual members and 
attendees, and how this might affect the interactions between individual 
governing body members. However, further meetings would need to be 
observed, and such observation would almost certainly need to be recorded in 
finer detail than was employed during the observation at Civic university, 
before additional analysis of this kind could be undertaken. I shall now turn to 
the data obtained from explicitly presenting governing body members and 
attendees with material about selected theoretical perspectives on 
governance.
5.7 Perspectives on selected governance theories
5.7.1 Eliciting explicit views about governance theories
As noted in Chapter 4 (sub-section 4.3.3), at the end of most of the 
interviews of governing body members and attendees, the opportunity was 
taken to seek peoples’ views on brief summaries of some of the principal 
characteristics associated with four theoretical perspectives on governance -
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agency, stewardship, stakeholder and managerial hegemony -  and the 
applicability of those perspectives to the operation of their governing bodies. 
These perspectives were selected as being amongst the most prominent 
theoretical positions discussed in the governance literature. They were 
presented to governing body members in the form of a two by two matrix (see 
figure 4.1, sub-section 4.3.3), and they were asked whether they felt any of 
the perspectives, singly or combined, might apply to the position of their 
governing body vis-a-vis their institution.
I had expected that relatively few, if any, governing body members 
would discuss governance theory spontaneously during their interviews. This 
expectation was borne out, and although a handful of individuals mentioned 
stakeholders, and one or two referred to the concept of stewardship, in none 
of these instances were these concepts raised as specific examples of 
theoretical perspectives.
5.7.2 Responses to the matrix of theoretical perspectives
The governance theory matrix was presented to most interviewees, but
time constraints around individual interviews meant that it was not presented
to eight people, including all the interviewees at UniCollege. Most of the
interviewees presented with the matrix spent between 30 and 60 seconds
considering it, and then commented on it briefly and straightforwardly. For
example, after about 30 seconds pause for thought, the totality of external
Greenfield 7’s comments was:
‘Well, this [institution] is stakeholder. Yes.’ (Greenfield 7, external, 
sub-committee chair)
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Similarly, a student at CityMod university, after an even shorter period of 
reflection (about 20 seconds), said:
I think the two that are more relevant here are probably stewardship
and stakeholder. And those are the ones that jump out more to me.
(NewMod 7, internal, student)
As illustrated in table 5.11 overleaf, the majority of respondents felt that 
the concepts associated with the stewardship or the stakeholder perspectives 
were most relevant. Strong identification with the stewardship and 
stakeholder perspectives, with each given approximately equal weight, 
applied across five of the six institutions where the matrix was used (CityMod, 
Civic, ExCAT, Greenfield and NewMill universities). There was some 
recognition of the agency perspective as applicable to their situation by a 
minority of people at Greenfield, and of the agency and managerial hegemony 
perspectives by a minority at Civic university. The nature of the data, and the 
way it was obtained, militate against reading too much into these detailed 
variations, but the extent of the endorsement of the stewardship and 
stakeholder aspects of governance makes clear that respondents felt strongly 
that their boards were operating within the parameters associated with these 
perspectives, and that these were appropriate and positive parameters.
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Table 5.11: Theoretical perspectives on governance
Institution/
interviewees
Agency Stewardship Stakeholder Managerial
Hegemony
General
Comments
CityMod
CMd2 
(Int. VC)
CMd 3 (Exec 
att)
X X
vvv
V V Stewardship too 
passive. Ldr’ship 
more important.
CMd 4 (Stff) X vvv X
CMd 5 (Chr) V vvv vv V
CMd 6 (Sec) V? vvv V? V
CMd 7 (Stdt) vvv vvv
CMd 8 (Ext) Willing to discuss but not keen on simplifying in this way, nor to allocate.
Civic
Cvc 2 (Stdt) vvv
Cvc 3 (Ext) X vvv vv V
Cvc 4 (Ext) vvv
Cvc 5 (Ext) X vvv vvv X
Cvc 6 (Ext) vv vv Comment that 
overall approach 
too simpiistic
Cvc 7 
(Exec att)
now  VVV now  VVV was VVV
Cvc 8 (Stdt) X vv VV VV
Cvc 9 (Chr) V? None sufficiently 
‘forward-looking’
Cvc 10 (Stff) vv vv V V
ExCAT
ExC 1 (Stff) X vvv vvv X
ExC 2 (Sec) vvv vvv
ExC 3 (Chr) vvv vvv
ExC 5 (Ext) X? V? V? V? Not very keen to 
simplify like this
ExC 6 (Stdt) X vvv V V
ExC 8 (Int 
exec)
Felt all views too passive, but that stewardship closest if more active than term 
implies at face value.
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Table 5.11 (continued)
Institution/
interviewees
Agency Stewardship Stakeholder Managerial
Hegemony
General
Comments
Greenfield
Gfd 1 (Stff) VV VVV V
Gfd 2 (Ext) vvv
Gfd 3 (Int, 
exec)
vvv vv
Gfd 4 (Ext) V vv vvv
Gfd 5 (Stdt) V V Saw ‘diluted’ 
instances of 
perspectives 
indicated
Gfd 6 (VC) vv vvv
Gfd 7 (Ext) vvv
Gfd 8 (Chr) X vvv vvv X
NewMill
NM1 (Chr) X vvv vvv X
NM2 (Ext) X vvv vvv X
NM3 (Ext) Willing to discuss but did not find it helpful -  all categories too static. Did not allocate.
NM5 (Ext) X V? V? X
TownMod
TM1 (Stff) 5 -1 0 % 5 -1 0 % ca  2 0 % ca 60%
TM 2 (Int, 
VC)
X X vvv VVV
TM 3 (Ext) V vvv ‘But my 
[personal] 
philosophy is 
stewardship.’
TM 4 (Ext) vvv vvv
TM 5 (Ext) W as willing to engage with the issue but felt it was too complex to distil, so no fixed 
conclusions offered.
Key: Att = attendee (and therefore not member), Chr = chair, Ext = external member,
Exec = executive, Int = internal member, Sec = governing body secretary,
Stff = internal, staff (not executive), Stdt = internal, student.
x = explicit statement that indicated category is not applicable (as opposed to silence 
on the issue)
V, VV, or VVV = my estimates of degree of support for category indicated. Equal 
number of ticks in different boxes in a row indicates explicit statement by interviewee 
of equal weight of each category; different number of ticks equals explicit 
differentiation by interviewee between weights to be given to categories
Note: Interviewees not presented with the matrix are omitted from the list, as are the
comments from one interviewee whose comments have been used only as 
background information (as explained in section 4.3.5).
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In the case of TownMod university, it was striking that three of the four 
people who commented on the matrix identified the managerial hegemony 
perspective as applicable to their governance situation, particularly given that 
the three people expressing this view were an internal, non-executive staff 
member, an external member who was also the deputy chair, and the Vice- 
Chancellor. Although managerial hegemony is usually associated in the 
literature with board weakness, and the likelihood that board or governing 
body members will not feel satisfied with their lot, there was strong evidence 
from the interview data for TownMod university that governing body members 
did feel able to contribute positively to the governance of the institution. They 
also clearly felt the university was successful, and that it was well run by a 
well-regarded Vice-Chancellor. In effect, albeit on the basis of a small 
sample, it appears as though the governance of TownMod involved voluntary 
acceptance of managerial hegemony.
Apart from the variation from the norm at TownMod university, the
other principal area of interest in Table 5.11 relates to those people who did
not find the matrix helpful. As briefly indicated in the table, some interviewees
felt that the issues involved were too complex to be captured in this way. For
example, although external member Civic 6 ultimately selected the agency
and stewardship perspectives as being the most relevant, he commented:
The truth is clearly not at either extreme and will vary from institution to 
institution and from individual to individual. I think that’s quite a useful 
way of thinking about it, except that ... it’s relatively simplistic in the 
sense that, for example, the concept of self-interest is a very 
complicated one. Just demanding more for me today, may actually not 
be in my long term self interest, whereas acting in the interests of all 
the stakeholders may in fact be very much in my self interest. So it’s a
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slightly more complicated dimension than is represented just by that bit 
of paper.’ (Civic 6, external, deputy chair)
An external at NewMill also did not find the matrix particularly useful. In 
relation to the agency and managerial hegemony perspectives, for instance, 
she reacted quite strongly, quoting some of the text from the matrix in her 
response:
‘“Board role to restrain/counteract perceived tendencies of managers to 
act in their own interest”! I mean, of course, but, you know, for God's 
sake don't let it get that far! “Assumes power of board is relatively 
limited” - you see, it isn't (laughs). I mean, it's a super balance, ’cos 
[the management] have all the knowledge, and they make the 
decisions broadly speaking, but at the end of the day, if the council 
says nyet, it bloody well is nyetl’ (NewMill 3, external, sub-committee 
chair)
In addition, with regard to stewardship, she commented:
‘I don't think, if you’re maintaining the institution and its assets, you're 
gonna do anything. You’ve either got to make progress or die!’ 
(NewMill 3, external, sub-committee chair)
After quoting further details from the matrix, she summed up her views by 
saying:
‘Right. Terrific. And then you bin all of that and you get on with real 
life!’ (NewMill 3, external, sub-committee chair)
In further comments on the matrix, the chair of Civic university, the
Vice-Chancellor of CityMod and an executive internal at ExCAT all expressed
the view that the choices in the matrix were too passive. The Vice-Chancellor
at CityMod said, for example, that a perspective based on leadership was now
far more appropriate:
‘I mean, the stewardship one, you know, my argument is we’re not 
about stewardship these days ... actually stewardship means you die. 
... you’ve got to actually do more than that -  you’ve got to not be 
stationery, you’ve got to develop is my whole view, right? ... I think
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actually this is the difference between the leadership aspects as 
opposed to the stewardship aspects, and I think there’s a leadership 
one, almost, in here.’ (CityMod 2, Internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
However, as noted earlier in this chapter (sub-section 5.2.1), there was very 
little recognition across the interviewees as a whole of the idea of governing 
bodies playing a leadership role, so it is difficult to treat CityMod 2’s views as 
anything other than an interesting outlier.
5.7.3 Commentary on the use of the matrix
Although the governance theory matrix was introduced into the data 
collection process somewhat abruptly at the end of relatively lengthy semi­
structured interviews, most interviewees took it in their stride and were happy 
to consider it. All the respondents recognised the potential relevance of the 
material in the matrix, even if in a minority of cases they found some of the 
descriptions of different perspectives too simplistic. Most people associated 
their governing body with the stewardship and stakeholder perspectives, 
although the ready categorisation by three interviewees from TownMod 
university of their governing body as operating in line with the managerial 
hegemony perspective, but that this was not a problem, was striking.
5.8 Conclusions
5.8.1 The principal findings in summary
This chapter has presented summaries of the principal findings from 
each of the four types of data collected in this study. In the case of the
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primary data source, the transcriptions of semi-structured interviews with 
governing body members and attendees, it has been possible to identify the 
interviewees’ perceptions that a number of distinct governing body roles exist; 
it has also been possible to show how the respondents perceive a range of 
factors and issues that contribute, or are associated with, governing body 
effectiveness. The data in the form of meeting documentation, although not 
by themselves capable of directly addressing the issue of peoples’ 
perceptions of aspects of governance, have been shown to provide relevant 
supplementary information about the ways in which governing bodies operate, 
that can potentially throw light on some of the views expressed by governing 
body members and attendees in their interviews. The observational data, 
although limited in extent, and again supplementary to the interview data, 
have also been shown to cast light on peoples’ interactions and behaviours 
which can be compared to the descriptions of their activities in meetings 
offered by the interviewees. Finally, the data gathered when interviewees 
were presented with a matrix of theoretical perspectives on governance offer 
a route to an exploration of attitudes towards governance theory and its 
potential relevance to higher education governing bodies. All these data 
have, however, been considered so far largely in summary form. I shall now 
therefore review aspects of the data in more detail, and endeavour to analyse 
and interpret their meanings, bearing in mind in addition the potential 
implications of both governance theory and previous studies of governance.
220
Chapter 6: Perceptions of governing body roles
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 The variety of governing body roles
The variety of governing body roles perceived to exist by governing 
body members and attendees was summarised in Chapter 5, and the degree 
to which different roles were identified on an institution by institution basis, 
and by different categories of governing body member, was reviewed. In the 
light of the relatively limited differences apparent when the data were 
considered on that basis, data relevant to each of the roles identified will now 
be considered in more detail. The bulk of those data will be drawn from the 
transcribed interviews with governing body members and attendees, but 
where relevant the data from the study of meeting documentation and from 
observation of governing body meetings will also be cited.
6.2 Challenging the executive management team
6.2.1 Common perceptions of external members
The importance of challenging, and being seen to challenge, the Vice- 
Chancellor and his or her executive management team, was amongst the 
most clearly expressed views of the external members of governing bodies.
221
For example, a number of external governing body members made
statements such as:
‘[The role] is to hold them to account, and it is to challenge. It is to 
examine, I think thoroughly, proposals for change, obviously, 
particularly, proposals relating to the distribution of the money that’s 
available.’ (TownMod 4, external)1
‘I think [the role is] asking questions, and listening very carefully to the 
answers -  sometimes I think you need to challenge things. I think 
there’s that kind of external reality check that lay members can bring.’ 
(Greenfield 4, external, sub-committee chair)
‘There’s lots of small, you know, are you sure this, and what about that, 
and we didn’t do that right, ...2 b u t... the challenging and the checking 
should be sort of a regular part of every decision, shouldn’t it?’ 
(NewMill 3, external, sub-committee chair)
Amplifying the basic position, other comments referred to seeking more detail,
stopping things when necessary, banging heads together, making the
executive uncomfortable, and being the ultimate blocker:
The way we use [council] is, it is the ultimate blocker... I see council 
as the ultimate restraint.’ (Greenfield 8, external, chair)
6.2.2 Challenge as seen by internal members and attendees
Internal governing body members and attendees also made statements
that supported the idea that the governing body was routinely engaged in
challenging and scrutinising the executive, and that it was appropriate for the
governing body to be doing this:
‘I think the main thing that members of the board should bring is a sort 
of questioning approach. It’s having someone who is that step 
removed able to ask some of the awkward questions, and sometimes
1 Quotations are attributed, by institution, to an individual governing body member. The type 
of member or attendee is indicated in accordance with Table 4.1 in Chapter 4.
2 Text omitted in extracts from the transcripts is indicated by
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... what could be deemed quite naive questions, but actually could be 
really, really important.’ (CityMod 1, internal, executive attendee)
Occasionally these views were expressed in terms that showed internal
members differentiating themselves from the external members, as ‘we/us’ in
contrast to ‘they/them’, despite their formal equivalence:
‘Something that they’re very good at is scrutiny of our strategy 
documents and things like that, because they do it in a completely 
different way to how academics do it, and that’s one of things that’s 
really struck me ... We just take a different way of looking at i t ... from 
inside our own bubble, and it’s that kind of external view ... which is 
very, very important.’ (ExCAT 1, internal, academic, non-executive)
Other internal, non-executive staff members and students also at times gave 
the impression that they did not see themselves as entirely equivalent to the 
external members. This perception did not seem to cause them any concern, 
nor did they imply that they felt deterred from making their own challenges to 
the executive on occasion. There was, however, something of an implication 
that it was generally more appropriate, and perhaps easier, for the external 
members to pose some types of challenge (although, as indicated in sub­
section 6.2.4 below, internal members did not always regard externals’ 
challenges as particularly appropriate of effective).
The descriptions by internal members of the nature of their role in 
raising queries and posing challenges were broadly substantiated by the 
observational data and, to a lesser extent, by meeting documentation. In the 
former case, the observation of meetings showed that internal members -  
both non-executive staff and students -  were willing to make interventions that 
were challenging to the executive’s position, and to pursue those interventions 
even when executives’ initial responses were not sympathetic to the query
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raised. In the case of the data derived from documentation, it was not always 
clear which type of member had raised queries or challenges recorded in the 
minutes, but occasionally it could be seen that internal members had done so.
6.2.3 Changes resulting from governing body challenge
Although challenge was often discussed in generic terms, governing
body members and attendees also cited examples of specific instances of
challenge that had led to changes. For instance, an external at Civic
university described a challenge to the executive’s approach to addressing
disappointing results in the National Student Survey:
‘Lay members in particular did feel that there needed to be a kind o f ... 
a more accelerated move to having, say, [a] 90% satisfaction rate from 
students than perhaps the initial executive attitude ... You could 
understand why [the executive] would be giving it a longer time scale, 
because that was what from their experience and expertise they felt 
was reasonable, [but] certainly from my point of view, and others, this 
was a too leisurely pace, and so I felt that was an appropriate 
challenge ... which did have an impact -  there were changes to the 
time scale to achieve [the agreed outcomes].’ (Civic 5, external, deputy 
chair)
The perception of this external governing body member was supported by an 
internal executive attendee, who coincidentally brought up the same topic and 
confirmed that paying more attention to it due to the governing body’s 
pressure seemed to have worked, since the university had ‘moved from a 
pretty poor position to a somewhat better position as a result’ (Civic 7, 
internal, executive attendee).
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An example of a more generic kind of challenge was given by an
external at TownMod university, who spoke about changing the institution’s
attitude to oversight of debt:
‘I’ve realised my area’s finance, and colleagues have got their own 
specialisms as well, and it’s the idea that in certain areas you’re not 
going to let things get past. The one I always challenge about is debt 
... most HE institutions are so heavily geared nowadays, and the ratios 
are eye-wateringly bad, and we finally formed a debt committee -  but I 
can’t be on it because I’m chair of audit committee!’ (TownMod 3, 
external, sub-committee chair)
Other instances of governing body challenge involved process and substance.
For example, an external at NewMill university described how:
‘One particular instance [was when] ... we were buying a sizable 
property ... Now, I’m sitting there in a governing body meeting, but it 
comes up having not been in the papers and I think no, no, no, this 
can’t be right. You can’t surely buy and sell real estate save with the 
approval of the governing body, and if the rules don’t say that, they 
bloody well should! ... So I express my views, relatively gently 
because the then chair was ... very determined that this was the right 
and proper way and was fairly resistant. And you could see the 
secretary’s look of horror as she realised I was right.’ (NewMill 3, 
external, sub-committee chair)
This last example (and a small number of other similar examples) can also be 
seen as reflecting a governing body role in ensuring probity and compliance 
with statutory and legal responsibilities. However, as noted in Chapter 5 (sub­
section 5.2.1), this is a role expected of governing bodies in the formal 
requirements and guidance provided for the higher education sector by 
external agencies (see also sub-section 6.8.1 below).
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6.2.4 Internal perceptions of the utility of governing body challenge
So challenge is recognised by a large number of governing body
members and attendees as necessary, appropriate and positive. It involves
ideas of externality, and of being a reality check, thoroughness and attention
to detail, but also consideration of big issues, occasionally creating discomfort
for the executive, and sometimes acting as the ‘ultimate blocker’. However,
challenges do not always come from the entire governing body, or even the
entirety of the externals. And in challenging proposals made by the executive,
governing bodies are sometimes seen by internal members as being a
challenge themselves. For example, an internal, executive member at
Greenfield university, commented:
The interest and challenge of council is that very often, you know, what 
we have is a vision of the way we want to take things forward, and ... in 
some cases [council’s] a problem, and in some cases it’s helpful and 
supportive. ... [A] very major example of that challenge ... was the 
point where we were finally deciding to embark on [a major project] and 
the council ... was both very supportive and very unsupportive ... So 
parts of the council were very, very concerned about [the project] in its 
entirety ... [and] I’m very conscious o f ... what the council does and its 
capacity to be both helpful and very unhelpful on occasions’ (Greenfield 
3, internal, executive).
There can also be an issue with the effectiveness of the governing body’s 
challenge. An internal, non-executive, staff member at Civic university 
referred in the following terms to a report on the prospect of introducing two 
year degrees:
‘We all think [going for two year degrees] is an absolutely barmy idea, 
and that’s basically what [the Pro-Vice-Chancellor] said ... but people 
round the table, the business people, didn’t agree. You know, they 
thought, you’re not really taking this possibility seriously enough, so 
they sent her away to think again ... but on the other hand I’m sure at
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the end of the day we won’t have two year degrees’ (Civic 10, internal, 
academic, non-executive)
Another perspective on the meaningfulness of challenge was expressed by a
student governing body member, also at Civic university, who commented on
an issue where there was disagreement:
‘I do think ... it was brushed to one side, like “Oh, we’ll take that on 
board”. [And] what [an external member] said was quite interesting, 
because that shows the attitude of a person on council. It’s like “I don’t 
really agree with this, [but] I know we can’t change it”, and the chair 
actually said “well, no, that’s not necessarily true”, but [to me] the 
perception [is] that things won’t change if you disagree with them’ (Civic 
8, internal, student).
Further examples of issues being raised by internal members or 
attendees about the effectiveness of challenge by the governing body 
included concern that the externals might be too ‘nice’, and therefore too 
gentle:
‘I think our governors are pretty good, [but] sometimes they could 
challenge more. I think they’re all very nice people and, you know, you 
try to be very nice, but I sometimes think they could ask questions 
underneath the issues.’ (UniCollege 2, internal, academic, non­
executive)
and the feeling that the potential influence of the governing body was actually 
very limited:
‘So I think there are sort of areas where they’ve got a sort of potential 
to nudge you, steer you, in a particular... directions, but it’s not sort of, 
erm, it’s not what you’d expect of a commercial board, in theory, I don’t 
think, it’s sort of a bit different from that. It’s, it’s a touch on the tiller of 
the supertanker.’ (Civic 10, internal, academic, non-executive)
The view was also sometimes expressed that the governing body was most
unlikely to ultimately say no to a proposal:
‘Council, quite properly, will ask hard questions about decisions that 
have been taken, but I’ve never in my experience got the sense that
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council was anywhere near saying, no, this is completely wrong, go 
back and do something else.’ (Greenfield 1, internal, academic non­
executive)
Even one of the board secretaries interviewed did not feel that the governing
body could effect significant change:
‘Will [the board] really say anything that changes what we do? The 
honest answer is probably not. But what I think they will do is 
challenge us to make sure we are coherent. ... We’ve also got this ... 
consistent narrative in the organisation [about its] heritage and all of 
that stuff [and the importance of] how the organisation tells itself and 
reinforces its narrative ... and [whether] we want continuity o r ... radical 
departure ... That sort of thing [the] board really can help with, but will 
they change fundamentally what we do? No they won’t.’ (CityMod 6, 
internal, attendee, not executive, secretary)
6.2.5 Concerns about challenge expressed by externals
The preceding examples of concern about the nature or ultimate 
effectiveness of challenges by governing body members all came from non­
executive internal members, or attendees. However, concerns about the 
effectiveness of challenging the executive were also occasionally raised by 
external members as well. For example, an external from TownMod 
university gave a specific instance of what he saw as the limits of the 
governing body’s capacity to affect things, and the frustrations that could then 
arise:
‘One of the things -  it’s stupid -  time-tabling ... that’s what institutions 
do, ... they put the right people in the right place at the right time. ... 
it’s not rocket, it’s fundamental, it’s sticking to the knitting, it’s core. ... 
If you can’t do time-tabling <splutters> ... that’s something as a board 
we just don’t know how to address. That really is management, pure 
management, and all we can do is rail against it, and hope that 
somehow the Vice-Chancellor and his team are going to do ... 
whatever they need to do. (TownMod 3, external)
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Another external, this time at Civic university, had concerns about the wider
implications of not being able to influence a particular decision:
‘I think the role of ... the board or the council is to ensure that 
executives and the institution itself doesn’t allow self interest to over­
ride its, both its legal position and its over-riding - particularly for a 
university - its long-term philosophical raison d’etre, really, which is 
very important. I mean, I kicked up a huge fuss when we closed [a 
science] department, and I still do at almost every meeting ... where 
anything vaguely close to the topic comes up. And they always tell me, 
oh we teach lots of [that subject], we just do it as part of other courses, 
and I say that’s fine, but eventually if you keep cutting things you will 
lose the point of being what you are. So, you know, it’s not that I 
disagree with that one decision, I just think that you need to always, ... 
you know, you don’t want the death of a thousand cuts. (Civic 6, 
external, deputy chair)
This led him to go on and express a broader concern about the changing
nature of governance in higher education, and the increasing burden of
responsibility being placed on governing bodies, which might engender:
‘An environment of distrust between council and executives ... and it’s 
really important that we don’t do that, because at the end of the day, 
neither side can ever know everything about the other, or control the 
other, so you have to have that co-operative relationship of trust, and if 
that breaks down, executives will stop being open with information and 
then council will be unable to do its job. And I’m not saying that 
executives would do that because they’ve got some[thing] personal [to] 
gain from it, just because practically they want to get on with doing the 
job, and if that level of trust breaks down, they’re not going to raise 
issues that are going to cause them problems. So I think that we need 
to be very, very careful that we maintain that, sort of, collegiate spirit 
that we’re all in it together, and, and there are external pressures now 
which I think are making that harder.’ (Civic 6, external, deputy chair)
Alongside the concern about the effectiveness of challenge, there is also an 
interesting reflection in the last comment about the inevitability of incomplete 
information -  ‘neither side can ever know everything about the other’ -  so that 
in this external’s view openness, trust and collegiality become extremely
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important. This perception captures something of the essence of a positive 
but realistic approach to governance that reflected the attitude of the majority 
of the people interviewed in the study.
6.2.6 The appropriateness and effectiveness of challenge
Overall, therefore, challenge was seen as necessary and appropriate, 
and usually concrete and effective. At the same time it was sometimes seen 
as ineffective, and as making limited differences to outcomes, with this view 
most strongly expressed by internal members, but recognised also by at least 
some externals. Nonetheless, challenge was sufficiently often seen as 
effective that some people also felt that it needed to be counter-balanced or 
complemented by support, and I shall turn to this role next. First, however, it 
may be appropriate to revisit, and reflect on, issues of credibility and 
plausibility in the light of this first detailed presentation and discussion of some 
of the interview data.
6.2.7 Questions of credibility and plausibility revisited
Although the range of views discussed above appeared genuinely held, 
and was certainly clearly expressed, it perhaps needs to be reflected on in the 
context of the expectations placed on governing bodies by external agencies 
such as the funding councils, and more general cultural expectations as to 
what governance is supposed to involve. Bearing in mind some of the tenets 
of institutional theory, it could potentially be the case that governing body 
members felt under pressure to describe themselves as providing robust 
challenge even when they were not doing so. Equally, however, it could be
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suggested that knowing what is expected of them might prompt governing 
body members to behave in line with those expectations, and not merely to 
pretend to do so, or to elaborate the extent to which they do so. Here, as will 
be the case on all the occasions in this study when interview data is 
discussed, analysed and interpreted, one is dealing with a constructed world, 
rather than a straightforward description of a real world. Nonetheless, 
evidence from the other data sources considered, despite their secondary 
nature, suggests that governing body members’ role descriptions are credible.
I would suggest that their credibility is also supported by an underlying 
consistency in the ways governing body members and attendees describe 
their perceptions of governing body challenge, and that the plausibility of their 
views is then reinforced by the nature of the detailed variations in their 
responses.
As a further consideration, the interviewees’ responses, in terms of 
their attribution of certain roles to their governing bodies, could in theory 
perhaps have been somehow prompted by the nature of my discussions with 
them. However, they were not, for example, asked whether they and their 
governing bodies challenged the executive, and if so how, but were instead 
invited in very generic terms to indicate what roles they and their governing 
bodies carried out. I am confident that overall my approach to the interview 
process was such that I did not impose on interviewees any preconceptions I 
may have had. Points such as these will be equally applicable on a number of 
occasions as further data are considered, and I shall therefore not repeat 
them each time such issues arise.
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6.3 Supporting the executive management team
6.3.1 The balance between challenge and support
Challenge and support were linked by many governing body members
as important and complementary roles. Indeed, it was clear that many
external members placed rather more emphasis on supporting the executive
than on challenging them. In some cases the idea of offering support
extended to providing encouragement, and to helping the executive team to
develop, both individually and collectively. Instances of governing body
members explicitly mentioning both challenge and support together included:
‘I think my view is we are part of the same team, b u t... the role we do 
is to challenge slightly more than we applaud’ (ExCat 5, external, sub­
committee chair).
‘I think that it’s very important that the executive team are given the 
support that they need, but also the appropriate challenge that they 
need, in order to be as good as they can be.’ (Civic 9, external, chair)
The proper function of a governing body is to ask questions and to 
challenge and then to support, unless you feel there are really 
imperative reasons why you should not.’ (TownMod 4, external, deputy 
chair)
The importance of being supportive could also be couched in terms of the
potential negative effects on executives if they were criticised too much:
‘Once the executives start to feel they’re coming [to meetings] just to be 
hammered, and to be criticised, then there’s a problem.’ (NewMill 2, 
external)
The same person also felt that there was a danger that if members of the 
governing body were too readily, or too often critical, the executive might 
become too cautious. The governing body therefore had an important role in
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‘enabling’ the executive, and in making suggestions, or drawing attention to
issues, in a developmental way:
‘I don’t think the role of the governors is to stifle the executive. ... The 
executives [can] become blinkered about certain issues, whereas ... 
the role of the non-executives is to look from the outside and see the 
wood from the trees, and say, well, look, there is something down 
there, but in a developmental and supportive way.’ (NewMill 2, 
external)
However, there was also occasionally a suggestion that there were dangers in
being too supportive:
There is always a danger... I’ve seen it a lo t ... of members of Council 
going native. ... people who’ve come from the business world and 
things, they fall in love with it. It’s lovely, so exciting ... it’s really 
interesting. And then their critical edge gets dulled. It can be a 
booster, but part of the role is to be critical, is to be a critical friend, not 
just a boosting friend.’ (Greenfield 2, external, deputy chair)
In a variation on the support theme, the need to support in particular
the chief executive of the institution was also highlighted:
‘I make it very clear that [the principal] is running the place, but he 
needs our support, and he needs feedback.’ (UniCollege 4, external, 
chair)
Such support could, however, be qualified, as illustrated by comments of
another chair, whose emphasis was on being supportive when things were
going well, but who had a rather colourful way of expressing his willingness to
hold his Vice-Chancellor to account if necessary:
‘I see him ... privately once a month, and I spend the evening with him. 
Er, I will not have an officer there, I won't crowd him - as some other 
chairs do - 1 just won't crowd him. He’s the chief executive, I’m a non- 
exec chair, I'm an unpaid non-exec chair, erm, and while it's all going 
perfectly fine, you know, one’s supportive, but he knows that if it 
doesn't go perfectly fine, and he's in the firing line, he gets decked, he 
understands that.’ (Greenfield 8, external, chair)
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Apart from reinforcing the idea that being supportive and holding people to 
account were both important, this last comment also offers an interesting 
glimpse of the ways in which individuals’ personalities and behaviour can be 
significant. This chair had a tendency to use colourful language and gave the 
impression of wanting to present a robust and combative face to the world. 
Nonetheless, the views of other governing body members at Greenfield 
university, including the Vice-Chancellor, suggested that the chair was well- 
regarded, and that his attitudes and style appeared to fit the particular context 
in which he was operating. The question of the importance of individual 
behaviours and interactions will be returned to below (sub-section 8.3.3).
6.3.2 Ways of providing support
Another way in which some governing body members felt it was 
important to be supportive was in relation to sub-committees and their 
interaction with the governing body. Describing how particular items of 
business were dealt with, the external who chaired the finance committee at 
UniCollege said:
‘A finance paper, of whatever sort, will be introduced by the director of 
finance, and then depending on -  you know, is it simply a report to 
note, is it something that’s slightly difficult, is it something that’s really 
difficult -  depending on where we are on that scale, usually the 
chairman will ask me ... do I want to add anything. And there are times 
when I actually have added quite substantially, and other times simply 
said, well no ... I support what he says. And I think that’s quite 
important actually, that an independent member of the board is actually 
supporting the member of the executive to the full board.’ 
(UniCollege 3, external, sub-committee chair)
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At Civic university, support was also associated with the idea of the governing
body and the executive working together to help the institution succeed:
‘Here I’ve seen that council and the ... executive board working 
together have actually been able to move this university ... forward 
quite substantially in a fairly short space of time ... by sharing a vision, 
by working together on issues, by the executive being ready to share 
its ideas and to be open to new ideas.’ (Civic 4, external, sub­
committee chair)
A deputy chair at the same institution referred to the governing body being
supportive in a more general sense, through the provision of overt support for
the university, and its mission. In doing so he made reference to the potential
leadership role of the governing body, a concept otherwise raised by hardly
any of the people interviewed during this research, a point which will be
returned to below (sub-section 6.8.3):
‘Council can have a leadership role ... a complementary leadership 
role. ... It’s not the executive and it shouldn’t seek to be ... but it can 
have role, as I say, [that is] complementary ... [and] supportive to the 
direction, the vision, the mission. ... It’s about supporting the tone, the 
being of the university -  what is it? ... A leadership role in terms of 
what is best and of the best for the university.’ (Civic 5, external, 
deputy chair)
6.3.3 The views of executives
In the case of members of the executive, whether board members or 
attendees, there was some evidence that they felt supported, although this 
was less explicitly expressed than by the externals who were doing the 
supporting. An executive attendee at CityMod university spoke, for instance, 
of how:
‘If [an] idea seems sensible, and there’s a rationale for it, and the board 
senses the executive have talked it through, and have done the work
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on it, and really think it’s in the best interests of the institution, the 
board would generally back us. ... I suppose what I’m saying is there 
is a high degree of trust by the board in the executive.’ (CityMod 3, 
internal, executive attendee)
Also referred to was the idea of a sense of cohesion, and of successful
working together between the governing body and the executive, and a
capacity to cope well when there was disagreement:
‘There’s something about our council that works quite well really ... 
even though it’s dealing typically with extremely thorny and important 
matters, it has generally dealt with contention very effectively. [This] 
may be some kind of comment about the university, because the 
university [is] quite a harmonious place, ... it is not a place where 
people go to posture or contend’ (Greenfield 3, internal, executive)
Another way of considering the governing body’s role in relation to the 
executive was, according to the Vice-Chancellor at TownMod university, to 
ask:
‘After each board meeting or committee meeting, did it add to our 
energy as an executive, or was it a Death Eater3 experience -  have 
they sucked all the life out of the executive. (TownMod 2, internal, 
executive, Vice-Chancellor)
Even if a meeting had left the executive ‘not where they wanted to be’, it was
still possible for the executive to be motivated and to say ‘right, we’d better get
on and sort this out’, or ‘we’ll show the blighters’. Overall, it was important for
the board to recognise that:
They are charged with making it happen, so they have to be conscious 
of energising the senior team, as much as anything else.’ (TownMod 2, 
internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
3 Death Eaters occur in the ‘Harry Potter’ sequence of novels by J K Rowling. They are the 
enemies of Harry Potter, led by his principal antagonist, Lord Voldemort. The idea of the life 
being sucked out of people is however more accurately associated with another category of 
characters in the novels, the Dementors.
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6.3.4 Support and challenge
Taken as a whole, support was certainly seen as being at least as 
important as challenge by many governing body members. This was clearly 
the view of the external members, with many of them seeing their role as 
being to support the executive whenever possible. Internal non-executive 
members and students did not see a strong role for themselves in providing 
support to the executive, but they recognised this as a significant role for the 
external members, albeit expressed primarily in terms of the externals 
supporting the institution, rather than the executive per se. Executives, 
whether members of the governing body, or attendees, also recognised the 
support provided by external members, and its importance in contributing to 
the development of mutual trust and a capacity to work well together. 
Occasionally, executives appeared to have an expectation that they would be 
supported, but only if they deserved to be, as illustrated by CityMod 3’s 
comments above. It is now appropriate to turn to the provision of advice and 
guidance by governing body members.
6.4 Providing advice and guidance
6.4.1 The nature of advice and guidance
The third governing body role clearly identified by the interviewees in 
the study was that of providing advice and guidance to the executive. Doing 
this will of course normally be supportive, but almost all the respondents 
appeared to conceive of the provision of advice and guidance as separate
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and distinct from the more generically supportive role discussed in section 6.3. 
Providing advice and guidance was seen primarily in terms of the deployment 
by individual governing body members of their specific expertise and 
specialised knowledge, although in some cases it was perceived to relate 
more generally to the weight of an individual’s overall influence and 
experience, both within and outwith the institution.
In many cases the advice and guidance role was identified
straightforwardly and generically:
‘[The council] has an important role ... acting as a source of advice and 
ideas. ... The role of being a friend and a guide ... having a joint 
responsibility, feeling a joint responsibility for the running of the 
organisation.’ (Civic 4, external, sub-committee chair)
They’re people who have influence in the fields where we need advice, 
so they know what they’re talking about, and can fight our corner. ... 
so I think they do make a difference, because ... they’re essentially 
friends to the university and the information they can give us is quite, 
quite critical.’ (ExCAT 1, internal, academic, non-executive)
The emphasis above is on direct input from external members. In some 
cases this type of input was linked to external members’ business 
backgrounds:
‘Going back to the fact that the university is doing quite a lot of building 
... [it] could be spending hundreds of thousands of pounds on buying in 
expert advice, which it seems largely to get for free because the people 
who sit on council who have that kind of expertise seem very happy, 
actually, to offer it and share, give it to the university ... it seems to me 
that must give the university quite a lot of confidence in what it does, 
that it has some, obviously, really quite high-powered people, who it’s 
not employing, but whose skills and knowledge it’s drawing on.’ 
(Greenfield 1, internal, academic, non-executive)
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The stress here is around the university making use of external members’
specific knowledge or expertise, and this was also the facet of the advice and
guidance role most often focussed on by the external members themselves:
‘I’ve always been impressed when board items come up in the round, 
[and] one or two people actually know [about the subject], board 
members who know this and can actually talk to it. ... [For example], 
our deputy chair, he’s very, very big in ... education ... and things will 
come up about bringing in sixth formers and things like that, and of 
course he can talk very knowledgably about these things, extremely so. 
... In my case I like to think I can talk reasonably sensibly about 
accounting and finance issues.’ (TownMod 3, external, sub-committee 
chair)
‘My background ... was very much in environment and sustainable 
development, and I’d thought for some time that UK universities were 
actually missing out on this -  that there were niches to be occupied. 
And ... I set about, right from the beginning, with [the chair’s] approval 
... to look at what role [the university] could play in this area.’ (Civic 3, 
external, sub-committee chair)
6.4.2 Input from internal, non-executive staff members
The value of advice and guidance from internal, non-executive staff 
members of governing bodies was also recognised. The internal, non­
executive members themselves generally felt able to contribute freely, and 
they were perceived by both externals and executives as having the capacity 
to contribute usefully to discussions. The main focus of their input was seen 
as being in the provision of information and insight in relation to academic 
issues, and they were sometimes regarded as being able to provide an 
alternative or corrective view to that provided by the Vice-Chancellor or the 
executive more generally. The Vice-Chancellor at Greenfield university saw 
input from the non-executive internal members in these terms, and also saw it 
as a good thing:
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They can certainly keep us on the straight and narrow in terms of 
remembering that we’re an educational institution ... we don’t really 
have an issue with that, but if the executive did start forgetting what the 
point of an education institution is, having the staff there would make a 
huge difference. And ... it gives the lay members comfort if they hear 
[the views], as it were, of ordinary [staff], because there are professorial 
and non-professorial members and somebody from the support staff, 
so you get these different views coming in.’ (Greenfield 6, internal, 
executive, Vice-Chancellor)
At CityMod university, the board secretary felt that the external members of
the institution’s governing body had a particular interest in the views of the
non-executive internals, so that those views were often actively sought:
The board does actually like to hear the academic perspective -  
sometimes they invite it, they ask for it. But they definitely [want to 
hear it], and ... it’s so important that the board believes it has a way of 
hearing an alternative voice.’ (CityMod 6, internal, attendee, not 
executive, secretary)
An internal at Civic university made the point that for some external members 
their only contact with staff members was with those on the governing body. 
She added:
‘Many of them are very interested ... many of them have said to me 
they do appreciate hearing the staffs position. And I know that ... I 
have an expertise and a kind of insight into the running of the university 
they will never have.’ (Civic 1, internal, academic, non-executive)
The importance of input to the governing body from academics was also 
stressed by externals at Civic university, with one of them commenting 
favourably on how helpful it was to have academics on the governing body, 
because ‘every now and then [they] bring everybody back to reality’ (Civic 3, 
external, sub-committee chair).
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6.4.3 The students’ views
The presence of student members on governing bodies was universally
welcomed, and the views expressed about the value of their contributions
were generally very positive. The range of those contributions was, though,
seen as being mainly confined to issues perceived as having a direct impact
on the student body. External members commented:
‘It seems to me ... legitimate for the board occasionally to turn to [the] 
student rep and say, give us a flavour of how you think this is going to 
play with a particular group. ... Saying, were we to do this, ... were 
the Vice-Chancellor to go forward with this, what do you think the 
student reaction [would be?] (TownMod 4, external, deputy chair)
The student union president has always found that they are, really, the 
student voice. And that’s been quite useful at times, because when 
we’ve been doing things we’ve been able to say, well, what about this, 
and this, and this?’ (NewMill 1, external, chair)
Internal executive members and attendees similarly registered the positive
impact of student members on the governing body:
The representation of the student body on council has been effective, 
and I know that council, particularly lay members of council, do listen, 
[do] take very seriously what the student member says -  sometimes 
one might say to excess, really. But there is a desire to listen to that.’ 
(Greenfield 3, internal, executive)
Finally, student members themselves also highlighted the extent to which their
views were sought:
‘I didn’t realise ... how much people wanted to listen to actually what 
the students had to say. I always knew that the student opinion was 
going to be important, but when you’ve only got two student members 
versus an entire committee, most of whom were staff, were senior 
businessmen, when effectively they are older and w iser... they know a 
lot more about the world ...but apparently what they don’t know about 
is actually the students on the ground, which is actually where student 
[members] fit in quite nicely.’ (ExCAT 6, internal, student)
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However, some students alluded to the fact that they found it difficult to
take a view on some topics, due to their lack of experience in comparison to
the external members. For example, a student member of the governing body
at Civic university said that it was:
‘Really difficult as a student member to feel as knowledgeable and 
capable as ... all the other people there. It’s quite a difficult thing, and I 
do spend a lot of time thinking, oh, I wish I knew something clever to 
say on this. But you just don’t have ... such a wide range of knowledge 
on so many [issues]. (Civic 2, internal, student)
But she went on to stress that she felt nonetheless that:
‘You can make really valuable inputs on things ... they do listen to us 
... [and] take what you say seriously.’ (Civic 2, internal, student)
6.4.4 Ways in which advice and guidance is given and/or sought
Advice and guidance are, then, regularly offered by the governing body
and its individual members through the routine and continuing interactions that
occur in governing body meetings. Sometimes, in addition, governing body
members are asked for explicit input in other formal settings, such as away
days. Thus, one external commented:
‘I was asked to give an input to the board on an away day about 
schools, and I chose to major on both the development of pedagogy 
and ICT, and my view that because the national agenda had driven the 
improvement of pedagogy at under sixteen, ... some sixth formers ... 
were now complaining about what they got, because they were used to 
rather more exciting lessons than they were now getting. I put on the 
table the fact that [the university] might be facing this ... a couple of 
years down the road.’ (TownMod 4, external, deputy chair)
External members also referred to providing advice and guidance in less
formal situations. For example, an external at Civic university explained that:
‘I also feel I get called upon to give advice on certain things -  people 
ring me up and ask me things or whatever -  and I’m quite happy to do
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that. I think ... the most effective work is done that way.’ (Civic 4, 
external, sub-committee chair)
The availability of advice and guidance from governing body members on an
informal and ad hoc basis was also recognised and valued by executives,
such as the Vice-Chancellor of CityMod university:
‘Another important part to me, is to be able to contact colleagues on the 
board when we have a particular issue ... and happily use them to 
support the development of the institution. Again, we do that 
extensively here. ... I regard [it] as supplementing [the executive] from 
their own skill set. So, we have someone on [the board] who’s 
particularly used to regeneration projects, so clearly he’s operating in 
[that] area. [And] we’ve a couple who are linked to political parties -  
not that they’re [on the board] for that reason - ... but they have [those 
links] and therefore we can use those at appropriate times, right? And I 
could keep going ... we’ve got financial people and other people.’ 
(CityMod 2, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
6.4.5 Recruiting external governing body members for their specialist skills, 
experience and knowledge
A corollary of having external members with a variety of useful skills,
experience and knowledge, is careful selection of those external members. At
Greenfield university, for example, the chair commented:
‘When [someone] retired I was able to recruit a very proper mandarin 
... [as an adviser about] government. ... [And with] government debt, I 
asked him to consider it and come back and tell us where it was likely 
to be ... and he [gave us very good advice] that put us very much on 
our metal, because we could see [the present issues] coming.’ 
(Greenfield 8, external, chair)
The chair at ExCAT university addressed the question of governing body 
members’ backgrounds and expertise more generally, stressing the 
importance not just of their knowledge and skills, but also of their personalities 
and behaviour:
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‘Each time we look at an appointment - we’ve mapped out a capability 
and behaviour matrix - and as people move off council we look at the 
blend of experience and capabilities around the table and say, OK, 
what are we missing. ... [It’s] important that you get the right balance 
of people around the table -  a diversity of people with their experience 
and their ideas. ... I’d want some visionaries ... but I’d want some 
action people too ... and a balance of behaviour as well as experience.’ 
(ExCAT 3, external, chair)
TownMod university’s Vice-Chancellor spoke in similar vein about having a
‘blueprint’ setting down the skills they wanted, such as ‘finance, estates, blah,
blah, blah, the a, b, c’ but stressed that overall:
‘Ability is the choice number one, above all else, because what you 
don’t want is a national numpty, or a local numpty ... that’s not going to 
help at all.’ (TownMod 2, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
There was, however, occasionally a perception that a focus on the
specific knowledge and skills of external governing body members could have
a downside. Sometimes this was in terms of people only relating to their
governing body role in terms of their prior experience:
‘In my experience there are some individuals who bring their own 
experience to council and nothing else. So if a [specific] topic comes 
up ... ‘Fred’ will always engage [with it], but beyond that he doesn’t.’ 
(ExCAT 3, external, chair)
In other cases, reliance on an external’s advice and guidance was perceived
as potentially blurring the governance-management boundary. The board
secretary at UniCollege, for example, while highlighting the benefits of using
external members’ expertise, also saw the potential for problems to arise:
‘We did have an architect as a governor for some time, and we 
recruited him really, specifically, [because] we’d been redesigning [part] 
of the campus ... so we did use him. [But] I think that was one of the 
areas where I felt it was getting off governance and going to executive 
areas a little bit, but nonetheless we’d invited that.’ (UniCollege 1, 
internal, attendee, not executive, secretary)
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External members were, however, perfectly capable of recognising and
endeavouring consciously to avoid this type of difficulty:
‘I think anybody can be passionate about anything, and then you sort of 
think, oh, I could really solve that one, just let me at it. There are times 
when I’m very tempted to say, let me at it ... because I know it’s my 
expertise area ... but that’s not our role, and you’ve gotta remember 
that, and so you need to make sure you’re tempering your language 
and your advice accordingly.’ (TownMod 5, external, sub-committee 
chair)
6.4.6 External members’ understanding of higher education
A particular issue raised by some executives related to their view that 
there were limits to the extent to which externals could contribute unless they 
understood enough about higher education or were a ‘fit’ for the culture of the 
institution:
‘I think one mustn’t imagine that because somebody is extremely 
successful in one field, whether that’s public sector or [not], that means 
they really do have an understanding of the business of universities, 
because it is extremely complicated ... universities are like that, it’s like 
cricket, you’ve kind of got to grow up with it to really understand.’ 
(Greenfield 6, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
‘We do try and choose governors who will be a cultural fit -  not 
unquestioning, but who think that, who share our belief that, education 
is actually one of the best routes to economic mobility.’ (ExCAT 4, 
internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
Nonetheless, there was a strong overall perception that governing body
members were keen to be used by their institutions as sources of advice and
guidance, and to have more involvement in the life and work of their
institutions, leading to reflections such as that of an internal, executive
governing body member at ExCAT university:
‘I think what we need to do, and we’ve started working on this already, 
is get more out of these people. And they want to have more taken out
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of them, [and] they want to have ... [more] roles with respect to the 
university, mentoring projects, or helping us with specific challenges 
and so on ... it makes their engagement with us a bit more meaningful, 
not just coming for the meeting and going away.’ (ExCAT 8, internal, 
executive)
6.4.7 External members with experience of the higher education sector
One way of ensuring that external governing body members have a 
good understanding of higher education is for some of those members to be 
drawn from within the sector, as either current or former practitioners. 
However, in contrast to the situation normally obtaining in the governance of 
private sector businesses, where non-executive board members very often 
have previous experience in the same commercial or industrial sector, 
relatively few of the external governors in higher education institutions have 
worked in higher education. When this issue was raised with interviewees, it 
was clear that the relative absence of external members with such expertise 
had not struck many people. For example, an external at Civic university 
commented:
‘I know exactly what you mean, and I think it is an interesting issue 
actually -  it’s not one that I’ve pondered before. First of all you’re quite 
right that in the private sector typically non-execs are recruited because 
they have specialist expertise. I think sometimes in private sector 
boards it might be quite useful to have, as it were, wild cards. If you 
look at what’s happened in the banking industry, a lot of the problem is 
that all the non-execs thought like bankers, and actually if they’d just 
put some normal person with a bit of common sense [on the board] 
they might just possibly have seen through some of the issues.’ 
(Civic 4, external, sub-committee chair)
The same external went on to raise the idea that was most often put forward 
as an argument for not having people with higher education backgrounds on
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governing bodies -  that a current Vice-Chancellor might feel threatened -  
although he thought that the benefits would probably outweigh any 
drawbacks.
In one of the rare instances of an external with extensive experience of
higher education, she seemed to see herself as an exception, and regarded
routinely having external members with higher education backgrounds as
potentially inappropriate:
‘I think I'm quite rare, because there aren't actually very many people 
who could be in my category, because to have worked inside [one] 
university and then become a lay member of council in another one is 
probably not so appropriate.’ (Greenfield 2, external, deputy chair)
The Vice-Chancellor at Greenfield was, however, more positive about the
idea. Commenting in the then recent context of governance failures at
London Metropolitan University, he said:
‘If you think about London Met, and what went wrong there, they had 
some extraordinarily high-powered people on their council who’d run 
massive corporations and really knew about money, etc. What they 
didn’t have ... was someone like ... an ex-Vice-Chancellor, somebody 
who’d operated at a high level, or an ex-PVC of learning and teaching, 
or somebody like that. Or even a present one, although that might be a 
conflict of interest, I suppose. But anyway, somebody who knew a lot 
about higher education, because anyone like that would have ... seen 
completion rates of 3 per cent, and they’d have thought ... how on 
earth are we doing that? ... Now that’s a perfect example of where the 
captain of industry or the banker, or even possibly the arts 
administrator... they’re simply not going to know, and if you don’t have 
people on council -  and this is certainly a lesson I’m going to draw ... - 
who have operated at a high level in higher education, you are taking a 
bit of a risk really.’ (Greenfield 6, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
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Elsewhere, the Vice-Chancellor of CityMod university suggested that 
he would personally benefit if he had a person on the board with experience 
of working in higher education, as they would be someone for him to talk with. 
He contrasted his position with that of chief executives in other sectors, who 
were more likely to have non-executive board colleagues with a background 
akin to their own:
‘In most commercial environments ... the chief exec has someone to 
turn to, to talk to, about the business, who understands the business. 
This sector is very different. The chief exec doesn’t have anyone to 
talk to about the whole business, and that’s, pretty well, a very unique 
feature across this sector, and where do you go? Who do you talk to? 
I find the cat and dog more sensible than most!’ (CityMod 2, internal, 
executive, Vice-Chancellor)
In contrast, the board secretary at CityMod did not feel that it would be
particularly useful to have external members with higher education
backgrounds, and suggested that it would be ‘difficult for a VC to have a
former VC sitting on their shoulder’. She added:
‘I think if you’ve got a non-executive board, which is clearly what we’ve 
got, then the argument for having ... former VCs is actually quite weak. 
That’s to me not really what you want of your board. There are plenty 
of other ways in which, if you want advice about how you approach 
something, from people in your own sector, you can get it.’ (CityMod 6, 
internal, attendee, not executive, secretary)
Other potential problems cited by governing body members and attendees 
included the danger of ‘tokenism’, potential difficulties around inter-institutional 
competitiveness, and the fact that a retired person would in due course lose 
their currency.
The views expressed about having external members with experience 
of having worked in higher education experience were ambivalent. Some
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members, both externals, and internals, thought it might be useful. However, 
many people saw drawbacks and cited examples of difficulties they thought 
would arise. Overall, the idea was only supported in principle by a minority of 
governing body members, albeit amongst those endorsing the practice were 
three of the four Vice-Chancellors amongst the respondents.
6.4.8 The importance of advice and guidance
The provision of advice and guidance by governing body members was 
clearly perceived by all categories of interviewees, and across all types of 
institution, as an important and distinct governing body role. Although the 
external members were seen as the most important providers of advice and 
guidance, and as the members able to offer advice and guidance on the 
widest range of topics, non-executive staff and students were also perceived 
by all those involved with governing bodies as having important, if narrower, 
roles to play.
6.5 Linking the institution to the outside world
6.5.1 The nature of potential links with the outside world
In fulfilling the advice and guidance role discussed above, external 
governing body members were often perceived as doing so through deploying 
the expertise or knowledge derived from their backgrounds, and from the 
professional or other groups they had connections with. It was also common 
for external members to act directly as links with such professional or other 
groups, and with their networks of personal contacts, the intention being to
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mobilise their influence on the institution’s behalf. A subsidiary feature of this 
role, more prominent in some institutions than others, involved a stress on the 
importance of striving to use external influence and contacts to defend 
institutional autonomy versus the government or the funding council. It was 
also possible for the external profile of a governing body member to enable 
them to fulfil a more general ambassadorial role. In this respect, there was a 
focus in some institutions particularly on external members’ engaging with 
local communities. There were also instances of governing body members 
engaging in more generic promotion of their institutions.
6.5.2 Networking and linking the university to the outside world
Representative examples of how externals saw their role in providing
access to networks of external contacts were as follows:
‘I think I’m bringing a network of various contacts into the university, 
and I think, I suspect that all the others feel the same way.’ (Civic 4, 
external, sub-committee chair)
‘I think ... certain council members are particularly valuable in their 
networks and connections, and they can add [value] in that direction as 
well. (ExCAT 5, external, sub-committee chair)
An example of linking the university with its local community was given by an
external at TownMod university:
That’s where the business about your place in the outside world, 
outside the university, is quite important. I am able occasionally to say 
to the governing body, and to the executive, that this isn’t something 
that will play well with schools in the town, or in the county. Or I can 
say, ... this is the perception we’re getting from the outside.’ 
(TownMod 4, external, deputy chair)
There was a sense from external governing body members that it was 
perfectly appropriate for the university to expect them to provide access to
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their contacts. The benefits of their doing so were clearly perceived by
internals, particularly Vice-Chancellors:
The group of stakeholders they are extremely helpful with, umm, tends 
to be the external, you know, local government, government, 
parliament particularly. We actually get, we actually try and look for 
people who will help us in terms of routes into parliament and so on. 
And all the other normal external stakeholders you’d imagine - funding 
bodies, you know, the RDAs4, all that sort of thing.’ (Greenfield 6, 
internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
A non-executive internal member at Greenfield also thought the externals
were very effective at linking the university to the outside world:
There are very effective links out through the council from the 
university to wider communities. ... And I guess some of those are 
accidental because you’re only going to be able to draw on people who 
live relatively close to the university, so it’s partly serendipity. But I do 
get the impression that ... the council is effective in various ... areas 
linking the university with various parts of the outside world.’ 
(Greenfield 1, internal, academic, non-executive)
6.5.3 Acting as an ambassador
Another strand of the governing body’s role in this area was expressed
in terms of being more explicitly ambassadorial, and representing and
promoting the institution to the outside world. This role was described by an
external at UniCollege:
‘I think also part of our role, particularly in an institution like this, is as -  
I hate the word -  champions -  because it was over-used a few years 
ago. Being people who can be a sort of public face to the institution. I 
don’t mean necessarily standing up on platforms and beating the drum 
for your body, but nevertheless being able to say in a conversation, I 
know about that. And it’s surprising how often that actually comes up, 
where the subject of HE, in whatever guise, comes up, whether it’s at a
4 RDA = regional development authority
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dinner party, or in my other various roles.’ (UniCollege 3, external, sub­
committee chair)
The value of externals acting as ambassadors for the institution was also
recognised by internal non-executive members:
‘I think another very important role that they play is in kind of helping to 
manage, and helping inform how we manage, the external perception 
of the university, and some of our council members, our lay council 
members, are very good at that ... their ambassadorial skills are very 
important.’ (ExCAT 1, internal, academic, non-executive)
An example of specific benefits that could arise from governing body
members’ acting in an ambassadorial role was cited at NewMill university, in
the context of the institution’s progress to university status:
‘At [the] time when we were seeking to grow from our college roots, 
[and] achieve university status, award our own degrees, by far the most 
important role of the council [was] as advocates and ambassadors for 
the university. And the council as it was then, and to an extent now, 
contains many people who are very well placed to play that role.’ 
(NewMill 4, external)
Occasionally there were signs that institutions took steps to support external
members in acting as advocates. At UniCollege, for example, ‘dinners for the
great and good’ of the area were arranged:
The governors are deliberately involved in that, to get know each other 
as well as outsiders. So are the governors representing the university 
college outside? Yes they are. Are they champions for it? I’d like to 
think they are.’ (UniCollege 4, external, chair)
However, such a deliberate approach to using external governing body
members as ambassadors appeared relatively rare, as illustrated by an
external at Greenfield university who commented:
‘I have occasionally represented the university outside, but not very 
often. I think probably the university could use lay members more.’ 
(Greenfield 2, external, deputy chair)
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6.5.4 Defending institutional independence and institutional accountability
Alongside the general promotion of the institution and its interests there
was, as already indicated (sub-section 6.5.1), a subsidiary strand concerned
with defending the institution against outside interference. This was perhaps
most clearly expressed in the following quotation, although the interviewee in
question thought her views would probably not be shared by her colleagues:
‘I would see the role of council, though I don’t think most council 
members would, as defending the university against outside 
interference. The council isn’t answerable to anybody outside, and 
shouldn’t put itself in a position where it is implied that it should be, in 
my view. It’s this business of HEFCE being able to dismiss a council. I 
think one of the roles of council insufficiently emphasised at the 
moment is the defence of academic freedom and the defence of 
institutional autonomy.’ (Greenfield 2, external, deputy chair)
She went on:
‘Not only do I think it’s possible [to defend institutional autonomy], I 
think it’s terribly important that it should be done. Political interference 
with universities is a real, real threat, and it should be resisted. [But]...
I think if I were to say this, they’d all nod and carry on to the next item 
on the agenda. I don’t think this is a preoccupation of many governors.’ 
(Greenfield 2, external, deputy chair)
Another view was offered by the chair at Civic university, who appeared to
approach the same topic with more explicit pragmatism:
The best way to be independent is to show you can manage your 
affairs properly, ... that you do your business effectively and well, and 
that you pay regard to those who are studying with you, ... and you 
really give thought to ... what you’re good for. These are things which 
will enable you to keep your independence, because other people can 
look at what you do and say, that’s absolutely fair, that place should be 
able to get on with doing what it’s doing in the way that it’s doing it. But 
I think anybody who thinks that the world has always been free is living 
in cloud-cuckoo land.’ (Civic 9, external, chair)
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Issues of institutional accountability and autonomy will be returned to below 
(see sub-section 8.5.3)
6.5.5 Overall benefits to the institution
By way of an overall summary of the role of the governing body in 
relation to institutional links with the wider world, and the implications this 
might have for the nature of the external members on the governing body, the 
comments of the Vice-Chancellor at TownMod university were perhaps the 
most apposite:
‘Universities’ boards must be a combination of local and national, and if 
possible international, because -  particularly [at] institutions like this -  
you’re clearly rooted in your local community, but it would be a disaster 
if your entire board is -  [and] this isn’t intended to be demeaning -  local 
worthies, that would be no good at all. You need a mixture of national 
figures, because they’ve got to hold a torch for you in that national 
agenda and they’ve got to be demanding of you, in terms of that 
national and international agenda. And equally it would be wrong if you 
were doing that at the cost of ignoring your locality.’ (TownMod 2, 
internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
There is therefore a need for governing body members to connect the 
institution to the wider world at both local and national levels, and, if possible, 
internationally as well. They also need to be well-regarded and reasonably 
well-known within relevant groups -  political, professional or commercial -  at 
appropriate levels. External governing body members can then undertake 
activities ranging from communicating with and reassuring a local community 
about an institution’s plans or intentions, to promoting the institution and its 
reputation and worth more generically. At the same time they can seek to 
help the institution influence opinion-formers and policy-makers, and to benefit 
from the input and advice of such people.
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6.6 Strategy
6.6.1 The governing body’s role in relation to institutional strategy
The next area to consider in this review of governing body roles 
concerns institutional strategy. There is widespread reference to the strategic 
role of boards and governing bodies in codes of practice and other guidance 
documents (see sub-sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.5). The issue of strategy has also 
been paid significant attention in previous studies (see sub-sections 3.7.2,
3.7.3 or 3.7.6). It is therefore not surprising that the governing body members 
and attendees who participated in this research saw themselves as involved 
in consideration of institutional strategy. For many external members, playing 
a role in the development and oversight of institutional strategy was the first 
governing body role that came to mind. There was, however, quite strong 
variation in how the governing body’s role in this regard was perceived from 
institution to institution. In a few instances, interviewees ascribed primacy in 
strategy development to the governing body. More often, there was perceived 
to be a degree of equivalence in the roles of the governing body and the 
executive in relation to the development of institutional strategy. Finally, there 
was sometimes a perception that the role of the governing body was 
secondary to the role of the executive.
6.6.2 The nature of the role
The governing body’s role in relation to strategy was sometimes 
described in the context of making a distinction between governance and
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managem ent, and using this to contrast the governing body’s role with that of
the executive. For example, an external at TownMod university said:
‘It’s easy to use the word strategic, but it’s clearly not our job to run the 
place -  that’s what we pay a Vice-Chancellor and a senior team to do. 
So it’s not day to day management... or indeed the generation of ideas 
around the everyday running of the institution.’ (TownMod 4, external)
A similar view was expressed by an external at Civic university:
‘[The council] has to take a strategic view, and I think that’s the most 
important thing. It has to be ready to stand back [and] let the university 
get on and run its own affairs, but to take a strategic vision of where it 
stands, and what it’s actually trying to achieve, where it wants to go 
and where it is now.’ (Civic 4, external, sub-committee chair)
Other interviewees did not make an explicit contrast between the strategic and
the operational, appearing to take the difference as understood. Instead they
spoke in terms of the council’s role being:
To discuss, agree and set, with the Vice-Chancellor, the strategic 
direction for the institution’. (ExCAT 4, internal, executive, Vice- 
Chancellor)
The governing body secretary at ExCAT stressed the importance of the
governing body’s role in the updating of the institutional strategy, which was
under way at the time this research was being undertaken. He spoke of the
executive initiating the discussions, and how:
‘Council will have a key role to play ... not just in terms of receiving a 
pretty well worked-up strategy for them to sign off at the end of the 
process, [but through a] strategy away day with them and with senate 
... right in the middle of the process of developing the ... update’. 
(ExCAT 2, internal, attendee, not executive, secretary)
In the last two quotations, a Vice-Chancellor and a secretary saw their 
governing body as closely involved in helping determine the institution’s 
strategic direction, but the process as being initiated by the executive. At
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CityMod university, strategy development was also seen as being led by the
executive, and firmly subsumed within the institution’s corporate plan. An
internal member described how the governing body was involved:
‘We had a board away day ... [and the corporate plan] was gone 
through in detail. The draft was challenged in terms of content, 
phraseology and things like that. And the background information was 
given to the board so they could understand where [things were] 
coming from.’ (CityMod 4, internal, non-academic, non-executive)
An external at CityMod saw the same process as follows:
‘Our two day away day ... is another place where we can ... road test 
the corporate plan ... and pick up certain key topics and ... say ... what 
do we think are the key topics going forward, that we have got to look 
at.’ (CityMod 8, external, sub-committee chair)
The role of the Principal (in this case) in preparing an initial version of the
strategic plan was highlighted at UniCollege:
‘We’re coming up ... to our strategic away day ... everybody comes to 
set the strategic direction of the institution, because we have a plan, we 
have a strategic plan which [the Principal] has written, but it was 
subject to scrutiny from the first draft.’ (UniCollege 4, external, chair)
The Vice-Chancellor and the executive also appeared to take the lead in 
strategy development at TownMod university.
The emphasis at Civic university was somewhat different, as the
impression given was that the governing body was involved at an earlier stage
in more open-ended discussions:
‘I think ... in terms of the kind of strategic process we’ve just been 
through, and are going through, then I think council members have 
been given the opportunity to get involved at the earlier stages of 
thinking ... and I think that’s where the council can actually make a 
better contribution, when it’s not operating on the basis of something 
that’s been pre-cooked, but is able to do some blue sky thinking and to 
throw ideas at the university. (Civic 4, external, sub-committee chair)
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However, even at Civic university there did not appear to be any suggestion
that the governing body had primacy in relation to the development of
institutional strategy. This was not the case at NewMill university, where
external members clearly felt that the governing body took the lead:
‘Well, the council sets the overall mission and the strategies ... we 
always have an away day ... and we spent quite a lot of time working 
during the day ... looking at the key issues for the university and the 
council, and what we had to o ffe r... the areas we wished to highlight, 
and then the VC ... put together a strategy paper based on our 
thinking.’ (NewMill 5, external)
So there are several different perspectives on the ways in which board 
members engage in strategy development and consideration. At most 
institutions it appears that the executive take the lead, but that governing 
bodies are involved in commenting on and contributing to the development of 
the strategy. There are signs at Civic university of governing body members 
being involved at an earlier stage (able to do ‘blue sky thinking’), and at 
NewMill of governing body members seeing themselves as owning the 
strategy (and sending the Vice-Chancellor away to write the strategy paper).
6.6.3 Does the governing body really have any influence on strategy?
Reflections on the nature and extent of governing bodies’ roles in
strategy development touched on a number of other issues. For example,
one external member thought some people had more influence than others:
‘It’s quite noticeable that the [members] with the business background 
... probably have more to say about strategy and direction, where the 
university should be going.’ (Civic 6, external, deputy chair)
There were also suggestions that there were limits to the extent to which 
governing bodies could actually influence the strategy. This was a
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perspective that was principally associated with internal members. One 
commented, in the context of his involvement in an effectiveness review 
committee, that:
‘Some people thought that the council didn’t have, wasn’t allowed to 
have, enough input into strategy, and other people thought it had 
exactly the right amount.’ (Greenfield 1, internal, academic, non­
executive)
Another non-executive internal member commented:
‘[The council’s] formally signing off the budget and policies, but how 
much is it really influencing strategy and direction, and so on? ... I 
must say I’m a bit ... sceptical in terms of it really being in charge, or 
controlling anything, or directing ... strategy to much of an extent.’ 
(Civic 10, internal, academic non-executive)
There were other indications of potential limits to the governing body’s
role in relation to strategy. For example, an external at CityMod university
appeared to stress the primacy in strategy development of the executive,
when he spoke of the governing body:
‘Ensuring that the ... full-time executive ... have been able to persuade 
you that the corporate plan, that they have set out, the way they wish to 
go, the means of travel of the university, is the right and proper means 
of travel. ... And the role of the board is to tweak it, if necessary, guide 
it, if necessary, but essentially to say this is the course of travel for the 
next X years.’ (CityMod 8, external, sub-committee chair)
A similar impression of the governing body having limited influence, was given
by an internal at TownMod university, who spoke of the Vice-Chancellor
setting out his plans and presenting them to the governing body:
‘Quasi fait accomplit.’ (TownMod 1, internal, non-exec academic)
The idea that there needed to be a balance between strategy and other roles
also arose. For example, an external at ExCAT university remarked:
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‘There’s a balance ... that says that strategy is very important, [and] 
that at a higher level a lot of things are strategic, but when it comes 
down to, say, signing off a TRAC return or something, you need to 
know that the actual controls are in place, and that there’s a robust and 
reliable set of data that’s been submitted, and that council don’t need to 
worry about that because it’s [already] been well-reviewed’ (ExCAT 5, 
external, sub-committee chair)
Finally, fore-shadowing an issue in relation to governing bodies’ attitudes
towards their responsibilities for the academic aspects of institutions’
activities, one external held the strong view that:
‘Universities ought to be run by academics, not by lay people. The lay 
people are there to suggest, to advise, to make sure that it's done, you 
know, that the ... books are OK, that the finances are honest, ... to 
oversee that there is a strategy, that it makes - to comment on it, to 
make it sense. But, but the strategic direction of the university has to 
come from within it.’ (Greenfield 2, external, deputy chair)
6.6.4 The variability of reflections on strategy
The preceding sub-sections have shown a clear perception on the part
of governing body members and attendees that governing bodies have an
important role in relation to institutional strategy. In terms of the emphasis
given to governing bodies’ contribution to strategy development, in
comparison to the emphasis placed on other governing body roles, there was
however some variation from institution to institution. Respondents from
CityMod, Civic and NewMill universities, for example, strongly identified
contributing to institutional strategy as a major governing body role, whilst at
Greenfield ad TownMod universities interviewees accepted that the governing
body had responsibilities in this area, but did not highlight this role so strongly
(see sub-section 5.2.2 and particularly Table 5.1, p 184).
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There were also differences of perception with regard to whether the 
executive or the governing body played the leading role in strategy 
development. In most cases, the impression given was that governing bodies 
contributed to strategy development on a broadly equal basis with the 
executive, but that the executive provided the initial input, in the form of a draft 
strategic plan or similar document -  this was the case in the chartered 
institutions, Civic, ExCAT and Greenfield universities, in two of the 
incorporated universities, CityMod and TownMod, and in UniCollege (see 
Table 6.1 below). Within this group there were indications that the executive’s 
control of the strategy development process was perhaps strongest at 
TownMod university, and that the nature of the contributions that the 
governing body could make was somewhat broader at Civic university (scope 
for ‘blue-sky thinking’). In contrast, at incorporated NewMill university 
governing body members clearly perceived themselves as taking the lead -  
sending the Vice-Chancellor away to write the strategy after their discussions.
Table 6.1: Governing body role in relation to institutional strategy
Institutions
Overall impression of extent of governing 
body’s role in strategy development:
GB comments on GB contributes to GB takes lead role in 
strategy developed by shaping of strategy formulation of strategy 
executive jointly with executive
CityMod v v V
Civic v v
ExCAT v v V
Greenfield v v V
NewMill V w
TownMod v v V
UniCollege v v V
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The differences of emphasis recorded above need of course to be 
treated with caution, because of the variations in the nature and number of 
governing body members and attendees interviewed at each institution (see 
sub-section 4.3.4, Table 4.3, p 152). At NewMill university, for example, the 
interviewees were all external members of the governing body and the lack of 
an executive or internal member’s view may have skewed the impression 
given as to the primacy of the governing body’s role in relation to strategy 
development. It is, however, still possible to conclude that members of the 
governing bodies of all the case study institutions perceived themselves as 
playing a significant role in strategy development, and that in one institution 
(NewMill) governing body members felt that they initiated the strategy 
development process and played the most significant role in it.
6.7 Educational character and academic activities
6.7.1 Attitude to educational character and academic activities
It was noted at the start of the previous chapter (sub-section 5.2.1) that 
alongside five areas where a strong role for governing bodies was widely 
accepted, a further area of strong agreement was that governing bodies 
should not play a significant role in relation to academic activities. This view 
is, prima facie, surprising, given the formal recognition of the governing body’s 
responsibility for educational character in the constitutional provisions of 
incorporated institutions, and the by now almost equally clear position with 
regard to the responsibilities of the governing bodies of chartered universities. 
A question therefore arises as to how governing bodies can fulfil their
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responsibilities, if governing body members do not feel it appropriate to play a 
significant role in relation to the determination of educational character and 
the oversight of academic activities.
6.7.2 External members content to let academics take the lead
One version of the idea that the governing body, and its external
members in particular, should not interfere in academic issues was set out in
terms of their lack of capacity to do so:
Til be absolutely honest, I’m absolutely baffled as to how any 
governing body can have anything to do with the academic side. We 
don’t have anything to do with the degrees, we don’t have anything to 
do with content. The only things we can really shape are ... which 
school gets the funding, which doesn’t, when there are decisions being 
made. But the educational character is beyond our remit.’
(TownMod 3, external)
TownMod university is, of course, an incorporated university, where the
board’s responsibility for the educational character is explicit in the institution’s
constitution, and it was not that this external member did not regard academic
issues as important. However, he thought that they should be dealt with by
the university’s senate, with the governing body simply being kept informed.
He categorised senate as being:
The institution internally, it’s the big decision-making body, discussion 
body ... and it gets very, very heated, and you get real clashes over 
absolutely minute detail. But a lot of stuff goes on in there, and ... the 
academic character, that I don’t think we can shape, but that’s where 
it’s happening, and we need to know. (TownMod 3, external)
This attitude towards the senate was echoed by another external at 
TownMod, who said:
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‘What we cannot be doing is interfering with senate. The senate has 
senate business, and we should not be [involved].’ (TownMod 5, 
external, sub-committee chair)
Externals at a number of other institutions were also firm in their view 
that the governing body’s involvement in academic matters should be limited. 
For example, at Civic university, an external member, having stated very 
clearly that the primary role of a non-executive, external member of the 
council was:
To hold the executive to account for the effective, efficient and honest 
running of the university.’
added:
‘Now, whether that applies to the academic output or not is a moot 
question. We basically have decided that it’s primarily the role of the 
member of council to ensure ... efficient financial compliance, the 
effective provision of facilities, ensuring that staff and students are well- 
treated and able to achieve what they wish, rather than -  and here I 
strongly agree -  rather than the actual academic standards which are 
achieved. That is the responsibility of senate -  which is currently being 
challenged by HEFCE.’ (Civic 3, external, sub-committee chair)
Another external member at Civic university noted that the audit committee 
had recently discussed the governing body’s role vis a vis academic issues, 
prompted by then recent proposals from HEFCE to amend its financial 
memorandum:
‘... and [the] collective view, including mine, was that it would be a 
great mistake ... for council to try to have a hands-on approach on the 
whole academic agenda.’ (Civic 4, external, sub-committee chair)
In the case of another chartered institution, Greenfield university, the externals 
also felt that they should defer on academic issues to the academics. This 
was again linked to perceptions of the appropriate role of the institution’s
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senate, but was coupled with recognition of the governing body’s ultimate 
responsibility:
‘I suppose we have a responsibility for the overall academic direction of 
the university as far as, you know, sort of overall governance is 
concerned, but I certainly think that senate is ... the driving force and 
the kind of dynamic lead on that. I’d be very surprised if something 
which senate had approved came to council and ... it wasn’t supported, 
because I think the respect of council members for the academic staff 
is too great for that to happen, probably. Of course, if we thought that 
somebody was making some mad decision, I am sure we would 
challenge it, but it hasn’t ever been like that. Greenfield has obviously 
got a lot of academic staff who’ve been there a long time, so there’s a 
sort of gravitas and ownership of the university, I think, amongst some 
of the senior academic staff, and perhaps we’re lucky in that.’ 
(Greenfield 4, external, sub-committee chair)
Overall, therefore, one has a clear view that academic matters are best left to 
the academics.
6.7.3 External members feeling they should do more
Notwithstanding the general thrust of the views considered so far, there
were some signs that external members would have liked to pay more
attention to academic activities. At CityMod university, for example, the chair
highlighted the importance of the governing body’s responsibility for
educational character, but felt there was too little time to consider it properly:
The first role of the board ... is financial sustainability, and we spend a 
lot of time on that. Second is the educational character, and we spend 
some time on that, but ... I do know all the board members would like 
to spend more time on that, but by the time you’ve dealt with financial 
sustainability, estates and a few strategic issues that are thrown at you 
by central government, often we don’t feel we spend enough time with 
the faculties.’ (CityMod 5, external, chair)
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He was also sceptical as to whether governing body members understood
educational character:
‘It would be quite interesting to canvas the board members ... if you 
ask them what they think our educational character is, what they come 
up with ... we've never done that. I mean we've done quite a bit of self- 
assessment on board process and things like that, but one of the things 
we didn't do was ask ourselves whether we had a clear view ... [about] 
what the educational character is.’ (CityMod 5, external, chair)
However, he concluded that even if he and his colleagues had wanted to, they 
could not put the issue of educational character ‘near the top of the agenda’, 
because of the need to give higher priority to things such as estates, financial 
sustainability, student satisfaction and employability.
Another external at CityMod appeared, however, broadly satisfied with
the way that academic issues were handled, commenting:
‘Do we have a direct input? No, that’s handled through senate. Are we 
aware of where the university is going? Yes, we are, because one of 
the ways you get your funding through HEFCE is people who complete 
their courses, and therefore if you’ve completions that are down, then 
your income is down, and so we have a general feel for what is 
happening academically.’ (CityMod 8, external, sub-committee chair)
At CityMod university there was, therefore, somewhat more explicit interest in 
the institution’s educational character than at most other institutions, but still a 
degree of acceptance of the idea that it was not necessary for the board to 
take a detailed interest in academic issues.
The perception that the governing body should have an explicit role in 
these areas was even more apparent at NewMill university and UniCollege. 
At NewMill, the chair (NewMill 1) recognised that the governing body had
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exercised its ultimate responsibility for academic activities when the
university’s courses needed to be ‘put on a proper business footing’ under the
previous Vice-Chancellor. She also foresaw there being a clear role for the
governors in making ‘some very difficult decisions’ in the near future because
of the external financial and economic climate. One of her colleagues
(NewMill 2, external) commented on the danger, as he saw it, of giving
academics too much leeway, and of just letting them ‘get on with it’, because
they would not take a broad enough view. However, another external at
NewMill (NewMill 4), while not conceding primacy in relation to educational
character to the academics, still recognised the importance of academic input,
commenting that there was:
‘Need for a senate, even in an institution like this -  a more work-a-day 
university on the scale of universities, compared with some of the more 
rarefied bodies -  even in a place like this [there is] the need for senate 
to be a place that’s both safe for academics, and doing important things 
that academics need to sign up to, particularly around how they relate 
to their peers, how they make sure the academic endeavour is going 
well rather than, badly, it seems to me essential. ... If senates didn’t 
exist, we’d need to invent them, I think.’ (NewMill 4, external)
Turning to UniCollege, there was again less sense of the governing
body being willing to leave responsibility for the educational character of the
institution to the executive and to academics, albeit with signs that this was a
relatively recent development:
‘Until, certainly, my first couple of years here, we didn’t get involved 
very much with the academic side of things. ... I think there were five 
new governors at the same time ... and we said, but this is crazy -  
we’re talking about money and all sorts of things, but we’re not doing 
anything on the academic side. And there was a slight bristling, I think, 
from ... the Vice-Principal, who chairs the academic board, but 
nevertheless we now have an annual meeting together, the academic
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board and the board of governors.’ (UniCollege 3, external, sub­
committee chair)
6.7.4 Internal perceptions
A high proportion of the external members therefore had a strong 
preference for ceding responsibility for educational character to the 
academics. At the same time, most external members appeared to accept 
that their governing bodies had an ultimate responsibility in this area, even if 
they were content to discharge it at one remove. What then of the views of 
internal members and attendees about these issues?
The overall tenor of the internals’ comments can be illustrated by the
views of two Vice-Chancellors, who both felt that the governing body’s role
should be limited. The Vice-Chancellor of TownMod university, asked about
educational character, had a very strong opinion:
‘I mean ... if you crack that, that’s, in my view, that’s the philosopher’s 
stone o f ... university boards, really. It is absolutely crucial for me that 
the board does not interfere with the operation of senate, because that 
would undermine ... academic quality. It would be fundamentally 
wrong, ... and also it would mean ... you would find it almost 
impossible to hire decent academic staff if that were known, and ... if 
that did happen I’m afraid I would resign instantly, because I think there 
are some things you have to stand up for.’ (TownMod 2, internal, 
executive, Vice-Chancellor)
He went on:
The way I explain it to the board is, yes, I completely and utterly 
understand that they are responsible for the institution, and if the 
education’s rubbish, that’s at their door, absolutely. But supposing we 
taught surgery, do they really feel they have the knowledge to go and 
help surgical teachers work out what better content there should be in 
their degrees and how better to organise the degrees? And that helps
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boards get their heads round where they need to be engaged ... What 
they need to do then is see to it that there’s a supply of information 
which will enable them to make sure it is being done well. (TownMod 
2, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
The second Vice-Chancellor it seems pertinent to quote was from ExCAT
university. She held almost equally strong views:
Tm quite nervous about suggestions that council should have more 
engagement in the academic side of the university ... Senate business 
is what research we do, how do we do our teaching, what are the 
important things about the courses we run. And the stuff about the size 
of the university, the finances of the university, the physical 
infrastructure, the estates’ strategy, is council business. I don’t want 
council pinching senate’s ... almost ultimate rights to be the senior 
academic body in the university. ... Clearly if the university was 
plummeting down the league tables ... then council has every right to 
question our academic standards and things, but if everything is going 
well those to me are absolutely senate’s business.’ (ExCAT 4, internal, 
exec, VC)
Here we have one Vice-Chancellor claiming to be ready to resign if his 
governing body started to interfere in educational issues, and another clear 
that the governing body should only intervene in extreme circumstances.
Other members of executive management teams at a number of
institutions held similarly firm opinions. Bringing the formal role of senate into
the discussion again, the deputy vice-chancellor at Greenfield said:
The thing that it [council] doesn’t do, and I think it’s not unreasonable 
that it doesn’t do it, it does not try to interfere in the work that the 
senate does. ... There’s perhaps a sort of, perhaps what that 
indicates is a respect, as it were, for the academic deliberations that go 
on at the senate, and a desire not to tinker with what it is the academic 
body is concluding is the right thing to do. ... So there’s a kind of 
understanding and a respect for the role that senate plays here ... and I 
suppose that is about [council members’] clarity in their own minds
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collectively of what their role as council is.’ (Greenfield 3, internal, 
executive)
A member of the executive at CityMod university also expressed strong views:
‘I think if you said to me where would my biggest concern be about the 
current way in which the responsibilities of boards of governors are 
stated, I think it is in terms of the educational character, because I don't 
think it's for a board of governors to actually [do that]. ... We do have 
discussion with the board of governors about the academic character, 
and I do, you know, from time to time, update them on the some of the 
academic issues ... so they can understand some of that, but I think it's 
for us to present what we think the educational character and mission 
is of the university, and then hopefully the governors buy into that, and 
by inference therefore take responsibility for it.’ (CityMod 1, internal, 
executive attendee)
The board secretary at CityMod was somewhat more positive, saying:
‘We encourage [externals] to engage with [educational character], so 
for example we have an away day coming up ... and the final session 
is breakout sessions where they are going to be debating the 
educational character and mission. Will we stage manage that? Yes, 
we will ... because it wouldn’t be fair on them anyway to just say, well, 
go away and tell us when you’ve sorted it out. Are they in a position to 
influence it? I do think they’re in a position to help you formulate your 
thoughts. ... The fact that you have to debate with somebody who isn’t 
close to your business, you know, living it every day, actually forces 
you to articulate it.’ (CityMod 6, internal, attendee, not executive, 
secretary)
However, the phraseology she used still implied that control remains with the
university’s staff, although input from external members was useful.
The views of internal, non-executive, members were similar to those of 
executive members and attendees. For example, at Civic university, one 
commented:
‘You wouldn’t expect council to be saying, y’know, we should be 
running a course in ethics ... or anything like that, I don’t think, or
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getting too involved. It’s very much an overview on the educational 
side and a bit more involved in the business side.’ (Civic 10, internal, 
academic, non-executive)
Student members had less to say about the role of the governing body in
relation to educational character or generic academic issues. Nonetheless,
the student member at ExCAT university remarked that:
‘I don’t see council’s job as to interfere with academics -  that is what 
senate is for. ... I don’t think directives are ever passed to senate, I 
think they almost co-exist side by side. ... I think they interact very 
well ... - council talks about the building projects, the finances, and 
things like that, senate talks about the academic stuff. I don’t think 
there’s any interference.’ (ExCat 6, internal, student)
6.7.5 Evidence from meeting documentation and observation
The strong evidence from the interview data showing that most 
governing body members and attendees perceived that detailed oversight of 
educational character and academic activities was best left to academics was 
supported by the documentation from governing body meetings. There were, 
for example, no references to explicit discussions of overall educational 
character in the meeting documentation of any of the institutions, although 
some such discussions may perhaps have been subsumed in items 
concerned with institutional strategy. There were also very few instances of 
agenda items or minutes about particular academic issues or activities, and 
while reports from senates or academic boards were routinely received by 
governing bodies, these were almost always included in the sections of the 
agenda that were flagged as not for discussion. This picture was borne out by 
the results of the observation of governing body meetings at Civic university, 
where academic issues were only referenced in passing.
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6.7.6 Educational character and academic activities best left to the experts 
Overall, therefore, whilst the views expressed about educational 
character and about the governing body’s involvement in academic activities 
were wide-ranging and considered, there was a clear, and strong, 
preponderance of opinion in most of the case study institutions that governing 
bodies and their external members should have only limited involvement in 
these areas. This did not, however, imply a failure by governing body 
members to recognise that they had the ultimate authority for educational 
character. Instead, there was a desire and a willingness in most institutions to 
entrust the responsibility to the academics of the institution at large. This was 
associated with a sense that it would in some cases be difficult to discharge 
the role more substantively even if an attempt was made to do so, and a 
feeling that other aspects of the governing body’s role needed to be given 
priority. Even in the two institutions, NewMill university and UniCollege, where 
governing body members paid much more explicit attention to educational 
character and academic activities, there was still clear recognition of the 
importance of allowing academics a large degree of autonomy.
6.8 Less discussed or absent roles
6.8.1 Complying with legal and statutory requirements
It was noted in the previous chapter (see sub-section 5.2.1) that in 
addition to there being widespread recognition of a set of governing body 
roles across all the case study institutions, there were also some standard
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governance roles that were discussed by very few  governing body members.
The first of these concerned ensuring probity and compliance with legal and
statutory requirements, a role HEFCE clearly expects governing bodies to
carry out. Although few interviewees spoke about this issue, the impression
they gave was that these responsibilities were accepted and understood, and
did not require comment in the same way as other roles. For example, at
UniCollege, an external member and the governing body secretary spoke
about the topic in very similar terms:
‘Obviously I won’t go into all the statutory stuff because, obviously, 
that's a given.’ (UniCollege 3, external, sub-committee chair)
‘Well obviously they have all the legal responsibilities. ... And they do 
all the sorts of things that, you know, they have responsibilities for - 
health and safety, and for quality legislation, and ... So, they're doing 
all that work, yeah.’ (UniCollege 1, internal, attendee, not executive, 
secretary)
A deputy chair at Civic university responded in similar vein:
‘I think that the collective role -  I mean there [are] the statutory 
responsibilities -  clearly we have those in governance terms -  you 
know, the financial situation, the quality of provision, the staff 
responsibilities in terms of ensuring both that they’re aware of what’s 
happening and that they have good working conditions, as well as 
contributing to the quality -  but ... council members ... give you a 
balanced perspective, ... challenge appropriately ... add value and 
support what it is the university is seeking to do.’ (Civic 5, external, 
deputy chair)
At one institution - CityMod university -  people seemed, however, 
rather more explicitly aware of such issues. The chair (CityMod 5), for 
example, wondered whether governing body members were given enough 
information about their legal responsibilities, and whether they were aware of 
the Nolan principles. The student member (CityMod 7) voiced concern about
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whether the governing body members had yet taken on board the implications 
of recent changes to charity commission requirements. And an internal 
attendee (CityMod 1) spoke about the potential dilemma of the governing 
body having responsibility for things they could not be expected to have 
detailed information about. Nonetheless, the overall impression given was still 
that there was awareness of legal and statutory responsibilities, without there 
being much active engagement with those responsibilities by governing body 
members.
As noted in sub-section 5.2.2 (see also section 5.5), review of 
documentary evidence, in the form of governing body agendas and minutes, 
confirmed that attention was being paid to these responsibilities at all the case 
study institutions. In addition, observation of the governing body at Civic 
university (see section 5.6) demonstrated that reasonably significant amounts 
of time were devoted to consideration of issues relating to legal and statutory 
responsibilities. Taking the case study institutions as a whole, it was clear 
that while the governing body’s role in ensuring compliance with statutory and 
legal requirements was not generally at the forefront of people’s minds, this 
was because it was understood as being addressed automatically and 
routinely, and was not seen as requiring the same proactive engagement as, 
for example, the governing body’s roles in challenging and supporting the 
executive.
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6.8.2 Risk assessment and management
The second area to which less attention was paid in discussion than
might have been expected in the light of the formal prescriptions for
governance in the higher education sector concerned risk. Nonetheless, a
number of comments on the governing body’s role in relation to risk were
made. For example, the Vice-Chancellor at Greenfield university was
concerned with external risk and avoiding mistakes. In this context he saw
the governing body having a role:
To make sure we don’t do something really stupid, and to help us 
calculate the risks ... it’s about future proofing ... and it’s ... extremely 
helpful to have people who’ve had very senior roles in various places 
... scanning the horizon, helping to assess the risk of doing [things]. 
(Greenfield 6, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
The chair of the audit committee at Greenfield commented on how much the
university’s approach to risk assessment and management had changed, and
how helpful this was to the governing body:
The other thing which ... I think has improved enormously ... is a much 
more robust approach to what the organisation’s response to risk is. 
They didn’t have a risk register when I joined, we have a risk register 
now. [And] all the monitoring that’s done ... enables you to be explicit 
about whether you’re a risk averse or a risk hungry organisation, and 
that the decisions that you make are made in the light of that level of 
risk that the organisation is prepared to take. ... those sorts of tools 
are really important to council -  you shouldn’t just be ... making 
decisions on the hoof.’ (Greenfield 7, external, sub-committee chair)
At UniCollege, the audit committee chair (UniCollege 3), stressed the value for 
the governing body of ‘understanding what the risks are for the institution’, 
while his counterpart at ExCat university explained that the institution had a 
risk matrix and highlighted the importance of understanding and controlling 
risks through the institution’s audit committee.
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As with the need to ensure compliance with legal and statutory 
requirements, the relative lack of reference to the governing body’s role in 
relation to risk can be explained by the fact that most governing body 
members regarded it as something that was automatically addressed, in this 
case by audit and risk sub-committees, and internal audit services. In 
addition, the fact that the respondents most prone to mention the subject were 
audit committee chairs, governing body chairs and Vice-Chancellors, 
suggests that concern with risk was principally of interest to the people on 
whom it impinged most directly. Indeed, there was a limited contrary strand of 
opinion about risk, conveying irritation with its prevalence as a discussion 
topic:
‘There’s a lot of preventative stuff -  risk, risk management -  all that’s 
come in. ... its absence never stopped the university working ... so 
there’s almost an attempt to predict the worst.’ (Civic 1, internal, 
academic, non-executive)
6.8.3 Leadership
The expectation that corporate boards will play a leadership role has 
existed in the UK private sector for some time (see sub-section 3.2.3). In 
contrast, the idea that higher education governing bodies in the UK should 
have a leadership role has not so far been reflected in formal HEFCE or CUC 
guidance (see sub-section 3.2.5), although it has recently become a topic of 
interest in Schofield’s work on effectiveness (Schofield, 2009; see sub-section 
3.5.3), and has always been reflected in the title of the Leadership Foundation 
for Higher Education (LFHE). However, apart from the implication that, since 
the LFHE addresses governance, governance must involve leadership 
activity, the idea that the governing body has a leadership role (as opposed to
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the chair of governors, or the Vice-Chancellor) has not been prominent. 
There is therefore a mixed context in which to place the almost complete lack 
of reference to leadership by the governing body members whose views were 
obtained in this research. On the one hand, the lack of reference to 
leadership as a governing body role could be seen as simply reflecting the 
fact that such a role for governing bodies has been given no emphasis by 
HEFCE and the CUC, notwithstanding the work of the LFHE. On the other 
hand, a leadership role is expected of the private sector boards of which many 
members of higher education governing bodies have experience.
It was in this context, then, that only four interviewees spoke about
leadership, and that three of those people were internal, executive members
of their governing bodies (two Vice-Chancellors and a Deputy Vice-
Chancellor). Two of these three respondents associated leadership with the
roles played by the chairs of their governing bodies. One said, when talking
about effectiveness (see also chapter 7):
‘Well, it's, it's good leadership. I mean, over the years I've seen 
different versions of chairs of council, and a good chair of council can 
gigantically affect the, you know, the capacity of the council to come to 
decisions about anything. So I think it's good leadership, and, and it's 
about, I think, an effective structure that works and I think what we've 
got at the moment is a structure that works very well.’ (Greenfield 3, 
internal, executive)
In similar vein, the Vice-Chancellor from TownMod university commented:
And we, we do have a very good board, ... and our two chairs <name 
and name> have shown excellent leadership in every way that that 
might be demonstrated. (TownMod 2, internal, executive, Vice- 
Chancellor)
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The third executive respondent, the Vice-Chancellor at CityMod university,
spoke about leadership when commenting on the governance theory matrix
(see sub-sections 4.3.3 and 5.7.2 above). Having touched on the relevance
or applicability of stewardship theory and agency theory, he said:
‘I don’t think our board ever has to encourage us to accelerate, at times 
I think it has to restrain me ... {mutual laughter), you know what I mean.
I think actually this is the difference between the leadership aspects as 
opposed to the stewardships aspects, and I think there’s a leadership 
one, almost, in here.’ (CityMod 2, internal, exec, Vice-Chancellor)
Finally, the one external member who commented explicitly about leadership 
suggested:
‘I think the council can have a leadership role, I think it has to be a 
complementary leadership role, ... it’s not the executive, and it 
shouldn’t seek to be, and I think that’s really important. But it can have 
a role as, as I say I would put it as complementary. I can only, my only 
experience is of [this university and] one of [being] supportive to the 
direction, the vision, the mission. So I think we made contributions to 
that, significantly, and it’s about supporting the tone, d’you know, the 
being of the university -  what is it? So I really feel that how the council 
behaves, and their contribution, should be a leadership role in terms of 
what is best and of the best for the university. (Civic 5, external, deputy 
chair)
So leadership here was seen by two senior executives in terms of the 
example set by the chair, while another executive saw a more general role for 
the governing body in this regard, and the one external who mentioned the 
subject saw a complementary leadership role for the governing body.
The fact that only one external member spoke about governing body 
leadership is even more striking given that he only spoke about the subject 
because I prompted him to do so. Leadership was not a topic that I set out to 
raise directly with governing body members. Instead, it was one of a number
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of potential governing body roles that I felt might arise but which I did not wish
to prompt direct comment about by posing a question. However, on this
occasion, the interviewee made a remark about council members having
‘aspirations for the university’ which brought the idea of leadership to my
mind, and I was moved to pose a specific question. The exchange (running
on from the interviewee’s initial remarks about governing body roles) went:
Civic 5: People can, of course, challenge appropriately, because I 
think that’s ... part of it, but also add value and support to what it is the 
university is seeking to do. So, I feel that individual members bring 
that. I think in a corporate sense, an, erm, corporate sense, it’s a 
sense of, er, loyalty, of belonging, of aspirations for the university.
DB: OK, alright. In terms of aspirations for the university, then, do you, 
does that spill over into, can council have a leadership role, for the 
university, ... or is it not sufficiently ... close to the university at large to 
have a sort of leadership role?
Civic 5: I think the council can have a leadership role, etc.
This provides an interesting illustration of the mutability of the interviewing
process. At the time, reflecting on this interview and others conducted up to
that point, the rarity of the comment about leadership did not immediately
strike me, nor did the fact that it had only arisen because I had put a specific
query to the interviewee. I did in due course recognise the scarcity of
comments about leadership, but decided not to start explicitly raising the issue
in the interviews still to be conducted (about a third of the total), on the
grounds that it might unduly affect the pattern of comments from future
interviewees.
As a final point, it is perhaps worth noting that the LFHE quite often 
arose in discussions with both external and internal governing body members.
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Sometimes the interviewee mentioned the LFHE, and sometimes it appeared 
to me appropriate to mention it, usually in discussions about effectiveness and 
the recommendations made in that regard in the Schofield report. 
Nonetheless, despite the leadership foundation being discussed, none of the 
interviewees then went on to address the topic of leadership per se. In this 
case, unlike those of the governing body’s roles in relation to legal and 
statutory responsibilities and risk assessment and management, I do not think 
that a leadership role is recognised but taken for granted; instead I believe in 
the light of the data discussed above that most governing body members do 
not see their governing bodies as playing a leadership role.
6.9 Conclusions
6.9.1 The desire to be positive
This chapter has demonstrated in detail the basis for the position with 
regard to governing body members’ and attendees’ perceptions of governing 
body roles summarised in Chapter 5, specifically in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (pp 
184 and 188). The data referred to here, and the examples of the transcribed 
interview data that have been quoted, show that some of the normative 
governing body roles set out both in guidance issued for the private sector 
and by HEFCE are recognised and regarded as important -  such as 
challenging the executive, and therefore holding them to account, and playing 
a role in strategy development. However, other roles that do not feature in 
external guidance and normative expectations -  such as providing support for
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the executive, offering advice and guidance, and acting as a link to the 
outside world - are seen as being at least equally important. All of this reveals 
a strong desire on the part of governing body members, and particularly 
external members, to see their roles in broadly positive and supportive terms. 
It has also been shown that governing bodies’ approaches to their roles are 
complex and varied, and that there is a strong reluctance on the part of 
governing bodies to engage with issues around their institutions’ educational 
character.
6.9.2 Less commonly discussed roles
Although it has been possible to cite some transcribed interview data to 
illustrate the views of governing body members and attendees towards the 
normative roles associated with fulfilling legal and statutory requirements, and 
paying attention to risk assessment and management, the extent of this data 
was very limited by comparison to that relating to the other governing body 
roles discussed above. However, it was apparent, from the meeting 
documentation and observational data also considered, that governing bodies 
were paying attention to their legal and statutory requirements, and to risk 
assessment and management, but that these roles were regarded as 
essentially routine, or ‘a given’ as one person put it. They therefore did not 
engage governing body members as actively or as positively as did their other 
roles.
In contrast, the lack of discussion of a leadership role for governing 
bodies did not appear to be due to such a role being taken for granted.
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Instead, the most plausible explanation for the lack of reference to leadership 
by the great majority of interviewees appears to be due to a shared perception 
that this is not yet a recognised governing body role, as opposed to a role 
associated with Vice-Chancellors and executive management teams. This 
raises interesting questions about governing bodies’ capacity to take ultimate 
responsibility for their institutions given that they do not seem to see 
themselves as having leadership roles.
In the next chapter, I shall consider the data discussed here in the 
context of other relevant studies of governance, in both the private and public 
sectors, and in relation to governance theory.
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Chapter 7: Reflections on the perceptions of governing body 
roles in the light of the wider literature and governance theory
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Perceptions of governing body roles in previous studies
Data were presented in the previous chapter which illustrated the 
perceptions of the governing body members and attendees interviewed in this 
study of the roles of their governing bodies. Although the major part of the 
data considered was drawn from the transcribed interviews, this was 
supplemented where appropriate by data drawn from meeting documentation 
and observation. In the context of a thematic analysis of the data at the level 
of the quintain, it was revealed that governing body members and attendees 
have clear perceptions of the importance of a variety of governing body roles. 
As illustrated in the summaries of the data presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 in 
Chapter 5 (pp 184 and 188), some of those perceptions of governing body 
members and attendees aligned with the normative expectations of bodies 
such as the Higher Education Funding Council (HEFCE) and the Committee 
of University Chairs (CUC) with regard governing body roles. However, some 
roles highlighted by HEFCE and the CUC were much less prominent in the 
interview data than they were in the meeting documentation. In addition, 
important roles were perceived to exist that were not included amongst the 
normative role expectations of HEFCE or the CUC. I shall now consider these
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findings and their interpretation in the light of the literature reporting on 
previous studies of governance.
7.2 Perceptions of challenge and support in previous studies
7.2.1 Challenge and support in private sector governance
The respondents in this study clearly saw the provision of both 
challenge and support to the executives in their institutions as key parts of 
their overall role. They saw these roles as complementary, with some 
externals perceiving there to be dangers in being too critical of the executive 
either too frequently or too persistently (see sections 6.2 and 6.3). A number 
of previous studies of private sector governance (see sub-section 3.7.2) have 
supported a more extreme position with regard to challenging executive 
management and have suggested that both the willingness and the capacity 
of board members to provide meaningful challenge is in practice very limited -  
certainly this view was expressed by Mace (1971) and Lorsch and Maclver 
(1989) in their studies of the private sector in the United States. However, the 
more recent study of the UK private sector by Stiles and Taylor (2001; see 
sub-section 3.7.3) supported instead a scenario closer to that revealed in this 
study, in that they found that while board members felt able to challenge the 
executive, they were uncomfortable with being too adversarial and ultimately 
saw more benefit from working collaboratively with their executive directors as 
colleagues. Roberts et al also found board members suggesting that the best
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approach was to be both ‘challenging and supportive’ and that this was what 
executives found most valuable (Roberts etal, 2005, S17).
7.2.2 Challenge and support in public sector governance
In the case of the public sector in the UK, studies of NHS governance 
(see sub-section 3.8.2), such as those by Ashburner (1997, 2003) or, more 
recently, Storey et al (2010, 2011) all suggest, inter alia, that the extent to 
which board members provide challenge to the executive is variable, so that 
‘board members are not always challenging enough’ in some circumstances, 
while in others ‘often ... there is a polarisation in the board between NEDs 
[non-executive directors] and executives’ (Storey et al, 2011, 151). This 
suggests that the two facets of challenge and support are not always well 
reconciled in the NHS, whereas analysis of the interview data in this study 
suggests that higher education governing body members do not generally 
seem to find it difficult to reconcile being both challenging and supportive.
Turning to studies of higher education governance (see sub-section
3.9.5), Bargh et al (1996) identified what they called the ‘supervisory’ role - 
‘supervising the chief executive and other senior managers’ (Bargh et al, 
1996, 90) - as their third most important governing body role, although there 
was no explicit sense of providing a challenge to the executive. Berezi (2008) 
noted that governing body members perceived themselves as having a role in 
holding the executives to account, but he had relatively little to say about how 
this worked in practice. Finally, the material presented by Schofield (2009) 
included responses by both governing body members and executives to a
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question about whether their governing bodies had ‘effective arrangements for 
governors to challenge key issues’ (Schofield, 2009, 85). This elicited positive 
responses, with around 90% of the externals responding that this was always 
or usually the case.
7.2.3 The overall position with regard to challenge and support
The sense obtained overall from other studies is that providing 
appropriate challenge to executives has been recognised for some time as an 
important role in governance. This is consistent with the views expressed by 
the respondents in this study. However, the extent to which the role has been 
successfully undertaken in the past has varied, and even now, when the 
importance of challenging the executive and holding them to account is more 
explicitly articulated than in the past in almost all governance contexts, there 
remains debate about board and governing body members’ ability to 
challenge executives effectively.
Although less evidence is presented in other studies about governing 
bodies’ roles in providing support for executives, the principle that board 
members should do so is apparent in the ‘service’ roles identified by Mace 
(1971) and Lorsch and Maclver (1989); there is also some evidence of the 
supporting role in the work of Stiles and Taylor (2001), and it features strongly 
in the study by Roberts et al (2005). It is clear in this study that external 
members of governing bodies, in particular, perceived being supportive of the 
executive as an important role, and that in some cases they saw it as being
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more important than challenging the executive. However, being both 
challenging and supportive at the same time was not seen as problematic.
7.3 Providing advice and guidance as a role in other studies
7.3.1 The advice and guidance roie in a wider governance context
The provision of advice and guidance by the non-executive members of 
a board or governing body is recognised as a traditional and mainstream 
governance role. In the commercial sector, as was noted in sub-section 3.7.2, 
studies by US authors have suggested that board members see the provision 
of advice and guidance as one of their principal roles (Mace, 1971; Lorsch 
and Maclver, 1989; Johnson et al, 1996). Mace also implied, however, that 
since non-executive directors had little time to devote to their board roles their 
advice must necessarily be limited in scope. Although his study concerns a 
different context, and took place some time ago, Mace’s comments are still 
relevant, because it is undoubtedly the case that many external members of 
higher education governing bodies spend only relatively little time on their 
work in that capacity. This is due both to their engaging in only a small 
number of governing body meetings each year, and to the need because of 
this to consider a large amount of material in a short time at each meeting. 
The comments of governing body members and attendees in interviews, 
review of meeting documentation and observation of governing body meetings 
all support this contention about the time available to governing body 
members, particularly external members, although it was also clear from the
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transcribed interview data that governing body members in this study 
nonetheless stiil felt able to provide meaningful advice and guidance.
A further consideration identified in this research (see sub-section 
6.4.6) concerned the extent to which external members of higher education 
governing bodies have, or can develop, a good understanding of the higher 
education sector, given how few of them have a background of working in the 
sector, and whether or not this was an important factor in relation to their 
being able to offer pertinent advice and guidance. Shattock certainly felt that 
these aspects of UK higher education governance could be problematic 
(Shattock, 2006, 50). The respondents in this study did not, however, give the 
impression that any lack of detailed knowledge of higher education deterred 
external members from offering advice and guidance to the executive, nor that 
they felt constrained when doing so, any more than the time constraints 
deterred them.
7.3.2 Lack of reference to an advice and guidance role in other studies
Although the provision of advice and guidance by board or governing 
body members is touched on in a number of other studies (see, for example, 
Huse, 2007), it often appears only to be mentioned in passing, and in the 
context of the board or governing body’s contribution to strategy (as in Stiles 
and Taylor, 2001). In other studies of the higher education sector, the 
provision of advice and guidance was hardly mentioned by Bargh et al (1996) 
and does not feature significantly in Berezi’s work (2008), nor in Schofield’s 
work (2009) on effectiveness for the LFHE. Overall, therefore, there is a
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striking contrast between the prominence accorded by the governing body 
members interviewed in this study to their roles in providing advice and 
guidance, and the relative lack of reference to this activity in other studies.
7.4 Acting as a link and ambassador to the outside world
7.4.1 Perceptions in other studies of governance of acting as a link and/or an
ambassador on behalf of the institution
Hillman et al (2000; see sub-section 3.3.7) highlighted a number of 
types of link that board members can provide in a private sector context, 
including ‘business experts’, ‘support specialists’ and ‘community influentials’. 
Equivalent roles are recognisable in this study, albeit with the more specific 
connotations appropriate to the UK higher education sector. The importance 
of the linking and ambassadorial role was also recognised by Stiles and 
Taylor (2001; see sub-section 3.7.3). They saw it as a strong feature of the 
grouping of activities they classified as ‘institutional’, encompassing 
relationships with shareholders and stakeholders, as well as interacting more 
generally with the external environment. They found that ‘non-executives 
drew considerable influence from their political and personal networks’, and 
that this was ‘an important element in their added value to the board’. This 
was recognised by board executives (‘such contacts were useful and could 
possibly give a firm an edge’), although by and large it was not suggested that 
non-executives were chosen because of their contacts (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001, 99).
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In relation to the higher education sector, Bargh et al (1996; see sub­
section 3.9.5) subsumed ‘lobbying on behalf of the institution’ with ‘giving 
technical advice’ in a combined ‘support’ role. They also identified a separate 
‘negotiating role’ which involved ‘handling links with other bodies such as the 
National Health Service, Training and Enterprise Councils, further education 
institutions and schools’ (Bargh et al, 1996, 90), although this suggests to me 
a management-related activity rather than a governance role. In any event, 
‘negotiating’ was seen as the least important of the eight roles identified in 
Bargh et a/’s study, which contained little evidence that governing body 
members saw themselves as engaged in linking their institutions to the 
outside world. Berezi (2008) noted that the governing body members in his 
study perceived their governing bodies to have an ambassadorial role, but he 
did not expand on this to any great extent, while the other recent touchstone 
in this area, Schofield (2009) says nothing in detail about the topic.
7.5 Contributing to strategy development
7.5.1 Perspectives on boards’ involvement with organisational strategy in the
private sector
The influence of boards on strategy is probably the area to which most 
attention has been paid in research on governance. As was noted in sub­
section 3.7.6, McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) found that boards tended not to 
initiate strategies but that they were actively engaged in a range of strategic 
processes. They contrasted this with the earlier US study by Mace (1971), 
who saw little or no evidence of non-executives being able to influence
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strategy in US firms. Stiles and Taylor (2001; sub-section 3.7.3), whose 
findings to some extent mirror those of McNulty and Pettigrew, concluded that 
most boards establish parameters for the discussion of strategy, but do not 
formulate strategy, while in their work associated with the Higgs review, 
Roberts et al (2005; see sub-section 3.7.4 above) saw ‘close involvement in 
strategy’ by non-executives as essential in enabling them to ‘critique executive 
performance’ (Roberts et al, 2005, S21).
The involvement of board members in strategy has continued to be 
seen as variable and contested in commercial contexts, as discussed in the 
recent review by Pugliese et al (2009). Nonetheless, the idea that board 
members should be involved in strategy development has clearly become 
more accepted over time.
7.5.2 Perspectives on boards’ involvement with organisational strategy in the
UK public sector
Studies of public sector governance in the UK have also considered the 
strategic input of boards and governing bodies. Writing about the NHS, 
Ashburner (1997) saw little evidence for board involvement in strategy 
formulation. More recently, Storey et al (2011) suggested that while it was 
recognised that boards should have a strategic role, evidence that such a role 
was being effectively undertaken was limited. Elsewhere in the public and 
non-profit sectors, Cornforth and Edwards (1999) found that the boards of a 
school and a local voluntary organisation had little involvement in strategy, 
whilst the board of a national voluntary organisation had rather more and that
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of a further education college the most involvement (see sub-sections 3.8.1 
and 3.8.2).
Turning to higher education, a ‘strategic’ role was identified by 
governing body members as the most important role (of the eight roles they 
identified in total) in Bargh et a ts 1996 study. However, Bargh et al also 
found in four case studies that the governing bodies in question were mainly 
reactive rather than proactive in relation to institutional strategy. Bargh et al’s 
study suggested in addition that strategy was owned more by the executive 
than the governing body. Bennett (2001) saw only limited evidence for 
governing body engagement with strategy. In something of a contrast, Bott 
(2008) found that the chairs of governing bodies felt that they played a 
significant role in strategy development (for all references see sub-section
3.9.5).
In the case of Berezi (2008), he identified two types of governing body 
in relation to their role in strategy development -  ‘reactive-passive’ and 
‘proactive-active’ (see again sub-section 3.9.5). In the former category (two of 
seven institutions), Berezi suggested there was limited involvement by 
external members in strategy development, but in the case of the governing 
bodies of his ‘active-proactive’ institutions (of which there were five) Berezi 
reported that they initiated ‘the strategy process ... through convening special 
strategy meetings’ (Berezi, 2008, 221). However, although Berezi therefore 
described his active-proactive governing bodies as initiating the strategy 
process, much of his discussion of the topic emphasises the collaborative
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nature of the strategy development process, so that ‘lay governors appear to 
have an opportunity to contribute to the strategic debates of the institutions’. 
He went on to suggest, inter alia, that the evidence that he found was 
‘consistent with the findings of Stiles and Taylor (2001) and McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999)’, to the effect that ‘boards ... collaboratively formulate 
strategy with the executive’, but ‘that it is the responsibility of the executives to 
develop the strategies’ (Berezi, 2008, 224). My own reading of Stiles and 
Taylor and McNulty and Pettigrew suggests that their views about board roles 
in the overall strategy formulation process are not quite as positive as Berezi 
suggests, and that Berezi’s evidence implies greater engagement in the initial 
creation of strategy by his ‘proactive-active’ governing bodies than either 
Stiles and Taylor or McNulty and Pettigrew found in their studies of boards in 
the commercial sector. Of the institutions in this study, only at NewMill 
university did governing body members appear to feel as unambiguously in 
charge of institutional strategy as Berezi implies his five active-proactive 
governing bodies were. Instead, the data presented here suggest that the 
institutional strategy is perceived as jointly owned by the governing body and 
the executive in six institutions (CityMod, Civic, Greenfield, ExCAT and 
TownMod universities and UniCollege), whilst it is seen as more strongly 
owned by the governing body in one instance (NewMill university). In relation 
to this point, it should be noted that the summary data presented in Chapter 5 
(see Table 5.1, p 184) referred to the governing body’s contribution to 
strategy, where in contrast both at Greenfield and TownMod universities 
respondents gave the impression that the governing bodies’ contributed to 
organisational strategy to a lesser extent than at the other five institutions.
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Despite this, members of these governing bodies still felt that they had joint 
ownership of institutional strategy with the executive.
7.5.3 The overall position with regard to institutional strategy and its 
development
Given the range of research just discussed, it seems that the trend 
towards boards and governing bodies playing an increasing role in institutional 
strategy, seen in the commercial sector, both in the UK and the US, in the last 
twenty years, has been paralleled in the public sector in the UK. This is not 
surprising, given the influence on governance in the higher education sector of 
the changes in the approach to governance in the private sector from the 
1990s onwards. However, the evidence presented here shows that the extent 
to which governing body members perceive themselves and their governing 
bodies as being able to contribute meaningfully to institutional strategy 
remains variable.
7.6 The lack of engagement with educational character
7.6.1 Failure to engage with a central responsibility
As was illustrated in Chapter 6, the evidence of the transcribed 
interview data from this study, supported by that from review of meeting 
documentation and observation of meetings, showed that governing body 
members and attendees in most institutions were reluctant to engage in any 
detail with oversight of educational character or academic activities in general
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(section 6.7). While there is evidence from some other studies showing 
boards or governing bodies either unable or unwilling to take on roles that 
they are in some sense expected to undertake, in hardly any case is there 
evidence of recognition that a board or governing body has an ultimate 
responsibility but is reluctant to directly engage with it. The work of Deem et 
al (1995; see sub-section 3.8.1) on school governance comes closest to 
offering a parallel, with part of the reason for some external school governors 
feeling unable to engage with educational issues involving deference to the 
professional expertise and knowledge of teachers, particularly head teachers.
The issue of engagement with educational character and oversight of 
academic activities is also far from prominent in other studies of higher 
education governance. Bargh et al (1996, 51-66) explored the views of the 
governing body members about a number of over-arching aspects of higher 
education in the questionnaire-based part of their study, including their 
perspectives on the nature of the UK higher education system, the nature of 
undergraduate degree programmes (whether, for example, they should be 
modular or not), and the role of higher education institutions in research 
(whether all higher education institutions engage in research, for example). 
They presented, however, relatively little detailed evidence concerning 
governing body members’ roles in relation to educational character and 
academic activities, as opposed to their attitudes towards different 
approaches that cold be taken in these areas. They did, nonetheless, feel 
able to conclude that external members of governing bodies felt ‘faintly but 
suggestively’ disempowered, and ‘excluded from sharing ... ownership’ of
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issues concerning teaching and research (Bargh et al, 1996, 175). Bennett 
(2001) noted rather in passing that the governing bodies in his study 
appeared to pay little attention to academic issues, and the topic features 
hardly at all in the studies by Bott (2007) or Llewellyn (2008). Turning to 
Berezi’s work, he offered little discussion of the subject in his thesis, but 
nonetheless did conclude that concern with ‘he academic activities of 
teaching, learning and research ... [and] the strategies for implementing these 
activities were delegated to ... academic senates’ (Berezi, 2008, 291).
7.7 Other governing body roles
7.7.1 Perceptions of other governing body roles presented in other studies -  
compliance with legal and statutory responsibilities 
It was suggested in Chapters 5 and 6 that there were roles that formed 
part of the normative expectations set down in, for example, the CUC 
governance code for higher education, that were hardly mentioned in their 
interviews by governing body members and attendees, although there was 
evidence from meeting documentation and meeting observation that these 
roles were being undertaken. In the case of paying attention to legal and 
statutory requirements, this is a role expected of all boards and governing 
bodies. However, the carrying out of legally mandated tasks and 
responsibilities does not feature as a primary concern of board members in 
empirical studies of the private sector, such as those of McNulty and Pettigrew 
(1999), Stiles and Taylor (2001) or Roberts et al (2005) (see sub-sections
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3.7.3 and 3.7.6). Addressing legal and regulatory requirements also does not 
arise to any great extent in studies of public sector governance, although 
some research has explored concerns about the capacity of governors to 
cope with the growing demands placed on them by increasing regulation (see, 
for example, Deem etal, 1995; sub-section 3.8.1).
In relation to the UK higher education sector, Bargh et al (1996) have 
little to say on the subject, subsuming it within governing bodies’ ‘audit role’ 
(Bargh et al, 1996, 90). Similarly, studies such as those by Bennett (2001) 
and Bott (2007) also did not identify meeting legal and statutory requirements 
as an issue of concern. Llewellyn (2007) noted the role of governing body 
secretaries in ensuring that legal and statutory responsibilities were 
discharged, while Schofield stressed the importance of ‘ensuring 
accountability and regulatory compliance’ (Schofield, 2009, 38), but noted that 
much compliance-related activity was undertaken not by governing bodies but 
by governing body secretaries, or by other employees or agents of the 
institution such as auditors. Berezi (2008), however, gave rather more 
emphasis to addressing legal and statutory responsibilities, as he concluded 
that it was one of four ‘determinants of effectiveness’ in governance. He did 
not, however, have much to say about how meeting legal and statutory 
responsibilities was undertaken in practice. (For all the sources in this 
paragraph see sub-section 3.9.5, and for Berezi also sub-section 3.6.3.)
The impression formed in this study - that governing body members do 
not often explicitly express concern with issues around legal and statutory
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requirements -  therefore matches that obtained from considering other 
research on governance. Moreover, studies such as those of Schofield and 
Llewellyn reinforce the impression also gained here that governing body 
members do recognise the importance of ensuring regulatory compliance, but 
see it as a role that is routinely carried out by senior institutional managers, 
particularly the secretary, and that rarely requires proactive intervention by 
governing bodies.
7.7.2 Other perspectives on risk assessment and management
Risk assessment and management is also an area that receives 
relatively little explicit attention in other studies of governance. This is 
notwithstanding the focus on the topic in the Turnbull Report (Turnbull, 1999), 
or within the higher education sector by HEFCE (2005). In relation to the 
private sector, there is, for example, little mention of risk in the work of Stiles 
and Taylor (2001) despite their study having as one of its main foci the control 
role of boards. Huse (2007) also makes only passing reference to risk (see 
sub-sections 3.7.3 and 3.7.5 above).
In the case of higher education governance, risk management hardly 
features in the study by Bargh et al (1996), but their work was undertaken 
before an emphasis on risk management and a risk-based approach to audit 
activity became prevalent in the sector. In Schofield’s work, a question about 
whether institutional approaches to risk management were effective was 
included in the survey that informed his study and suggested that the issue 
caused hardly any concern (over 90% of responses being positive; Schofield,
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2009, 86). Although Schofield subsequently identified ‘effectively assessing 
risk and supporting innovation’ as one of his ‘outcomes of effective 
governance’ (Schofield, 2009, 38), risk assessment and management were 
not prominent features of his overall discussion.
An exception to the relative paucity of reference to the subject of risk in 
higher education governance comes in Berezi’s 2008 study (see sub-section
3.9.5), where he concluded that external members of governing bodies tended 
to be risk averse. Although relatively few people commented directly about 
risk in this study, the general tenor of the views expressed suggested that 
their governing bodies were not particularly risk averse.
7.7.3 The question of board leadership
In the case of leadership, and specifically the idea that boards should 
collectively have a leadership role, it was noted above (section 6.8.3) that this 
was an expectation in the private sector in the UK. However, although the 
Higgs Report referred to boards providing ‘entrepreneurial leadership’ (Higgs, 
2003, 21), in some of the underlying research, McNulty and his colleagues 
suggested that ‘the role of the non-executive is to ... support executives in 
their leadership of the business’ (McNulty et al, 2003, 21; my emphases). 
Stiles and Taylor refer to the potential for boards to provide leadership, but 
very much in passing -  leadership per se did not feature amongst the thirteen 
board roles identified by their interviewees (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, 37, Table
4.2). Board leadership was also discussed to some extent by McNulty and 
Pettigrew (in Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998, and McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999),
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but in the first case they were principally concerned with boards playing a 
leadership role in removing chief executives from office, whilst in the latter 
case they were concerned with the leadership aspects of boards’ roles in 
shaping strategy and found that only a minority of boards were fully involved 
in exerting leadership in this area (see sub-sections 3.6.3 and 3.7.2 to 3.7.6).
In relation to the public and non-profit sectors in the UK there is again 
little recognition of boards and governing bodies playing leadership roles. 
Reference to any explicit leadership role is essentially absent from the work of 
Deem et al (1995), while for Farrell (2005) school governing bodies were 
focussed on strategy rather than leadership (and were in any event not 
managing to get much involved in strategy; see sub-section 3.8.1). In the 
case of the NHS, although there is explicit reference to board leadership in 
official guidance (National Leadership Council, 2010), leadership is 
predominantly associated with the chair and chief executive. The recent 
research into NHS governance by Storey et al (2010, 2011) found some chief 
executives seeing leadership as more important than governance, but not 
seeing leadership as a governance role (see sub-section 3.8.2).
In the higher education sector, Bargh et al (1996) were relatively silent 
about leadership in general, although they saw some members of governing 
bodies (such as ‘chairs, vice chairs, treasurers and other key members’) 
developing leadership responsibilities in relation to the external environment 
(Bargh et al, 1996, 12; sub-section 3.9.5). Middlehurst (1993, 2004, 2008; 
sub-section 3.9.3) discussed leadership and governance explicitly, and saw
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the external members of governing bodies as contributing to institutional 
leadership through their on-going formal and informal interactions with senior 
members of university staff. Leadership is touched on in the studies by Bott 
(2007) and Llewellyn (2007), although their focus was on the roles of key 
individuals rather than the governing body as a whole. Berezi (2008) referred 
to governing bodies having a ‘strategic leadership’ role, but did not suggest 
that they had a leadership role more generally. However, as previously noted 
(sub-sections 5.2.1 and 6.8.3), Schofield (2009) has recently asserted the 
growing importance of a leadership role for higher education governing 
bodies. In doing so, he referenced work in the United States by Chait et al 
(2005) on how boards could generate new ideas and new ways of thinking 
and that through combining this ‘generative governance’ with more traditional 
aspects of governance they could develop a leadership role (see sub-section
3.9.6). It is not yet clear how influential Schofield’s introduction of such ideas 
into his work on effectiveness will be, as there is little if any evidence from this 
or other studies to sustain Schofield’s assertion that there is a growing 
emphasis on the leadership role of boards. The data obtained in this study 
certainly suggest that most governing body members do not see their 
governing bodies as playing a leadership role.
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7.8 The predictions of corporate governance theory
7.8.1 Governing body roles predicted by governance theory
The development of corporate governance theory was discussed in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.3) and the extent to which the implications of governance 
theory have been considered in previous studies was touched on elsewhere in 
that chapter (see, for example, sub-section 3.9.4). As noted in Chapter 4 
(sub-section 4.1.2), one of the subsidiary research questions in this study 
concerns the extent to which models derived from governance theory appear 
relevant or helpful in explaining or characterising the roles of higher education 
governing bodies. It is therefore appropriate now to consider the predictions 
with regard to potential governing body roles derived from governance theory 
in relation to governing body members’ and attendees’ perceptions of these 
roles that were presented and discussed in Chapter 6. In addition, further 
consideration will be given to the data specifically concerned with governance 
theory derived from the discussions with most of the interviewees of the matrix 
of selected theoretical perspectives on governance (see sub-section 4.3.3 and 
section 5.7).
7.8.2 Governance theory and challenge and support
Challenging the executive, and holding them to account, is seen as the 
primary role of the non-executive members of boards according to agency 
theory (see sub-section 3.3.2). The identification by both governing body 
members and attendees of a prominent role for governing bodies in
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challenging the executive suggest that there are times when the tenets of 
agency theory are potentially applicable to higher education governance. 
Supporting the executive, and working in partnership with them, is in contrast 
often associated with the stewardship perspective on governance (see sub­
sections 3.3.6 and 3.8.1), although it has also been associated somewhat less 
positively with managerial hegemony (sub-section 3.3.7). The existence of 
dual roles associated with ‘control and collaboration’ has also been 
recognised, sometimes in connection with concerns that tensions will thereby 
arise that will have adverse affects (Cornforth, 2003a; sub-section 3.8.1).
There is, however, little evidence in this study that the governing body 
members or attendees found there to be any contradiction in governing bodies 
sometimes challenging the executive, whilst at the same time also behaving in 
ways that were supportive of the Vice-Chancellor and the executive. Indeed, 
there was very little indication that the classic agency problem of senior 
managers serving their own and not the organisation’s interests was 
perceived to exist. This was implicit in the interview data, and explicit in 
responses to the matrix of selected governance theories, of which agency 
theory was one. As illustrated in Chapter 5 (Table 5.11), only a minority of 
interviewees saw agency theory as relevant to their institutions’ governance, 
and no-one saw the issues associated with agency theory as being the most 
prominent in their institution. Instead, rather more people stated explicitly that 
the tenets of agency theory were not applicable. Viewed on an institution by 
institution basis, agency theory was most clearly rejected at NewMill 
university. The possibility that agency effects might occur was most widely
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accepted at Greenfield university, but even here respondents still associated 
governance at Greenfield much more strongly with the tenets of stewardship 
and stakeholder theory. Overall, stewardship theory, with its association with 
the idea of supporting the executive and, thereby, the institution, was 
regarded as the most relevant theoretical position by all categories of 
respondent and in almost all the institutions. The only clear exception was 
TownMod university where views were mixed, with stakeholder theory 
accorded on significant credence, but also a strong and unique recognition of 
managerial hegemony -  and therefore of somewhat unquestioning support for 
the executive (and for the Vice-Chancellor in particular).
7.8.3 The relationship of governance theory to the advice and guidance role
In the case of the strongly identified and distinct role for governing 
bodies in offering advice and guidance, with regard to governance theory one 
is again in the territory of stewardship theory and, to some extent, managerial 
hegemony. In the higher education context, stewardship theory, and the 
associated idea of trusteeship, sees governing body members working 
collegially with executives to preserve and sustain their institutions. Many 
external governing body members clearly identify very closely with their 
institutions and saw their roles as offering advice and guidance in this context, 
which is line with the tenets of stewardship theory.
Turning to managerial hegemony theory, despite the negative 
connotations often associated with it when the provision of support for the 
executive is too uncritical, if associated with the explicit provision of advice
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and guidance it potentially becomes less negative. This possibility is 
illustrated by the attitudes towards theoretical perspectives at TownMod 
university where, as noted just above, managerial hegemony was strongly 
endorsed as a partial model for the governing body’s activities, and was not 
regarded as an inappropriate approach.
7.8.4 Governance theory and the linking and ambassadorial roles
In the case of governing body members and attendees identifying roles 
in relation to linking institutions to the outside world, and for external members 
in particular in acting as ambassadors for their institutions, such roles can be 
related to stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory. In the case of 
stakeholder theory (see sub-section 3.3.5), Hung (1998) sees it as central to 
the co-ordination of organisations’ activities with their wider communities, 
which can be very extensive and very widely defined (Freeman, 1984).
Turning to resource dependency theory, this assumes that board 
members link organisations to facilitate access to resources and to regulate 
interdependence (Hillman, 2000; Hillman et al 2000, 2009; Hung, 1998; 
Pfeffer, 1982; see sub-section 3.3.7). In the higher education context, there is 
clearly the potential for governing body members to link their institutions with a 
wide variety of organisations, in both the private and public sectors, and with 
government and its agencies, although the extent to which this was perceived 
as happening in practice clearly varied from institution to institution, being 
least prominent at the two most traditional chartered institutions (Civic and 
Greenfield; see Table 5.1, p 184). In all institutions, benefit was nonetheless
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seen as accruing to the institutions through the actions of governing body 
members in making and using their links outwith their institution on its behalf, 
and in acting more generally in an ambassadorial capacity.
In terms of the data obtained through the governance theory matrix, 
this was silent with regard to resource dependency theory, as this was not one 
of the theoretical perspectives included in the matrix (see sub-section 4.3.3). 
However, the stakeholder theory was seen as the second most relevant 
theoretical perspective after stewardship theory across all the institutions 
where the governance theory matrix was considered.
7.8.5 Governance theory and governing bodies’ roles in relation to
institutional strategy
In relation to theoretical perspectives on governance, Hung (1998; see 
section 3.3) associated the strategic role of the board firmly with stewardship 
theory. He noted, however, that even in that context the extent of the board’s 
involvement in strategy formulation has been debated. Huse (2007) and 
Stiles and Taylor (2001, 52-53) also associated boards’ involvement in 
institutional strategy with stewardship theory. In Huse’s case this was 
because of stewardship theory’s emphasis on ideas of collaboration and 
mentoring. Stiles and Taylor considered in addition the concept of passive 
and active boards (Stiles and Taylor, 36-37, particularly Table 4.1). They 
noted the lack of board involvement in strategy in the former category, and the 
stronger strategic role of boards in various active categories.
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In the higher education context, the notion of passive and active boards 
was discussed by Berezi (2008; sub-sections 3.9.4 and 8.6.3). Like Stiles and 
Taylor, he associated ‘active’ governing bodies as operating in accordance 
with the tenets of stewardship theory. Schofield (2009) discusses stewardship 
theory in his study of effectiveness in governance and notes its link to 
governing bodies’ roles in relation to strategy development and decision 
making. He also suggest that stewardship theory supports the idea that 
governing body members should be chosen because of their specialist 
knowledge and expertise, which can help them support the institution, and 
develop its strategy, through the advice and guidance they are able to offer.
7.8.6 Attitudes towards educational character
From the perspective of governance theory, the attitudes displayed by 
higher education governing body members towards educational character and 
academic activities more generally place one in the territory of institutional 
theory and managerial hegemony, in the terms of the definitions used by 
Hung (1998; see sub-section 3.3.7). Hung associated the institutional theory 
perspective on governance with the idea of boards fulfilling a maintenance 
role, ‘identifying with the societal expectation of [the] organization’ and with 
boards limited in their actions principally to maintaining the status quo (Hung, 
1998, 105, 107). From the managerial hegemony perspective, the 
connotations are of the board as a ‘rubber stamp’. However, although such a 
perception was not totally absent from the views of the people interviewed in 
the study, it did not surface in the context of the governing body’s role vis-a- 
vis educational character. The managerial hegemony perspective, as used in
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a wider context, is probably too negative to be strictly applicable here, 
because governing body members both recognised their ultimate 
responsibilities and by and large seemed content to place reliance on the 
executives, and the wider academic body, particularly as represented in 
senates and academic boards, to engage with educational character and 
detailed academic matters on their behalf.
7.9 Conclusions
7.9.1 The evidence about board roles from other studies of governance
Evidence from other studies of governance, both in the private sector 
and elsewhere in the public sector show, suggests that aspects of almost all 
the roles identified in this research can be shown to exist in the governance 
arrangements of other types of organisation and institution. In relation to 
board roles in challenge and support, recent evidence from the UK private 
sector (see sub-section 7.2.1), as presented for example by Stiles and Taylor 
(2001) and Roberts et al (2005), shows strong support for the contention also 
supported in this study that board members felt able both to challenge and 
support their executive colleagues. In the UK public sector (see sub-section
7.2.2), the evidence also suggests that the importance of both challenge and 
support is recognised, but that in some situations -  such as those found in the 
NHS -  challenge is not always seen as particularly effective, and challenge 
and support are not as well reconciled as they seem to be in the higher 
education sector.
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In contrast to challenge and support, the roles perceived to exist by the 
governing body members and attendees involved in this study in relation to 
the provision advice and guidance, and acting in an ambassadorial capacity, 
appear to be less strongly paralleled in other governance arenas. These roles 
are therefore not recognised, or are subsumed within discussion of providing 
support for the board or governing body more generally.
The importance in principle of board and governing body roles in 
relation to institutional strategy and its development has been very clearly 
identified in a wide range of other studies of governance. However, boards’ 
engagement with institutional strategy has often been found to be limited. 
Although in some instances boards can be seen to play a leading role in 
strategy initiation and development, this appears only to apply in a minority of 
cases, with there being considerable variety in the extent of board or 
governing body involvement in strategy development across both the private 
and public sectors - as shown, for example, by Cornforth and Edwards (1999), 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), Ashburner (2003), Farrell (2005) and Storey 
(2011) (see sub-section 7.5.1).
In higher education governance, it was noted above that Berezi (2008; 
see sub-section 7.5.2) suggested that there were two categories of governing 
body - passive-reactive and active-proactive. The responses of governing 
body members in this research, however, gave no impression that any of their 
governing bodies were generally passive. The picture of engagement 
specifically with institutional strategy was also far from passive, and was more
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nuanced than seems to have been the case in Berezi’s study, not least 
because in most instances my findings do not imply that governing bodies 
take the lead in strategy development, whereas Berezi felt this was the case 
for the institutions where he identified governing bodies as being ‘active- 
proactive’.
Turning to engagement with educational character and with academic 
activities, the widespread prevalence of the view held by governing body 
members in this study that this was best left to academics is striking, as is the 
fact that this view was held strongly by both external and internal governing 
body members. This outcome is noteworthy both in the context of the formal 
external requirements and expectations placed on governing bodies and 
because there was clear recognition by governing body members of their 
ultimate responsibility in this regard. It is also notable in this context, as noted 
in chapter 6 (sub-section 6.4.7), that while a small number of governing body 
members, particularly some internal executives, saw that benefits might be 
gained from the presence on governing bodies of more external members with 
experience of higher education, most respondents saw significant potential 
drawbacks in this regard.
The final governing body roles reviewed above (section 7.6) in relation 
to the attention paid to them in other studies of governance concerned 
compliance with legal and statutory responsibilities, risk management and 
assessment, and the issue of leadership. In all three cases the findings from 
most previous studies are broadly in line with the findings from this research.
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7.9.2 Implications of governance theory
The consideration of governance theory and its implications, both in 
relation to the wider literature and the data gathered in this study through the 
presentation of a matrix of selected governance theories to governing body 
members and attendees (see sub-section 4.33 and section 5.7), has shown a 
strong association of the tenets of stewardship and stakeholder theory with 
higher education governance. While the possibility of executives behaving in 
the ways predicted by agency theory was recognised by interviewees, there 
was very little evidence that agency theory was regarded as a good predictor 
of the nature of higher education governance. Managerial hegemony theory 
has also been shown to be recognisable by governing body members, albeit 
much less commonly. In addition, aspects of other theoretical positions have 
been seen to have explanatory value, such as resource dependency theory 
(see sub-section 7.7.4).
While it has been seen both above, and in chapter 3 (sub-section 
3.8.4), that theoretical perspectives of governance have not often been 
considered in detail in previous studies of higher education governance in the 
UK, where such perspectives have been discussed those most often 
associated with higher education governance have been, as in this study, 
stewardship and stakeholder theory. However, this study shows that it is also 
important to recognise that no single theoretical approach to governance is 
likely to capture all aspects of the roles of governing bodies. In other studies 
of higher education governance the benefits of the adoption of a multi- 
theoretic or hybrid perspective have been recognised and supported by
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authors such as Llewellyn (2007) and Schofield (2009). In addition, the 
potential validity of an approach of this kind has been discussed in relation to 
other areas of the public sector in the UK by, for example, Cornforth (2003a) 
and in the private sector by authors such as Hung (1998).
Overall, therefore, the evidence from this study strongly supports the 
idea that no single governance theory is likely to predict or explain all the roles 
governing bodies perform. Instead, it is possible to recognise and associate 
the tenets of different theoretical positions with different governing body roles. 
For example, while the presumptions of agency theory are not seen as 
predominant factors in higher education governing body interactions, it is clear 
that individual senior executives may still have the capacity occasionally to 
pursue their own interests rather than wider institutional interests. Governing 
body members need to recognise this, and to be able in terms of their role in 
challenging the executive to guard against it. In similar vein, while recognising 
the importance of the tenets of stewardship theory in facilitating the governing 
bodies’ roles in supporting and sustaining the institutions for which they 
responsible, this needs to be set alongside and balanced with the importance 
of recognising the rights of stakeholders, and of governing bodies’ roles in 
facilitating links between their institutions and different internal and external 
stakeholder groups. While it is therefore necessary to accept that no single 
governance theory can explain all aspects of corporate governance, by 
adopting a multi-theoretic approach and taking account of a range of different 
theories, many aspects of the extent and variety of governing body roles can 
be explained and predicted.
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Chapter 8: Perceptions of effectiveness and how to achieve it
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 The variety of factors associated with effectiveness in governance
As noted in Chapter 5, in the case of governing body members’ and 
attendees’ perceptions of the factors they felt contributed to achieving 
effectiveness in governance, there was more variation and greater 
fragmentation in their responses than in the case of perceptions of governing 
body roles. A range of factors seen as contributing to effectiveness was 
however identifiable, and these were summarised in Chapter 5, particularly in 
sub-sections 5.3.2 to 5.3.4. In addition, in Tables 5.3 and 5.5 (pp 194 and 
196) the degree to which different factors contributing to effectiveness were 
identified on an institution by institution basis, and by different categories of 
governing body member, was set out. These data were supplemented, in 
Tables 5.4 and 5.6 (pp 194 and 197), by a similar summary concerning 
additional issues discussed by governing body members and attendees in the 
context of effectiveness. As with perceptions of governing body roles, 
relatively limited differences were apparent when the data were considered on 
an institution by institution basis or by category of governing body member. 
The data about factors recognised as contributing to, or otherwise associated 
with governing body effectiveness will therefore now be considered in more 
detail focussing at the level of the quintain. The bulk of the data will again be
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drawn from the transcribed interviews with governing body members and 
attendees, but where relevant the data from the study of meeting 
documentation and from observation of governing body meetings will also be 
cited.
8.2 What is effectiveness?
8.2.1 Effectiveness as difficult and hard to pin down
As the primary focus of one of the principal research aims of this study,
effectiveness was raised as a specific question during most of the research
interviews (very occasionally an interviewee mentioned the subject first). A
very wide variety of views were prompted, to the extent that there seemed at
times to be almost as many views as there were interviewees. In addition, a
number of respondents identified effectiveness as an intrinsically difficult
concept. There was therefore a strong sense from a number of people that
effectiveness was a hard issue to grapple with; even board secretaries felt it
was a difficult topic:
‘Crikey, crikey! That's such a tough question, because it's such a 
simple, I mean, you know. What is effectiveness?’ (CityMod 6, 
internal, attendee, not executive, secretary)
‘It's quite a fuzzy thing to try and grasp.’ (ExCat 2, internal, attendee, 
not executive, secretary)
Effectiveness was also seen as problematic by some governing body
members, both internal and external:
‘I think it’s an elusive concept.’ (Civic 10, internal, academic, non­
executive)
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‘It's difficult isn't it, effective, what does it mean?’ (CityMod 7, internal, 
student)
‘It’s terribly hard to pin down.’ (Greenfield 2, external, deputy chair)
‘Effective. I think it is a very good and a very difficult question to 
answer.’ (ExCat 3, external, chair)
The perceived intrinsic difficulty of effectiveness as a concept, and the 
terms in which some respondents referred to it, almost certainly helps explain 
the wide variety of factors subsequently adduced by the interviewees taken as 
a whole. The difficulty for some people of wrestling with the abstract concept 
of effectiveness, as opposed to the relatively more tangible idea of a 
governing body role, may perhaps explain in part the greater variety and 
degree of variation from person to person in their responses as to what 
constitutes or contributes to effectiveness. This variety and variation might 
also relate to some extent to the constructed and ultimately subjective nature 
of individual perceptions in a study of this kind.
8.2.2 Differing conceptions of effectiveness
Despite some people regarding effectiveness as a difficult concept, 
most interviewees were able to discuss it in concrete terms. In doing so, they 
spoke about the governing body carrying out its principal roles, and doing so 
well, or about good institutional performance demonstrating that the governing 
body was being effective. Governing body members also sometimes 
highlighted the importance of actions associated with specific powers of the 
governing body, such as appointing the Vice-Chancellor. There were further 
strands of narrative linking effectiveness to having particular structural
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arrangements, or with practical issues, such having clear procedures, good 
information flows, skilled chairmanship and active participation by governing 
body members, with good interactions and mutual trust. There was thus a 
great variety in the ways effectiveness was defined, or exemplified.
8.3 Ways of being effective
8.3.1 Carrying out accepted governing body roles well
A common starting point was for people to see effectiveness in terms of
governing body roles. For example, an internal, non-executive member of
Greenfield university commented:
‘Where the council obviously is very effective and very helpful ... is in 
providing expert advice to the university. ... In other respects as well, I 
guess, there are very effective links out through council from the 
university to wider communities ... the council is effective in ... linking 
the university with various parts of the outside world.’ (Greenfield 1, 
internal, academic, non-executive)
An external at Greenfield also regarded the provision of good advice as a sign
that the governing body was being effective, citing a specific example of the
external members advising the university about loan funding. She also
associated effectiveness with the commitment and eye for detail of individual
governing body members, the benefits of having diverse viewpoints, and the
governing body’s role in appointing the Vice-Chancellor:
‘You need people to read the papers and you need them to spot if 
there's something silly going on -  so there's a certain amount of nit­
picking, which is, I think, quite useful ... an outside eye picks up things. 
And with the diverse range of people, they pick up different things. ... 
‘The other very big thing which makes a difference of course is that 
we've recently, fairly recently hired a new vice-chancellor.’ (Greenfield 
2, external, deputy chair)
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Further examples of governing body members associating effectiveness with
carrying out the governing body roles identified in chapters 5 and 6 could be
found in all the case study institutions. There were, for instance, references to
appropriate challenge at the right level, to holding the executive to account,
and to setting the direction for the institution:
‘What is effectiveness? I think it's good strong challenge, personally, 
but it's good strong challenge on the big stuff and keeping out of the 
small stuff.’ (ExCAT 4, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
‘How do they hold the executive to account? That's a key measure of 
whether they're being effective as a governing body.’ (UniCollege 4, 
external, deputy chair)
‘I suppose at a fundamental level it's, you know, setting the direction for 
the organization, for the benefit of its stakeholders, you know, not just 
its students, but staff and others, and making sure that the executive, 
execute that, you know?’ (CityMod 3, internal, executive attendee)
8.3.2 Good institutional performance
Another common reference point for judging effectiveness was good 
institutional performance, linked in the first example to selecting the right Vice- 
Chancellor:
I think if you're effective, your institution or your organization is doing 
well. Because the governing council appoint the Vice-Chancellor, if 
they don't ... appoint the right person ... what does that do? So in a 
way it starts there, because you appoint a person and you, as 
chairman, you've got to make sure that they're doing their job.’ 
(NewMill 1, external, chair)
Judging effectiveness by reference to institutional performance was cited by
another external governing body member at NewMill, with a rather stark
reference to institutional survival:
‘Well, obviously the key things are whether the council is producing the 
outcomes that they are signed up to do. And one of the outcomes,
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clearly, is the on-going financial and student success of the university. 
... The test will be if we are all still here in five years time. I mean 
that's what, that’s what the universities are facing now. That's a 
measure of effectiveness - if they’re not here in five years time, they’re 
not effective. ... So measure by outcomes is what I say.’ (NewMill 5, 
external)
The Vice-Chancellor of TownMod university also associated effectiveness
with institutional performance, focussing on ‘two dimensions’ of effectiveness:
There are the obvious things about performance, in terms of finance, 
... academic development -  are things moving in a direction, and all 
the rest of it -  financial stability, ensuring the jobs, making sure 
students have a satisfactory education. But for me as well it’s about 
making sure that the institution has an appropriate engagement with 
where it is. ... There is [also] a social and cultural agenda ... So, that 
social, cultural, economic development, beyond the education of 
students, those dimensions, I think, are important for the board to think 
about where it stands, ... and we are measuring those.’ (TownMod 2, 
internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
The importance of key performance indicators was highlighted by some 
people:
The KPIs are about reviewing effectiveness ... the KPIs and progress 
on them come to council twice a year, as does the review of the risk 
register, and ... different areas of strategy ... and whether they’re still 
moving in the right direction.’ (ExCAT 2, internal, attendee, not 
executive, secretary)
Cautionary notes were, however, occasionally sounded about judging
effectiveness in governance through institutional performance. An external at
TownMod university, for example, started to relate effectiveness to
institutional performance, but immediately stopped herself:
The effectiveness of a governing body can be measured by, I suppose, 
looking at the overall performance] - 1 won’t say the performance of the 
institution, that’s not the right thing to say, necessarily. I can see that 
when we’ve discussed things, that when they come back to the board,
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that there has been some measurable difference in what was 
discussed before. ... And so you can measure it by that.’ (TownMod 
5, external, sub-committee chair)
Reflecting on why she had ‘pulled back’ from citing institutional performance
as an indicator of effectiveness, she added:
‘What’s a success? Of an institution? ... I suppose in a way I pulled 
back a bit because I started to think, is that more of a management, or 
is that more of a governor, governance issue? I think it is a mixture, 
but the management are the ones who have to do the day to day, to 
make it successful. We have to look at the long term success ... So 
it’s different measures that you’re talking about here. So that’s why I 
pulled back a little bit.’ (TownMod 5, external, sub-committee chair)
8.3.3 The right structure, the role of individuals and behaviours and trust
A further set of perspectives on effectiveness was associated with 
having what people saw as the right structure, and with the role of individuals, 
particularly the chair. Members’ and attendees’ behaviours were also seen as 
important, as was mutual trust.
Speaking about structural issues, Greenfield 3 commented on the
importance he attached to the role of the finance and strategy committee:
This is the kind of key steering committee of council ... where, really, 
the business of council is set and defined. And that meets much more 
often than council - it's virtually monthly. ... It's chaired by the chair of 
council, it’s g o t... the key lay members and a subset of the university 
members on it. And I think the effectiveness of the way our council 
works is very much driven by the work that that group does.’ 
(Greenfield 3, internal, executive)
He added that previously the council itself did ‘a lot of ... low level work - 
shaping ideas and so on’, which ‘led to very long, flabby discussions which 
didn't come to any conclusions’, whereas the present structure provided ‘a
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much faster, more purposeful mechanism, which makes it work well’. He 
stressed, however, that this did not mean that the governing body had 
abrogated its responsibilities, because things got ‘referred back’ by council ‘for 
further work’.
The secretary at ExCAT university spoke about the importance of ‘the
effectiveness of [the] committee sub-structure’, suggesting that in particular:
‘Audit and finance have a really crucial role in doing the more detailed 
work on council’s behalf.’ (ExCAT 2, internal, attendee, not executive, 
secretary)
In a related point, the relevance to overall effectiveness of governing body 
members being on sub-committees was highlighted by the chair of 
UniCollege:
‘A test of whether [the governing body’s] being effective is, is there a 
good range of governors involved in the sub-committees?’ 
(UniCollege 4, external, deputy chair)
Turning to the question of the role of individuals and the relationships
between them, an internal, executive governing body member at Greenfield
university referred to the need for an effective working relationship between
the chair, the Vice-Chancellor and the secretary, and the importance of having
good personal interactions generally, commenting:
‘If you actually had a hugely contentious council you can imagine it 
becoming totally ineffective, more or less, you know, all the time. 
(Greenfield 3, internal, executive)
A related point was made by an external member at Civic university about the
chair contributing to effectiveness through her influence on other members:
The chair is very, very good and I think that she is a bit like a 
conductor, d’you know what I mean? I think she plays a really key role 
and I think in any situation the chair does. So it’s about ... bringing
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people on, and perhaps softening them. So I feel it’s more about an 
individual having a very clear view about how a council and particularly 
lay members would be effective.’ (Civic 5, external, deputy chair)
Moving on to the question of individual behaviours and interactions 
more generally, and the need for mutual trust, the chair at Civic university, for 
example, felt that the personal contributions from governing body members, 
and their individual judgements about the outcomes of their participation in 
council, were more important than any formal processes that might contribute 
to effectiveness:
To me ... council is effective ... if the members of council, whatever 
their derivation, whether they’re students, academic or lay, or the 
executive team in attendance, feel that as a result of working together 
in council we’re in a better place ... That people feel that they’ve had 
the opportunity to add value to the discussion and the debate; that they 
feel that they’ve been listened to and heard; and, that the view that they 
have is treated with respect, is treated with courtesy and is enabled to 
be considered by those who are in power.’ (Civic 9, external, chair)
The secretary at ExCAT university also felt that the existence of mutual trust
was an important indicator of effectiveness:
‘If everyone within the council trusts each other, and has a good feeling 
about how things are going, you know, provided it's got hard evidence, 
as well, that things are going well, then, you know, I think that's pretty 
effective, if you ask me.’ (ExCAT 2, internal, attendee, not executive, 
secretary)
The chair at UniCollege similarly emphasised the importance of trust between 
governing body members, and as a corollary of this, the desirability of 
ensuring that governing body members had opportunities to interact outwith 
formal meetings:
‘What we need is a trust amongst the governors, in the other 
governors. A bit like privy council rules if you like, and that just comes
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from getting to know each other, so another function of an effective 
board is that the members actually know each other. They don't just 
meet on the day. So, the college [has] dinners for the great and good 
of the surrounding [area], and supporting, whatever, you know? The 
governors are deliberately involved in that, to get to know each other, 
as well as other outsiders.’ (UniCollege 4, external, chair)
Given the perception that people’s interactions and behaviours can be 
significant contributors to effectiveness, with mutual trust and respect also 
seen as important factors, this leads to consideration of the nature of the 
people on the governing body, and their knowledge, skills and experience. 
The recruitment of governing body members was discussed in chapter 6 (sub­
section 6.4.5) and although the subject was not often raised explicitly in 
discussions of effectiveness, there was general recognition of the importance 
of having external members drawn from a range of backgrounds. At Civic 
university, for example, a deputy chair commented:
‘You don’t want a board to be homogenous ... you want a range of 
different views and a range of different backgrounds. ... People 
who’ve had very senior public sector careers ... understand the funding 
side and the interaction with government, [while] the ones with the 
business background probably have more to say about strategy and 
direction.’ (Civic 6, external, deputy chair)
Another aspect of the importance of the make up of the governing body was 
highlighted by an internal, non-executive member at ExCAT, who felt that 
positive steps had recently been taken to improve the effectiveness of 
ExCAT’s council:
‘Council had a lot, kind of, of old codgers on it, who were people who 
the university owed something to, or people that the Vice-Chancellor... 
and his colleagues knew and liked, like friends of theirs. They were 
overwhelmingly male, incredibly old, actually. ... I think the age has 
dropped and the gender ratio has improved dramatically, which, you 
know, I don't have any problem with the older men leading council, but
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I think if that’s kind of uniformly what your council is, then ... it kind of 
limits the views and it limits the perspectives and it limits the style ... 
I've seen that change quite a bit.’ (ExCAT 1, internal, academic, non­
executive)
This quote picks up issues about gender (the speaker was a woman), but also 
about the dangers of a common mind set developing if the members all come 
from similar backgrounds. The overall message is clearly that the diversity of 
governing body members, not only in terms of skills and experience, but also 
in relation to other factors such as age and gender, is potentially important in 
terms of governing body effectiveness.
8.3.4 The variety of views
The range of comments about what constitutes effectiveness set out so 
far shows that a wide range of factors are regarded either as demonstrating 
effectiveness, or as the keys to being effective. These include:
• the governing body carrying out its primary roles well;
• good institutional performance;
• good leadership from the chair;
• having good relationships between key players, and between 
governing body members generally;
• selecting a good Vice-Chancellor; and,
• having the right sub-committee structure.
This variety of views did not, however, lead to any sense of disagreement 
between governing body members. Instead the impression given was that 
governing body effectiveness was multi-faceted, and could be legitimately 
related to many aspects of a governing body’s roles and activities.
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8.4 Practices that support effectiveness
8.4.1 The value of clear processes and procedures
Another aspect of effectiveness that arose in discussions across all the
institutions concerned the need to pay attention to processes and procedures.
An external at TownMod university, for instance, spoke about the need for the
governing body itself to pay attention to its own processes:
‘An effective board recognises what it’s own agenda ought to be ... ’cos 
it’s very easy, when you only meet three times a yea r... or four times a 
yea r... to forget that you haven’t seen anything on that for a while. So 
an efficient board knows its calendar too, it knows that with this 
regularity, with this frequency, we ought to be getting something which 
tells us about that, even if that means it’s a ten minute report, and we 
can all file it away saying thank god for that, that seems OK.’ 
(TownMod 4, external, deputy chair)
TownMod 4 was concerned, however, that there was sometimes a danger of
being too rigid in terms of process, and that this might be exacerbated by
relying too heavily on such things as codes of practice. So that ‘you end up
doing things for the sake of them’ and thinking that ‘because you’ve done
them ... you’re effective’, whereas:
‘If the processes have been done in isolation, without understanding 
what their real core purpose is, then you actually ... may not be 
operating very effectively. You know, I ticked the list, all the individual 
processes on this list are being carried out, does that add up to an 
effectively operating governing body -  not in my view necessarily, not 
necessarily.’ (TownMod 4, external, deputy chair)
For the chair at CityMod university effectiveness involved having the
right people, the right types and quantities of information. This meant:
‘Firstly, an ability in the process of the board meeting - whether it's in 
the meetings, or by telephone calls or by meeting - to reach consensus.
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I think, if it's taking a long, long time to reach consensus on decisions 
of investment or strategy, then that becomes frustratingly inefficient. 
So the construct of the people on the board is quite important, I think, 
right?’ (CityMod 5, external, chair)
He then spoke about:
Trying to keep the papers a sensible density for people who mostly 
have day jobs, is I think a second part of board effectiveness. It is quite 
easy to bamboozle a group of people who are only, who are non-exec 
and partly involved in a place, by producing monumental reports, in 
which the facts, the dangerous facts, may be reported but they are 
buried in a lot of other stuff. So I think a good construction of the 
papers, a good orderly system of just indexing them, clear advice at the 
top.’ (CityMod 5, external, chair)
And finally he stressed the need to keep the board interested (‘interested
boards are more effective’), by ensuring that meetings did not just involve the
executive reporting all the time, because:
The board will start to disengage, because it's all about throwing 
information at them, rather than the members feeling that they’re 
actually part of the process of creating the future. ... I think you might 
look effective if all you were doing was fabulous financial sustainability 
governance, but I think after a while it would get weaker and weaker, 
because people would just get bored stiff and wouldn't read the 
papers.’ (CityMod 5, external, chair)
CityMod 5 also referred to the importance of other practical issues, including 
good time management (see section 8.4.4 below), which he saw very much 
as his personal responsibility, and ensuring that he worked closely with the 
secretary and Vice-Chancellor to ensure that ‘the board handling’ was ‘well 
rehearsed’.
The Vice-Chancellor at CityMod was also seized of the importance to 
effectiveness of practical matters, emphasising the need for all governing 
body members to attend meetings and to make contributions:
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The first one I think is that -  this is really simple -  board members 
attend board meetings. Right? No gaps, they attend. Sounds ever so 
trite, I know, but actually there’s nothing worse than a board member 
missing a board, and you go back on the debate of the previous 
meeting, right? It’s a real issue. I think - that’s number one. Number 
two is that every board member participates in an appropriate way and 
adds their knowledge -  i.e. we don’t have any silent members round 
the board, so we’ve got a full range of issues.’ (CityMod 2, internal, 
executive, Vice-Chancellor)
The actual practice experienced in meetings and the desirability of all
governing body members participating was also a sign of effectiveness for an
external at NewMill university:
‘I mean, of course you can look at measures and you can say, you 
know, how many decisions go to the council and how many get passed 
and how long do the meetings last, and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. 
But I think what you really need is to sit in some of the meetings and 
say, what’s the debate like, how did it go? Who - does everybody 
contribute?’ (NewMill 3, external, sub-committee chair)
In this latter regard, the observation of two governing body meetings at 
Civic university provided mixed evidence. A report of a recent review of the 
university’s governance arrangements considered at one of those meetings 
prompted significant and, in my view, serious discussion of the issues raised 
(see sub-section 5.6.2), with contributions made by several external members. 
However, there were a number of other items that were clearly recognised as 
significant by many of those present, but that prompted little debate or 
discussion. There were some indications that this was due to issues having 
already been considered in detail in sub-committees, but in a couple of 
instances in the latter part of each meeting I also formed the impression -  
from observation of body language, and from people making quiet remarks to 
their neighbours -  that some members were deterred from raising points
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because of the length of time that the meeting had already taken and an 
unwillingness in that context to extend discussion.
8.4.2 Information flow
Amongst the most important practical matters seen as influencing
effectiveness was information flow. To some extent this was recognised as a
perennial problem. As one internal, executive attendee, put it:
There is an onus on us to try to make their time as efficient as 
possible, and we have gone through processes of trying to, you know, 
slim down papers for meetings - you can't win though, because you 
provide them with lots of information, they say they want less, so you 
provide them with less, and they say, oh, we can't make a decision 
because we haven't got enough. And you're always in that sort o f ... 
seesaw, sort of, approach, yeah, from one to the other.’ (CityMod 1, 
internal, executive attendee)
Similar issues had arisen elsewhere:
‘You cut down on the amount of paperwork you send to council and 
then they complain that they haven’t been given enough information, 
you give them more paper, they don’t like it, and so you just sort of go 
in this kind of oscillatory manner.’ (Civic 7, internal, executive 
attendee)
The question of the nature as well as the quantity of information also surfaced:
There is always that tension, isn't there, between wanting to make sure 
that they get enough information, but equally that it’s of the right sort.’ 
(CityMod3, internal, executive attendee)
The views above demonstrate widespread recognition of the 
importance of trying to provide an appropriate amount of information to 
governing body members, and an understanding that it was often difficult to 
get the balance right. However, in a number of instances there remained a
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strong feeling that governing bodies were still being given too much
paperwork, sometimes far too much:
‘It’s very difficult for the executive to present information ... in a concise 
form, because there is so much. Now, they try hard, and they do a 
pretty good job sometimes; other times I think they just let themselves 
go and produce enormous papers which are unnecessary ... it 
becomes very difficult for lay members to fully absorb it. And I think 
that’s one of the real governance issues, ... a lot of the time we ... 
[aren’t] really governing; [we’re] really struggling just to rubber-stamp 
effectively. ... not, not for any ill will on either side, the executive try to 
make it simple, the lay members try to understand it - but there is a 
huge volume of stuff that just comes through meeting after meeting, 
which makes it hard to stay on top of it.’ (Civic 4, external, sub­
committee chair)
An external at Greenfield university, while accepting that a great deal of
information was supplied, nonetheless felt it was better to have it than not:
‘We ... get masses and masses of information, [and] there is 
sometimes criticism from council th a t... we get wodges of information, 
... sort of paperwork that thick [gestures], ... I would personally rather 
have that, all that information.’ (Greenfield 4, external, sub-committee 
chair)
It was also the case that some externals were satisfied with the information 
they received:
‘In broad terms, I think the right information comes to us, at about the 
right time, ... and would and does enable the governing body to make 
reasonably sound decisions about how it advises the university to 
deploy its resources. There are things that we are required to do, and I 
think we are making those decisions with good information, eyes open.’ 
(NewMill 4, external)
Other people, though, felt they received too little information and 
worried about the control of the information flow by the executive. These 
concerns were mainly expressed by internal members. The student member 
at Greenfield university commented:
328
‘I don't think the information’s always sufficient. ... So sometimes a 
proposal will go through that’s very, very broad, ... to give that little bit 
of leeway to what the project’s actually going to look like. So, all the 
information? Not always. I think sometimes things are made a little bit, 
erm, flexible for their, you know, their wider purposes sometimes.’ 
(Greenfield 5, internal, student)
An internal, non-executive at Civic university also expressed concern about 
sometimes getting insufficient information, through not being presented with 
alternatives:
‘One of the tricky issues is capital expenditure. Every piece of capital 
expenditure gets signed off by council ... but it’s an unsatisfactory form 
of decision-making, because, y’know, the decision you’re presented 
with is perfectly logical and all the rest of it, ... but you have no sense 
of what else might be on the list. I mean, by committing six million to 
that, there must be quite a lot of other things we’re never going to do, 
and therefore we have no, no view of that, and if you wanted council to 
be more strategically involved, you might have a dialogue about what 
the ... priorities were, which was informed by council.’ (Civic 10, 
internal, academic, non-executive)
This internal member also commented on the control of the information flow
by the executive. Discussing whether the governing body would identify a
potential crisis he suggested:
‘It depends a lot on the information you’re given, and who controls the 
information flow -  the executive. ... Our, y’know, QAA1 audit report 
was dealt with [recently] in a couple of oral lines by the VC - 1 mean, he 
wasn’t even offering to show people the document. ... So, I mean, 
how well-informed would they be? ... I don’t think a council would see, 
would be likely to see a limited confidence thing coming.’ (Civic 10, 
internal, academic, non-executive)
A similar point was made by the secretary of UniCollege, who reflected that:
‘Their information flow comes from us, and if we’re not, if we weren’t 
prepared to tell them, they probably wouldn't get to know, would they? 
But we like to be open with the governors and we don't try and hide
1 QAA = Quality Assurance Agency
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anything particularly. So I think our governors get a reasonable deal on 
that, you know. But if I, if I didn't want to tell them anything, then I’m 
not sure how they'd get to know.’ (UniCollege 1, internal, attendee, not 
executive, secretary)
Interestingly, this governing body secretary summed up her view by saying
that she felt responsible for making sure:
That ... we're being reasonably transparent towards them.’ 
(UniCollege 1, internal, attendee, not executive, secretary; my 
emphasis)
While the secretary at UniCollege therefore acknowledged the issue, but did 
not actually suggest that information had been withheld from the governing 
body, one of her internal, non-executive colleagues was nonetheless 
concerned:
Well there've been a couple of issues, but ... and I’m not kind of 
looking for controversy, but I just think that openness is very important 
... [and I think] some things are, er, somewhat sanitised when they 
reach governor level. When you look at a report and you think, mmm, 
well that's been glossed over. ... I would sometimes think, well, 
actually that perhaps doesn't give as full a picture as possible, and 
that’s my concern.’ (UniCollege 2, internal, academic, non-executive)
To set governing body members’ comments about the amount of 
information they received in context, as noted in chapter 5 (sub-section 5.5.3), 
agendas, papers and minutes from four of the case study institutions (Civic, 
Greenfield and CityMod universities and UniCollege) were reviewed. This 
review showed that large volumes of paperwork were routinely received at 
each governing body meeting, particularly at the two chartered institutions, 
although many individual papers were quite short, consisting only of one or 
two pages. As also noted in sub-section 5.5.3, a corollary of the quantity of 
material received, and the number of agenda items, was that the time
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available for the discussion of items was limited, even allowing for some 
material simply being received and not discussed. It is therefore perhaps not 
surprising that most governing body members perceived that they had a 
challenging amount of information to deal with in the context of the time 
available to them at each meeting.
8.4.3 Other mechanisms for obtaining information
Having an appropriate flow of information through the formal
mechanisms of the governing body was clearly seen as important, but for
many people other ways of obtaining information were seen as just as
important. An external from TownMod university, for example, felt that the
internal, non-executive staff members made:
‘[A] really important contribution, because they do see things from the 
day to day point of view. They are the people who are actually out 
there doing the job on the street. However you want to describe it, 
they’re the ones that are in the departments and they are representing 
the vast majority of the staff that work there, you know, that’s their role. 
Er, so, you know, they’re gonna hear the complaints, they’re gonna 
hear the good things.’ (TownMod 5, external, sub-committee chair)
At Greenfield university the chair stressed the importance of both student and
staff contributions, albeit being ‘a bit disappointed’ with the students:
‘I’ll just start with the student member. I’ve tried to give the student 
member of council a proper and sensible platform because at the end 
of the day, what are we all about, we’re all about, you know, looking 
after the interests of the students. I’ve probably been a little 
disappointed at the quality of student representation that we've had. I 
think I'm on my third, as chair, and fourth or fifth as a member of 
council. We've only had one with real ability, and that's just, it’s just 
disappointing because the platform is ever there, because I think it's 
very important that students have that platform.’ (Greenfield 8, 
external, chair)
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Turning to the non-executive staff, he added:
‘I think two thirds of the non-exec members of council make sensible, 
considered and thoughtful contributions, and it is at the sensible, 
considered and thoughtful contribution level that they best operate. 
And their views are taken terribly seriously, as are the student’s views 
taken terribly seriously.’ (Greenfield 8, external, chair)
In the case of Civic university, one external said he had not expected students
to be on the governing body, but to his surprise found their presence helpful:
‘I was quite surprised when I turned up and saw students on council. 
And initially I was a bit taken aback and thought I could see that 
causing problems. As I’ve been on council longer, I’ve never seen it 
cause a problem, and actually I suspect I was wrong in my initial 
judgement. ... you know, students know what’s going on in the 
university [and] at the end of the day undergraduates are our main 
business, although we talk about it surprisingly little, in fact. So I think 
having students on council is good.’ (Civic 6, external, deputy chair)
In addition to there being a clear perception that the governing body as
a whole, and external members in particular, benefited from information
provided by non-executives and students in formal situations, there was also a
strong view that more informal interactions were also helpful. For an
executive attendee at CityMod university beneficial informal interactions could
take several forms:
‘One of the most beneficial aspects ... is not just [board members’] 
contribution in meetings, but the informal contact outside, before and 
after board meetings and at other functions. We have a sufficiently 
strong relationship just to be able to have an informal chat with [a board 
member]. The chairman of the finance committee, if there’s an issue 
he’s concerned about, he’ll pick the ’phone up, and likewise if the VC 
and I have talked about something and we think ... it’d just be useful to 
run it past the chair of the finance committee, and not wait for the next 
formal meeting, that’s hugely valuable.’ (CityMod 3, internal, executive 
attendee)
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The perceived benefits of informal contacts were even extolled by people who 
felt that opportunities for such interactions in their institutions were presently 
limited:
Tm quite a keen believer in, if you have your meeting -  and we don’t 
do it at the moment, we’re going to try it next year -  that if you’ve had 
your meeting, well then let’s now gather together for a glass of wine, 
and a bite to eat, and talk in a buzzy room. So that, in a sense, if 
you’ve got two or three over here, a little bit concerned about the way a 
debate went in the full board ... you can almost pick that up straight 
away and carry it round the room, and see whether people, [or] the 
chair feels we should return to it. I’m more comfortable in that than 
governors ’phoning one another. (TownMod 4, external, deputy chair)
Information flow was therefore an important practical concern for 
governing bodies, both from the perspective of external members, and that of 
executives and others with a duty to provide information. There was evidence 
that all institutions had wrestled with this issue, and that they had succeeded 
to varying degrees. It was also clear that informal mechanisms for the 
provision of information were important.
8.4.4 Meeting management and related issues
Other practical factors seen as important in governing body 
effectiveness included aspects of meeting management, how frequently 
meetings took place, and how much time governing body members devoted to 
their roles outwith formal meetings. The size of the governing body was also 
discussed by some people, but there was no general sense of pressure for 
change.
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The most important aspect of meeting m anagem ent was perceived to
be the role of the chair. This was highlighted by a variety of interviewees,
including chairs themselves. For example, the chair at CityMod university
stressed the importance of good time management and accepted personal
responsibility for it:
The final thing’s time management, I think. And that's just down to the 
chair really. It’s not my strongest suit, but ... you have to get to a 
position, it's taken me a year, to feel that I was sort of like in control in 
the board. ... I mean there are typically 30-odd people in those rooms 
... [You need] to work with the secretary, beforehand] ... so the board 
handling is well rehearsed between your Vice-Chancellor and your 
secretary, so that you can get, you know exactly who to go to, to each 
question, and that's about efficiency.’ (CityMod 5, external, chair)
The importance attached by the chair to their role in the management of
governing body meetings was also illustrated at ExCAT university, where
changes had recently been made:
‘I think a very clear change is the way in which we actually set our 
agenda, in as much as we set the agenda with a very clear focus on a 
small number of issues that we want to discuss in detail, because we 
are adding value to the thinking or whatever the purpose is. And then 
[we] sh ift... other issues, which we need to review, [to] consider from a 
governance point of view, but arguably we don't need to spend, y’know, 
too much time on.’ (ExCAT 3, external, chair)
The chair’s own perception of these changes and, indeed, his role in making
them, was echoed by an internal, non-executive member:
‘I think that a lot of it is to do with how you manage the information and 
the meetings and that kind of thing. ... The chair is very good -  he has 
changed the way that information is presented. We clearly know when 
an item is just to be, kind of, signed off, and we've just got to be aware 
of it, versus items that need a discussion and a debate. And I think that 
probably effectiveness is about having a situation where people are 
prepared to just rubber stamp the things that need to be rubber 
stamped or to be filed away, but then to have quite a frank and honest
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debate about the, about the other issues. I think that’s something that 
we achieve quite well.’ (ExCAT 1, internal, academic, non-executive)
Other aspects of meeting management that were cited as having had an 
impact on the effectiveness of governing bodies included providing an 
appropriate setting for meetings, finding the best time for meetings to be held, 
and the problems of long meetings.
In the case of the frequency of meetings, this was not seen as an issue
by most governing body members, although some people had considered
whether their governing body should meet more often:
‘My honest answer is I’m not sure. ... Unless the role of councils 
changes quite dramatically, I think more frequent meetings of council 
are not really appropriate, and I think we should recognise there is an 
awful lot of work going on to prepare for council meetings and you kind 
of want the executives to be getting on with their jobs and ... actually 
putting into action what the council have decided, rather than 
constantly preparing] for, for endless council meetings. Er, and there’s 
a temptation there I think of the council starting to merge into the 
executive, you know. If you are meeting that frequently, you, I think it's 
changed from a strategic body into a sort of an operational body. So I 
certainly wouldn't want to see councils meeting significantly more 
frequently.’ (ExCAT 3, external, chair)
The issue of the amount of time governing body members were able to devote
to their roles outwith meetings was also not generally of concern, although a
small number of people highlighted issues such as the possibility that high
status or high profile external members might not be able to devote enough
time to their governance role:
‘I think one of the key things about a governing council is the amount of 
time its members are prepared to put in. You have to be very careful if 
you have captains of industry, because they're so busy running their 
industries, especially in times of recession, that they don't have
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sufficient time to put in to their university commitments.’ (NewMill 5, 
external)
Another occasional concern was with the perceived difficulty of making a 
contribution as an external if you just attended the main governing body 
meetings:
‘I feel sometimes that ... unless you do g e t... involved in a number of 
different committees, then it must be very difficult for somebody who 
turns up five times a year to really understand the issues and the 
personalities that are involved, and how they cross cut. ... I think if I 
wasn’t involved like that, I would think I was just rubber-stamping 
something. So I think that’s, that’s where we make a contribution. 
(Civic 4, external, sub-committee chair)
So the time external members could contribute was for most people not 
an issue, but others felt that it could be, and that they had encountered 
circumstances in which some externals - of a kind that might in other ways be 
potentially attractive as members -  would in practice be less useful because 
there were too busy to devote enough time to their governing body roles. One 
way of dealing with this that has been suggested is to remunerate governing 
body members. This is something of a contested issue, albeit it is at present 
the policy of the Committee of University Chairs (CUC) and the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) that most governing body 
members should not be remunerated (CUC, 2009, 24). The chair at Civic 
university commented that she was personally in favour of remuneration for 
governing body members, but that she recognised that her colleagues taken 
as a whole were not. Her concern centred on the problem that some people 
might not be able to become governing body members because they could 
not afford the loss in income it might involve. Externals elsewhere were either
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ambivalent about the idea of paying governing body members or clearly 
against doing so.
Turning to governing body size, all the institutions in the study have
governing bodies that conform with, or in one instance come close to, the
recommendations set out in the CUC Governance Code of Practice, which
suggests that having ‘no more than 25 members’ is ‘a benchmark of good
practice’ (CUC, 2009, 41; see Table 4.2, p 142). Most of the interviewees
who expressed a view appeared to feel that the present size of their governing
bodies was about right, or that whilst there might be some benefits to having
fewer people at meetings, this would be offset by problems that would then
arise about breadth of knowledge and experience, and the practical difficulty
of there not being enough members to fill all the sub-committee positions in
the governing body’s sub-structure. For example, the Vice-Chancellor at
CityMod university commented:
The board here used to be about 24 externals and we’ve brought it 
down to about 17, 17 or 18, something along those lines. It works at 
that size. Yeah, I can hanker after a smaller board in one view point, 
but if I start doing that I find I can’t populate the various groups that 
need ... it, right? ... On the question of how many non-execs there 
should be on the board as well, you know, I think we’re about, we’re 
about balanced. And actually, in terms of the board structure, I 
wouldn’t change it here, but that may well be because I’ve had a hand 
in putting it together!’ (CityMod 2, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
The Vice-Chancellor at TownMod felt very strongly that small boards could be 
problematic, particularly where staff and student representation had also been 
reduced:
‘It was not a surprise to me that where boards have shrunk, and got rid 
of staff and students, there’s been trouble. I think that tells you about a
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mind set, and it’s not a proper one.’ (TownMod 2, internal, executive, 
Vice-Chancellor)
There was also support for having a ‘fair-sized’ governing body at NewMill 
university, with one external (NewMill 3) flagging up that having more, rather 
than fewer members, helped allow for some members making more limited 
contributions than others, and provided more routes to link the university and 
its locality.
Overall, although a small number of governing body members and 
attendees were concerned about the amount of time some external members 
devoted to their governing body work, this was not regarded as a significant 
issue. There was also relatively little indication of a desire for governing 
bodies to meet more frequently. When the idea of remunerating the external 
members of governing bodies was added to the mix, whilst one or two 
individuals were in favour of doing so, there was a strong feeling from most 
people that it would not be appropriate at present to remunerate all external 
members. There were also no serious concerns about governing bodies 
being too large.
8.4.5 The importance of processes, procedures and people
In this section it has been shown that there is a strong and widespread 
perception that effectiveness in governance is dependent on governing body 
members paying attention to detail and to process, and to their having a 
relevant and diverse range of knowledge, skills and experience. These points 
are manifest in a number of ways, including:
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• understanding the annual cycle, and what reports, etc, should be 
coming up when;
• knowing what will happen in a variety of situations, such as how 
matters will be handled if an urgent decision has to be made;
• having the ‘right’ people on the board, keeping them interested, and 
ensuring that they are involved and committed, and contribute to the 
work of the governing body;
• ensuring that the right type and quantity of information is provided, 
and that it is well-presented, with clear advice from the executive 
when appropriate;
• ensuring that meetings are well run, with good time management, 
and good preparation by key individuals beforehand, with the role of 
the chair being crucial.
These points of detail or process may not of themselves ensure that a
governing body is effective, as they do not relate directly to the substance of
governing bodies’ primary roles. However, it seems reasonable to conclude
that governing bodies will be more likely to be effective when attention to is
paid to matters of this kind, and to the composition of the governing body and
the ways people interact, than if these operational issues are neglected.
8.5 Other aspects of effectiveness
8.5.1 Measuring effectiveness
A number of the comments about effectiveness that have already been 
cited blur the distinction between what constitutes governing body 
effectiveness, and how it might be measured. However, where respondents 
made their views on measuring effectiveness explicit, those views were
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mixed. Some interviewees felt that most attempts to measure effectiveness 
focussed too strongly on process and that this was not useful. This view was 
perhaps most energetically expressed by an external from Civic university, 
who said:
‘Well that’s a bit of a personal bugbear of mine here. [As] I ... have 
seen in so many businesses over the years, people measure process 
... and I think it’s a complete and utter waste of time. What you want to 
measure is outcomes.’ (Civic 6, external, deputy chair)
He went on:
‘It’s outcomes that matter, and people love measuring process because 
it’s easy. You can hit process targets every time, you can’t hit output 
targets, if they’re financial or whatever, every time. So, when people 
say to me, we’ve developed a code of practice, or a set of standardised 
KPIs, ... I always cringe. Not because those things are inherently bad, 
but because they’re often mis-used and they’re often used to disguise 
the situation, and I think in a big organisation like this ... where it’s very 
difficult for lay members to understand the inner workings, it’s very 
easy to get distracted into measuring process while the organisation is 
going down the tubes.’ (Civic 6, external, deputy chair)
For the chair at Greenfield university, paying attention to two key issues was
central to measuring effectiveness:
‘I think you come back to some very, very obvious issues - the demand 
for your product and your overall financial health. I think they’re two of 
the strongest indicators that there are, and the two are inextricably 
linked. ... You can have all the KPIs you like, and they are very useful 
measures at a point in time ... but at the end of the day, it’s, I think it's 
very simple, you know. If you’ve got a good product and if you ... 
manage your organisation well enough, and you have ... a sensible 
balance sheet and sensible income and expenditure accounts, in a way 
[that’s] its own judgment.’ (Greenfield 8, external, chair)
However, as noted above (sub-section 8.3.2), KPIs were not always seen as a
bad thing, and for some people they were very useful, perhaps even essential:
‘[It’s] very difficult sometimes for a board to know how effective they are 
being, [and] you’ve always got to be aware as a member of the council
340
... are we actually adding any value, and if we're not, we damn well 
ought to be. ... [We] struggled a bit with KPIs, and how they relate the 
governing body ... [but have] ... got to grips with it.’ (NewMill 1, 
external, chair).
So despite the caveats offered by some governing body members, ultimately 
overall effectiveness was best measured, for the majority of people, by 
institutional success, sometimes on a wide, and sometimes on a small, range 
of measures.
8.5.2 Effectiveness reviews
As well as discussing the measurement of overall effectiveness, some 
interviewees spoke specifically about periodic effectiveness reviews, and 
other review processes used on an on-going basis. With regard to the former, 
one of the institutions in the study (Civic university) was undertaking a periodic 
effectiveness review during the time when the research was carried out, and 
two others had recently completed such reviews (TownMod and Greenfield). 
In relation to the latter, the institutions in the study employed a range of 
mechanisms, including annual surveys of members using questionnaires, 
one-to-one meetings between the chair and the other members of the 
governing body, and in one case the inclusion at the end of the agenda for 
every governing body meeting of an explicit question as to whether members 
regarded the meeting they had just taken part in as having been effective. 
There were, however, varying perceptions as to the value of these 
procedures.
Periodic effectiveness reviews were only mentioned by a minority of 
interviewees, but where they were brought up attitudes towards them were
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broadly positive. The chair at CityMod university gave as a specific instance
of their utility the fact that differences had been revealed between the
executives’ views and the externals’ views with regard to the
governance/management boundary, and that this had been beneficial:
‘We did an internal assessment of board effectiveness, and it was quite 
interesting that the, the executives’ view of what we were good or bad 
at, was quite different to the non-execs’ views. Well, not quite different, 
but there was enough difference so you could see the set that had 
come from the executive members of the board and the non-execs. 
And some of the execs thought that we were sometimes quite probing 
and, you know, asked some difficult questions and ... aren't you over­
stepping the line between the non-executive and the executive. I didn't 
think we were, but it's interesting that that is the feedback we've had. 
And again you wouldn't be very effective if you work with that horse’s 
head on the table not being discussed for a long period of time. Now, 
because we've done an assessment and we know it, and we've shared 
it, and everybody knows we know it - it's not that the executive don't 
know that we know that - we've told them we know that. Erm, so I think 
that you have to keep that, you know, from time to time you have to get 
a consensus of what effective is, because what [the executive] think is 
effective might be we nod everything through really quickly. 
(CityMod 5, external, chair)
The value of undertaking periodic effectiveness reviews was also recognised 
at Greenfield university, where such a review was credited with leading to the 
creation of the powerful senior sub-committee which was regarded as key to 
the effectiveness of the overall governance arrangements (see sub-section
8.3.3 above). The most recent review was felt to have provided helpful 
reassurance about issues such as the size and composition of the governing 
body.
342
There was, however, also some scepticism about the value of 
effectiveness reviews. For example, an external at Civic university said that 
he had:
complained vigorously in the audit committee and in council each 
time we have gone through the effectiveness evaluation process ... 
because for me i t ... means very little. For me it is simply ... anecdotal 
evidence ... because the questionnaire we fill in individually is really 
very, very subjective. ... On the whole, I think [we have] been fairly 
effective, and that’s what I think emerges from ... the analysis of these 
questionnaires, but I think they could be, it could be done in a much 
more rigorous way.’ (Civic 4, external, sub-committee chair)
Turning to continuous monitoring, the most developed approach was at
ExCAT university, where effectiveness was considered at the end of every
meeting. Commenting on this, the chair spoke about the importance of
members being willing to express themselves frankly, and implied that
routinely taking a self-questioning approach encouraged this:
‘One of the things that we now do at [ExCAT], every meeting we 
challenge ourselves was that an effective meeting? Did we consider 
the right topics? Did we consider them in the right depth? Did we 
consider things that we shouldn't have been considering? And that's 
quite powerful, because, you know, we've got into a framework where 
people are prepared to say, well, look, chairman, I think we shouldn't 
have been discussing that really, you know, and/or we went off in a sort 
of crazy direction here.’ (ExCAT 3, external, chair)
On the whole, effectiveness reviews appear to have become accepted parts 
of the governance landscape, and are regarded as positive exercises by most 
governing body members.
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8.5.3 Accountability
Accountability was touched on briefly towards the end of chapter 6, 
when discussing the roles of governing body members in linking their 
institutions to the outside world (sub-section 6.5.4). There was, though, little 
mention of accountability in discussions of effectiveness. This seems likely to 
be because the subject was raised separately by the researcher with most of 
the interviewees. In response, notwithstanding the formal, legal autonomy of 
the institutions considered here, virtually all the people who commented 
accepted that their governing body was accountable to some degree to 
someone. The principal strand of accountability recognised was to people 
and organisations outwith the institution, particularly HEFCE. However, there 
was also a strong sense of being accountable internally, to students and staff. 
In addition, there was occasional reference to institutions’ formal autonomy, 
and the need to protect and preserve this autonomy in the face of external 
influence.
With regard to accountability to the outside world, the Vice-Chancellor 
at ExCAT university saw the governing body as accountable to the public at 
large:
‘I suppose I sort of feel that councils are answerable to the general 
public in a way, because they do actually still provide the majority of 
our funding, by some way, through their taxes. It’s like NHS foundation 
trust boards and things, isn’t it, that the general pubic should be there 
because it is their money being spent, and they are a shareholder in a 
way.’ (ExCAT 4, internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
At TownMod university, the Vice-Chancellor was more specific, being very 
clear about accountability to the funding council, although not happy about
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some of the requirements that HEFCE had then (2009-2010) recently been 
trying to change:
‘Well, it’s certainly accountable to the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England, and the financial memorandum makes that 
absolutely clear, and of course they are trying to harden up the 
financial memorandum, and I think we have now seen off some of the 
biggest excesses of that. But most certainly, if you take the money the 
piper calls the tune, so there is a clear accountability.’ (TownMod 2, 
internal, executive, Vice-Chancellor)
Student members had similar perceptions:
The thing with autonomous institutions is, they're not ever completely 
autonomous. I mean, let's be honest, we’ve got to get our money from 
somewhere. HEFCE are the ones that provide us with the majority of 
it, so they've got a vast interest in how we run.’ (ExCAT 6, internal, 
student)
The Vice-Chancellor of TownMod university was not alone in being
resistant to aspects of external accountability. For instance, a deputy chair at
Civic university stressed his perception of the importance of autonomy in
principle, while accepting that complete independence could not exist:
‘I think actually one of the great strengths of British universities is that 
they are autonomous institutions. I think that’s ... part of why British 
universities are still amongst the best in the world. But we’re all fooling 
ourselves ... if we think we’re completely independent, and the most 
obvious one is that ultimately the person who gives you the money 
generally gets to call the shots. And, OK, HEFCE’s only, what, [less 
than half] our funding, but indirectly that, that gives them a lot more 
than [that amount of] influence. So you have to be very sensitive, and 
you have to be very aware of that, [but] I don’t think that that affects 
how council thinks of its responsibilities, I don’t think it should.’ 
(Civic 6, external, deputy chair)
Moreover, this external saw the autonomy of the institution and the 
independence of the external members as enabling them to have a role:
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‘Holding HEFCE to account as well, in that it’s much easier for a 
funding body to exercise control over the executives in an organisation, 
than it is over the non-executives. So ... one could imagine that they 
could be leant on to behave in a way that might not be ... viewed over 
the very long term, might not be the right thing, or it might be the right 
thing in the short term. Whereas I think the lay members can to some 
extent represent that sort of philosophical continuity of purpose of the 
university and resist some of those things.’ (Civic 6, external, deputy 
chair)
In these perceptions, one therefore has recognition of the accountability in 
practice of higher education institutions to the outside world, both generally, 
and to government, as well as to HEFCE. However, one also has continuing 
support for the principle of institutional autonomy, and an indication that there 
are circumstances where autonomy needs to be defended, because it 
provides a basis for resisting outside interference.
Also recognised was accountability to staff and students, and
sometimes to a wider community. An external at Civic university, who had a
background in the NHS, while recognising the need to be accountable to ‘the
public and to our local community’, was convinced that being accountable to
staff was the most important thing:
‘I feel very strongly about this. If you don’t have a contented, 
supportive, and supported staff, you’re not going to get an institution 
that functions in the way you would want it. I would use that argument 
within the hospital context, that if you’re going to have a high standard 
of patient care, you’ve got to have a very contented well-motivated 
staff. And therefore the staff in my view are some of the most 
important. I would say that was true here as well. That I would, if I 
wanted to say who am I actually morally accountable to, I would say 
the staff, to make sure that they have an effective, harmonious, 
productive university, because if you have a disconnected staff you 
won’t get that.’ (Civic 3, external, sub-committee chair)
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In contrast, an external at TownMod university put the focus squarely on the 
students:
The students ... want to feel they got a good quality education and that 
they’re proud of the institution which they graduated from. That’s who 
we’re accountable to and people will vote with their feet if they don’t like 
it.’ (TownMod 5, external, sub-committee chair)
while an internal, executive attendee, at CityMod university mentioned both
staff and students:
‘I think [the governing body members] are accountable to students, 
because ... we're all here to do a good deal for our students, and 
therefore governors have a key role in that and, you know, to the wider 
community and to staff as well. I think they are accountable to staff to 
ensure that the university continues to be healthy financially, that’s it's 
viable, sustainable, all those sort of things. So I think there is an 
accountability, but it's in that broad sense of stakeholder, and you 
might put students and staff at the top of those, because if the 
governors get it wrong, as we've seen in some other institutions, you 
know, who is it that suffers?’ (CityMod 1, internal, exec attendee)
Accountability was therefore both external, to HEFCE, and to the local 
community and the general public, and internal, to students and staff. 
Nonetheless, although accountability was widely accepted, it did not imply that 
the concept of institutional autonomy had been abandoned. Indeed, the legal 
principle of autonomy was viewed by some governing body members as a 
source of power and authority of use in resisting external pressures, and had 
recently been deployed to resist and ultimately ameliorate proposals by the 
HEFCE to amend the financial memorandum in 2009-2010.
8.5.4 Crisis spotting
One final test of effectiveness can be considered -  whether or not a 
governing body can help an institution identify and avert a potential crisis.
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The question of whether governing bodies could identify critical issues was 
included in the protocol for the research interviews in this study partly because 
of the high profile problems encountered in 2009-2010 at London Metropolitan 
University (see sub-section 2.9.9). The ‘London Met problem’ also proved to 
be on the minds of a number of the interviewees. Indeed, recent problems in 
governance, including the London Met case, were the starting point for one 
Vice-Chancellor’s comments, as he began his interview (in the spring of 2010) 
by remarking that governance was ‘a hot topic’ and referring to problems at 
the University of Gloucestershire, City University and London Met (his 
comments are quoted in sub-section 6.4.7, in relation to the merits of having 
governing body members with higher education backgrounds).
An executive attendee at Civic university commented on the London
Met case as follows:
‘ I mean, if you just muse on the London Met situation, I don’t think a 
governing body would ever have known there was a problem in that 
particular instance, ... [given] the HEFCE rules for completion, which 
are byzantine and antediluvian. ... It’d be very, very easy for that to be 
n o t... surfaced at council. In fact, I suspect most of the executive team 
may not have known about it, because ... they’re not necessarily 
chosen for their numerateness.’ (Civic 7, internal, executive attendee)
An external at TownMod university highlighted in this context the problem of
information flow to the governing body:
The big shock for us is what happened at London M e t... what weren’t 
they being told? Obviously they weren’t being told anything. But, you 
know, that is the nightmare scenario for any governor ... they weren’t 
being told, and they weren’t asking the questions to be told. So, so, 
you know, that’s frightening stuff.’ (TownMod 3, external, sub­
committee chair)
348
However, an internal, non-executive member at ExCAT university thought that
London Met’s governing body should have spotted that something was wrong.
Speaking about the capacity of her own external governing body members to
spot problems, she said:
Tm quite confident that they would. I mean, ... like what happened at 
London Met, for example, ... I think there might be other things that 
they should have spotted, that were going on there, that should've 
raised a red flag.’ (ExCAT 1, internal, academic, non-executive)
A student member at ExCat was even less forgiving:
‘If they’re checking over everything that comes through to them, then 
they should be able to flag things before it goes any further. As long as 
they’re doing that - 1 mean, at London Met they should’ve picked up on 
the finances. There is no reason that they couldn’t have went, oh, hold 
on, aren’t we getting too much money here, you know.’ (ExCAT 6, 
internal, student)
Another comment, on crisis spotting more generally, summed up the dilemma
for governing body members:
‘How can you know what you don't know? ... I would hope we get 
enough information to be able to smell a rat, if you like. I mean, there 
[is] continual pressure, particularly from the people who are 
accustomed to commercial company boards, to have less paper. 
Shorter papers, you know, just brief things. I think that would be a 
mistake, because I think in that way it would be much more difficult to 
spot something that didn't add up, that didn't smell right ... I'm not an 
accountant, accounting person, but you get a sort of feel for it if you've 
got the background papers.’ (Greenfield 2, external, deputy chair)
So the problems at London Met (and elsewhere) provided a cautionary 
tale, and left some governing body members apparently thinking that it could 
have happened to them, although others felt that the problems at London Met 
should have been spotted. There were therefore mixed views about the 
likelihood of governing bodies being able to spot crises. There was also an
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acceptance that the nature of some crises was such that it was inevitable they 
would come as a surprise, even to a good and effective governing body. 
There was recognition of the extent to which governing body members, and 
particularly the externals, were reliant on the Vice-Chancellor and other 
members of the executive to provide appropriate, and sufficiently complete 
information, alongside some stress on the importance of governing body 
members taking responsibility for asking the right questions and seeking 
information if they were concerned they might not be getting the full picture. 
This brings one back to practical issues associated with the operation of 
governing bodies, discussed in section 8.4 above, and the fact that how those 
issues are addressed can potentially help or hinder effectiveness.
8.6 Perceptions of effectiveness in other studies
8.6.1 The private sector
As noted in chapter 3 (sub-section 3.6.1), there was historically a 
strong perception in the commercial sector in the US that boards were 
intrinsically ineffective, or incapable of fulfilling some of their intended roles, 
due largely to issues of managerial hegemony (Mace, 1971; Lorsch and 
Mclver, 1989). Both Mace and Lorsch and Maclver suggested that board 
members’ capacity to carry out their prescribed roles was adversely affected 
by having insufficient knowledge about their organisations, and that this was 
linked to control of the flow of information by management. Echoes of these 
concerns can be seen in some of the views discussed above, notwithstanding
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the fact that the overall message from the governing body members in this 
study was that they felt their governing bodies were effective.
The work of Forbes and Milliken (1999; see sub-section 3.6.1), 
connecting overall board effectiveness with the board undertaking recognised 
control and service tasks, is also pertinent. They related effectiveness in 
addition to the board’s ‘cohesiveness’, or ‘the degree to which board members 
are attracted to each other and motivated to stay on the board’ (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999, 492-493). The responses from interviewees in this study has 
shown a strong association of effectiveness with Forbes and Milliken’s idea of 
task performance, and a somewhat less sharply focussed, but nonetheless 
clear, emphasis on the importance of good interpersonal relationships and on 
loyalty and commitment to the institution served.
Relevant work from other researchers (see sub-section 3.5.1), such as 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), McNulty et al (2003), Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004) and Roberts et al (2005), and the conclusions of the Higgs Report on 
effectiveness (Higgs, 2003), associate effectiveness in governance with 
issues such as board structures, processes, policies and procedures, with 
board members’ behaviour, knowledge and experience, and with cultural 
values, norms and motivations. All of these factors are reflected to some 
extent in the comments of the governing body members interviewed in this 
study. In particular, Roberts et a/’s conclusion that effective non-executives 
displayed ‘three linked sets of behaviours’, which meant that they were 
‘engaged but non-executive’, ‘challenging but supportive’ and ‘independent
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but involved’ (Roberts et al, 2005, S6), is paralleled to a strong degree in the 
overall approach to their roles of the governing body members interviewed in 
this study.
8.6.2 The public sector
The results of studies touching on effectiveness in public sector 
governance were also reviewed in chapter 3 (sub-section 3.6.2). Issues 
similar to those identified above were noted in the NHS by authors such as 
Ashburner (1997), Harrison (1998), Peck (1995) and Storey et al (2010), and 
their conclusions are again to some extent matched by the perceptions of 
interviewees in this study. There were, however, also some points of 
difference. Harrison, for example, suggested that the roles of non-executive 
board members in his study were not clear, but this was not a perception 
apparent in this study. He also noted the importance to the effective 
functioning of the board of the relationship between the chair and the chief 
executive, which has been echoed in this chapter. Peck’s overall findings -  
essentially that the board he studied was ineffective -  are also not matched in 
this study. There is also no evidence here that would support a conclusion 
like that of Storey et al about the negative impact of chief executives who are 
seen as too assertive.
Studies of governance in other parts of the public sector, or in the not 
for profit and voluntary sectors, such as those by Cornforth (2001a) and 
Cornforth and Edwards (1999), linked board effectiveness to things such as 
board members’ skill and experience, the time they can spend on their board
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roles, the agreement of clear roles and responsibilities for the board, and 
aspects of board process (see, again, sub-section 3.6.2). Some of these 
features were prominent in the responses of governing body members in this 
study, but others were not (such as the need for clarity in board roles and 
responsibilities).
8.6.3 The higher education sector
Turning lastly to other studies of the effectiveness of higher education 
governance, Bargh et al (1996) considered some aspects of effectiveness in 
governance (see sub-section 3.6.3), and found limits to the influence, and 
capacity to challenge, of governing body members; this was partly associated 
with their reliance on information from executives, and their lack of knowledge 
of higher education. They also found that governing body chairs, supported 
by an inner core of governing body members, had very strong influence. 
Bargh et a/’s conclusions about the importance of information flow, and of 
interpersonal interactions, are reflected in comments from interviewees in this 
study, but others are matched less strongly or not at all. The evidence from 
this research suggests, for example, that not all institutions have clearly 
recognised core groups of particularly influential governing body members, 
and that where such groups do exist, they are regarded positively.
The more recent studies by Bennett (2001), Bott (2007), Llewellyn 
(2007) and Berezi (2008) (see again sub-section 3.6.3) all considered 
governance effectiveness to some extent. Although the basis for the 
derivation of ‘effective governance factors’ by Bennett was not entirely clear in 
all cases, his recognition of the complexity and multivariate nature of the
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subject was important, and broadly matches the findings of this study. His 
conclusion that the non-executive staff and student members of governing 
bodies were generally less positive about their governance roles than external 
members is also perhaps echoed in the perceptions of such members 
interviewed in this research, albeit rather faintly and not uniformly.
In Bott’s work on the role of the chair, the idea of a core group of 
governing body members again surfaces, this time in the context of the chair 
co-opting the support of such a group to ensure they can maintain their 
influence on the governing body as a whole. There was, though, no sign of 
such a perspective on the chair’s role in this study, although the importance of 
the role of the chair and his or her contribution to the governing body’s 
effectiveness more generally was stressed a number of times.
Llewellyn found that governing body secretaries had an important role 
in the context of effectiveness through their engagement with the chair and 
Vice-Chancellor. The role of the secretary did not feature prominently in the 
comments from interviewees in this research, although when they were 
mentioned, their roles were described in ways broadly in line with the 
conclusions reached by Llewellyn.
In the case of Berezi, he identified four ‘determinants of effectiveness’ 
(see sub-section 3.6.3). There are, however, some interesting differences of 
emphasis between the views summarised by Berezi and the views expressed 
by respondents in this study. For example, one of Berezi’s determinants, 
‘induction and development’, was only referred to in passing by the
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interviewees in this study and was not highlighted as an important factor in 
determining effectiveness. The second of his determinants of effectiveness 
was ‘compliance with governance codes and legal frameworks’. This was 
also not regarded in this study as of significance in determining effectiveness, 
being seen instead as a governing body role dealt with routinely and without 
much need for active intervention by governing body members (see sub­
section 6.8.1). The third and fourth of Berezi’s determinants of effectiveness -  
governing body members having appropriate ‘knowledge, skills and expertise’ 
and ensuring the ‘achievement of the strategic objectives of the university’ do 
however find parallels in this study.
Finally, if one turns again to Schofield (2009; see once more sub­
section 3.6.3), he developed a complex set of enablers and outcomes of 
effective governance. Although his work was hardly mentioned by the 
respondents in this study, the complexity of the parameters he identified is 
broadly borne out by the diversity and variety of views about effectiveness 
expressed here.
8.7 Conclusions
8.7.1 Consensus as to complexity
The views about effectiveness expressed by the participants in this 
study encompassed a wide range of opinions. Indeed, the impression gained 
overall was that there were almost as many perceptions as to what constituted
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effectiveness in higher education governance as there were respondents. 
Nonetheless a number of strands can be detected. First, for some people, 
effectiveness was a difficult concept to grapple with. Second, there were 
governing body members from all institutions and of all types who associated 
effectiveness with carrying out particular governing body roles well, and who 
felt a governing body’s effectiveness could be judged through institutional 
performance. Third, a variety of other factors were also cited as contributing 
to effectiveness, including:
• good leadership from the chair;
• having good relationships between key players;
• selecting a good Vice-Chancellor;
• having the right sub-committee structure.
There was, in addition, a strong and widespread perception of the 
importance of having clear processes and procedures, and of individual 
behaviours and interactions, which meant in turn that it was important to have 
people on governing bodies with the right mix of skills, experience and 
knowledge. Concerns about effectiveness often related to these issues and to 
such practical problems as information flow, the need to rely on the executive 
for data, and to perceived difficulties in how effectiveness could be measured.
Another issue related to effectiveness, albeit less directly, was the 
nature of governing bodies’ external and internal accountabilities. There was 
recognition of the inevitability of accountability to HEFCE, as the most 
important single funding source for all the case study institutions. There was 
also strong recognition of accountability to stakeholders of varying kinds.
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However, the accountability to HEFCE was tempered by assertions of 
autonomy. This was strongest in the chartered institutions, which were also 
arguably the most well-established institutions and the most confident 
institutions, but it was also apparent in some of the incorporated institutions. 
As an ultimate test of effectiveness, there was acceptance of the idea that 
crisis spotting was an important attribute of any effective governing body, and 
this was near the forefront of many governing body members’ minds because 
of recent instances of governance-related difficulty in a number of universities, 
particularly London Metropolitan.
8.7.2 Relationship of findings to other studies of board effectiveness
One of the commonest areas of concern in other studies of 
effectiveness (see sections 3.6 and 8.6) relates to the incompleteness of the 
information available to board and governing body members. Perceived 
problems in this regard in some classic studies of the private sector, such as 
those in the United States by Mace (1971) and Lorsch and Maclver (1989) 
saw difficulty in this regard as inevitable due to executive control of 
information flow. Although potential problems in this regard have been 
recognised in more recent studies in both the private sector and the public 
sector in the UK (e.g. Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Roberts et al, 2005; Ashburner, 
1997; Storey, 2010), they were not on the whole in these instance seen as 
causing significant. Instead, there was a stronger focus on governing body 
structures and processes, and on things such as the nature of governing body 
members’ interactions, and knowledge, and on cultural values and norms. 
These findings generally align well with those of this study, where many of the
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same issues were identified as being important. At the same time, while the 
issue of information flow, and the control of that information by the executive, 
was noted as a potential issue by respondents in this research, it was not 
perceived to cause any difficulties in practice, as opposed to the quantity of 
information supplied to governing body members, which was clearly perceived 
to sometimes lead to ineffectiveness.
Previous studies of governing body effectiveness specifically in the UK 
higher education context were shown in sub-section 8.6.3 to highlight some 
findings similar to those in this study, but also highlighted some differences. 
The latter included in particular the identification in other studies of a core 
group of more senior or more influential governing body members whose role 
diminished the effectiveness of other governing body members. This topic did 
not surface as a problem in this research, with in some cases there being no 
obvious perception that informal core groups existed, but even where they did 
(perhaps at Civic university, or embodied in the formal structure at Greenfield 
university) the over-riding perception appeared to be that effectiveness was 
enhanced, rather than diminished.
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Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusions
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 The rationale for the study
This thesis has explored English governing body members’ perceptions 
of the roles and the effectiveness of their governing bodies. The context for 
the study, discussed in chapter 2, has included the shifting focus of attention 
on governance in higher education over many years, and related changes in 
the locus of power and authority in universities, culminating in the significant 
attention paid to higher education governance in recent years. This led to the 
development of new expectations and formal requirements as to the ways in 
which higher education institutions should be governed. Despite this, until 
recently only a limited amount of research into the sector’s governance 
arrangements has been undertaken. In particular, there was until very 
recently little by way of empirical study of the perceptions of the people most 
closely involved in governance -  i.e. governing body members. It was in that 
context that I decided that it was appropriate and timely to embark on the 
research reported in this thesis.
9.1.2 The aims of the research
The aims of the research were set out in chapters 1 and 4 (sub­
sections 1.2.1 and 4.1.1). These aims were complemented by a number of 
more specific primary and secondary research questions, set out in sub­
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sections 1.2.2 and 4.1.2. In this final chapter, I shall reflect on the extent to 
which my research aims have been met, and the degree to which the more 
specific primary and secondary research questions have been addressed. I 
shall relate the findings from my empirical research to theoretical 
perspectives, drawn from governance and institutional theory, the normative 
expectations of governance codes of practice, and the findings of previous 
studies of governance, as discussed in chapter 3. Conclusions will also be 
drawn as to the reasons why governing body members perceive the roles of 
their governing bodies in certain ways, and about their attitudes towards 
governing body effectiveness.
In addition to summarising the main findings of the study, and drawing 
conclusions about their relevance and importance, I shall also discuss the 
study’s limitations, and possibilities for further research to extend or 
complement the work discussed here. Finally, I shall highlight what I believe 
to be the significance of the work I have undertaken, and the conclusions I 
have reached.
9.2 Perceptions of the roles of the governing body
9.2.1 The principal governing body roles
The views expressed by governing body members and attendees (see 
sub-section 5.2.1) show that the principal roles of governing bodies are 
perceived to be:
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• challenging the Vice-Chancellor and the executive management 
team;
• supporting the Vice-Chancellor and the executive management 
team;
• providing advice and guidance to the Vice-Chancellor and the 
executive management team;
• acting as a link with, and/or having an ambassadorial role to, the 
outside world; and,
• playing a role in strategy development.
In addition, although governing body members appeared to accept their 
ultimate responsibility in relation to a further role, that of:
• overseeing educational character and academic activities
they did not perceive it to be necessary, or appropriate, for governing bodies 
to play a significant role in this respect, preferring instead to let academic staff 
play the major role in these areas.
It was also possible to identify additional roles that emerged much less 
strongly in the interviews with governing body members and attendees, but 
whose existence was confirmed by consideration of documentary and 
observational data. These roles related to:
• ensuring compliance with legal and statutory requirements; and,
• paying attention to risk assessment and management.
Finally, it was notable that there was hardly any evidence that governing 
bodies were perceived as playing a leadership role.
When the roles set out above are compared to those expected of 
higher education governing bodies as set down by the Higher Education
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Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and the CUC, and to the equivalent 
expectations of boards in the UK private sector, as promulgated by the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), there is some overlap, but there are also 
significant differences of emphasis, and some apparent lacunae, as illustrated 
in Table 9.1 overleaf1. Striking in the listing of roles in Table 9.1 is the fact 
that three of the five roles most commonly perceived to be important by 
governing body members in this study -  providing support, providing advice 
and guidance, and acting as a link or ambassador to the outside world -  are 
not identified as specific roles in either the expectations set out by the CUC 
and HEFCE, or in the requirements of the FRC in relation to the private 
sector. The absence of these roles from the formal expectations set out by 
the CUC and HEFCE and, indeed, the FRC, is perhaps explained by the 
relevant formal codes of practice (CUC, 2009; FRC, 2010) starting from the 
premise that as governing bodies and boards have the ultimate responsibility 
for their organisations, functions related to control, oversight and direction- 
setting should be privileged. It then follows that the governing body, or the 
board, should concentrate its attention on the oversight and control of 
management. The underlying attitude here is firmly that of agency theory and 
its assumption that senior managers need to be continuously and closely 
monitored.
1 Note: the roles perceived to exist by the governing body members and attendees 
interviewed in this study are set out in the first column in Table 9.1, rather than the normative 
roles prescribed by HEFCE, because the former include roles not separately identified as 
such by HEFCE.
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Table 9.1: Comparison of perceived roles with expected roles
Roles expected by: 
CUC/HEFCE FRC
Roles perceived by 
governing body members 
in this study
Challenge (including hold to 
account, oversee and monitor)
Support
Advise and guide
Act as link/ambassador to 
outside world.
Contribute to strategy
(Very little mentioned -  
appeared understood but 
largely implicit)
(Very little mentioned -  
appeared understood but 
largely implicit)
(Accountability explicitly 
recognised but not as a 
specific role)
(Leadership role for board not 
recognised. Ensuring long­
term success implicit)
(Not articulated as a governing 
body role)
(Recognition that governing 
body members need to have 
mix of skills and experience, 
but ensuring that this is the 
case not seen as explicit role)
Oversee activities of 
institution and monitor 
institutional 
performance
(Not specified as a 
distinct governing 
body role)
(Not specified as a 
distinct governing 
body role)
(Not specified as a 
distinct governing 
body role)
Determine future 
direction, and approve 
mission, strategic 
vision and long-term 
plans
Meet legal, statutory 
and regulatory 
requirements
Ensure appropriate 
controls exist to 
assess and manage 
risk
Ensure accountability 
to stakeholders
(Not specified as a 
governing body role)
(Not addressed 
explicitly)
Nominations 
committee to ensure 
balance of skills and 
experience.
Scrutinise performance of 
the management and 
monitor reporting of 
performance
(Not specified as a distinct 
governing body role)
(Not specified as a distinct 
governing body role)
(Not specified as a distinct 
governing body role)
Set strategic direction, 
constructively challenge 
and help develop 
proposals on strategy
Implicit re legal 
requirements: explicit re 
compliance with code (or 
explanation why not)
Ensure appropriate 
controls exist to assess 
and manage risk
Ensure accountability to 
shareholders
Provide leadership and 
ensure long-term success
Set values and standards
Board role to ensure that 
members to have right 
balance of skills, 
experience, independence 
and knowledge to operate  
effectively
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In practice, as will be discussed below (sub-section 9.2.3), governing 
body members appear to recognise the importance of their control and 
oversight roles, but see it as appropriate for these to be primarily carried out 
by other parts of the overall governance structure, in the form of relevant sub­
committees, and through the actions of staff such as the university secretaries 
and internal auditors. While control and oversight are recognised as being 
related to the need to pose appropriate challenge to the executive, most 
discussion of challenging the executive was not expressed in terms of thereby 
being able to control the executive.
The evidence summarised in chapter 5 and presented in detail in 
chapter 6 also shows very clearly that governing body members have a strong 
perception that they have a distinct and separate role in supporting the 
executive, as well as challenging them. They recognise that one way to be 
supportive is to provide advice and guidance, but they nonetheless perceive 
doing so as an important role in its own right, as was acting as a link between 
the institution and the outside world. These perceptions relate to a clear 
desire on the part of governing body members, particularly the external 
members, to see governing body roles in positive terms, and therefore to do 
things that involve them working together with one another and with the 
executives to contribute to the success of their institution. These attitudes 
come close to those found to exist in the UK private sector by Stiles and 
Taylor (2001), in their demonstration that board members felt that being too 
adversarial was counter-productive and that they were more comfortable 
working collaboratively, and by Roberts et al (2005), particularly in their
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conclusion that effective non-executive directors were ‘challenging but 
supportive’ (see 7.2.1).
9.2.2 Perceptions in relation to institutional strategy
In relation to the governing body’s role with regard to institutional 
strategy, there was closer alignment with the expectations of CUC/HEFCE 
code of practice. However, in most cases governing body members and 
attendees saw their governing bodies as contributing to, rather than initiating, 
strategy development. This contribution was regarded as being on a broadly 
equal basis in terms of extent and influence to that of executive, albeit with the 
executive providing the initial input. Detailed variations were such that at 
TownMod university, for example, there was a clear perception that control of 
the strategy development process resided with the executive, and the 
governing body’s influence was less than at other institutions. This is perhaps 
explicable in the context of the view also held at TownMod that the overall 
approach to governance was associated quite strongly with managerial 
hegemony.
The most nearly balanced position with regard to influence on strategy 
was probably that at Civic university, where the governing body appeared to 
feel able to make more fundamental contributions than at other institutions, as 
there was scope for ‘blue-sky thinking’ (see sub-section 6.6.2). This 
perception is made somewhat more striking in that the executive was not 
regarded as weak in any sense at Civic university. Instead it seems possible
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that some aspects of governance at Civic university may have been overall 
more collegial than in other institutions.
In contrast, governing body members at NewMill university stood out 
from their counterparts elsewhere, as they clearly saw themselves as taking 
the lead in both strategy development and initiation of the process -  and 
sending the Vice-Chancellor away to write the strategy after their discussions 
(see, again, sub-section 6.6.2; the varying impressions of governing bodies’ 
roles in relation to institutional strategy are summarised in Table 6.1, p 261). 
It seems likely that this may have been associated with the nature of the 
institution and its relatively recent transition to university status which had led 
the governing body to feel the need to exert more explicit control than 
governing bodies elsewhere in a number of ways (including engagement with 
educational character - see sub-section 9.2.8 below).
The conclusion that there is variability in the extent to which governing 
bodies are involved in strategy development matches similar findings in other 
sectors - for example, those of McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) or Stiles and 
Taylor (2001) for the private sector, and Ashburner (1997), Cornforth and 
Edwards (1999) or Storey (2011) for the public sector (see section 7.5). 
These conclusions are, though, not entirely matched by those reached in the 
recent study of higher education governance by Berezi (2008; see sub-section 
7.5.2). He suggested that five of the seven governing bodies involved in his 
study led the strategy development process in their institutions. However, 
despite this Berezi still emphasised the collaborative nature of the strategy
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development process, and concluded that it enabled external governing body 
members ‘to have an opportunity to contribute to the strategic debates of the 
institutions’ (Berezi, 2008, 221). Although, therefore, Berezi appears to have 
found more frequent instances in his research of governing bodies taking the 
lead in strategy development, his findings as a whole were broadly consistent 
with those in this study, in that governing bodies and executives were seen as 
working together to shape strategy, which the executives developed and 
implemented.
9.2.3 Other governing body roles
As shown in Table 9.1 (p 363), there were several roles specified by 
the CUC/HEFCE code of practice that governing body members made little or 
no explicit reference to. These involved ensuring that:
• legal, statutory and regulatory requirements were met;
• appropriate controls existed to assess and manage risk; and,
• accountability to stakeholders was recognised and demonstrated.
In relation to the first two of these roles, they appeared to be seen as routine 
aspects of governing bodies’ overall responsibilities. As such, they did not 
require active engagement by the governing body in the same way as roles 
such as posing appropriate challenge, etc. Instead, they were facilitated 
through standard and formal governance structures (such as finance and 
audit committees) and through continuing activity overseen or carried out by 
management. The fact that such activities were being addressed, despite not 
being much discussed by governing body members, was confirmed by the 
evidence obtained from governing body documentation and meeting 
observation (see sections 5.5 and 5.6 and sub-sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.2).
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The accountability of governing bodies was widely recognised (sub­
section 8.5.3). It was not, however, regarded as a distinct role in its own right. 
Instead there was acceptance that in carrying out the other roles expected of 
them, governing bodies did so in the context of being accountable to a variety 
of internal and external stakeholders. Students were the most common focus 
for internal accountability, although some responsibility to staff was also 
recognised. The most frequently recognised aspect of external accountability 
was to the HEFCE, as the primary funder, and de facto regulator of the higher 
education sector. As one external member put it, ‘the person who gives you 
the money gets to call the shots’ (Civic 6, external, deputy chair).
Alongside accountability, views were also expressed, albeit less 
frequently, about institutional autonomy. It was recognised that there were 
limits to institutional autonomy in practice, but nonetheless some governing 
body members felt strongly that one of their roles was to defend that 
autonomy and that it was still possible to do this. This view arose partly in the 
context of governing bodies’ resistance to the attempt by HEFCE (in the light 
of the governance problems that had arisen at London Metropolitan University 
in 2009) to amend its financial memorandum to give itself the power to require 
governing bodies to appoint a new accountable officer (see sub-sections 
2.11.4, 8.5.3). It is therefore possible to conclude that while governing body 
members recognise their accountability, many of them still also regard 
institutional autonomy as relevant and meaningful.
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9.2.4 Leadership, power and authority
Extending the set of normative expectations about roles to include 
those specified by the FRC, another role which governing body members 
might perhaps have identified with was leadership. This was, though, not the 
case (see sub-section 6.8.3), and the concept of leadership by the governing 
body hardly arose. There was no indication that this was because it was such 
a deeply engrained activity that it was taken for granted. Taken at face value, 
this is not surprising, as the idea that higher education governing bodies might 
have a leadership role does not feature amongst the standard roles specified 
by the CUC or HEFCE (although it has very recently been introduced into the 
guidance on effectiveness developed by the Leadership Foundation for 
Higher Education (LFHE; Schofield, 2009)). However, since it is a specified 
board role in the governance guidance for the private sector, from which the 
majority of the external members of higher education governing bodies are 
drawn, the concept would be familiar, and leadership might have been 
expected to be seen as a governing body role; it might perhaps also have 
been thought to be implicit, given the reference to leadership in the title of the 
LFHE.
The attitudes displayed by governing body members towards 
leadership, and the association of leadership with the executive, rather than 
governing body, touches also, of course, on the question of governing bodies’ 
power and authority in universities. It was noted in chapter 2 (see section 
2.10 and sub-section 2.12.1) that the extent of governing bodies’ power and 
authority has varied over time, and that by the 1960s there was a strong
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current of opinion that stressed the desirability of academic supremacy in 
governance. Although governing bodies have subsequently regained much of 
their power and authority relative, for example, to senates and academic 
boards in institutions, the findings from this study do not suggest that their 
control of their institutions is absolute and untrammelled. Instead, and 
notwithstanding the statement in HEFCE’s Financial Memorandum that
the governing body ... has ultimate non-delegable responsibility for
overseeing the institution’s activities (HEFCE, 2010a, 7)
the reality is nuanced, with governing bodies’ ultimate authority recognised in 
principle all institutions, but with it very rarely being exercised, and overt 
power and authority being ceded for much of the time, in addition to 
leadership, to the Vice-Chancellor and the executive.
9.2.5 The selection of new governing body members
The final section of table 9.1 (p 363) noted the expectations in private 
sector guidance that the board has a role in ensuring that members have 
appropriate skills, experience and knowledge. In the CUC/HEFCE guidance 
this role is associated with nominations committees, rather than with the 
governing body itself. People interviewed in the study recognised the 
importance of governing body members having a wide range of skills and 
experience, but gave no indication that the formal responsibility for this lay 
with governing bodies themselves. In this respect it appears that governing 
body members conform to the expectations of the CUC/HEFCE guidance and 
are content to leave oversight of the processes for selecting new members, 
and for ensuring that they have appropriately varied backgrounds, to
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nominations committees, guided by chairs, Vice-Chancellors and governing 
body secretaries.
9.2.6 The relative importance of different governing body roles
The order in which governing body roles were set out in section 9.2.1 
was not intended to reflect the relative degree of importance attached to them 
by governing body members. While challenging the executive was often the 
first role discussed by governing body members, for many people supporting 
the executive was at least as important. This seemed to be part of a 
widespread desire by governing body members to accentuate the positive 
nature of the role of the governing body. This perception was perhaps most 
clearly expressed when governing body members were speaking of the ways 
in which they contributed individually to the work of the governing body. They 
gave the strong impression that what they found most satisfying was doing 
things that they felt were positive, and helpful because of that to the governing 
body and the institution.
In the case of the other roles set out above, perceptions as to their 
importance varied from person to person and, to some extent from institution 
to institution. For example, some institutions, such as UniCollege or NewMill 
university, took more overt steps as organisations to encourage, or facilitate, 
governing body members in carrying out a linking or ambassadorial role. With 
regard to the governing body’s role in relation to strategy, this was clearly 
seen as significant, notwithstanding the variations in the degree to which the
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governing body was perceived to take a leading, collaborative or secondary 
role.
Although, as was shown in chapter 5 (see sub-section 5.2.2 and Table
5.1, p 184), there was overall a strong degree of commonality across all 
institutions as to which governing body roles were seen as significant, some 
differences were also apparent. Thus, for instance, being both challenging 
and supportive were on the whole the roles most strongly recognised and 
most frequently discussed across all the institutions. However, in contrast, 
offering advice and guidance, and linking the institution to the outside world 
were generally less prominent in members’ and attendees’ discussion of 
governing body roles. These differences should perhaps not be seen as 
surprising given the combination of strong normative expectations that 
privilege the control and monitoring roles in governance, but the clear desire 
expressed by respondents in this study (and in other research) to be seen to 
be supportive as well as challenging. In this context providing advice and 
guidance and linking institutions to the outside world might well be expected to 
be seen in some sense as secondary roles, but nonetheless important and 
distinct.
Differences in the prominence of particular roles were also identifiable 
on an institution to institution basis in a small number of cases. For example, 
the advice and guidance role seemed to be perceived as less significant than 
most other roles, and less significant than in other institutions, at ExCAT and 
TownMod universities; similarly, the role of helping to link the institution to the
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outside world was less prominent at Civic and Greenfield universities than 
other governing body roles, and less prominent than it was at other institutions 
(see Table 5.1, p 184). Hypotheses as to why such differences might exist 
include the possibility that Civic and Greenfield universities, as the two 
institutions that by most measures had the highest academic status amongst 
those in the study, may therefore have felt the most confident about their 
place in the world, and less inclined to give priority to the role of governing 
body members in helping them in their links to the outside world. However, as 
also noted in chapter 5 (see again sub-section 5.2.2), differences of the kind 
highlighted here need to be treated with caution, bearing in mind the 
variations in the numbers and types of governing body members and 
attendees interviewed at each institution.
9.2.7 Individual members’ perceptions of their own contributions
In discussing how they felt able to contribute personally to the work of 
the governing body, most people tended to give examples of how their actions 
related to the principal roles of the governing body as a whole. External 
members therefore spoke of being supportive when deploying their expertise 
on an institution’s behalf (see section 6.3). External members also saw 
themselves, and were seen by others, as making contributions through linking 
their institutions with individuals or groups outwith the institution, either to 
draw on additional expertise or in a lobbying capacity, and through more 
generic ambassadorial activities (see, for example, sub-sections 6.5.2 and
6.5.3). Evidence for external members of governing bodies or the non­
executive members of boards acting in these ways can be found in other
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studies (see sections 7.3.and 7.4). These roles have, however, markedly less 
prominence in other research than, say, the mainstream normative roles of 
challenging the executive and contributing to institutional strategy. This may 
be partly due to these roles being subsumed within more general conceptions 
of governing bodies having a supportive role, despite the clear distinction 
apparent in the perceptions expressed by governing body members and 
attendees in this study between being generally supportive, and providing 
more specific advice and guidance.
9.2.8 Attitudes to educational character and academic activities
One of the strongest conclusions that can be drawn from this study is 
that most governing body members and attendees do not perceive it as being 
the role of governing bodies to engage in any detail with the educational 
character and the academic activities of their institutions. This view was 
widely and clearly expressed by both external and internal members. There 
was nonetheless recognition and acceptance of the fact that governing bodies 
held the ultimate overall responsibility in these areas (see section 6.7). This 
might on the face of it seem paradoxical, but having ultimate responsibility for 
an activity, but not having management or operational control over it, is of 
course intrinsic to governance. The issue in this case is whether it is 
appropriate or reasonable for a governing body to delegate its task of 
oversight so completely as appears to be the case with regard to educational 
character and academic activities.
Although some external members showed signs of feeling that other
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aspects of governing bodies’ roles needed to have a higher priority than 
oversight of educational character and academic activities, and that it was in 
these other areas that they could best contribute, the principal basis for 
governing bodies distancing themselves from engagement with these issues 
seems largely to be due to a combination of respect for the expertise of 
academic staff, and concern that external members lack the necessary 
knowledge to undertake a greater role (see sub-section 6.7.2). It is notable 
that this view was expressed not only by internal members and executive 
attendees but also by the external members themselves. Given these 
perceptions, it is also notable that while there were very few external 
members on the governing bodies studied here who had direct experience of 
higher education (other than as a student, usually many years previously), 
most respondents did not see the recruitment of more externals with relevant 
experience of higher education as desirable, or even likely to be beneficial 
(see sub-sections 6.4.6 and 6.47).
External members’ respect for academic staff seemed most marked in 
the chartered institutions, which are those generally accepted as having the 
highest status, particularly in relation to their research activities. Respect for 
the professional expertise of academic staff and the specialised nature of their 
knowledge extended, however, across all the institutions, and was also seen 
by internal members and attendees as the basis for external members having 
a limited role in relation to academic activities, as demonstrated by the 
comment by the Vice-Chancellor at TownMod university that he would ‘resign 
instantly’ if the board was to ‘interfere with the operation of senate’ (see sub-
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section 6 .7 .4).
The last comment points towards another reason for the attitudes of 
governing body members, which is the acceptance as a norm of the idea that 
issues associated with educational character and academic activities are 
properly the preserve of the academics, and therefore of senates and 
academic boards. It was shown in chapter 2 that the spread of ideas about 
academic freedom and autonomy, derived ultimately from the Oxbridge model 
of academic self-government, had become so established by the 1960s that 
they had a significant influence on the tenor of university governance 
arrangements, with the presumption being very firmly that oversight of 
academic issues should be left clearly in the hands of the academics 
themselves. The governance pendulum, in terms of the weight of overall 
power and authority, began to swing back towards governing bodies from the 
1970s onwards, influenced by the tenets of new public management in the 
context of reductions in funding. However, the norm of self-governance by 
academics in relation to academic activities was by then so strongly 
established that it has continued to determine what is seen as the proper 
approach to such activities by governing bodies to the present day. In 
addition, the norm established in the traditional, chartered universities, also 
came to strongly influence the attitudes of governing bodies in the 
incorporated institutions that became universities in 1992. For the latter, 
many of which had aspired to university status for a number of years, it 
became possible to take on attributes associated with the long established 
universities, and in doing so to legitimise and emphasise their new status.
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An explanation for the strength of the acceptance by governing bodies 
of the primacy of academic staff in relation to educational character and the 
oversight of academic activities can be found in institutional theory (see 
section 3.4). Through the assimilation of common values, norms and attitudes 
and the acceptance of ‘myths’ about their institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), similar approaches come to be adopted 
towards things such as educational character and the oversight of academic 
activities. The plausibility of this explanation for the attitude of governing 
bodies towards their responsibilities in these areas is enhanced by the 
evidence (see again sub-sections 6.4.6 and 6.4.7) that few governing body 
members saw the small number of external members on governing bodies 
with higher education experience as a problem. It is reinforced by the fact that 
increasing governing bodies’ collective expertise in this regard was more often 
seen as likely to be problematic rather than beneficial. The issue was 
unrecognised, and potential problems were privileged over potential benefits, 
because there was an existing approach that was understood and accepted 
as the norm.
In so far as there was any variation in the views of governing body 
members towards educational character and the oversight of academic 
activities, some sign of differentiation was apparent between NewMill 
university and UniCollege, and the other five case study institutions. NewMill 
had been a university college until relatively recently and its governing body 
members gave a much stronger impression of interest in their university’s 
academic affairs than did the governing body members of the other
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universities involved in the study. This appeared to be in large part because 
some of the interviewees had been at NewMill as it went through the process 
of gaining its own degree-awarding powers and, eventually, university status, 
and this had prompted their closer engagement with academic issues. It is, I 
suggest, significant that NewMill was also the institution where governing 
body members saw themselves as taking the leading role in developing 
institutional strategy (see sub-section 9.2.2 above).
At UniCollege governing body members also saw the need to engage 
with academic matters more directly as they also pursued a policy trajectory 
intended to lead to university status. Their status as a university college, 
rather than a fully-fledged university, undoubtedly informed in addition the 
recruitment to the governing body of a high proportion of external members 
with education and higher education backgrounds, which seems likely in turn 
to have meant that the governing body as a whole was more inclined (and felt 
fitted) to pay direct attention to educational character and academic activities. 
The example of the attitudes of both NewMill and UniCollege governing body 
members towards educational character and oversight of academic activities 
reinforces the contention that institutional history and context can have a 
significant influence of perceptions of governing body roles.
9.2.9 The appearance of paradox
In considering governing body members’ attitudes to the differing 
governing body roles, some potential paradoxes can be recognised. For 
example, if a significant governing body role is to support the executive, is it
378
reasonable to expect governing bodies to be able at the same time to 
challenge the executive to a sufficient extent, or with sufficient rigour? Or in 
the case of the attitudes displayed towards educational character and 
academic activities, can governing bodies meaningfully take ultimate 
responsibility in these areas, whilst at the same time not engaging with them? 
And if some of the governing body roles specified by the CUC and HEFCE are 
hardly mentioned by governing body members, even if they are being carried 
out, are they less important than other governing body roles due to their 
hardly being mentioned?
None of these potential paradoxes appear, however, to cause any 
concern to the great majority of the governing body members and attendees 
interviewed. So while it is fair to say that some respondents expressed 
doubts about the extent or seriousness of the challenge governing bodies 
could pose in practice to institutions’ executives (see sub-sections 6.2.4 and
6.2.5), most people saw no contradiction in being both supportive and 
challenging at the same time. Thus, while there may be a surface paradox, it 
is either not perceived as such by governing body members, or the existence 
of paradox is not perceived as a problem. Instead, governing body members 
appear by and large capable of operating with sufficient understanding of 
nuance and complexity as to allow them to be by turns both straightforwardly 
supportive and supportive through the very act of providing appropriate 
challenge when necessary. Indeed, it seems likely that in many instances 
challenge or criticism is more likely to be accepted, and acted upon, in a 
context that is generally perceived as constructive and supportive.
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This finding is similar to that in studies of the private sector in the UK by
Roberts et al (2005), to the effect that:
Non-executives can both support the executives in their leadership of 
the business and monitor and control executive conduct (Roberts et al, 
2005, S6; see sub-section 3.6.1 above)
It can also be related to the conclusion reached by Stiles and Taylor (2001)
that, provided boards ensure that a ‘threshold level of monitoring’ occurs,
thereafter the approach taken can be co-operative and based on mutual trust
(see sub-section 3.7.3). Cornforth’s discussion of paradoxes in governance in
the public sector (Cornforth, 2003a, 2003b; sub-section 3.8.1) adds further
weight to the idea that approaches to governance that embody paradox can
be negotiated and can ultimately be beneficial.
9.2.10 Overall conclusions with regard to governing body roles
The evidence from this study demonstrates that governing body 
members do not in practice privilege the roles expected of their governing 
bodies by external agencies. Instead, they perceive a number of alternative 
roles to be important, including the three inter-related and positive roles of 
providing support, advice and guidance, and links to the outside world. Even 
where there is a direct overlap between normative expectations and perceived 
governing body roles, as in the case of involvement by the governing body in 
institutional strategy, governing body members’ perceptions of their 
experience is couched in terms that differ from those used in official guidance, 
with most involvement in strategy being contributory, rather than directive. 
Notwithstanding differences of emphasis or scope in other research on 
governance, the conclusions set out here are reinforced by the findings of a
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number of other studies, particularly with regard to the multi-faceted nature of 
perceptions of governance, and the capacity of governing body members to 
accommodate apparently contradictory roles such as providing both challenge 
and support (as demonstrated, for example, by Cornforth, 2003a, 2003b; 
Cornforth and Edwards, 1999; Roberts etal, 2005; Schofield, 2009; Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001; see chapters 3 and 6). All of this suggests that the lived 
experience of governing body roles, as perceived by governing body 
members, is both more nuanced, and more active, than that assumed by 
normative role specifications.
9.3 Perceptions of effectiveness
9.3.1 What is effectiveness?
The second principal aim of this study was to explore perceptions of 
effectiveness in governance. This was discussed in chapter 8, where it was 
shown that effectiveness was often seen as a difficult concept to address (see 
sub-section 8.2.1). This reaction was perhaps part of the explanation for the 
fact that the range of views as to what constituted effectiveness was very 
broad (see section 5.3, and particularly Tables 5.3 to 5.6, pp 194 to 197, and, 
for more detailed discussion, sub-sections 8.3.4 and 8.4.5), and that a number 
of people expressed caveats about some of the suggested indicators of 
effectiveness, or about the extent to which governing bodies could actually be 
effective in practice (see sub-sections 8.3.2, 8.3.3 and 8.4.1). Nonetheless, 
despite the caveats expressed, the association of effectiveness with a wide
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range of factors is paralleled in other studies of governance in both the private 
and public sectors (e.g., Ashburner, 1997; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Roberts 
et al, 2005; see sections 3.6 and 8.6). It is also matched in terms of diversity 
and complexity in the conclusions reached by Schofield (2009) in his study of 
higher education governance, as shown by the extent and variety of his 
enablers and outcomes of effective governance (see sub-sections 3.6.3 and
8.6.3).
However, in the study undertaken by Berezi (2008), his findings 
differed from mine, in that they suggested that governing body members’ 
conceptions of effectiveness were much narrower than I have found to be the 
case. Berezi suggested that governing body members perceived 
effectiveness to be associated with the application of their knowledge, skills 
and expertise; with induction and development; with compliance with 
governance codes and legal frameworks; and with the achievement of the 
strategic objectives of the university (see sub-section 3.6.3). Of Berezi’s four 
‘determinants of effectiveness’, the first and fourth are paralleled in my 
findings, but the respondents in this study did not associate effectiveness with 
induction and development, or see compliance with governance codes, etc, as 
an important factor in being effective. Although Berezi’s conclusions may 
accurately reflect the perceptions of the governing body members interviewed 
in his study, I find their narrowness unpersuasive. My own findings in this 
regard are also, I believe, much closer to those in a number of other studies, 
such as those by Stiles and Taylor (2001) or Roberts et al (2005) (see sub­
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sections 3.6.1 and 8.6.1), and I feel confident that they accurately reflect the 
perceptions of the people interviewed in this study.
Whatever factors are involved in achieving or demonstrating 
effectiveness, there is a separate question as to whether governing bodies 
and boards are actually effective or not. The material reviewed in section 3.6 
highlighted a number of instances in both the private and public sectors where 
boards and governing bodies were seen as ineffective, or at least only 
partially effective, including recent studies such as that by Storey et al (2010) 
of the NHS. However, other studies, particularly perhaps that of Stiles and 
Taylor (2001), suggest that boards and governing bodies can be effective. In 
relation to the higher education sector, Berezi (2008) concluded that most 
members of the governing bodies he studied regarded those governing 
bodies as effective. His conclusion was in line with the findings from the 
Office of Public Management (OPM) questionnaire survey concerning 
effectiveness in higher education governance reported by Schofield (2009; 
see sub-section 3.6.3).
It was undoubtedly the case that the great majority of governing body 
members interviewed in this study felt that their governing bodies were 
effective. This may simply have reflected people’s reluctance to describe their 
own governing bodies as ineffective, and the views expressed by interviewees 
in Berezi’s study and the respondents to the OPM survey may have been 
equally self-serving. However, a variety of the respondents in this study 
appeared to be capable of expressing apparently frank and negative views
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about their governing bodies from time to time, so perhaps one does not need 
to dismiss entirely the perception most people had that their governing bodies 
were operating effectively.
9.3.2 Measuring effectiveness
The issue of what constitutes effectiveness in higher education 
governance means that the question of measuring effectiveness arises. It 
was clear that in many instances governing body members were content to 
make subjective judgements about effectiveness, based on their own 
experience as a member of the governing body. It was also the case that 
most peoples’ perceptions of how to measure effectiveness came back to 
using institutional success as a proxy for governance effectiveness.
The question of formal effectiveness reviews of governing bodies also 
arose. In line with CUC and HEFCE guidance these are now an accepted 
part of the higher education governance landscape. They might therefore be 
expected to be a prime source of evidence for effectiveness cited by 
governing body members. In practice this was not the case, although such 
reviews were regularly undertaken at all the institutions involved in the study 
(and were in train at two of them when interviews were carried out). Where 
reference was made to effectiveness reviews, their primary focus was 
process-related. Governing body members seemed to regard them as 
helpful, but did not give the impression that they were actually critical in 
determining whether governing bodies were being effective or not. In his 
comments on governing body effectiveness, Berezi (2008; see sub-section
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3.6.3) suggested that carrying out such reviews was seen by governing body 
members as a sign of the seriousness with which the issue of effectiveness 
was addressed. However, he also seemed personally to perceive the 
processes used to be potentially biased and lacking in rigour, because 
external assessors were not routinely used and there was no formal appraisal 
of individual governing body members. These concerns find no echo in my 
own study.
9.3.3 Averting crises
Just before the fieldwork for this study was undertaken the governance 
problems faced by London Metropolitan University had occurred, and a 
number of other institutions were also reported as having had governance- 
related difficulties (see sub-sections 2.11.4 and 8.5.4). This prompted me to 
ask governing body members about their perception of governing bodies’ 
capacity to spot crises, as an ultimate test of effectiveness. It transpired that 
the London Met issue was on the minds of a number of the people 
interviewed. For some external members the main problem was around 
information flow, and taking responsibility for understanding what information 
was needed, and seeking it if it was not being supplied. For others, the 
London Met case highlighted the desirability of having external members with 
higher education management backgrounds, although this was not a 
widespread response. There was also recognition that governing bodies were 
ultimately reliant on Vice-Chancellors and other executives to provide 
appropriate and sufficiently complete information. Overall, most respondents 
expressed an interesting mixture of confidence that ‘their’ governing body was
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well placed to spot crises, and a somewhat fatalistic acceptance that there 
was always going to be the danger of something totally unanticipated arising.
9.3.4 The importance of structures, processes and procedures
Amongst the factors identified as contributing to effectiveness was 
having the right structure and using the right processes. These points were 
discussed in section 8.4, where it was shown that governing body members 
had a strong perception of the importance of practical matters to effectiveness 
in governance. At the same time, it was accepted that some practical issues 
were always likely to be problematic, such as achieving the right balance 
between having too much or too little information. Ensuring good practice in 
relation to the practical aspects of governance was seen as helpful in 
achieving effectiveness, but not by itself sufficient. These perceptions found a 
strong parallel in a number of other studies of governance, both in the private 
sector (e.g., Higgs, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004) and the public sector 
(e.g., Bennett, 2001; Cornforth, 2003a; Storey etal, 2010).
9.3.5 Conclusions with regard to effectiveness
Overall, it is possible to conclude that effectiveness in governance is a 
concept that is challenging in principle, but one that governing body members 
nonetheless feel able to engage with. It is multi-faceted and complex, and 
encompasses the idea of carrying out recognised governing body roles well, 
and a range of other factors, many of which are associated with the skills and 
behaviours of governing body members; the role of the chair is seen as 
particularly important. Governing body members also regard procedural and
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process issues as having significant impact. Finally, although some people 
expressed concerns about how much influence governing bodies could have, 
and implied that there might therefore ultimately be limits to their 
effectiveness, the majority of governing body members clearly felt their 
governing bodies were effective. These findings are broadly in line with 
those of other recent studies in the private and public sectors, although in the 
case of the research most closely aligned with this study -  that by Berezi 
(2008) -  there are some differences of emphasis, particularly in relation to his 
conclusions that induction and development, and compliance with governance 
codes and legal frameworks were important determinants of effectiveness. In 
this study, these factors did not appear to be perceived as important to 
governing body effectiveness.
9.4 Corporate governance theory
9.4.1 Perspectives on corporate governance theory
The relevance of corporate governance theories to higher education 
was approached in two ways in this research. First, for each of the governing 
body roles identified by the interviewees in the study, the ways in which those 
roles potentially related to roles predicted by or associated with specific 
governance theories were considered (see section 7.8 and sub-section 7.9.2). 
Second, most of the people interviewed were asked explicitly about four 
prominent governance theories (agency, stewardship and stakeholder
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theories and managerial hegemony; see section 5.7) presented to them in a 
matrix at the end of their interviews.
In considering governing bodies’ roles, challenging the executive can 
be associated with the expectations of agency theory (see sub-section 7.8.2). 
However, in the case of supporting the executive (see again sub-section 
7.8.2), this can be equated with aspects of stewardship theory or, if the 
support in question is uncritical and reflective of an attitude of subsidiarity, 
with the tenets of managerial hegemony. In this study, the ways in which 
supporting the executive was discussed strongly suggested that governing 
body members did not see the role as having any negative connotations, so 
one is in the realm of stewardship theory. Stewardship theory, and potentially 
managerial hegemony (but again not in practice in this study), was also 
associated with the advice and guidance role (see sub-section 7.8.3). 
Theoretical positions that could be identified as offering possible explanations 
for other governing body roles include resource dependency theory (in relation 
to providing links between institutions and the outside world; see sub-section
7.8.4), and stewardship theory again (in the governing body’s role in relation 
to institutional strategy; sub-section 7.8.5).
Governing body members’ consideration of the matrix of theoretical 
positions produced clear and strong responses, with the majority of 
respondents at most institutions clearly seeing their governing bodies 
operating in accordance with stewardship and stakeholder perspectives. 
However, it was interesting to note, albeit in the context of a smaller sample of
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interviewees than at the other institutions, the strong association by members 
of TownMod university’s governing body with a managerial hegemony 
perspective. It was even more interesting that this did not seem to be 
perceived as a problem (see sub-section 5.7.2). Finally, the potential 
problems of seeking views through something such as the matrix were 
illustrated by the responses of a small number of interviewees who found the 
approach too simplistic, or too passive, or who felt it omitted perspectives that 
they thought were more important than those presented.
Although only four theoretical perspectives on governance were 
explicitly drawn to the attention of the interviewees, the views subsequently 
expressed by the governing body members and attendees are important, as I 
am not aware of any other study of higher education governance that has 
obtained direct comments from governing body members or attendees on 
specific governance theories. This certainly applies to the studies by Bennett 
(2001), Berezi (2008), Bott (2007), Llewellyn (2007) and Schofield (2009) that 
I have cited on a number of occasions.
9.4.2 Conclusions as to the relevance of governance theory
Consideration of governance theory in other studies of the UK higher 
education sector suggests that the theoretical positions of most relevance are 
those associated with stewardship, stakeholder and managerial hegemony 
theory (see sub-section 3.9.4 and, for example, Berezi, 2008; Llewellyn, 2007; 
Shattock, 2006). The findings in this study emphasise stewardship and 
stakeholder theory in particular, albeit with recognition of the existence of
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managerial hegemony, particularly in one institution. Aspects of agency 
theory, resource dependency theory and legalistic perspectives can also be 
seen in the mix, but not class hegemony theory. Findings from a number of 
other studies in both the private and public sectors (see, for example, sub­
sections 3.7.3, 3.8.1) support the conclusion reached here that boards and 
governing bodies rarely operate only in ways consistent with a single 
theoretical position and that a multi-theoretic approach has far more utility in 
terms of explanatory value.
Turning to two significant points of detail, class hegemony theory is 
referred to in particular by Berezi (2008, 58-59; see sub-section 3.9.4), and 
associated by him with the idea that the external members of university 
governing bodies are self-perpetuating elites recruited from particular groups 
in business, industry and the professions. In this study I have focussed less 
attention on the processes used to recruit external governing body members 
than Berezi, and I regard his conclusions in relation to the potential 
explanatory value of class hegemony theory in connection with these 
processes as plausible. However, while it would probably be fair to 
characterise most of the external members interviewed in this study as being 
drawn from elite groups similar to those characterised by Berezi, there was 
evidence of the existence in most of the institutions studied here (sub-section
6.4.5) of formal and standard processes for the identification of new governing 
body members, including the use of role descriptions and skills matrices. This 
suggests that while there may be some tendency for the recruitment of 
governing body members to operate partly in accordance with the tenets of
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class hegemony theory, in the institutions I have studied it should be offset to 
at least some degree by the adoption of more formal and structured 
recruitment processes.
Another aspect of Berezi’s findings (see again sub-section 3.9.4) was 
his conclusion that the expectations of stakeholder theory were not borne out 
in his research, and that there was instead an ‘accountability deficit’, due to 
the ‘limited representation of stakeholder groups’ (Berezi, 2008, 296). Berezi 
associated this specifically with a lack of representation by academics on 
governing bodies. This conclusion is intrinsically surprising, because 
academics are one of the two groups of stakeholders (the other being 
students) that always have a presence on governing bodies. It is also a 
conclusion that finds no echo in the results of this study, where most 
governing body members saw paying attention to stakeholders as an 
important facet of their governing bodies’ responsibilities.
9.4.3 Shared governance or joint governance
It is also appropriate here to re-visit the concept of ‘shared governance’ 
(see sub-section 3.9.3). This is a collective approach to governance involving 
either governing bodies and academics, or in some conceptions governing 
bodies, management and academics. The most prominent proponent of 
shared governance in the UK, Shattock (2002, 2005) sees it as distinct from 
both the recent ‘corporate-dominated’ approach to governance and previous 
forms of ‘academic-dominated’ governance. The findings of this study do not 
support the notion that governing bodies presently operate on the basis of
391
shared governance in the strict sense intended by Shattock. However, the 
reluctance of governing bodies to involve themselves in matters concerning 
educational character and academic activities, and the strongly positive 
perspective of external governing body members towards academic staff, 
suggests that governing bodies are in practice sharing at least some of their 
responsibilities with academics. The result is not shared governance, per se, 
but might perhaps be characterised as joint governance, where overall legal 
and statutory, strategic, financial and operational governance is reserved 
largely for the governing body and senior management, with some input from 
academics (and sometimes other staff), whilst academic governance is 
reserved for academics and senior management, with some limited input from 
the governing body.
9.5 Perceptions across different institutions and between different 
types of governing body member
9.5.1 More similarities than differences
As noted in chapter 5 (sub-sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3), and in some 
instances above, there were only limited differences in the views of governing 
body roles when considered on an institution by institution basis (see Table
5.1, p 184) or when examined in relation to categories of governing body 
members or attendees (see Table 5.2, p 188). The extent of the commonality 
of perceptions overall led to the decision discussed in chapter 5 (see section
5.4) to focus in the major part of the analysis and discussion in this thesis on
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what Stake (2006) called the quintain, or the totality of the case studies taken 
together. Despite the inevitable variability in the transcribed interview data 
when considered at the level of individual quotations, as set out in chapter 6, I 
remain confident that undertaking a thematic analysis and then interpreting 
the majority of the data at the level of the quintain was the most appropriate 
way forward. This is particularly so when the variation in the numbers and 
categories of interviewee on an institution basis, and the ultimately subjective 
and constructed nature of data, are also taken into account (see sub-section
5.4.1).
9.5.2 Perceptions across institutions
With regard to perceptions of governance roles across institutions, as 
shown in Table 5.1 (p 184) there were only limited variations in those 
perceptions from institution to institution. Challenge and support, and the 
provision of advice and guidance were seen as almost equally important and 
prominent in all the case study institutions, while in the case of acting as link 
to the outside world, this role was again recognised in all institutions, although 
less strongly at ExCAT and TownMod universities than elsewhere. It was also 
apparent that thought was routinely given, particularly by chairs and Vice- 
Chancellors, as to what types of external links would be most helpful, so that 
governing body members with appropriate backgrounds and contacts could 
be recruited. Variations between institutions, in terms of the extent of 
governing body members’ engagement with institutional strategy, or their 
attitudes towards educational character, etc, have already been noted above 
(see sub-sections 9.2.2 and 9.2.8).
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Turning to perceptions of the factors contributing to governing body 
effectiveness, similarities of view were again commoner than differences, as 
illustrated in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 (p 194). It was, however, possible to identify 
some factors as being regarded generally as more important than others -  
such as the capability, and therefore the role, of the chair, the capability of 
governing body members generally, and the importance of the provision of 
appropriate information. Caution is nonetheless needed (see sub-section
5.3.2) because of the sheer variety of views expressed and the nature of the 
groups expressing them.
Three principal conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, although some 
differences can be detected between institutions in perceptions of governing 
body roles, those differences are not very marked - rather, they reflect 
differing degrees of emphasis along a spectrum of widely-shared views. 
Secondly, no strong differences are apparent between the chartered 
institutions taken as a group on the one hand, and the incorporated 
institutions on the other hand. And, thirdly, at the institutional level, 
differences in the perceptions of governing body members towards their roles 
are associated to some extent with the state of development of the institution, 
so that the institution that gained university status most recently, and the 
institution currently working towards that status, were the ones where 
governing body members’ perceptions differed most from the norm.
It might be hypothesised that amongst the underlying reasons for these 
conclusions are factors associated with the creation of a unitary higher
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education system in the 1990s. This led most of the former polytechnics to 
endeavour in various ways to become more like the pre-existing chartered 
universities. When this attitude is combined with the development from the 
mid 1990s onwards of common approaches to governance across the sector, 
based largely on the import of models from an increasingly standardising 
private sector, an outcome that by the late 2000s involved a significant degree 
of commonality in perceptions of governance across institutions is not perhaps 
entirely surprising. As discussed above in relation to attitudes towards 
educational character (sub-section 9.2.8), there seems likely to be significant 
explanatory value in the concepts associated with institutional theory. At the 
same time, in the case of institutions such as NewMill and UniCollege, which 
might be seen as still working their way up the higher education hierarchy, 
their governing bodies might feel imperatives to pay closer attention to, and be 
more interventionist in relation to, aspects of their institutions’ character than 
the governing bodies of other, more established and higher status universities.
9.5.3 The perceptions of different types of governing body members
In most respects, different categories of governing body member and 
attendee (see sub-section 4.3.4 and Table 4.3, p 152) had similar perceptions 
in relation to both the nature of governing body roles and effectiveness in 
governance, as illustrated in Tables 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6 (pp 188, 196 and 197). 
There were, however, some differences of emphasis in the ways different 
types of governing body member perceived the capacity of other types of 
member to contribute to the work of the governing body.
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For example, in the case of external members, they tended to perceive 
the contribution of student members in narrower terms than their own 
contributions. Student members were seen as participating actively only 
when topics arose that clearly and directly related to students as a whole. 
While students were recognised as being full members of their governing 
bodies (and they were rarely if ever excluded from meetings, even when 
confidential or sensitive matters were discussed), there was a strong tendency 
to treat them as though they were representatives, and to look to them to 
express views as to what students at large might think about subjects under 
discussion. In this context, chairs and other externals spoke about drawing 
out students’ views and the importance they attached to hearing those views. 
The students themselves also highlighted the fact that they appreciated both 
that their views were sought, and that attention seemed to be paid to what 
they had to say (see, for example, sub-section 6.4.3). The capacity of 
students to get to grips with the issues addressed by governing bodies was 
mentioned by a small number of external members and executives, and 
students’ capabilities were more often praised than not. Students were also 
generally very positive about the experience of being on governing bodies, 
although some of them commented on the difficulty of developing a complete 
understanding of their roles and contributing as fully as they would wish when 
they were normally only members for a year.
In the case of non-executive staff members, there was some 
difference discernible in both their attitudes, and attitudes towards them, 
between chartered and incorporated institutions. This was almost certainly
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due partly to the fact that there were significantly fewer non-executive staff 
members on the governing bodies of the incorporated institutions, because of 
the parameters specified in their instruments and articles. It also seems likely 
that the more managerial and less collegial traditions of most incorporated 
institutions affected the attitudes of some of the people involved. 
Nonetheless, there was still recognition by external members and executives 
across all institutions of the value of the contributions of non-executive staff 
(see sub-section 6.4.2). To some extent, as with student members, there was 
a sense of the staff being treated de facto as representatives when their views 
were sought by external members. There was also, however, a rather more 
explicit recognition that non-executive staff did not formally have any 
representative role.
In a further variation, it was apparent that external members, including 
chairs, emphasised governing bodies’ roles in providing support to the 
executive somewhat more strongly than did the internal members (including 
Vice-Chancellors) and attendees. In the latter group, it was striking that 
governing body secretaries placed less emphasis than anyone else on the 
importance of governing bodies’ roles generally, particularly those associated 
with challenge, support, advice and guidance from externals and linking to the 
outside world. Given that one of the secretaries went so far as to question 
whether a governing body could change what the university did (see sub­
section 6.2.4), perhaps university secretaries were generally more caught up 
in the complexity and minutiae of board processes, and less able to separate 
outcomes from processes. Alternatively, perhaps other people were more
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inclined, and had a greater personal need, to feel that their actions as 
governing body members and attendees could make a difference. In any 
event, as noted elsewhere, caution is required in discussing potential 
explanations for differing perceptions, partly because of the small numbers of 
respondents involved (only three in the case of governing body secretaries) 
and because of the subjective and constructed nature of peoples’ views (for 
example, perhaps secretaries felt the need to appear to be objective, or 
dispassionate).
Other points can be made about differences between different types of 
governing body member. First, it was noticeable that some non-executive 
staff and student members spoke of ‘them’ when referring to external 
members (see, for example, sub-section 6.2.2). Although only a minority of 
people in these categories used this terminology, it was revealing of an 
attitude suggesting that some internal members and students saw themselves 
as not really being members in the same way as externals. Second, although 
all types of governing body member perceived the roles undertaken by their 
governing bodies as valuable and important, and those governing bodes as 
generally effective, there was somewhat more scepticism amongst non­
executive members than other types of member about the difference 
governing bodies could make to the success or failure of their institutions 
(see, for example, sub-section 6.2.4).
In relation to the perceptions held by different types of governing body 
members, it is therefore possible to conclude that external members are seen
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as first amongst equals. In some institutions this attitude may be reinforced 
by the fact that non-executive internal members are not often eligible to sit on 
most governing body sub-committees. It is also possible to contend, but not 
perhaps to conclude quite so firmly, that internal, non-executive members are, 
as a group, more likely to be sceptical about the extent to which governing 
bodies can make a difference to the success of their institutions. Given that 
many of the expectations about higher education governance derive from the 
private sector, where the only type of non-executive board members are the 
external members, it is perhaps not surprising either that non-executive 
internal and student members are seen, and see themselves, as in effect 
secondary to the external members, or that their views about the utility of 
governance are somewhat less positive than those of external members and 
internal executives.
9.6 Potential limitations of the study
9.6.1 Limitations as to scope
In this study I have considered perceptions of corporate governance in 
the English higher education sector, thereby excluding from the scope of the 
study anything other than passing reference for comparative purposes to the 
governance of higher education elsewhere in the UK. The study is also 
limited by its focus on governance at the institutional level and its 
concentration on the governing bodies of institutions (by way of parallel, for 
recent comments on the narrow focus of work on governance in the non-profit
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and voluntary sectors see Cornforth, 2011). This focus excludes or 
diminishes consideration both of external governance mechanisms and issues 
such as those associated with the role of bodies such as CUC or HEFCE, or 
directly with government (see, for example, Shattock, 2008; Tapper, 2007) 
and other aspects of internal governance, such as the roles of governing body 
sub-committees, or of the academic governance structures, headed by 
senates or academic boards.
9.6.2 Limitations in regard to research methodology and design
There are also potential limitations associated with the choice of 
research methodology and design. In this regard, it is legitimate to consider 
whether the methodology and design selected for this study were appropriate 
to its aims and to the research questions that have been pursued, and to my 
underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions (see section 4.2). As 
the starting point, for the reasons set out in chapter 4 (section 4.2), I believe 
that taking a qualitative approach to my research was appropriate, as was 
initially planning to use a case study design throughout. In this context, 
collecting data primarily by means of semi-structured interviews was 
consistent with my intention to explore individuals’ perceptions of the roles 
and effectiveness of the governing bodies of English higher education 
institutions and a rich data set was obtained.
A particular issue arose, however, in relation to my intention to 
undertake a case study approach overall. I believe I succeeded in taking such 
an approach in relation to the selection of institutions to include in the study
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and with regard to the collection of the principal data through semi-structured 
interviews. Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 4 (see, in particular, sub­
sections 4.2.3 and 4.5.4), during the initial analysis on a case by case basis it 
became apparent that there were considerable similarities in the principal 
themes arising across institutions (see chapter 5 and the discussions in 
section 9.5 above). This led me to adopt what I felt was an appropriately 
amended strategy involving concentration on thematic analysis at the level of 
the quintain -  that is, the case studies taken together and considered as a 
whole. The intention in considering and analysing my interview data on this 
basis was to develop explanations for the views of governing body members 
about the activities they engage in, and the factors that influence their 
capacity to undertake their roles.
Despite what I believe to be the ultimate suitability of the methodology 
and methods I have used, there remain potential limitations associated with 
the use of data based on individuals’ perceptions, and with the size and 
nature of the data sample. To a significant extent these are intrinsic to the 
methods used. So, for example, as illustrated above (sub-section 9.3.1) when 
discussing the fact that most interviewees clearly regarded their governing 
bodies as effective, since this view is based on individual perceptions it is 
feasible that people may have misrepresented their views, or have not been 
open to the possibility of admitting that the activity they are engaged in is 
ineffective. This issue could perhaps be addressed by further research using 
a different approach to attempt to measure in some notionally objective sense 
the effectiveness of each of the governing bodies. What is important here is
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to recognise the subjective nature of perceptions and to read and interpret the 
conclusions of the study in that context.
With regard to the size of the sample, issues associated with this were 
discussed in chapter 4 (see section 4.2). The end result is necessarily a 
compromise associated with the resources available to undertake the study. 
Given the nature of the methodology, a bigger sample would not have made 
the conclusions drawn any more generalisable (see sub-section 4.2.3), 
although data from additional people or additional institutions might have 
revealed new insights.
There may additionally be limitations as to the validity and reliability of 
the conclusions reached. As again discussed in chapter 4 (section 4.7), the 
validity and reliability of the findings needs to be judged in relation to a variety 
of factors. As noted there, internal, external and measurement validity are 
concepts recognised in quantitative research that are sometimes carried over 
into qualitative research but often questioned in this context. I have preferred 
the approach of authors such as Hammersley (1990, 1992), and his focus on 
judging validity and relevance in terms of credibility and plausibility, and 
coherence and consistency. I believe that the range of concepts I have used, 
and the ways I have described and defined governance roles and processes, 
have been consistent, and that I have presented enough primary evidence, in 
the form of quotations from participants, sufficiently coherently, to enable the 
credibility and plausibility of my conclusions to be judged. I have also 
endeavoured to give sufficiently clear details of my methods and of both the
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cases and the individual data sources within cases, to enable the reliability of 
my research to be determined.
9.6.3 Limitations due to practical problems
At a practical level there are potential limitations associated with the 
application of the methods used in the study. For example, as noted in sub­
section 4.3.5, the arrangements to interview the participants in the study from 
UniCollege were such that three of four interviews were shorter than was 
normally the case and it was not possible to address all the topics on the 
interview protocol. The views of the people concerned were therefore less 
fully reflected in the dataset taken as a whole than those of people from other 
institutions. Another practical issue concerns the type of person interviewed 
at each institution (see sub-section 4.3.4, Table 4.1, p 141). In the case of 
NewMill university, all the interviewees were external members of the 
governing body. This means that whereas at all the other institutions the 
interviewees had a variety of relationships to the governing body -  external or 
internal member, attendee, executive -  this was not the case at NewMill. 
Consequently, the overall impression of the perceptions held about 
governance at NewMill may not have reflected as full a range of potential 
perceptions as was obtained from the other institutions.
Other practical problems could be cited. However, the underlying issue 
is whether or not practical problems associated with carrying out the research 
have been recognised sufficiently, and allowed for where necessary. I believe 
this to be the case, but the judgement in this respect, as with regard to the
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other potential sources of limitations set out above, needs to be made by the 
reader.
9.7 Possibilities for further research
9.7.1 Areas of potential interest
It is apparent from reviewing the literature that the internal governance 
of higher education institutions has been even less researched than 
governance at the level of governing bodies. This applies both to the ways in 
which governing body sub-committees contribute to governance overall, and 
to the roles of senates and academic boards, and their sub-structures. In the 
former case, for example, one could pursue the contention of some 
respondents in this study that the ‘real work’ of governance was done in the 
sub-committees; in the latter case, given the willingness of governing bodies 
to leave oversight of educational character and academic activities to 
academics, and indications that there were limited interactions between 
governing bodies and senates/academic boards, there is scope for research 
into academic governance and its influences, if any, on overall governance.
Further research could also be pursued into the extent of the influence 
of Vice-Chancellors and their executive management teams. How, for 
example, do executives and external members interact in governing body sub­
committees, and where does the balance of power lie between external 
members and executives? And in the case of academic governance, do
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senates and academic boards, or their sub-structures, still have meaningful 
roles in relation to anything other than academic quality assurance, or does 
management power predominate? Or in other words, as governing bodies 
cede oversight of educational character and academic activities to academics, 
are they in practice simply ceding that oversight just to the executive and 
other senior managers?
Other areas where additional research could be pursued include:
• studying the nature of diversity in governing body membership. 
The importance of diversity was asserted by a number of 
interviewees, but it was in most cases expressed in terms of 
variety in individuals’ skills and experience; only rarely was 
diversity seen as encompassing factors such as gender, age or 
ethnicity. It would be interesting to explore whether the limited 
nature both of conceptions of diversity and of the diversity in 
practise observed, effectively in passing, in this study, were 
reflected across the sector as a whole, and what implications 
might flow from that outcome;
• more explicit examination of governing body members’ 
perspectives with regard to governance theory. This would 
enable the range of governance theories presented to governing 
body members to be extended, and the contexts in which 
different theories might be applicable to be explored more fully; 
and,
• more detailed study, perhaps making greater use of observation 
of governing body meetings, of the ways in which governing 
body processes and procedures, and the nature of personal 
interactions, have an impact on governing body effectiveness.
More examples could be added to this list, but I suggest that it is clear that
there is significant potential for further research into aspects of higher
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education governance for which the research presented here provides a 
valuable starting point.
9.8 The significance of this research
9.8.1 The potential importance of the focus of this study
The significance of the research reported in this thesis has several 
facets, the first of which lies in the fact that it is a still rare instance of empirical 
research into higher education governance. Very few previous studies have 
gathered empirical data about higher education governance in the UK. 
Indeed, the first extensive study was that of Bargh et al (1996). Since then, 
only one study has been undertaken with similar aims to this study, that of 
Berezi (2008). My findings support those of Berezi in some respects, but 
challenge them in others (see, for example, sub-sections 7.4.2 and 8.6.3) -  for 
example, I find his conclusions in relation to what promotes effectiveness 
surprisingly narrow, particularly with regard to their omission of any reference 
to the influence on effectiveness of governing body processes and 
procedures.
9.8.2 Governing body members’ role perceptions
Further facets of the significance of my research lie in the conclusions 
reached. It was shown above (sub-section 9.2.1 and Table 9.1, p 363) that 
governing body members perceive their governing bodies to have a number of 
distinct roles, but that there is a gap between those perceptions and the roles
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specified by the CUC/HEFCE. It was also clear that while normative roles in 
relation to monitoring and control, and responsibility for institutional strategy, 
were recognised, they were conceived in practice in somewhat different terms 
from those used by the CUC/HEFCE. Finally, while governing body members 
recognised the need for their governing bodies to undertake roles associated 
with meeting legal, statutory and regulatory requirements, and ensuring 
appropriate controls exist to assess and manage risk, which were prominent 
as normative role expectations, they did not see these roles as requiring their 
proactive attention to the same extent as their roles in challenge, support, etc. 
These conclusions regarding the mismatch between perceived and expected 
governing body roles has potential implications for the approach taken 
towards both governance policy and practice across the higher education 
sector. They also suggest that official guidelines would benefit from review 
and revision to better reflect the perceptions of their roles held by governing 
body members.
A further significant conclusion is in relation to the attitude of governing 
body members towards educational character and the oversight of academic 
activities. Despite the recognition of the formal responsibility of governing 
bodies for these central and fundamental aspects of their institutions, in most 
institutions it was felt that academics should take responsibility for these areas 
on governing bodies’ behalf. This is a striking finding that raises fundamental 
questions about the ways in which governing bodies discharge their 
responsibilities, and again suggests that there is a gap between the
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expectations of the sector-wide bodies, particularly the CUC and HEFCE, and 
institutional practice.
9.8.3 The difficulty of grappling with effectiveness
In relation to perceptions of effectiveness, part of the significance of my 
conclusions lies in their confirmation that the issue of what constitutes 
effectiveness is perceived by governing body members to be very complex. 
This finding is consistent with the outcomes of Schofield’s (2009) report into 
the variety and range of factors that contribute to achieving effectiveness in 
higher education governance. It is also significant that the findings of this 
study highlight the importance to perceptions of effectiveness of the 
processes and procedures employed in the practice of governance. As noted 
above (section 9.3), similar conclusions have been reached in studies of 
governance in other sectors. However, while addressing issues such as 
these is necessary in seeking to ensure overall effectiveness, succeeding in 
doing so is not by itself sufficient.
9.8.4 Common perceptions
An additional striking outcome of the research has been the extent to 
which common perceptions about governing body roles and effectiveness in 
higher education governance are held across all the case study institutions 
and by different types of governing body member and attendee, as illustrated 
by the findings set out in Tables 5.1 to 5.6 (pp 184 to 197). This suggests that 
despite the sometimes significant differences in institutional context, or the 
nature and background of governing body members, influences of the kind
408
associated with institutional theory appear to be at work, so that governance 
activity tends to conform to a set of norms. However, this influence does not 
extend so far as to lead governing body members simply to operate solely in 
accordance with the normative expectations set down in codes of practice and 
other formal guidance. Instead, informal influences are perhaps at work, 
influenced by formal expectations, but rooted in the practice rather than the 
theory of governance.
9.8.5 The relevance of governance theory
Turning to the question of governance theory, my research has 
demonstrated that none of the governance theories considered in the study 
can by themselves explain or predict the behaviour of governing bodies and 
their members. However, the strong identification by many governing body 
members of the relevance of the stewardship and stakeholder perspectives 
has reinforced the association of such theories with higher education 
governance in previous studies (see sub-sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6). Taken 
together with the recognition of features associated with other theoretical 
positions, such as agency theory, resource dependency theory and 
managerial hegemony, the findings clearly support a multi-theoretic 
perspective towards governance theory, as proposed in sub-section 7.9.2.
9.8.6 The overall significance of the research
Taken as a whole, this thesis presents original data relevant to an 
under-researched area of study. It provides new evidence of a mismatch 
between the perceptions held by governing body members as to governing
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body roles and the roles governing bodies are expected to play by sector-wide 
bodies such as CUC and HEFCE. There is also clear evidence that most 
governing bodies are ceding their responsibilities in relation to educational 
character and the oversight of academic activities to academic staff to a 
greater extent than might be expected in light of their ultimate accountability in 
these areas. Effectiveness in governance is shown to be a difficult and 
complex subject, where the processes and practices involved in carrying out 
governance roles are seen to be particularly important. Finally, although no 
single governance theory offers explanations for all aspects of the governance 
roles that are perceived to exist, there is explanatory value in a multi-theoretic 
approach, and a strong identification by most governing body members with 
the tenets of stewardship and stakeholder theory.
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Appendix 1 -  Summary details of the case study institutions
1. CityMod university
‘CityMod’ is a large city-based incorporated university. It has several 
campuses, and developed from predecessors founded from the mid­
nineteenth onwards. These merged to form a polytechnic which became a 
university in 1992. CityMod university is a predominantly teaching-focussed, 
but even so its HEFCE grant is only about 40% of its total income. CityMod 
has quite a high proportion of part-time students, at around 30% of the total 
student body.
CityMod’s governance arrangements are typical of an incorporated university. 
It had the smallest governing body amongst the case study institutions. The 
majority of the external members had private sector backgrounds, as did the 
chair. Two external members with public sector backgrounds had extensive 
experience of working in the education sector. The Vice-Chancellor is the 
only member of the university’s executive team who is also a member of 
Board. There are academic and non-academic non-executive staff members 
on the governing body, plus the student union president.
2. Civic university
‘Civic’ university is a large chartered institution with nineteenth century 
origins. It had the highest income amongst the case study institutions, and 
the highest proportion of research income; it also entered staff in the highest 
number of UoAs (40). Civic university is city-based. It has over 20000 
students, with over 80% studying full-time. Roughly 30% of the students are 
postgraduates.
Civic university’s governance arrangements are typical of those of a chartered 
institution. The backgrounds of the external members of its governing body 
were almost equally split between the public and private sectors; the chair’s 
experience lay primarily in the public sector. Two of the external members 
had extensive experience of working elsewhere in the higher education 
sector. The Vice-Chancellor is the only executive member of the governing
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body, although all the senior executives attend all governing body meetings. 
This gave Civic university one of the highest numbers of total people present 
at its governing body meetings. The internal non-executive staff members 
were drawn from only the academic staff and there were two student 
members (the student union president plus one).
3. ExCATuniversity
‘ExCAT’ university is by most measures small to medium-sized. Its origins lie 
in a technical school which became a College of Advanced Technology in the 
1950s, and then a university in the 1960s. ExCAT has between 7500 and 
10000 students, of whom about 20% are from outside the UK.
ExCAT’s governance arrangements are in most respects those of a typical 
chartered university. The governing body was, however, the largest amongst 
the case study institutions. It also had the equal lowest proportion of external 
members. There were more external members with private sector experience 
than public sector experience; the chair’s experience lay primarily in the 
private sector. Two of the external members had extensive experience of 
working in the education sector. ExCAT university was atypical in that other 
members of its executive group were members of the governing body in 
addition to the Vice-Chancellor. There were few non-executive internal 
members, drawn only from academic staff. There were two student members 
(the student union president plus one).
4. Greenfield University
‘Greenfield’ is a medium-sized university founded as part of the 1960s 
expansion on a green field site on the edge of a major town. Greenfield 
university had one of the lowest proportions of income from the HEFCE 
amongst the case study institutions, at around 30%. It has around 10000 
students, of whom over 90% study full-time, with 75% being undergraduates.
Greenfield’s governance provisions are typical of those of a chartered 
university. It has an unusually low proportion of external members - the 
lowest amongst the case study institutions. The backgrounds of the external
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members varied, with an almost equal mixture of public sector and private 
sector experience; the chair’s experience lay primarily in the private sector. 
Two of the external members had extensive experience of the higher 
education sector. The Vice-Chancellor and one other senior executive were 
members of the governing body, although all members of the executive team 
attend all governing body meetings. There is a relatively high proportion of 
internal, non-executive staff members on the governing body, mostly drawn 
from amongst the academic staff, although there is also one member of non- 
academic staff, and one student (the student union president). Amongst the 
case study institutions Greenfield thereby has the highest number, and 
highest proportion, of internal, but non-executive, members of its governing 
body.
5. NewMill university
A small to medium-sized institution that has become a university since the 
turn of the millennium in 2000, ‘NewMill’ university has its origins in a technical 
college and an education college, which merged to form a higher education 
college, and successively a university college and then a university. NewMill 
has around 10000 students, of whom about 90% are undergraduates.
NewMill’s governance arrangements are similar to those of other incorporated 
institutions, although its governing body has an unusually high proportion of 
external members - the highest amongst the case study institutions. The 
external members were equally split in terms of whether their experience lay 
in the public or the private sectors; the chair had experience in both sectors. 
Three of the external members had extensive experience of working in the 
education sector. The Vice-Chancellor is the only member of the university’s 
executive team who is also a member of governing body. The internal 
members of the governing body included academic and non-academic staff 
and one student (the student union president).
6. Town Mod university
‘TownMod’ is large post-1992 university, with two main campuses. It is town- 
based, rather then city-based, hence its designation. Its origins lie in
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nineteenth and twentieth century colleges which merged and then became a 
polytechnic, before gaining university status in 1992. TownMod university 
was the largest of the case study institutions in terms of student numbers. 
Over a third of TownMod’s students study part-time.
TownMod university’s governance arrangements are typical of an 
incorporated institution. The governing body members have a mix of private 
and public sector backgrounds, although there are slighlty more externals with 
private sector experience than public sector experience. The chair’s 
experience lay primarily in the public sector. Three of the external members 
had experience of working elsewhere in the education sector. The Vice- 
Chancellor is the only member of the university’s executive team who is also a 
member of the governing body. The internal members of the governing body 
include both academic and non-academic staff, and one student (the student 
union president).
7. UniCollege
‘UniCollege’ is a relatively small, faith-based, university college, whose 
origins lie in teacher-training. UniCollege expanded its range of subject 
provision and became a university college in the 2000s. It is the smallest of 
the case study institutions in terms of income, and staff and student numbers. 
UniCollege has less than 5000 students, of whom about two-thirds study full­
time. About 90% of UniCollege’s students are undergraduates.
UniCollege’s governance arrangements differ in their details from those of the 
other case study institutions, because of its faith-based background. 
However, its Instrument and Articles of Government are similar to those of 
mainstream incorporated institutions. UniCollege’s governing body has a high 
proportion of external members, many of whom are drawn from the relevant 
faith-based background. With regard to their professional experience, an 
unusually high proportion of the external members have public sector 
backgrounds, with only three of them having private sector experience. The 
chair’s experience lay primarily in the public sector. Four of the external 
members had extensive experience of working in the higher education sector,
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and three others, including the chair, had considerable experience of other 
aspects of education and training. The Principal is the only senior executive 
who is also a member of the governing body. The remaining internal 
members of the governing body are members of academic and non-academic 
staff and one student (who is not automatically the student union president).
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Appendix 2 -  interview protocol
The effectiveness of the governing bodies of UK higher education 
institutions
1. Explain own purposes, etc. See if any immediate queries and address 
if so.
2. Invite interviewee to indicate length of involvement in the governing 
body and (if relevant) s/cttees. Explore how they came to join the GB; 
what led them to be interested; what they get out of it. (?explore, if 
possible/relevant, why they value the role, etc.)
3. Invite comment on interviewee’s perception of the main role(s) of GB. 
Who is GB answerable to?
And what about own role as individual GB member?
4. What about effectiveness? What does interviewee think constitutes 
effectiveness; what is an effective GB? (Introduce issues such as roles 
of Chair and VC, personal interactions, codes of practice, CUC guide, 
Schofield, etc, if not brought up by interviewee. Perhaps also touch on 
role of CUC, HEFCE, LFHE if not brought up by interviewee.)
How confident is interviewee that GB is/would be able to identify critical 
issues in full range of university’s activities?
5. What about relevance of governance arrangements in other sectors? 
E.g. pressure to import models and approaches from corporate world; 
relevance of arrangements in, say, NHS?
6. How does interviewee perceive roles of different categories of GB 
members (e.g. external v staff v student v exec)? What about other 
aspects of uni governance -  e.g. input from senate?
7. Check if any questions, or anything else they wish to say that has not 
been addressed. Introduce governance models if time permits.
DJB, 10.1.10
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Appendix 3 -  consent form
David Buck
Institute of Educational Technology
The Open University
Walton Hall
Milton Keynes
MK7 6AA
d.j.buck@open.ac.uk
<date>
CONSENT FORM
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research project exploring aspects 
of the governance of UK Higher Education Institutions. The study is being 
carried out as part of a programme of doctoral research at the Open 
University. It is being undertaken in accordance with the requirements of the 
University’s ethical guidelines, and taking account of the ethical and other 
relevant guidelines of the Economic and Social Research Council and the 
British Educational Research Association.
To enable the requirements of the ethical guidelines for the conduct of 
research to be met, all participants in the study are requested to complete a 
consent form confirming that they understand the nature of the research 
project, and the ways in which data will be collected, analysed and reported.
I should therefore be grateful if you could complete the Consent Form printed 
on the reverse of this sheet.
If you have any queries please let me know. If you want to talk to someone 
else at the Open University about this research, you can contact Mr William 
Locke (Centre for Higher Education Research and Information, 44 Bedford 
Row, London, WC1R 4LL [w.d.locke@open.ac.uk; 020 74472553] and 
Professor John Richardson (Institute of Educational Technology -  address as 
above [j.t.e.richardson@open.ac.uk; 01908 858014]).
Thank you for your assistance.
David Buck
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Research Project concerning the governance of Higher Education 
Institutions in the United Kingdom
CONSENT FORM
I understand that my participation in this study will involve my being interviewed by 
the researcher about my views of aspects of the governance of Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs) in the United Kingdom. I understand that the interview will either 
be digitally recorded, or that the researcher will write notes summarising the contents 
of the interview. I also understand that a transcription of any recording, and/or copies 
of any notes made, will be provided to me subsequent to the interview, in order that I 
may correct any factual inaccuracies.
I understand that information obtained from the interview will be analysed by the 
researcher in conjunction with information gathered from a number of other people 
associated with a range of UK HEIs.
I understand that participation in the study is entirely voluntary and that I can 
withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason. I note that I can ask 
questions at any time and that I am free to discuss any concerns with the researcher, 
or with the researcher’s supervisors at the Open University, Mr William Locke or 
Professor John Richardson.
I understand that the information I give in the interview will be used anonymously in 
the study and in any future publications, and that every effort will be made to ensure 
that comments cannot be attributed to me personally, nor associated with my 
institution, unless I give my explicit consent for such attribution to be made. I 
understand that if I say something that I do not want to be used in the study I can ask 
for it to be excluded.
I understand that quotations from the interview may be used anonymously in the 
study and in any future publications.
I
___________________________________________ (Print name)
consent to participate in the study being undertaken by David Buck (Institute of 
Educational Technology, Open University) under the supervision of Mr William Locke 
(Centre for Higher Education Research and Information, 44 Bedford Row, London, 
W C 1R  4LL [w.d.locke@ open.ac.uk; 020 74472553] and Professor John Richardson 
(Institute of Educational Technology, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton 
Keynes, MK7 6AA [j.t.e.richardson@open.ac.uk; 01908 858014])
Signed:
Email or postal address:
Date:
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Appendix 4 -  copy of letter confirming ethical approval
From John Oates
Chair, The Open University Human Participants and 
Materials Research Ethics Committee 
Research School
Email j.m.oates@open.ac.uk
Extension 52395
To David Buck, research student in CREET/IET.
Subject The effectiveness of governing bodies in UK Higher 
Education Institutions
Ref HPMEC/2009/#554/1
Date 15 April 2009
This memorandum is to confirm that the research protocol for the above-named 
research project, as submitted on 24th March 2009, is approved by the Open 
University Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee, subject to 
satisfactory responses to the following:
You are asked to:
1. include your telephone number with your other contact details;
2. include the right to destruction of participant data on request up to a defined 
date such as the date of data aggregation;
3. amend the reference to confidentiality of all data to clarify the confidentiality 
of personal identity and the anonymisation of other data.
At the conclusion of your project, by the date that you stated in your application, the 
Committee would like to receive a summary report on the progress o f this project, any 
ethical issues that have arisen and how they have been dealt with.
John Oates 
Chair, OU HPMEC
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Appendix 5 -  example of letter sent to governing body members
<Date>
Dear Governing Body Member
Research into aspects of the governance of 
Higher Education Institutions in the United Kingdom
I am writing to you about research that I am undertaking into aspects of the 
governance of Higher Education Institutions in the UK. The <chair of the governing 
body>, <name>, has kindly agreed that I might approach governing body members at 
institution name> in connection with this research, and the <University Secretary> 
has very helpfully asked his colleague, <name>, to assist me in contacting you.
The principal aim of my research is to explore the perceptions governing body 
members have of their roles in contributing to the work of the governing body, and of 
the role(s) of the governing body as a body in relation to the wider university. Within 
these broader contexts, I am also interested in exploring views as to what constitutes 
effectiveness in university governance, and the extent to which governing body 
members feel they are able to contribute in that capacity to the success of the 
university.
I am seeking to collect data for my study primarily through interviewing members of 
the governing bodies of universities, including <name of institution^ and I hope that 
you may feel able to agree to take part in one of those interviews. I expect each 
interview to take about an hour, or just over. Subject of course to the permission of 
each interviewee, I plan to record the interviews. I would hope to schedule the 
interviews in such a way as to minimise any inconvenience and in this regard I 
should be happy to conduct interviews somewhere other than the university if that 
might be helpful.
By way of background, I should mention that the study I am engaged in forms part of 
research towards the degree of PhD in the Institute of Educational Technology and 
the Centre for Research in Education and Educational Technology at the Open 
University. Before embarking on this research, I spent some twenty years working in 
university administration and management at the universities of Cambridge, Warwick, 
Newcastle and, most recently, Cranfield. At Cranfield I was the University’s 
Academic Registrar and Secretary. I was therefore secretary to Cranfield’s 
governing body, and it is from having held this role that much of my interest in 
governance stems.
I should also add that my work is funded by the Open University, but has not been 
commissioned by any organisation. In addition, all the information I obtain directly 
from individuals interviewed as part of the study will be treated as strictly confidential. 
In analysing and reporting my conclusions, I shall ensure, as far as possible, the 
anonymity both of the institutions that I have included in the study and of any 
individuals that I interview.
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I would of course be happy to provide further details of my research if you might find that 
helpful. In addition, if you want to talk to someone else about my research, you can 
contact either or both of my Open University supervisors, Mr William Locke and Professor 
John Richardson. William is based at the OU’s Centre for Higher Education Research 
and Information (44 Bedford Row, London, WC1R 4LL; w.d.locke@open.ac.uk; 020 
74472553) and John is, like me, at the Institute of Educational Technology (mailing 
address as above; j.t.e.richardson@open.ac.uk; 01908 858014).
I hope, however, that in the light of the information I have provided here you will feel 
able to agree to take part in an interview. If so, perhaps you would be kind enough to 
let <name> know, so that s/he might then liaise with you to find a convenient time 
and date.
Yours sincerely
444
Appendix 6 -  Summary details of the arrangements associated with the 
observation of two governing body meetings at Civic university
There were 28 people at each of the two meetings observed (excluding the 
researcher as an observer), comprising 18 members and 10 attendees at the first 
(spring) meeting and 16 members plus 12 attendees at the second (summer) 
meeting. There were 26 items on the agenda for the spring meeting, of which four 
were classed as not for discussion. The equivalent figures for the summer meeting 
were 29 items, with 11 not for discussion. Each meeting lasted for around three 
hours, which was apparently the typical length of time for meetings of this governing 
body.
The physical setting for the meetings was a room arranged boardroom style which 
accommodated a table only just big enough for the number of people present (i.e. its 
capacity was around 30, or just over). The room was the one routinely used for 
governing body meetings. The chair, the Vice-Chancellor, the registrar (who was 
also the governing body secretary) and a minute secretary sat together at one end of 
the room. There was no seating plan for the other members and attendees, although 
there appeared to be a tendency for members of the executive in attendance to sit 
near to one another if there was space for them to do so. The two student members 
mentioned to me that they always tried to sit together, for mutual support and so that 
they could quietly consult one another during the meeting if necessary.
Although present only as an observer, I was seated at the main table. I was explicitly 
welcomed at the start of each meeting, and at the start of the spring meeting I was 
invited to provide some information about my research and hence my presence. I 
had by then already interviewed some of the governing body members and I had in 
addition previously met three of the executive attendees (in my former professional 
capacity). Over the course of the two meetings observed, I formed the view that my 
presence had no obvious affect on the behaviour of the governing body members 
and attendees. This perception appeared to be shared by at least some of the other 
people present, because of comments received in passing after the meetings (from 
people I had already interviewed) to the effect that I should now be able to see what 
they had meant when they had described some aspect of the governing body’s 
activities during our previous conversation. In addition, similar remarks were made
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during all four of the interviews undertaken the day after the spring meeting, when 
people said things such as:
‘W e saw some interesting little vignettes into that yesterday.’ (Civic 7, 
executive attendee; speaking about his perception that the chair tended 
occasionally to display an urge to manage rather than govern.)
‘Everyone was really friendly and I think, like you saw yesterday, it’s quite 
jovial sometimes.’ (Civic 8, internal, student; describing her experience of 
joining the governing body.)
‘You saw that yesterday.’ (Civic 9, external, chair; talking about the 
importance of constantly improving and moving forward.)
‘Yesterday was a fairly good example of that’ (Civic 10, internal, non­
executive; referring to what he felt was the excessive quantity of ‘rather 
tedious, quite technical, sort of business’.)
Overall, therefore, although I recognise that the behaviour of some individuals may 
nonetheless have been altered by my presence, I felt confident that any such 
changes were limited and that the meetings I observed were typical of normal, 
unobserved meetings, in terms of members’ interactions, behaviours and 
contributions.
Contemporaneous notes were made of each of the meetings observed, and as far as 
possible a record was made of:
who spoke and for approximately how long;
how long individual items took;
what side conversations and other activities took place.
An attempt was also made to judge the extent to which people were actively engaged 
in the meeting by noting whether they appeared to be paying attention to the 
speakers (for example, looking at them as they spoke), as opposed to reading their 
paperwork, or generally gazing around the room. Judging these last matters is 
necessarily a subjective process, but at times I formed quite strong impressions that 
people were engaged, or not, with the subject under discussion and therefore felt it 
appropriate to note the fact.
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